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ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL FORM

CARL SCHMITT
Translated and Annotated by G. L. Ulmen

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INTRODUCTION

G. L. Ulmen

Political theory thrives in times of unrest, such as Germany and Europe experienced between the two world wars when Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) wrote many of his most important works. The dramatic changes and upheavals in both East and West during the closing years of this century, no less tumultuous than those of the interwar years, help explain why Schmitt's works are again becoming relevant.

Schmitt is undeniably the most controversial legal and political theorist of the twentieth century. The reason why has less to do with his ill-fated collaboration with the Nazi regime between 1933 and 1936 than with the fact that many of his positions and concepts continue to challenge established mind-sets and academic sinecures with respect to both past and present political forms and ideological agenda. His critique of the dominant persuasion of Western democracies—liberalism—as well as that of Eastern despotism—communism—set him apart and made him universally problematic.

Like all important political theorists, Schmitt was concerned fundamentally with the nature and meaning of politics, which he came to define in terms of "the political."[1] Widely known, discussed, and debated in Europe,[2] only recently has his thinking been given critical attention in the English-speaking world.[3] Not only have three major books on Schmitt been published in English,[4] but translations of

some of his most important works have appeared and others are in progress.[5] Nevertheless, more justification is needed to explain the reason for a translation of *Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form*, a seemingly obscure essay first published in 1923. If it is nothing more than a religious tract, directed to the debate on "political Catholicism,"[6] what possible interest might it have today? If it is only of interest to Schmitt scholars, only some sort of intellectual curiosity, this would hardly be sufficient cause. What then is its concrete significance?

Roman Catholicism and Political Form presupposes Schmitt's seminal interpretation of the modern age and provides a means of confronting its culmination. In his view, the European sovereign state that originated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and constituted the core of the *ius publicum Europaeum* and a Eurocentric international law began to decline at the end of the nineteenth century. This state was the principal agent of secularization and the supreme accomplishment of occidental rationalism. As long as it possessed the monopoly of politics—as long as there was a clear distinction between state and society—the equation *state* = *politics* expressed a concrete reality. But once state and society began to penetrate each other, which began after 1848 and reached its conclusion in Germany with the democratic revolution of 1918, this equation became "erroneous and deceptive."[7] The question for Schmitt then was not only what "political form" might replace the sovereign state and what kind of *nomos* (order) might be established thereon, but even more how to understand politics in this new historical context.

Schmitt's approach is found in his assertion that "all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts."[8] A Catholic by birth and persuasion, Schmitt found parallels between the Church and the state. Both embodied political ideas that required

political form. The medieval Church was the only institution that ever rivaled the authority of the state, which it actually preceded. However, given that the European sovereign state was in decline and that its form was becoming questionable even as its radius of power was becoming broader, Schmitt would soon assert that the institutional basis of politics had given way to the existential basis of "the political," that is, the friend-enemy grouping. Although the distinction between the institutional and the existential in *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* is still adumbrated along the lines of Catholic theology, the transition is evident—how the concrete ambit of politics gives way to a conceptual argument for the political that speaks directly to present problems and concerns. To apprehend this transition is at once to appreciate the essay's relevance and significance.

THE THEOLOGICAL GROUND OF SECULARIZATION

Roman Catholicism and Political Form is Schmitt's most systematic treatment of the Catholic Church. But it contains neither his first nor his last thoughts on the theological significance and historical place of the Church in European history. In his later works, he elaborated various aspects of the themes introduced in this 1923 essay.[9] In an earlier essay, "The Visibility of the Church," written in 1917, he presented the role of the Church as a worldly institution or, more precisely, a spiritual institution manifest in a mundane "visible" form.[10] Visibility is understood in the sense of concrete manifestation in history, of externalization of the idea, of realization in the public sphere. Since Schmitt characterized his 1917 essay as a "scholastic" consideration and his 1923 essay as "anything but,"[11] they do not consti-

tute a uniform argument.[12] Nevertheless, a comparison and contrast between these two essays is useful not only to understand the development of Schmitt's thinking but also, and more importantly, because his 1923 essay presupposes the theological argument in his 1917 essay. For this reason, it is published as an appendix to this volume.

Whereas *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* takes the Church on its own terms, "The Visibility of the Church" is intent upon revealing the "truth" of Catholic dogma. One strategy is to combat interpretations that reduce this "truth" to subjective experience and human conduct—those systems of thought that reinterpret theology in either Freudian or Marxian terms. Another strategy is to combat the influence of Darwinism and all other such "scientific" arguments against the incarnation of Christ and the institution of the Church. One such argument was that of sociology, which Schmitt had already addressed in 1914.[13] But since "truth" is principally a matter of concern to Christians, Schmitt chastises those Catholics who have abandoned the Church, a fundamentally *public* institution, and are content with their own *private* spirituality. In effect, he upbraids them for succumbing to the unintended consequences of the world created by the Protestant ethic in general and Pietistic asceticism in particular, which was causing them to withdraw into inwardness.[14] This counterargument is even more clearly framed in Schmitt's 1923 essay in response to Max Weber's investigation of the consequences of the Protestant ethic.[15]

Just as Schmitt, in 1914, examined the significance of the individual in relation to the state,[16] so, in 1917, he focused on the distinction between the sociological understanding of individualism[17] and the theological understanding of the individual *vis-à-vis* the community. Both in the sociological and the theological sense, man is a communal being. The community of believing Christians is the body of Christ,

which is why "mediation" is the essence of the Church. Even as "mediation" is the core concept in Schmitt's 1917 essay, "representation" is the core concept in his 1923 essay. Already in the transference of emphasis from "mediation" to "representation," one can see the process of secularization at work in the Church and in Schmitt's thinking.

The brunt of Schmitt's argument is directed against inwardness—against this Protestant impulse that was presumably affecting Catholics as well. Essentially, it is an argument against abandoning the world. Since the Church, as the unseen body of Christ, became visible, "no visible man should leave the visible world to its own devices."[18] This assertion is a justification of the institution of the Church in the world and in history. Schmitt describes the "visible" Church as a collective-singular institution composed of many subsidiary institutions. As such, it presents itself in a hierarchy of mediations consolidated and consecrated as "legal relations."[19] He even speaks of "the limitations of the pneumatic in the juridical," which means that the incarnation belongs "to another reality," that is, to the legality of the visible world. Since "the devil has his own legality," Catholics must guard against mistaking the visible Church for a Church of the visible, that is, a religion of material evidence, which ultimately leads to "the official rejection of the official."[20] The intense and intended irony of this last statement is already a portent of Schmitt's critical distance from the Church, which he would achieve through the writing of his 1923 essay.

POLITICAL THEOLOGY

Roman Catholicism and Political Form is concerned with the *political* consequences of Protestant inwardness and worldly asceticism, for which Schmitt finds an antidote in

the "political idea" of Catholicism. This essay makes the reader privy to his thinking as it emerges from the referential system of the Catholic Church and becomes manifest in the analogical structure of political theology. In fact, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* was written in conjunction with *Political Theology*,[21] which has been described as "a necessary complement to *The Concept of the Political* in explaining Schmitt's understanding of state, sovereignty, and politics."[22] The key to the relation between *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* and *Political Theology* is found in Schmitt's later assertion that political theology as such "is not concerned with any theological dogma but with a scholarly-theoretical and conceptual-historical problem: the structural identity of concepts, of theological and juridical argumentation and cognition"; it "does not proceed in some diffuse metaphysics, but concerns the classical case of a reoccupation with the help of specific concepts developed in the systematic thinking of both the most highly developed and most perfectly formed historical examples of 'occidental rationalism,' namely, the *Catholic Church*, with its completely juridical rationality, and the *state of the ius publicum Europaeum*."[23]

Once the state began to lose its monopoly of politics, Schmitt looked to what he considered the other side of the occidental equation in order to find an answer to the question of the form of the political. He explored the nature of sovereignty in terms of a "sociology of juridical concepts," which presupposes a "radical ideology"—a "radical conceptualization," whereby first an idea or mode of thinking is traced to its roots in metaphysics and theology and then its conceptual structure is compared with the conceptual elaboration of the social structure of a particular epoch. It demonstrates the *structural identity* between "the metaphysical image of the world a particular age creates" and "the form of a political organization."[24] This then is the

analytical frame within which *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* is understood.

If Schmitt's 1917 essay seeks to find a *modus vivendi* between the Catholic layman and the modern world, his 1923 essay seeks to find a *modus vivendi* between the Vatican and the modern, even postmodern world. Both recognize the given antithesis, which is only one of many Schmitt mentions in his elaboration of the *complexio oppositorum* (complex of opposites) he finds characteristic of the "visible" Church. It is also characteristic of his essay, which embraces the Church and the state, the theological and the juridical, papal infallibility and political decision, the pope and Hobbes. Years later, Schmitt provided a commentary on the themes introduced here:

> The most important statement of Thomas Hobbes remains: Jesus is the Christ. Such a statement retains its power even when it is relegated to the margins of an intellectual construct, even when it appears to have been banished to the outer reaches of the conceptual system. This expulsion is analogous to the domestication of Christ undertaken by Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor. Hobbes gave voice to and provided a scientific reason for what the Grand Inquisitor is — to make Christ's impact harmless in the social and political spheres, to dispel the anarchistic nature of Christianity while leaving it a certain legitimating effect, if only in the background; at any rate, not to abandon it. A clever tactician does not abandon anything, unless it is completely useless. This was not yet the case with Christianity. Hence the question: Is Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor closer to the Roman Church or to the sovereign of Thomas Hobbes? Reformation and Counter-

> Reformation point in the same direction. Tell me who is your enemy and I will tell you who you are. Hobbes and the Roman Church: the question of the enemy is our own.[25]

Schmitt had discovered the theologian of the state, whose "mortal God" was transcendent only in a juridical sense. To Schmitt, the self-styled "theologian of jurisprudence,"[26] Hobbes's state was at once a product of the religious civil war between Catholicism and Protestantism[27] as well as the instrument of its detheologization—its neutralization and secularization, which in Schmitt's view spelled a juridification analogous to the institutionalization of Christianity in the Roman Church—the realization of law.[28] Hobbes's significance lay not only in his conception of the state, which marked a "decisive metaphysical step," but also in his discovery of a conceptually systematic and politically consistent alternative to the Catholic Church's monopoly of decision whereby, as Schmitt later would argue, he had "completed" the Reformation.[29] From the standpoint of the Middle Ages, the *ius reformandi* was decisive. From the standpoint of the European sovereign state that had arisen thereby, it was already a right of sovereignty.[30]

Schmitt's definition of sovereignty—"Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception"[31]—reflects Hobbes's distinction of a juridical personalism. The question of "who decides?" is not one of truth but of authority. Personal authority understood in terms of representation is the logical counterpart of the "political idea" of Catholicism. The Church provided Schmitt with the perfect analogy, especially after the First Vatican Council (*Vaticanum*) of 1869–1870 asserted the doctrine of papal infallibility. Here was an authoritative instance at once representative and personalistic:

> The pope is not the Prophet but the Vicar of Christ. Such a ceremonial function precludes all the fanatical excesses of an unbridled prophetism. The fact that the author is made independent of charisma signifies that the priest upholds a position which appears to be completely apart from his concrete personality. . . . In contradistinction to the modern official, his position is not impersonal because his office is part of an unbroken chain linked with the personal mandate and concrete person of Christ.[32]

The ground of decisionism is always a "political idea," be it theological or juridical. There is always the presupposition of an original ideology: "To the political belongs the idea, because there is no politics without authority and no authority without an ethos of belief."[33]

In Schmitt's sequel to *Political Theology*, he tells us that *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* "supports a unique political form of the Roman Church . . . publicly manifest: as aesthetic form in great art, as juridical form in the development of its canonical law, and as the magnificent world-historical form of its power."[34] This "great trinity of form" is equated with the "political form" of Roman Catholicism, which can only have reference to the idea of the political and forms of its representation. It is a unity-in-plurality, which clearly has both a metaphysical structure and a concrete significance. The forms of this unique structure are not universal archetypes or ideal patterns, since Schmitt sees them as guaranteeing all the higher categories of European civilization. With respect to the content of representation, he gives a decisive place to juridical form, which is already an indication that he would soon see not the Roman Church but the model of Roman law and the vocation of jurisprudence as guaranteeing the higher cate-

gories of European civilization.[35] Later, he formulated the matter more clearly: "Form is the essence of law. Is form not the essence of every matter? It is the law itself—its visibility, its externality, its publicity."[36]

The link between representation and personal authority introduces Schmitt's critique of the modern world and its consummate materialism. Already at the time of Karl Marx, said Schmitt, bourgeois society had lost its capacity for representation and succumbed to the fateful dualism whose logical outcome was the class concept of the proletariat. He credits Marx with recognizing that economic thinking inherently rejects every representation, and he criticizes Auguste Comte for attempting to compare "representative" types of bourgeois society with those of the Middle Ages:

> The savant was only representative in the transitional period of the struggle with the Church; the merchant, only as a Puritan individualist. . . . The savant and the merchant have become suppliers or supervisors. The merchant sits in his office; the savant, in his study or laboratory. If they are really modern, both serve a factory; both are anonymous. It is senseless to claim they represent something. They are either private individuals or exponents; not representatives.[37]

Whereas the value of a commodity only reflects the market at any given time, Schmitt argues that the true representative of a "noble value" cannot be without a corresponding value. Again, the formulation is contraposed to the argument in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, which demonstrates the polemical intent of Schmitt's essay. Since what he opposed early in this century is even stronger at its end, and since the relation between economic thinking and political thinking has reached a crisis in the sense of a

turning point, Schmitt's counterargument has become even more to the point.

THE PRIMACY OF THE POLITICAL

Schmitt juxtaposes a juridical interpretation of religion oriented to the political sphere to Weber's sociological interpretation oriented to the economic sphere.[38] But Schmitt's essay is not essentially a critique of Weber's main thesis, which posits a relation between Calvinism and capitalism; rather, it is a metacritical antitype, which presents Weber's treatise with a Catholic complement.[39] Like Weber, Schmitt is fundamentally concerned with the course of modern European culture and civilization. Whereas for Weber this is primarily a question of modern capitalism, for Schmitt it is primarily a question of the modern state. Since, in Schmitt's view, the modern capitalism of Western Europe was aligned with intellectual and other forces of liberal-bourgeois society against the state, his essay is also a critique of the liberal-bourgeois-capitalist age that ultimately achieved a kind of intellectual self-consciousness in Weber's treatise. It is at once an intellectual exercise and a political tract. Some of Schmitt's assertions about Catholicism are stylized to correspond to Weber's assertions about Protestantism, but this does not detract from the seriousness of his intention.

Schmitt's focus is not on an individual ethic but a collective authority, not on private initiative but a public institution, not on a formative spirit but a substantive form, not on an economic correlation but a political manifestation. To Weber's concept of "calling," he opposes the concept of "representation." Whereas the one leads to economic *acquisition*, the other leads to political *decision*. The apposition alone is enough to demonstrate that Schmitt did not follow

his liberal-bourgeois opponent into the economic sphere, onto the economic battlefield, nor did he allow him to choose the weapons of combat. From his starting point in the juridical sphere, he draws his opponent into the political sphere, onto the political battlefield, and there challenges him with weapons of his own choosing. It is no accident that Schmitt found the prototype for his antitype in Weber's writings. In his sequel to *Political Theology*, dedicated to Hans Barion, he observed that this canonist and constitutional jurist had seen "in the *Codex Juris Canonici* an 'already exemplary approach to divine Church law in the inner order of the Church's legal institution,'" and went on to say that it was "sufficient to cite a typical remark of Max Weber, which came to my mind when I mentioned his name in my 1923 essay on Roman Catholicism. Max Weber remembered that the law of the Roman Church had created *'a rational order* like no other holy law,' which even Roman law did not approximate."[40] Even so, canon law did find in Roman law a secular competitor that had achieved a formal perfection and had in the course of history become universal. When Roman law attempted to extend its domination, it met with strong and successful opposition from the economic interests of the bourgeoisie. But its rational traditions lived on in the administration of the Church. Not the least for Weber was that the character of ecclesiastical legislation was influenced by the fact that the Church's functionaries were holders of rationally defined bureaucratic offices. "[T]here arose that unique relationship between sacred and secular law in which canon law became indeed one of the guides for secular law on the road to rationality. The relatively decisive factor was the unique organization of the Catholic Church as a rational institution."[41] By contrast, Schmitt wrote: "The dominant type of economic thinking today can no longer conceive of a politi-

cal idea. The modern state appears to have actually become what Max Weber saw in it: a giant business enterprise."[42]

Even though Schmitt's opponent in *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* is the liberal bourgeois Weber, at least for the purposes of intellectual debate, his main argument is directed at "the economic thinking of our time," that is, the thinking of the liberal bourgeoisie, which he interprets as "the struggle against the political"—the struggle directed "against politicians and jurists." This is clear in his assertion that "the political idea of Catholicism . . . contradicts everything synonymous with objectivity, integrity, and rationality in economic thinking." He affirms that "economic rationalism has accustomed itself to deal only with certain needs, and to acknowledge only those it can 'satisfy,' " but hastens to add that this rationalization of modern economy conforms to an irrational consumption. On the one hand, Schmitt recognizes that economic thinking has its own reason and veracity precisely in its materialism; on the other, he is aware that once it claims to be something more than this, it is obliged to base itself on categories other than production and consumption. His key assertion is that "no great social antithesis can be solved by economics," which is directed against not only Marxist sociologists but also American financiers and industrial technicians, since, as he observed in *Political Theology*, "all unite in the demand that the immaterial domination of politics over the materiality of economic life come to an end."[43] In line with this understanding, he observed at the conclusion of *The Concept of the Political* that the often quoted assertion that today the destiny is not politics but economics is a fantasy: "It would be more exact to say that politics continues to remain the destiny, but what has occurred is that economics has become political and thereby the destiny."[44]

At every stage of Schmitt's way to the conclusion of *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, he is not resolving a

theological dispute but responding to an intellectual challenge epitomized in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Nowhere is this more evident than in his final observations, wherein he takes aim at the difficulties and limits of economic thinking evidenced in liberalism and the Enlightenment. He contrasts the juridical foundation of the Catholic Church on the public sphere with liberalism's foundation on the private sphere, while observing that the "religion of privacy" explains "the sociological development of modern European society." The antithesis to the Protestant ethic is clearly expressed: "The great betrayal laid to the Catholic Church is that it does not conceive Christ as a private person; does not conceive Christianity as a private matter, something wholly and inwardly spiritual, but rather has given it form as a visible institution."[45] But Schmitt well knew that the Protestant ethic had long been replaced by the Enlightenment. Weber had recognized that the religious root of modern economic humanity was dead, and that the concept of "calling" was a "*caput mortuum*" [death's head].[46] He observed at the conclusion of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* that victorious capitalism no longer needed the support of Protestant asceticism because it now rested on mechanical foundations: "The rosy disposition of its jubilant heir, the Enlightenment, appears to be finally fading."[47]

Schmitt responded to Weber's conclusion with one of the most fascinating passages in his essay—his interpretation of Mozart's *The Magic Flute*, universally regarded as a "hymn of the Enlightenment." By stressing particularly the Masonic symbolism, his interpretation reflects the early twentieth-century reinterpretation of Mozart's intention.[48] He clearly equates the Masonic priest with the "priests" of the Enlightenment, suggests that the resolution of the antagonism between the High Priest (Sarastro) and the Queen of the Night is mechanical rather than existential, and sees a

signal of the oncoming (nineteenth) century in an economic interpretation of the Queen's bird-catcher, Papageno, the uncorrupted natural man, who is intent upon and disposed of with the "satisfaction" of his economic needs. But Schmitt goes further and draws a parallel to Shakespeare's *Tempest*. Whereas Prospero is a typical conjurer of esoteric tradition, Caliban embodies "nature without nurture."[49] If one recognizes, says Schmitt, "how Prospero has become a Masonic priest and Caliban a Papageno," then it is clear why there is nothing more horrifying in intellectual history than this beloved Mozart opera.[50] His point is that Freemasonry was the last real European opponent of Catholicism, because it zealously confronted the Church with another idea. As self-assured aristocrats, the philosophers of the eighteenth century represented the idea of humanity, and thereon based their authority and secret societies. He compares this true opponent with the fiction of economic thinking: "In a society that no longer has such courage, there can be no more 'arcana,' no more hierarchy, no more secret diplomacy, in fact, no more politics. To every great politics belongs the 'arcanum.' Everything takes place on stage (before an audience of Papagenos)."[51] Behind the scenes, the domination of "capital" is still no form, even though it can undermine an existing form and make it an empty facade.

Schmitt acknowledges that economic thinking appears to have a peculiar understanding of the right type of secrets, and that therein may lie the possibility of a new politics. But it is not Roman Catholicism which must accommodate itself to economic thinking, but rather economic thinking which must accommodate itself to the political: "An alliance of the Catholic Church with the present form of industrial capitalism is not possible. The alliance of throne and altar will not be followed by an alliance of office and altar, also not of factory and altar."[52] Roman Catholicism cannot

correspond to a "consortium of conflicting interests," but it will continue to accommodate itself to every political order, capitalist or socialist. "If and when economically-based power becomes political, that is, if and when capitalists or workers who have come to power assume political representation with all its responsibilities, the new sovereign authority will then be compelled to recognize situations other than those concerned only with economy and private property."[53] This last statement is a formal assertion of Schmitt's thinking, which both confronts and goes beyond Weber's thinking. It arrives at the political divide at the end of this century with a rudimentary idea in search of a new form.

NOTES

1. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*. Translation, introduction, and notes by George Schwab. With comments on Schmitt's essay by Leo Strauss (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976).

2. Cf. "Kommentiertes Verzeichnis der Schriften von Carl Schmitt," in *Verortung des Politischen: Carl Schmitt in Plettenberg*, compiled by Ingeborg Villinger (Hagen: v.d. Linnepe, 1990), pp. 62–126; Piet Tommissen, "Ergänzungen meines ersten biographischen Beitrags" (1988), in "Schmittiana-II," edited by Piet Tommissen, in *Eclectica* 19, Nos. 79–80 (1990): 148–162; Piet Tommissen, "Bausteine zu einer wissenschaftlichen Biographie (Periode: 1888–1933)," in *Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl Schmitt*, edited by Helmut Quaritsch (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), pp. 71–100; Alain de Benoist and Günter Maschke, "Bibliographie Carl Schmitt," in the special Schmitt issue of *Nouvelle Ecole*, No. 44 (Spring 1987): 67–86; Piet Tommissen, "Zweite Fortsetzungsliste der C.S.-Bibliographie vom

Jahre 1959 (Abgeschlossen am 1. Mai 1978)," in "Miroir de Carl Schmitt," a special issue of *Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto: Revue européenne des sciences sociales* 16, No. 44 (1978): 187–238; Piet Tommissen, "Ergänzungsliste zur Carl-Schmitt-Bibliographie vom Jahre 1959," in *Epirrhosis: Festgabe für Carl Schmitt*, edited by Hans Barion, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Ernst Forsthoff and Werner Weber (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1968), Vol. II, pp. 739–778; Piet Tommissen, "Carl-Schmitt-Bibliographie," in *Festschrift für Carl Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag dargebracht von Freunden und Schulern*, edited by Hans Barion, Ernst Forsthoff and Werner Weber (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1959), pp. 273–330.

3. Cf. George Schwab, "Progress of Schmitt Studies in the English-Speaking World," in *Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl Schmitt*, pp. 447–464; George Schwab, "Carl Schmitt: Through a Glass Darkly," in "Schmittiana-I," edited by Piet Tommissen, in *Eclectica* 17, Nos. 71–72 (1988): 70–87; Joseph W. Bendersky, "Carl Schmitt Confronts the English-Speaking World," in *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 1, No. 2 (1978): 149–154. George Schwab, "Carl Schmitt Hysteria in the US: The Case of Bill Scheuerman," in *Telos*, No. 91 (Spring 1991): 99–107.

4. Paul Edward Gottfried, *Carl Schmitt: Politics and Theory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990); George Schwab, *The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt Between 1921 and 1936*, Second Edition, with a New Introduction (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989); Joseph W. Bendersky, *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

5. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, translated by George Schwab, Second Printing (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988); *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, translated by Ellen Kennedy (Cam-

bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); *Political Romanticism*, translated by Guy Oakes (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986). *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol*, translated by George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996). See my own translations of "The Legal World Revolution," in *Telos*, No. 72 (Summer 1987): 73–89, "The Plight of European Jurisprudence," in *Telos*, No. 83 (Spring 1990): 35–70, and "The Constitutional Theory of Federation," in *Telos*, No. 91 (Spring 1991): 26–56. See also "The Source of the Tragic," translated by David Pan, in *Telos*, No. 72 (Summer 1987): 133–146 and "The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations," translated by Matthias Konzert and John P. McCormick, in *Telos*, No. 96 (Summer 1993): 130–142.

6. When *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* first appeared, it was well received in Catholic and non-Catholic circles in Germany and beyond. Cf. Bendersky, *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich*, pp. 48–52. Not a member of any party, Schmitt exhibited religious sympathies and intellectual concerns were in line with those of the Catholic Center Party. See Helen Lovell Evans, *The German Center Party 1870–1933: A Study in Political Catholicism* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 1981) and Margaret Lavinia Anderson, *Windhorst: A Political Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). Even so, a long review in a democratic journal generally hostile to political Catholicism stated: "This little book contains so many keen observations . . . [that] no one should say a word about the Roman Catholic Church who has not read it." See Friedrich Sternthal, "Über eine Apologie der römischer Kirche," in *Der Neue Merkur*, Vol. 7 (1922–1924), p. 768. Also indicative of Schmitt's independent position within the fabric of political Catholicism in the 1920s was his personal and intellectual association with Carl Muth, the founder and editor of the influential Catholic journal *Hochland*. Schmitt's "little book" also exercised an extraordi-

nary influence on such Catholic intellectuals as the canonist Hans Barion and the journalist Waldemar Gurian.

7. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, p. 22.

8. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, p. 36.

9. Cf. Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum* (1950), Second Edition (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974), pp. 25ff.

10. Carl Schmitt, "Die Sichtbarkeit der Kirche: Eine scholastische Erwagung," in *Summa: Eine Vierteljahresschrift* (1917), pp. 71–79. For further clarification of this essay, see Helmut Quaritsch, *Positionen und Begriffe Carl Schmitts* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1989), pp. 25ff.

11. Schmitt, *Politische Theologie II: Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder Politischen Theologie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970), p. 27.

12. Unfortunately, an argument for their consistency has been made. See the Introduction to the Italian edition of these two essays, in which the 1917 essay appears as a subtitle to the 1923 essay: *Cattolicesimo romano e forma politica: La visibilita della Chiesa. Una riflessione scolastica* (Milan: Guiffre Editore, 1986).

13. Carl Schmitt, *Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen* (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1914), p. 81: "As soon as there is a striving for a realization of ideas, for a visibility and secularization, there appears at the same time (together with the need for a concrete decision which, above all, even at the expense of the ideas, must be determined) a striving for an infallible instance provided by this formulation and determined in the same way. Here also, the Catholic Church and its dogma provide a typical example. Since the idea of a visible Church, constitutionally established by a legal order and thus a *ius divinum* that is no ethic but a true law, prevailed, such concrete formulations serve doubtful cases." The very contraposition of ethic and law immediately suggests that Schmitt has not a theological but a secular

opponent in view and that he is demonstrating the original source of all secularization, meaning that the very process of "political theology" has a theological paradigm in both the incarnation of Christ and the visibility of the Church. Secularization in this context posits the relation between transcendence and immanence, but this is as much a historical-objective as a hermeneutic-subjective process. The fact that the Word is made flesh and the Church is made visible is both hermeneutical and historical—the one presupposes the other—because without a historical Christ and a historical Church there would be no subjective process to be objectively considered. For an interpretation of this process as strictly hermeneutic-subjective, see Michele Nicoletti, "Die Ursprunge von Carl Schmitts 'Politischer Theologie'," in *Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl Schmitt*, edited by Helmut Quaritsch (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), pp. 109–128; and *Trascendenza e potere: La teologia politica di Carl Schmitt* (Brescia: Editrice Morcelliana, 1990).

14. Max Weber focused on the extreme asceticism produced by Pietism in response to bourgeois legality with its excessive individualism. Although ascetic Protestantism was for him only one of the formative elements that shaped modern culture, he insisted that the attendant ethic in its Calvinist form was essential to an understanding of the origin and character of that culture because the rejection of the world inherent in this ethic revealed the preconditions and consequences of a specific type of rationalism that became a dominant force when inner-worldly asceticism fused with the capitalist economic system. With a common source in predestination, "it was almost impossible to draw the line between Pietistic and non-Pietistic Calvinism" (*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958], pp. 128f.) But more to the point, Pietism "wished to make the invisible Church of the elect visible on this earth. Without going so far

as to form a separate sect, its members attempted to live, in this community, a life freed from all the temptations of the world and in all its details dictated by God's will, and thus to be made certain of their own rebirth by external signs manifested in their daily conduct. Thus the *ecclesiola* of the true converts—this was common to all genuinely Pietistic groups—wished, by means of intensified asceticism, to enjoy the blissfulness of community with God in this life" (ibid., p. 130).

15. This argument was carried further by Walter Benjamin; more recently, it has been elaborated in the continuity between Weber and Benjamin and between Benjamin and Schmitt. Exploring "the Baroque ethic and the spirit of fascism," Benjamin extended the exploration of the Protestant ethic "from Protestant or Pietistic inwardness to the inwardness of the Protestantism of the Counter-Reformation, to nineteenth-century French Catholic inwardness, and to the inwardness of Jewish modernity. These forms of inwardness are correlated with the transition from *worldly asceticism to worldly aestheticism* (the Baroque ethic of worldly aestheticism persists from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century), and with the transition from the end of politics in the spirit of capitalism to aestheticized ethics in the spirit of fascism." See Gillian Rose, "Walter Benjamin: Out of the Sources of Modern Judaism," in Rose, *Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp. 175–210. Cf. Norbert Bolz, "*Charism und Souveränität: Carl Schmitt und Walter Benjamin im Schatten Max Webers,*" in *Der Fürst dieser Welt: Carl Schmitt und die Folgen*, edited by Jacob Taubes (Munich, Paderborn, Vienna, and Zurich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag/Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1983), pp. 249–262; Carl Schmitt, "On the Barbaric Character of Shakespearean Drama: A Response to Walter Benjamin on *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*," in *Telos*, No. 72 (Summer 1987): 146–151.

16. As Schmitt explains in *Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen*, the individual disappears as an empirical entity when considered from the standpoint of law and the task of the state to realize law. Schmitt asserts that there is an antithesis between law and the state—not law and the individual—because positive law is the unity of impersonal, supra-empirical rule and the state, which is also not an inter-individual instance but a supra-individual idea. No individual has autonomy in the state because the state is a servant either of the individual or of law. If there is autonomy in law, then only the state can be the subject of ethos in law. As Schmitt indicates, even the subject of autonomy in Kantian ethics is not the empirical but the rational individual. The Kantian claim that the individual always has a purpose and should never be a means to an end holds only so long as the precondition of autonomy is fulfilled, and this means that the individual must constitute a rational essence. Given that here Schmitt was not concerned with the individual in a religious or theological sense, he implied no critique of the value of the individual as such. On the contrary, in his view the individual's task in relation to the state demonstrated the value of the individual in an anti-individualistic age.

17. In Schmitt's view, neither skepticism nor the exact sciences could provide a foundation for individuality. An age that was both skeptical and exacting could not be individualistic. No age before had such a tendency to codification, calculation, and subsumption. This mechanistic age of money economy and technology was outspokenly anti-individualistic. The two symptoms of the age that had particular relevance for Schmitt were sociology as "the new science of factual correlations, without which the individual cannot be conceived and in which he completely disappears," and contemporary epistemology, "which seeks the epistemological subject that can only be found in a supra-individual

consciousness." See *Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen*, p. 6.

18. Schmitt, "The Visibility of the Church," p. x.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid. Here Schmitt is contrasting impersonal officialism with personal officiality.

21. The first edition of *Political Theology* (1922) contains a note indicating that Schmitt's four chapters on the theory of sovereignty were written together with an essay titled "The Political Idea of Catholicism," which appeared separately in 1923 under the title *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*.

22. Cf. George Schwab's Introduction to Schmitt, *Political Theology*, p. xv.

23. Schmitt, *Politische Theologie II*, pp. 21f. and 110.

24. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, p. 46 (translation altered).

25. Schmitt, *Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947–1951*, edited by Eberhard Freiherr von Medem (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), [May 23, 1949], p. 243.

26. Ibid. [October 3, 1947], p. 23.

27. Carl Schmitt, "Die vollendete Reformation: Bemerkungen und Hinweise zu neuen Leviathan-Interpretationen," in *Der Staat, Zeitschrift für Staatslehre, Öffentliches Recht und Verfassungsgeschichte*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1965): 65.

28. Cf. Schmitt, *Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947–1951* (July 4, 1949), p. 252.

29. Cf. Schmitt, "Die vollendete Reformation," in *Der Staat*, p. 69.

30. Ibid., p. 65.

31. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, p. 5 (translation altered). Schmitt's concept of decisionism developed in and through his critique of normativism—a doctrine consistent with legal positivism. Simply stated, a norm cannot realize itself; it requires an authoritative instance. Schmitt often

repeats Hobbes's question: *Quis iudicabit?*, which in many respects is also a question of *quis interpretabitur?* because every religious, philosophical or political issue requires interpretation as well as decision. Once made, the decision becomes independent of any need for substantiation and acquires an autonomous value—a value independent of any norm. Normatively speaking, the decision derives from nothing but authority itself, and this authority presupposes the ability of an individual to establish order, peace and security from a chaotic situation as well as his responsibility to safeguard this concrete stability. Schmitt also subscribes to Hobbes's dictum, *auctoritas, non veritas facit legem* (authority, not truth makes law), which presupposes that the sovereign, by virtue of his authority, can demand obedience in exchange for protection.

32. Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, p.14.

33. Ibid., p.17.

34. Schmitt, *Politische Theologie II*, pp. 27–28n.

35. Schmitt did not escape the widespread confusion in philosophy concerning the concept of form he addressed in *Political Theology*, pp. 27ff., where he also criticizes Weber's confusion.

36. Schmitt, *Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947–1951* (April 25, 1949), p. 235.

37. Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, p. 20.

38. It is perhaps unfair to compare and contrast Schmitt's essay with Weber's treatise in any but the widest possible implications because Schmitt's essay was obviously written in haste, whereas Weber's treatise was written over the course of two years and in view of critical comments. Schmitt's essay also lacks the technical apparatus of Weber's treatise. Thus, only if the limitations of Schmitt's essay are accepted can a comparison with Weber's treatise proceed in terms of Schmitt's intentions. It is the argument rather than the apparatus that is at issue

here. Schmitt accepts the validity of Weber's thesis concerning the peculiar relation between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, and the lack of such a spirit deriving from Roman Catholicism. His critique of Weber's treatise proceeds on a different level. Schmitt could find support for his own thesis concerning the relation between Roman Catholicism and political form in the works of Ernst Troeltsch. For example, Troeltsch wrote:

> It seems to me a fact of the highest importance that, in the transition from the semi-anarchistic feudal states and city-federations to the uniform bureaucratic modern sovereign states, the Church was an example of the only sovereign institution which governed through a vast body of officials, supported by unconditional obedience, and using a formal written law. Indeed, one might even say that the modern conception of the State, in which the will of the individual is united with a collective will which can be legally represented, which at the same time secures the inviolable personal rights of the individual, found its first method of orientation in the *Corpus mysticum* of the Church and through this it is distinguished from the ancient conception of the State, in which the State is abstractly bound to observe the laws and in which it was impossible to keep a clear line of demarcation between the collective will and the will of the individual. At least all these modern conceptions of the law of the State have grown out of the elements of a philosophy of the State which was bound up with the Church, and directed towards the collective will of the *Corpus mysticum*.

See *The Social Teaching of Christian Churches*, translated by Olive Wyon, with an introduction by H. Richard Niebuhr

(New York: Harper Books, 1960), Vol. 1, p. 325. Troeltsch's insight undoubtedly comes from the fact that he considers the institution of the Church even as he explores its "social ethics." While disputing Weber's thesis, Amintore Fanfani wrote: "Our outline of Catholic social ethics will have made it clear that Catholics, so long as they held closely to the social teachings of the Church, could never act in favor of capitalism." See *Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955). Schmitt would have no argument with this statement. But if one stops there, one has only negatively grasped the essence of Catholic "social ethics." Troeltsch grasped the positive essence that Schmitt developed into a thesis to match Weber's own. See also Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World*, translated by W. Montgomery (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912). For contrary views of the origin of capitalism with particular respect to Catholicism, see Luciano Pellicani, *The Genesis of Capitalism and the Origins of Modernity* (1988), translated from the Italian by James G. Colbert, edited by Kerry Milliron (New York: Telos Press, 1995) and Michael Novak, *The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: The Free Press, 1993).

39. See G. L. Ulmen, "Politische Theologie und Politische Ökonomie: Über Carl Schmitt und Max Weber," in Quaritsch, *Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl Schmitt*, pp. 341–365; see also Chapter II/1 of my book, *Politischer Mehrwert: Eine Studie über Max Weber und Carl Schmitt* (Weinheim: VCH Acta humaniora, 1991).

40. Schmitt, *Politische Theologie II*, p. 100. Schmitt's reference is to Hans Barion's book, *Sakularisation und Utopie* (Ebrach: Ebracher Studien, 1967), p. 190. See also Barion, "Ordnung und Ortung in Kanonischen Recht," in *Festschrift für Carl Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag*, edited by Hans Barion, Ernst Forsthoff, and Werner Weber (Berlin:

Duncker & Humblot, 1959), pp. 1–34; and Barion, "Kirche oder Partei?: Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form," in *Der Staat*, No. 4 (1965): 131–176.

41. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), Vol. 2, p. 829.

42. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, p. 65 (translation altered).

43. Ibid., p. 65.

44. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, p. 78.

45. Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, pp. 31–32.

46. Max Weber, "The Evolution of the Capitalistic Spirit," in Weber, *General Economic History*, translated by Frank H. Knight (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 270.

47. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, p. 182 (translation altered).

48. See Jacques Chailley, *Musique et ésoterisme: La Flute enchantée, opera maconnique* (Paris: R. Laffont, 1968); *The Magic Flute: Masonic Opera* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971). Chailley reveals the existence of a controversy in eighteenth-century Masonic circles over whether women should be admitted as full members—whether they should be admitted to full enlightenment. (In Freemasonry women represent the emotional, instinctive, unreasoning, "inferior" part of the human psyche.) The regeneration in the person of Pamino becomes the focal point of the opera. In the end it is she, fully awakened by her love for Tamino, who leads him in the final stage of their journey to enlightenment. Thus, the plot is nothing so simple as a struggle between "good" Masonic priests being threatened by the "evil" Queen of the Night—of superstition and ignorance—because they are all playing the same game. It is, rather, a journey from

darkness to light that celebrates the possibility of human progress. The conflict between the Queen of the Night and Sarastro for control of the Circle of the Sun symbolizes in Masonic law the dualisms of the inscriptions on the twin pillars of Hiram's Temple of Solomon: Masculine/Feminine, Sun/Moon, Day/Night, Fire/Water, Gold/Silver, and so on. The Queen seeks to perpetuate the conflicts; Sarastro aims to resolve them by creating with Tamino and Pamino "the new pair," that is, the synthesis of all the antagonisms that will herald a new Golden Age of peace and freedom. The unity-in-diversity of the opera's musical style is the analog of the theme of reconciliation. The Queen and her creatures are not so much defeated by force as cast off into the night, because they are revealed to be nothing more than phantoms and memories of former disorder in the unenlightened soul.

49. This is the critic Frank Kermode's characterization. Caliban is a Noble Savage, modeled on Shakespeare's conception of an American Indian but retaining elements of an Old World mythical figure.

50. On Schmitt's irony regarding Papageno and Caliban, see Schmitt, *Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947–1951* (October 8, 1947), pp. 28f.

51. Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, p. 34.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION

G. L. Ulmen

This translation is based on the third German edition of Carl Schmitt's essay, *Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form*, published by Klett-Cotta in Stuttgart in 1984, itself a reprint of the improved second edition published by Theatiner-Verlag in Munich in 1925 with the imprimatur: DER KATHOLISCHE GEDANKE, Veröffentlichungen des Verbandes der Vereine Katholischer Akademiker zur Pflege der Katholischen Weltanschauung, Vol. XIII. The first edition was published by Jakob Hegner Verlag in Hellerau in 1923.

An unauthorized translation of Schmitt's essay was published by Sheed & Ward in London in 1931. Long out of print, it appeared in a series, Essays in Order: No. 5, under the somewhat misleading title: *The Necessity of Politics: An Essay on the Representative Idea in the Church and Modern Europe*. Although no translator is named, the introduction was written by Christopher Dawson. At the time Dawson, a Catholic, was Lecturer in the History of Culture at University College, London. Interested primarily in the relation between religion and culture, specifically Catholic theology and Catholic life, he quickly recognized the significance of Schmitt's essay. But his introduction does not evidence a very clear understanding of Schmitt's thesis, even with respect to the concrete historical situation of modern Catholicism. More to the point, Dawson's translator was neither technically nor conceptually fit for the task. The

translation is so inaccurate, the style so indifferent, that it is worse than useless because it distorts Schmitt's meaning.

Another, more recent unauthorized translation of Schmitt's essay has been published in mimeograph under the title: *The Idea of Representation: A Discussion* (Washington, D.C.: Plutarch Press, 1988). The translator is identified only as E. M. Codd, but the editor who introduces the work, Simona Draghici, identifies herself as "a European-American social scientist who among other things holds a Ph.D in sociology from the University of Texas at Austin." Not incidentally, she is also the editor-in-chief of Plutarch Press. She informs the reader that "her interests in the comparative studies of social institutions have led her more recently to the analysis of the recurrent phenomenon of civilizational [*sic*] decline." Her introduction can most generously be described as fanciful, when not factually incorrect. It seems likely that it was the editor who fabricated the chapter titles to Codd's translation, since the last and most grotesque, "Whereto Humanity[?]," corresponds to her notion of "civilizational decline," although such Spenglerian attributes are far from Schmitt's thinking.

As for the Codd translation, there are fewer inaccuracies than in the Dawson volume, although stylistically and grammatically it reads like the work of someone for whom English is a second language. But the misunderstandings are still sufficient to make the translation more problematic than useful. A few examples will suffice. At the beginning of Schmitt's essay, Codd translates the word *Vaticanum* as simply "the Vatican," which misses the point entirely, since the term refers to the First Vatican Council of 1869–1870. This Council changed fundamentally the relation between Church and state with the doctrine of papal infallibility, and this doctrine is essential to an understanding of Schmitt's concept of "political form." At another place, the philosophical category of "indifference point" is translated as "neutral

zone"; and still another, where Schmitt asserts that Roman Catholics appear to love the soil in a different way than Protestants, Codd has "Catholic countries" having a different relation to the soil than "protestant lands." In the same context, Schmitt says that the Huguenot or the Puritan has a strength and a pride that is often "inhuman," as compared with the human character of the Catholic concept of nature, which Codd translates as "super-human."

Much of Schmitt's meaning in this essay relies on such nuances, which the Codd translation by and large misses. There are, of course, many other problems, some of them quite amusing, such as Codd's characterization of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as "two West Germans," and the reference to Bakunin in this same connection, which he renders thus: "everything in the anarchistic Russian revolted against the 'German Jew who on top of it all hailed from Treves [Trier].' " But perhaps the most serious failing is the translator's haphazard treatment of the word and concept of form, which play such a significant role in Schmitt's essay.

Concerning the present translation, a few words are in order. While the structure of Schmitt's text remains unchanged, I have taken the liberty of dividing many of his longer paragraphs to clarify the meaning. For this same reason, and because some of the names, events, and documents Schmitt mentions are not as familiar today as they no doubt were earlier in this century, and certainly not as familiar to American as to European readers, I have added some notes of identification. Since Schmitt's writing style is characteristically more accessible than much German prose, there was little need to sacrifice idiom for clarity. Finally, I have held to Schmitt's practice of utilizing adjectival nouns—the political, the economic, the religious, and so on—because such have a specific conceptual distinction: they designate separate spheres of intellect or practical activity.

ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL FORM

Carl Schmitt

There is an anti-Roman temper that has nourished the struggle against popery, Jesuitism and clericalism with a host of religious and political forces, that has impelled European history for centuries. Not only fanatic sectarians but whole generations of pious Protestants and Greek-Orthodox Christians have seen in Rome the Antichrist or the Babylonian whore of the apocalypse. The mythical power of this image is deeper and stronger than any economic calculation; its after-effects long endure. Consider Gladstone, or Bismarck's memoirs,[1] wherein a nervous uneasiness is evident whenever mysteriously intriguing Jesuits or prelates appear on the scene. Yet the emotional, one might even say mythical, arsenal of the *Kulturkampf* and the whole struggle against the *Vaticanum*,[2] as well as the French separation of church and state, are harmless by comparison with Cromwell's demonic rage. Since the eighteenth century, the argumentation has become ever more rationalistic or humanitarian, utilitarian and shallow. Only with an adherent of Russian orthodoxy, with Dostoyevsky in his portrayal of the Grand Inquisitor, does the anti-Roman dread appear once again as a secular force.

In all these various nuances and gradations there is always the lingering fear of the incomprehensible political power of Roman Catholicism. I can well imagine that a Protestant Anglo-Saxon may find all his antipathies ex-

pressed in the "papal machine," if he surmises it is a monstrous hierarchical apparatus bent on controlling religious life and directed by men who in principle refuse to have a family; in other words, a celibate bureaucracy. With his refined domestic sensibility and aversion to every bureaucratic control, that must indeed frighten him. At any rate, it is more an unspoken sentiment.

For the whole of the parliamentary and democratic nineteenth century, one most often heard the charge that Catholic politics is nothing more than a limitless opportunism. Its elasticity is really astounding; it unites with opposing movements and groups. Thousands of times it has been accused of making common cause with various governments and parties in different countries. Critics have demonstrated how it always pursues political coalitions, whether with absolute monarchs or monarchomachists; how, during the Holy Alliance, after 1815, it became a center of reaction and an enemy of all liberal freedoms, and in other countries an exponent of these same freedoms, especially freedom of the press and freedom of education; how, in European monarchies, it preaches the alliance of throne and altar, and in the peasant democracies of the Swiss cantons or in North America it stands wholly on the side of a firm democracy. Men of such eminence as Montalembert,[3] Tocqueville, and Lacordaire[4] represented liberal Catholicism at a time when many of their fellow Catholics still saw in liberalism the Antichrist or at least his forerunner. Catholic royalists and legitimists appear arm-in-arm with Catholic defenders of the republic. Some Catholics are tactically aligned with a socialism others believe to be in league with the devil. They have even parlayed with Bolsheviks at a time when bourgeois advocates of the sanctity of private property still saw in them a cabal of criminals *hors la loi*.

With every change in the political situation, all principles appear to change save one: the power of Catholicism. "One

appropriates all freedoms of one's opponent in the name of the opponent's principles and denies them to him in the name of one's own Catholic principles." How often one sees the picture drawn by bourgeois, socialist, and anarchistic pacifists: High Church dignitaries blessing the guns of all warring nations; or neo-Catholic literati, partly monarchist, partly communist; or finally, to cite another sort of sociological impression, the [French] *abbé*, favored by court ladies, side by side with the Irish Franciscan encouraging striking workers to stand firm. One can always point to a new example of similar contradictory figures and associations.

Some of this diversity and ambiguity—the double face, the Janus-head, the hermaphroditic nature (as Byron characterized Rome)—can be explained simply by political or sociological analogies. In the tactics of political struggle, every party with an established world-view can form coalitions with the most disparate groupings. This is no less true of orthodox socialism, insofar as it has a radical principle, than it is of Catholicism. Given the state of affairs in particular countries, the national movement has also aligned itself at one time with a legitimate monarchy, at another with a democratic republic. From the standpoint of a world-view, all political forms and possibilities become nothing more than tools for the realization of an idea. Some of what appears inconsistent is only the consequence and manifestation of a political universalism.

From all sides there is a remarkable consensus that the Roman Catholic Church as an historical complex and administrative apparatus has perpetuated the universalism of the Roman Empire. French nationalists like Charles Maurras, German racial theorists like H. Stewart Chamberlain, German professors of liberal provenance like Max Weber, a Pan-Slavic poet and seer like Dostoyevsky—all base their interpretations on this continuity of the Catholic Church and the Roman Empire. To every worldly empire belongs a

certain relativism with respect to the motley of possible views, ruthless disregard of local peculiarities as well as opportunistic tolerance for things of no central importance. The similarities between the Roman Empire and the British Empire are sufficiently striking. Every imperialism that is more than jingoism embraces antitheses—conservatism and liberalism, tradition and progress, even militarism and pacifism. In the history of English politics—from the antithesis between [Edmund] Burke and Warren Hastings to that between Lloyd George and [Winston] Churchill or Lord Curzon—almost every generation has evidenced such antitheses.

Despite the allusion to the peculiarities of universalism, the political idea of Catholicism has as yet not been defined. It has only to be mentioned, because the feeling of anxiety with respect to the universal administrative apparatus often arises from a justifiable reaction of national and local movements. Many a national patriot must feel ignored and cheated in the strongly centralized Roman system. An Irishman, reflecting the embitterment of his Gaelic national consciousness, opined that Ireland was just "a pinch of snuff in the Roman snuffbox" (he would have rather said: A chicken the prelate would drop into the caldron which he was boiling for the cosmopolitan restaurant).[5] However, Catholics in particular (Tyrolers, Spaniards, Poles, Irish) have Catholicism to thank for a large part of their national strength of resistance, and certainly not only when the oppressor was an enemy of the Church. Cardinal Mercier[6] of Mechlin as well as Bishop Korum[7] of Trier have more imposingly and impressively represented national honor and self-confidence than have trade and industry, and this in the face of an opponent who in no way appeared as an enemy of the Church but rather sought an alliance with it. One can no more account for such manifestations with mere political or sociological explanations derived from the

nature of universalism than one can interpret the anti-Roman temper as a national or local reaction against universalism and centralism, since it cannot be denied that every empire in world history has evoked such reactions.

All the same, I believe this temper would have become infinitely deeper if one had grasped completely the extent to which the Catholic Church is a complex of opposites, a *complexio oppositorum*. There appears to be no antithesis it does not embrace. It has long and proudly claimed to have united within itself all forms of state and government; to be an autocratic monarchy whose head is elected by the aristocracy of cardinals but in which there is nevertheless so much democracy that, as Dupanloup[8] put it, even the least shepherd of Abruzzi, regardless of his birth and station, has the possibility to become this autocratic sovereign. Its history knows examples of astounding accommodation as well as stubborn intransigence, the manly ability to resist and womanly compliance—a curious mixture of arrogance and humility. It is not easily understandable that a rigorous philosopher of authoritarian dictatorship, like the Spanish diplomat Donoso Cortés, and a "good Samaritan" of the poor with syndicalist connections, like the Irish rebel Padraic Pearse, were both staunch Catholics.

But this *complexio oppositorum* also holds sway over everything theological: the Old and New Testament alike are scriptural canon; the Marcionitic[9] either–or is answered with an as-well-as. Here also, many arrangements are conceivable, because so many elements of God's immanence in the doctrine of the Trinity are attributed to Jewish monotheism and its absolute transcendence. French atheists and German metaphysicians, who rediscovered polytheism in the nineteenth century, praised the Church because they believed they had found a sound paganism in its veneration of saints. The fundamental thesis to which all dogmas of a consistent anarchistic philosophy of state

and society return, namely, the antithesis of man "by nature evil" and "by nature good"—this decisive question for political theory — is in no sense answered by a simple yes or no in the Tridentine Creed.

In contrast to the Protestant doctrine of the total depravity of natural man, this Creed speaks of human nature as only wounded, weakened, and troubled, thus permitting the use of some gradations and adaptations. The union of antitheses extends to the ultimate socio-psychological roots of human motives and perceptions. The pope is called the Father; the Church is the Mother of Believers and the Bride of Christ. This is a marvelous union of the patriarchal and the matriarchal, able to direct both streams of the most elemental complexes and instincts—respect for the father and love for the mother—toward Rome. Has there ever been a revolt against the mother? Ultimately, most important is that this limitless ambiguity combines with the most precise dogmatism and a will to decision as it culminates in the doctrine of papal infallibility.

From the standpoint of the political idea of Catholicism, the essence of the Roman-Catholic *complexio oppositorum* lies in a specific, formal superiority over the matter of human life such as no other imperium has ever known. It has succeeded in constituting a sustaining configuration of historical and social reality that, despite its formal character, retains its concrete existence at once vital and yet rational to the *n*th degree. This formal character of Roman Catholicism is based on a strict realization of the principle of representation, the particularity of which is most evident in its antithesis to the economic-technical thinking dominant today. Before proceeding, however, it is still necessary to eliminate a misunderstanding.

Out of a spiritual promiscuity which seeks a Romantic or Hegelian brotherhood with Catholicism, as with so many other ideas and individuals, a person could make the Catho-

lic *complexio* into one of many syntheses and rashly conclude that he had thereby construed the essence of Catholicism. The metaphysicians of speculative post-Kantian philosophy conceived organic and historical life as an eternal process of antitheses and syntheses, assigning the respective roles at will. When Goerres[10] pictures Catholicism as the masculine and Protestantism as the feminine principle, he makes of Catholicism nothing more than an antithetical extreme and sees the synthesis in a "higher third."[11] It is obvious that Catholicism could as well be considered the feminine and Protestantism the masculine principle. It is also conceivable that speculative system-builders have at one time or another considered Catholicism the "higher third."

This idea had particular appeal for Romantics who toyed with Catholicism, although they also did not readily refrain from exhorting the Church to break free of Jesuitism and scholasticism in order to create an "organic" higher unity out of the schematic externality of formal Catholicism and the imperceptible internality of Protestantism. Such is the basis of the apparently typical misunderstanding. But these constructs are still more than fantasies out of the blue. Though it sounds improbable, they are completely in harmony with the spirit of our age because their intellectual structure accords with a reality. Their point of departure is actually a real cleavage and division: an antithesis that calls for a synthesis or a polarity that has an "indifference point"; a condition of problematic disunity and profound indecision from which the only escape is self-negation in order to arrive at [positive] positions.

Every sphere of the contemporary epoch is governed by a radical dualism. It will be necessary to refer frequently to its various manifestations as we go along. Its common ground is a concept of nature that has found its realization in a world transformed by technology and industry. Nature

appears today as the polar antithesis of the mechanistic world of big cities, whose stone, iron, and glass structures lie on the face of the earth like colossal Cubist configurations. The antithesis of this empire of technology is nature untouched by civilization, wild and barbarian—a reservation into which "man with his affliction does not set foot." Such a dichotomy between a rationalistic-mechanistic world of human labor and a romantic-virginal state of nature is totally foreign to the Roman Catholic concept of nature.

It appears that Catholics have a different relation to the soil than Protestants, perhaps because, in contrast to Protestants, they are mostly agricultural peoples who know no large industry. In any case, this is generally true. Why have there been no Catholic migrations, at least none on the grand scale of the Huguenot or the Puritan? There have been any number of Catholic emigrants: Irish, Poles, Italians, Croats. Probably most emigrants have been Catholic, because most simple Catholics were by and large poorer than Protestants. Poverty, peril, and persecution have impelled them. But they never lose the longing for their homeland.

Compared with these indigent, dispossessed peoples, the Huguenot or the Puritan has a strength and pride that is often inhuman. He is capable of living on any soil. But it would be wrong to say he finds roots on every soil. He can build his industry far and wide, make all soil the servant of his skilled labor and "inner-worldly asceticism," and in the end have a comfortable home; all this because he makes himself master of nature and harnesses it to his will. His type of domination remains inaccessible to the Roman Catholic concept of nature.

Roman Catholic peoples appear to love the soil, mother earth, in a different way; they all have their own "*terrisme*" [loyalty to the land]. Nature is for them not the antithesis

of art and enterprise, also not of intellect and feeling or heart; human labor and organic development, nature and reason, are one. Viniculture is the most beautiful symbol of this union. But the cities that develop out of this type of spirit also appear as naturally grown products of the soil, which become part of the landscape and remain true to the earth. In their essential concept of "urbanity," they have a humanity that remains eternally inaccessible to the mechanistic precisionism of a modern industrial city. Just as the Tridentine Creed knows little of the Protestant rupture of nature and grace, so Roman Catholicism understands little of the dualisms of nature and spirit, nature and intellect, nature and art, nature and machine, and their varying pathos. The synthesis of such antitheses remains as foreign as the antithesis of empty form and formless matter.

The Catholic Church is categorically something other than the (in any case, always absent) "higher third" of the German philosophy of nature and history. To it belong neither the despair of antitheses nor the illusory optimism of their synthesis. For this reason, a Catholic must consider it a dubious honor when someone seeks to make his Church into the antagonistic pole of the mechanistic age. It is a striking contradiction, again demonstrating the curious *complexio oppositorum*, that one of the strongest Protestant perceptions finds in Roman Catholicism a debasement and misuse of Christianity because it mechanizes religion into a soulless formality, while at the same time Protestants return in Romantic flight to the Catholic Church seeking salvation from the soullessness of a rationalistic and mechanistic age.

Were the Church to have rested content with being nothing more than the soulful polarity of soullessness, it would have forgotten its true self; it would have become the desired complement of capitalism—a hygienic institution for enduring the rigors of competition, a Sunday outing

or a summer sojourn of big-city dwellers. Naturally, the Church has an important therapeutic function. But the essence of such an institution must consist in something more. Rousseauism and Romanticism are able to take pleasure in many things, including Catholicism, as they would in a magnificent ruin or an authenticated antique; and "in the *fauteuil* of the achievements of 1789," also to make these things into consumer goods of a relativistic bourgeoisie.

Many Catholics, especially German Catholics, appear to be proud of having been discovered by art historians. Their delight, of little note in itself, would not need be mentioned were it not for the fact that such an original and prolific a thinker as Georges Sorel sought the crisis of Catholic thought in the new alliance of the Church with irrationalism. In his view, the argumentation of Catholic apologetics until the eighteenth century was to demonstrate faith based on reason, but in the nineteenth century the Church benefited from irrationalistic currents. In fact, every conceivable type of opposition to the Enlightenment and rationalism reinvigorated Catholicism. Traditionalist, mystical, and Romantic tendencies made many converts. Today, as far as I can judge, Catholics are profoundly dissatisfied with established apologetics, which appear to many as sophistry and forms without content. But all this misses the essential point, because it identifies rationalism with the thinking of the natural sciences and overlooks the fact that Catholic argumentation is based on a particular mode of thinking whose method of proof is a specific juridical logic and whose focus of interest is the normative guidance of human social life.

In almost every discussion one can observe the extent to which the methodology of the natural-technical sciences dominates contemporary thinking. For example, the God of traditional theological evidence—the God who governs the world as the king governs the state—subconsciously is made

the motor impelling the cosmic machine. The chimera of modern big-city dwellers is filled to the last atom with technological and industrial conceptions, which are projected into cosmological or metaphysical realms. In this naive mechanistic and mathematical mythology, the world becomes a gigantic dynamo wherein there is even no distinction of classes.

The world-view of the modern capitalist is the same as that of the industrial proletarian, as if the one were the twin brother of the other. Thus they are of one accord when they struggle side by side for economic thinking. Insofar as socialism has become the religion of the industrial proletariat of big cities, it contraposes a fabulous mechanism to that of the capitalist world. The class-conscious proletariat considers itself the legitimate, if only the logically qualified master of this apparatus, whereas the private property of the capitalist is seen as the logically adverse remnant of a technically backward age. The big industrialist has no other ideal than that of Lenin—an "electrified earth." They disagree essentially only on the correct method of electrification. American financiers and Russian Bolsheviks find themselves in a common struggle for economic thinking, that is, the struggle against politicians and jurists. Georges Sorel also belongs to this fraternity. Here then, in the economic thinking of our time, is a fundamental antithesis to the political idea of Catholicism, because this idea contradicts everything synonymous with objectivity, integrity, and rationality in economic thinking.

The rationalism of the Roman Church morally encompasses the psychological and sociological nature of man and, unlike industry and technology, is not concerned with the domination and exploitation of matter. The Church has its own rationality. Renan's[12] dictum is well-known: *Toute victoire de Rome est une victoire de la raison.*[13] In struggles with sectarian fanaticism, the Church was always on the

side of common sense. Throughout the Middle Ages, as Duhem[14] has well shown, it suppressed superstition and sorcery. Even Max Weber has ascertained that Roman rationalism lives on in the Roman Church, that it knowingly and magnificently succeeded in overcoming Dionysian cults, ecstasies, and the dangers of submerging reason in meditation. This rationalism resides in institutions and is essentially juridical; its greatest achievement is having made the priesthood into an office—a very distinctive type of office.

The pope is not the Prophet but the Vicar of Christ. Such a ceremonial function precludes all the fanatical excesses of an unbridled prophetism. The fact that the office is made independent of charisma signifies that the priest upholds a position that appears to be completely apart from his concrete personality. Nevertheless, he is not the functionary and commissar of republican thinking. In contradistinction to the modern official, his position is not impersonal, because his office is part of an unbroken chain linked with the personal mandate and concrete person of Christ. This is truly the most astounding *complexio oppositorum*. In such distinctions lie the rational creativity and humanity of Catholicism. Both remain within and give direction to the human spirit, without exhibiting the dark irrationalism of the human soul. They provide no formulas for the manipulation of matter, as does the rationalism of economy and technology.

Economic rationalism is so far removed from Catholic rationalism that it can arouse a specific Catholic anxiety. Modern technology easily becomes the servant of this or that want and need. In modern economy, a completely irrational consumption conforms to a totally rationalized production. A marvelously rational mechanism serves one or another demand, always with the same earnestness and precision, be it for a silk blouse or poison gas or anything

whatsoever. Economic rationalism has accustomed itself to deal only with certain needs and to acknowledge only those it can "satisfy." In the modern metropolis, it has erected an edifice wherein everything runs strictly according to plan—everything is calculable. A devout Catholic, precisely following his own rationality, might well be horrified by this system of irresistible materiality.

Today, one can say it is perhaps more among Catholics that the image of the Antichrist is still alive. If Sorel sees evidence of a vital force in the capacity for such "myths," he is unjust in asserting that Catholics no longer believe in their eschatology and that no one of them still awaits the Last Judgment. That is factually incorrect, although in Maistre's *Soirées of St. Petersburg*[15] a Russian senator says practically the same. The expectation of the Last Judgment is as alive with a Spaniard like Donoso Cortés, French Catholics like Louis Veuillot[16] and Léon Bloy,[17] and an English convert like Robert Hughes Benson,[18] as with any Protestant of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who saw in Rome the Antichrist. The main point, however, is that the modern economic-technical apparatus arouses a similar fear and loathing in a great many Catholics. Genuine Catholic anxiety derives from the knowledge that here the concept of the rational is warped fantastically, in a manner alien to Catholic sensibility, because a mechanism of production serving the satisfaction of arbitrary material needs is called "rational" without bringing into question what is most important—the rationality of the purpose of this supremely rational mechanism.

Economic thinking is totally incapable of apprehending this Catholic anxiety. It is content with everything it can supply with its means of technology. It knows nothing of any anti-Roman temper, nor of the Antichrist and the apocalypse. The Church is perceived as a strange phenomenon, but no less so than other "irrational" things. It is well

and good that there are men who have religious needs to be satisfied reasonably. This appears to be no less irrational than many senseless whims of fashion, which also demand satisfaction. If and when the sanctuary lamps fronting all Catholic altars are fed by the same electric company that supplies the theaters and dance halls of the city, then Catholicism will also become something instinctively and logically comprehensible to economic thinking, something accepted as a matter of course.

Economic thinking has its own reason and veracity in that it is absolutely material, concerned only with things. The political is considered immaterial, because it must be concerned with other than economic values. In sharp contrast to this absolute economic materiality, Catholicism is eminently political. But it is not political in the sense of the manipulation and domination of fixed social and international power factors, as obtain in the Machiavellian conception (which makes of politics a mere technique in that it isolates a single, extrinsic factor of political life). The political mechanism has its own laws, which Catholicism as well as any other historical force embroiled in politics must obey. The fact that the "apparatus" of the Church has become more rigid since the sixteenth century, that (despite Romanticism, or perhaps to vitiate it) the Church is a more centralized bureaucracy and organization than in the Middle Ages—everything one characterizes sociologically as "Jesuitism"—is explained not only by the struggle with Protestantism but also by the negative reaction to the mechanism of the age.

The absolute prince and his "mercantilism" were the forerunners of the modern type of economic thinking and of a political state of affairs situated somewhere in the indifference point between dictatorship and anarchy. In the seventeenth century, a power-political apparatus developed together with the mechanistic concept of nature and the

often reputed "functionalization" of all social relations. In this milieu, the organization of the Church also became denser and harder, like a protective shell. In itself, that is still no evidence of political failing and aging; it only raises the question whether therein is still a living idea. No political system can survive even a generation with only naked techniques of holding power. To the political belongs the idea, because there is no politics without authority and no authority without an ethos of belief.

By claiming to be something more than the economic, the political is obliged to base itself on categories other than production and consumption. To repeat: it is curious that the capitalist entrepreneur and the socialist proletarian are of one accord in considering the political's assumption a presumption and, from the standpoint of their economic thinking, regarding the dominance of politicians as "immaterial." Seen from a strictly political viewpoint, this can only mean that certain socio-political groupings—mighty private entrepreneurs or the organized workers of particular factories or branches of industry—exploit their position in the process of production in order to grasp the reins of state power. When they turn against politicians and politics as such, they see them as the concrete force blocking their own road to political power. If they succeed in removing them, the interest in formulating antitheses of economic and political thinking will also be lost. A new type of politics arises together with the new power based on economics. But what they do will be politics nevertheless, and that means the promotion of a specific type of validity and authority. They will justify themselves on the basis of their social indispensability, appeal to the *salut public*, and already thereby will be subscribing to the idea.

No great social antithesis can be solved by economics. When the employer says to the workers, "I support you," the workers answer, "We support you." That is no struggle

of production and consumption, in no sense something economic; it derives from a different conviction about what is moral or lawful. It concerns the ethical or legal determination of who is actually the producer, the creator, and therefore the owner of modern wealth. As soon as production becomes completely anonymous, and a web of joint-stock companies and other "juridical" persons makes reference to concrete individuals impossible, the private property of the prototypical capitalist is discarded as having lost its evidence. This will come to pass, though today there are still capitalists who know how to succeed on the basis of their alleged indispensability.

As long as both parties think in economic terms, Catholicism might almost be ignored in such a struggle. Its power is not based on economic means, even though the Church may have landed property and various "financial interests." These are innocuous and idyllic by comparison with the interests of big industry in raw materials and markets. Possession of the earth's oil deposits can possibly decide the struggle for world supremacy. But the Vicar of Christ on earth will have no part of this struggle. The pope is disposed to be sovereign of the Pontifical State. What significance has that in the great clamor of international trade and imperialism?

The political power of Catholicism rests neither on economic nor on military means but rather on the absolute realization of authority. The Church also is a "juridical person," though not in the same sense as a joint-stock company. The typical product of the age of production is a method of accounting, whereas the Church is a concrete personal representation of a concrete personality. All knowledgeable witnesses have conceded that the Church is the consummate agency of the juridical spirit and the true heir of Roman jurisprudence. Therein—in its capacity to assume juridical form—lies one of its sociological secrets.

But it has the power to assume this or any other form only because it has the power of representation. It represents the *civitas humana*. It represents in every moment the historical connection to the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ. It represents the Person of Christ Himself: God become man in historical reality. Therein lies its superiority over an age of economic thinking.

The Catholic Church is the sole surviving contemporary example of the medieval capacity to create representative figures—the pope, the emperor, the monk, the knight, the merchant. It is certainly the last of what a scholar[19] once called the four remaining pillars—the House of Lords, the Prussian General Staff, the Académie Française, and the Vatican. It stands so alone that whoever sees therein only external form mockingly must say it represents nothing more than the idea of representation. The eighteenth century still had some classical figures, like the "*législateur*." In view of the unproductiveness of the nineteenth century, even the Goddess of Reason appears to be a representative.

In order to obtain a clear picture of the extent to which the representative capacity has disappeared, we have only to consider the attempt to rival the Catholic Church with an enterprise drawn from the modern scientific spirit. Auguste Comte wanted to found a "positivistic" church. The result of his effort was an embarrassingly telling imitation. Nevertheless, one cannot but admire the noble intention of this man and even his imitation, which is still magnificent by comparison with similar endeavors. This greatest of sociologists discerned the representative types of the Middle Ages—the cleric and the knight—and compared them with the representative types of modern society—the savant and the merchant. But it was an error to hold up the modern savant and the modern merchant as representative types. The savant was only representative in the transitional period of the struggle with the Church; the merchant, only

as a Puritan individualist. Once the wheels of modern industry began to turn, both increasingly became servants of the great machine. It is difficult to say what they truly represent.

Estates are a thing of the past. The French bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century—the third estate—proclaimed itself "the nation." The famous slogan, "*le tiers État c'est la Nation*," was more profoundly revolutionary than anyone suspected. When a single estate identifies itself with the nation, it abolishes the very idea of estates, which requires a plurality of estates to constitute a social order. Bourgeois society was thus no longer capable of representation. It succumbed to the fateful dualism of the age and developed its "polarities": on the one side, the bourgeois; on the other, the bohemian (who, if he represents anything, represents himself). The logical outcome was the class-concept of the proletariat, which groups society materialistically—according to one's position in the process of production—and thus conforms to economic thinking. Thereby it demonstrates that the renunciation of every representation is inherent in this type of thinking. The savant and the merchant have become suppliers or supervisors. The merchant sits in his office; the savant, in his study or laboratory. If they are really modern, both serve a factory—both are anonymous. It is senseless to claim they represent something. They are either private individuals or exponents; not representatives.

Economic thinking knows only one type of form, namely technical precision, and nothing could be further from the idea of representation. The association of the economic with the technical (their inherent disparity is still to be noted) requires the actual presence of things. Corresponding terms such as "reflex," "radiation" or "reflection," which have reference to matter, denote various aggregate states of the same material substratum. With such images one makes something existing as idea understandable by incorporating

it into one's own material thinking. For example, according to the famous "economic" conception of history, political and religious views are the ideological "reflex" of relations of production. Taking this theory on its own terms, this means nothing other than that economic producers stand higher than "intellectuals" in its social hierarchy. In psychological discussions, a word like "projection" sounds good. All such metaphors as projection, reflex, reflection, radiation and transference seek to express the "immanent" material basis.

In contradistinction, the idea of representation is so completely governed by conceptions of personal authority that the representative as well as the person represented must maintain a personal dignity—it is not a materialist concept. To represent in an eminent sense can only be done by a person, that is, not simply a "deputy" but an authoritative person or an idea which, if represented, also becomes personified. God or "the people" in democratic ideology or abstract ideas like freedom and equality can all conceivably constitute a representation. But this is not true of production and consumption.

Representation invests the representative person with a special dignity, because the representative of a noble value cannot be without value. Not only do the representative and the person represented require a value, so also does the third party whom they address. One cannot represent oneself to automatons and machines, anymore than they can represent or be represented. Once the state becomes a leviathan, it disappears from the world of representations. This world has its own hierarchy of values and its own humanity. It is home to the political idea of Catholicism and its capacity to embody the great trinity of form: the aesthetic form of art; the juridical form of law; finally, the glorious achievement of a world-historical form of power.

What first strikes the attention of an age devoted to artistic enjoyment is that which is last in natural and historical development—the crowning fulfillment and ultimate gift, the aesthetic beauty of form. Form, figure, and visual symbolism arise independently from great representation. The modern factory, lacking representation and imagery, takes its symbols from another age because the machine has no tradition. It is so little capable of creating an image that even the Russian Soviet Republic found no other symbol for its badge of rule than the hammer and sickle. This suited the place of technology a thousand years ago, but it does not portray the world of the industrial proletariat. One can view this emblem satirically, as suggesting that the private property of the economically backward peasant has triumphed over the communism of the industrial worker, the small-scale agrarian economy over the technically and mechanically developed large-scale enterprise. Still, this primitive symbolism has something lacking in the most-advanced machine technology, something human, namely, a language.

It is not surprising that the economic age first succumbs to beautiful externals, for it is most of all lacking in beauty. Even so, in aesthetics also it is usually most comfortable with the superficial. The ability to create form, which is essential to aesthetics, has its essence in the ability to create the language of a great rhetoric. This is what should be considered; not the snobbishly praised vestments of cardinals or the trappings of a magnificent procession and all the poetic beauty that goes with them. Great architecture, ecclesiastical painting and music, or significant poetic works are also not the criterion of the ability to create form that concerns us here.

It is undeniable today that the bond between the Church and the creative arts has been broken. One of the few great Catholic poets of the last generation, Francis Thompson,

takes note of this in his wonderful essay on Shelley: The Church, once the mother of poets no less than saints, Dante no less than St. Dominic, now reserves for itself only the glory of holiness and leaves art to those outside the Faith. No one could formulate it more aptly and correctly: "The separation has been ill for poetry; it has not been well for religion."[20] This is true; the present situation is not good for religion. But with respect to the Church, it is not an incurable illness. On the contrary, the power of speech and discourse—rhetoric in its greatest sense—is a criterion of human life.

Perhaps today this is a hazardous assertion. The lack of understanding of the significance of rhetoric is but one manifestation of the polar dualism of the age, expressed here, on the one side, by a rapturously overpowering music; on the other, by a mute practicality. It seeks to make "true" art into something Romantic, excessively musical and irrational. It is well-known, largely owing to Taine's[21] gifted discernment and depiction, that there is a close relation between rhetoric and the *esprit classique*. But Taine destroyed the living idea of classicism by making it the antithesis of Romanticism. Without actually believing it himself, he endeavored to identify the classical with the rhetorical and thereby with artificiality, empty symmetry, and fabricated lifelessness. A whole assortment of antitheses to play with!

In this comparison of rationalism and something "irrational," the classical is allotted to the rational; the Romantic, to the irrational. Rhetoric comes under the heading of the classical and rational. Most decisive, however, is rhetoric in the sense of what one might call representative discourse, rather than discussion and debate. It moves in antitheses. But these are not contradictions; they are the various and sundry elements molded into a *complexio* and thus give life to discourse. Do Taine's categories help us understand

Bossuet?[22] He has more intelligence than many rationalists and more intuition than all Romanticists. But his eloquence is only possible against the background of an imposing authority, which lapses neither into a discourse nor a dictate but finds resonance in the architecture of speech. Its great diction is more than music; it is a form of human dignity which becomes manifest in a rational form of speech. All this presupposes a hierarchy, because the spiritual resonance of great rhetoric derives from the belief in the representation claimed by the orator. He is witness to the fact that the priest has his place in world history beside the soldier and the statesman. Like them, he is a representative figure. His place is not beside the merchant and the technician, who give him only alms and confuse his representation with a decoration.

An alliance of the Catholic Church with the present form of industrial capitalism is not possible. The alliance of throne and altar will not be followed by an alliance of office and altar, also not of factory and altar. If the bulk of the Roman Catholic clergy of Europe were no longer recruited from the peasant population but rather from the big cities, unforeseen consequences might ensue. But no eventuality will make possible an alliance of the Church with industrial capitalism. Nevertheless, Catholicism will continue to accommodate itself to every social and political order, even one dominated by capitalist entrepreneurs or trade unions and proletarian councils. But accommodations will be possible only if and when economically based power becomes political, that is, if and when capitalists or workers who have come to power assume political representation with all its responsibilities. The new sovereign authority will then be compelled to recognize a situation other than those concerned only with economy and private property. The new order cannot confine itself to management of the process of production and consumption, because it must be

constituted formally: every order is a legal order; every state, a constitutional state. Once this step is taken, the Church can align itself with this new order, as it has with every order. By no means is it obliged to align itself only with states in which the landed nobility or peasantry is the ruling class.

The Church requires a political form. Without it there is nothing to correspond to its intrinsically representative conduct. The domination of "capital" behind the scenes is still no form, though it can undermine an existing political form and make it an empty facade. Should it succeed, it will have "depoliticized" the state completely. Should economic thinking succeed in realizing its utopian goal and in bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society, the Church would remain the only agency of political thinking and political form. Then the Church would have a stupendous monopoly: its hierarchy would be nearer the political domination of the world than in the Middle Ages. According to its own theory and hypothetical structure, the Church would not wish for such a situation. It presupposes coexistence with the political state, a *societas perfecta;* not with a consortium of conflicting interests. It wishes to live with the state in a special community in which two representations confront each other as partners.

One can observe how the understanding of every type of representation disappears with the spread of economic thinking. Still, the hypothetical and theoretical basis of contemporary parliamentarism at least includes the idea of representation. It is even supported by what is technically called the "principle of representation." So far as this principle signifies only a representation (of the electorate), it does not connote anything distinctive. In the constitutional and political literature of the last century, this term stands for a representation of the people in contrast to another representative, namely, the king, although both together (or

when there is a republican constitution, the parliament alone) represent "the nation." One accordingly says of the Church that it has "no representative institutions" because it has no parliament and its representatives do not derive their authority from the people. Consequently, it represents "from above."

Jurisprudence lost both its meaning and the specific concept of representation during the popular struggle with the king for representation in the nineteenth century. The German theory of the state, in particular, developed a scholarly mythology at once monstrous and confused: parliament as a secondary political organ represents another, primary organ (the people), but this primary organ has no will apart from the secondary organ, unless it be by "special proviso"; the two juridical persons are but one, constitute two organs but only one person, and so on. It is enough to read the curious chapter in Georg Jellinek's *Allgemeine Staatslehre* on "Representation and Representative Organs."[23] The simple meaning of the principle of representation is that the members of parliament are representatives of the whole people and thus have an independent authority *vis-à-vis* the voters. Instead of deriving their authority from the individual voter, they continue to derive it from the people. "The member of parliament is not bound by instructions and commands and is answerable to his conscience alone." This means that the personification of the people and the unity of parliament as their representative at least implies the idea of a *complexio oppositorum*, that is, the unity of the plurality of interests and parties. It is conceived in representative rather than economic terms. The proletarian system of soviets therefore seeks to eliminate this remnant of an age devoid of economic thinking and emphasizes that parliamentary delegates are only emissaries and agents, deputies of the producers, with a *"mandat impératif"* (liable to be recalled

at any time), administrative servants of the process of production. The "whole" of the people is only an idea; the whole of the economic process, a material reality.

The intellectual consistency of anti-intellectualism is certainly impressive. In the springtide of socialism, young Bolsheviks turned the struggle for economic-technical thinking into a struggle against the idea, even against every idea. So long as even the ghost of an idea exists, so also does the notion that something preceded the given reality of material things—that there is something transcendent—and this always means an authority from above. To a type of thinking which derives its norms from the economic-technical sphere, this appears as an outside interference, a disturbance of the self-propelling machine. An intelligent person with political instincts who fights against politicians immediately recognizes in any appeal to the idea the claim to representation and authority—a presumption that goes beyond proletarian formlessness and the compact mass of in"carnate" reality in which men have no need of government and "things govern themselves."

Political and juridical forms are equally immaterial and irritating to the consistency of economic thinking. But only where the paradoxical situation arises that this thinking is taken up by fanatics (which can probably happen only in Russia) does it reveal its total enmity against the idea and all noneconomic and nontechnical intelligence. Sociologically, this demonstrates the true revolutionary instinct. Intelligence and rationalism are not in themselves revolutionary. But technical thinking is foreign to all social traditions: the machine has no tradition. One of Karl Marx's seminal sociological discoveries is that technology is the true revolutionary principle, beside which all revolutions based on natural law are antiquated forms of recreation. A society built exclusively on progressive technology would

thus be nothing but revolutionary; but it would soon destroy itself and its technology.

Economic thinking is not so extremely radical. Despite its contemporary alliance with absolute technicism, it can be its opponent. To the economic belong also certain legal concepts, such as property or contract. Yet it confines these to a minimum; above all, to those of private law. In this context, the glaring contradiction between the goal of making the economic into a social principle and the endeavor to perpetuate civil law and especially private property can only be noted in passing. Of interest here is that the tendency of the economic to perpetuate civil law means in effect a limitation of juridical form. Public life is expected to govern itself. It should be governed by public opinion, the opinion of private individuals. Public opinion, in turn, should be governed by a privately owned free press. Nothing in this system is representative, everything is a private matter.

Historically considered, "privatization" has its origin in religion. The first right of the individual in the sense of the bourgeois social order was the freedom of religion. In the historical evolution of the catalogue of liberties—freedom of belief and conscience, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of trade and commerce—it is the fountainhead and first principle. But whatever place is assigned to religion, it always and everywhere manifests its capacity to absorb and absolutize. If religion is a private matter, it also follows that privacy is revered. The two are inseparable. Private property is thus revered precisely because it is a private matter.

This hitherto scarcely recognized correlation explains the sociological development of modern European society, which has its own religion. Without its religion of privacy, the structure of this social order would collapse. The fact that religion is a private matter gives privacy a religious

sanction. In the true sense, the unconditional guarantee of absolute private property can exist only where religion is a private matter, where again it is also the governing principle. The often-quoted passage on religion as a private matter in the Erfurt Program of the German Social Democratic Party[24] is an interesting reversion to liberalism. Karl Kautsky, the theologian of this program, made a correction (in his 1906 pamphlet on the Catholic Church and Christianity[25]) that is as symptomatic as it is innocuously incidental, namely, that religion is less a private matter than a simple matter of the heart.

The juridical foundation of the Catholic Church on the public sphere contrasts with liberalism's foundation on the private sphere. This also is consistent with its representative character and allows the religious to be conceived in such a juridical manner. Thus a high-minded Protestant like Rudolf Sohm[26] could define the Catholic Church as something essentially juridical, while regarding Christian religiosity as essentially non-juridical. In fact, the permeation with juridical elements goes very deep. Much of the seemingly contradictory political behavior of Catholicism so often reproached is explained by its formal juridical character. In the social world, secular jurisprudence also manifests a certain *complexio* of competing interests and tendencies. Like Catholicism, it also evidences a curious mixture of traditional conservatism and revolutionary resistance in line with natural law. Every revolutionary movement confirms that jurists, the "theologians of the existing order," are perceived as specific enemies. Jurists, in turn, are those who support revolution and imbue it with a passion for the rights of the oppressed and the offended.

Owing to its formal superiority, jurisprudence can easily assume a posture similar to Catholicism with respect to alternating political forms in that it can positively align itself with various and sundry power complexes, provided only

there is a sufficient minimum of form "to establish order." Once the new situation permits recognition of an authority, it provides the groundwork for a jurisprudence—the concrete foundation for a substantive form. But despite all this affinity in form, Catholicism goes further because it represents something other and more than secular jurisprudence—not only the idea of justice but also the person of Christ—that substantiates its claim to a unique power and authority. It can deliberate as an equal partner with the state, and thereby create new law, whereas jurisprudence is only a mediator of established law. The law a judge must apply in the state is mediated by the nation, whereby a more or less fixed norm stands between the idea of justice and the individual case.

An international court of justice, independent in the sense that it is not bound to political instructions but only to fundamental principles of law, is closer to the idea of justice. Given its separation from the individual state, which distinguishes it from a state tribunal, it would also claim to represent something autonomous *vis-à-vis* the state, namely, the idea of justice independent of the will and judgment of individual states. Its authority would thus be based on the direct representation of this idea, not on the delegated authority of individual states, even though it might owe its existence to an agreement between these states. Consequently, it must present itself as an original and thus also a universal court of justice. This would be the natural extension of the logical consistency; psychologically, it would be an inference of the original situation of power based on the original legal condition.

One can well understand the misgivings concerning such a tribunal expressed by publicists of powerful states, all of which spring from the concept of sovereignty. The power to decide who is sovereign would signify a new sovereignty. A tribunal vested with such powers would constitute a

supra-state and supra-sovereignty, which alone could create a new order if, for example, it had the authority to decide on the recognition of a new state. Not a Court of Justice but a League of Nations might have such pretensions. But in exercising them, it would become an independent agent. Together with the function of executing the law, managing an administration, etcetera (which might involve independence in financial affairs, budgeting, and other formalities), it would also signify something in and of itself. Its activity would not be limited to the application of existing legal norms, as would a tribunal that is an administrative authority. It would also be more than an arbiter, because in all decisive conflicts it would have to assert its own interests. Thus it would cease to uphold justice exclusively—in political terms, the *status quo*. If it took the constantly changing political situation as its guiding principle, it would have to decide on the basis of its own power what new order and what new state is or is not to be recognized. This could not be determined by the preexisting legal order, because most new states have come into being in opposition to the will of their formerly sovereign ruler. Owing to the rationale of self-assertion, it is conceivable that a conflict with the law might arise. Such a tribunal would not only represent the idea of impersonal justice but a powerful personality as well.

In the proud history of the Roman Church, the ethos of its own power stands side by side with the ethos of justice. It is even enhanced by the Church's prestige, glory, and honor. The Church commands recognition as the Bride of Christ; it represents Christ reigning, ruling and conquering. Its claim to prestige and honor rests on the eminent idea of representation; it engenders the eternal opposition of justice and beauty. The antagonism is inherent in the general condition of human nature, though pious Christians view it as a peculiar form of an even more peculiar malice. The

great betrayal laid to the Catholic Church is that it does not conceive Christ as a private person, does not conceive Christianity as a private matter, something wholly and inwardly spiritual, but rather has given it form as a visible institution. Sohm believed the fall from grace could be perceived in the juridical sphere; others saw it in a more grandiose and profound way as the will to world power. Like every worldwide imperialism that has reached its goal, the Church seeks to bring peace to the world. To the enemies of all forms, this raises the specter of the devil triumphant.

Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor confesses he has consciously succumbed to the wiles of Satan, because he knows that man is by nature evil and vile, a cowardly rebel who needs a master. Only the Roman priest finds the courage to take upon himself all the condemnation owing to such power. With the Grand Inquisitor, Dostoyevsky strongly projected his own, latent atheism into the Roman Church. Every power was something evil and inhuman to his fundamentally anarchistic (and that always means atheistic) instinct. In the temporal sphere, the temptation to evil inherent in every power is certainly unceasing. Only in God is the conflict between power and good ultimately resolved. But the desire to escape this conflict by rejecting every earthly power would lead to the worst inhumanity.

There is a dark and prevalent temper that perceives Catholicism's cold institutionalism as evil and Dostoyevsky's remote formlessness as true Christianity. That is as superficial as anything on the level of emotion and sentiment. It does not even realize the pagan nature of the notion that Christ could appear (in experimental fashion, so to speak) one or many times between His historical existence and His glorious return on the Day of Judgment. More concisely than Dostoyevsky, yet with far greater vision, the genius of a French Catholic devised a picture that at once includes the whole

tension of the antagonism and (through the formulation of a direct appeal to Divine Justice) dialectically forces justice to its logical conclusion in that it preserves law with the forms of judgment and appeal. It is a despicable picture of the Day of Judgment, which Ernest Hello[27] had the courage to depict. When the Judge-of-the-World has pronounced sentence, one of the damned, covered with iniquity, stands fast and, to the horror of all creation, says to the Judge: *J'en appelle.*[28] "With these words the stars ceased to shine." According to the idea of The Last Judgment, however, His verdict is eternally irrevocable *effroyablement sans appel.*[29] To whom dost thou appeal My sentence? asks Jesus Christ the Judge. Amidst a dreadful silence, the damned replies: *"J'en appelle de ta justice à ta gloire."*[30]

In each of the three great forms of representation, the *complexio* of life in all its contradictions is molded into a unity of personal representation. Thus each of the three forms can also evoke a certain anxiety and perplexity, and give new life to the anti-Roman temper. All sectarians and heretics have refused to recognize the extent to which the personalism inherent in the idea of representation is human in the deepest sense. Precisely for this reason, a singularly new type of struggle was signaled when the Catholic Church in the eighteenth century met an opponent who zealously confronted Her with the idea of humanity. The fire and flame of this opponent was especially noble. But where he rose to historical significance, he also succumbed to that fateful antagonism whose appearance aroused so many forces against the Church. As long as the idea of humanity preserved a spontaneous power, its representatives also found the courage to succeed with inhuman power. The humanitarian philosophers of the eighteenth century preached enlightened despotism and the dictatorship of reason. They are self-assured aristocrats. Thus they base their authority and secret societies (i.e., strictly eso-

teric associations) on the claim that they represent the idea of humanity. In this, as in every esoteric construct, lies an inhuman superiority over the uninitiated, the common man, and mass democracy. Who today still has such courage of conviction?

It would be highly instructive to recall the fate of a particular German monument of great humanitarian genius—Mozart's *Magic Flute*. Is it regarded today as something more than genial German music, an idyll, a forerunner of the Viennese operetta? Everyone avers it is also a hymn of the Enlightenment, of the struggle of the sun against the night, light against darkness. Of course, this would also be in complete harmony with the sentiment of a democratic age. By comparison, it might be less acceptable to say that the Queen of the Night, against whom the masonic priest struggles, is the mother in a specific sense. But ultimately, how alarming for men of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the virile arrogance and authoritarian self-confidence of these priests, how diabolical is the contempt for the common man depicted in the character of Papageno, the good-natured *pater familias*, who is intent upon the satisfaction of his economic needs and is disposed of when his wishes are fulfilled and his needs gratified. There is nothing more frightful than this beloved opera, if only one takes the time to understand it in the wider context of the history of ideas. One must compare it with Shakespeare's *Tempest* and recognize how Prospero has become a masonic priest and Caliban a Papageno.

The eighteenth century staked much on self-confidence and the aristocratic concept of secrecy. In a society that no longer has such courage, there can be no more "arcana," no more hierarchy, no more secret diplomacy; in fact, no more politics. To every great politics belongs the "arcanum." Everything takes place on stage (before an audience of Papagenos). Will commercial and industrial secrets still be

permitted? Economic-technical thinking appears to have a peculiar understanding of this type of secrets. Therein may lie once again the beginning of a new, uncontrolled power. For the present, it remains completely in the economic sphere, conceivably little representative. It has as yet only occurred to proletarian councils to rebel against such secrets. One will always hear only of humanity, and therefore not see that once the idea of humanity is realized it will also become subject to the dialectics of every realization. It must cease to be nothing but human.

The Catholic Church in Europe today has no adversary which so openly and vigorously challenges it as an enemy as did this spirit of the eighteenth century. Humanitarian pacifism is incapable of enmity, because its ideal is lost in justice and peace. Many pacifists, though not the best of them, deal only with the plausible calculation that war is usually bad for business—the unshakable rationalistic assertion that in war too much energy and material is squandered. As it exists today, the League of Nations[31] may prove to be a useful institution. But it does not appear as an adversary of the universal Church, even less the spiritual leader of humanity.

The last European adversary of Catholicism was Freemasonry. I am unable to judge whether it still embodies the fire of its heroic age. But whatever spiritual pretensions it may have, they are today as irrelevant to consistent economic thinking as the League of Nations and Catholicism. All are but phantoms to this type of thinking: the one, perhaps a phantom of the future; the other, perhaps a phantom of the past. As has been said: whether one phantom reaches out to another is as inconsequential as whether they come to blows. Humanity is such an abstract idea that even Catholicism appears comprehensible by comparison, because at least it has possible advantages for aesthetic consumption. For the third time, I reiterate that the mate-

riality of economic-thinking capitalists is very close to that of a radical communism. Neither persons nor things require a "government" if the economic-technical mechanism is allowed its own immanent regularity.

If every political authority is rejected in such reasoned arguments, then Bakunin,[32] one of the greatest anarchists of the nineteenth century, appears to have been the naive berserker who was generations ahead of his time in the battle against the idea and the spirit. He swept away all metaphysical and ideological obstacles, then turned with Scythian might against religion and politics, theology, and jurisprudence. His fight with the Italian Mazzini[33] appears as the remote symbolic skirmish of a colossal, world-historical upheaval of greater dimensions than the *Völkerwanderung*.[34] For Bakunin, the theism of the Freemason Mazzini was, like every theistic belief, only evidence of servitude and the true source of all evil—all state and political authority. It was metaphysical centralism.

Marx and Engels were as well atheists. But here the ultimate criterion was the conflict between the educated and the noneducated. The insurmountable antipathy both these men of the western half of Germany harbored for Ferdinand Lasalle, who stemmed from the eastern half, was more than an unheeded whim. But their hatred of the Russian arose from their most deeply rooted instincts and manifested itself in the struggle within the First International. Conversely, everything in the Russian anarchist rose in revolt against the "German Jew" (born in Trier) and against Engels. What continually provoked Bakunin was their intellectualism. They had too much of "the idea," too much "grey matter." The anarchist can only utter the word "*cervelle*"[35] with sibilant fury. Behind this word he rightly suspected the claim to authority, discipline, and hierarchy. To him, every type of cerebralism is hostile to life.

Bakunin's untamed barbarian instinct hit with unerring certainty on a seemingly incidental but in reality very decisive concept, to which the German revolutionaries gave a strange moral fervor when, having created the bellicose class of the "proletariat," they baptized the "*Lumpenproletariat.*" This designation (*à la fois méprisant et pittoresque*[36]) can actually be regarded as a symptom, since it is bound inextricably with so many different value connotations. Social thinking in all its manifestations is related in some way to this remarkable mixture called *Lumpenproletariat*. It is a "proletariat," but to it belong also the bohemian of the bourgeois age, the Christian beggar, and all the insulted and the injured. It has played a somewhat hazy but essential role in all revolutions and rebellions. Bolshevik writers have in recent years accorded it a vindication.

When Marx and Engels are at pains to distinguish their true proletariat from this "rotten" rabble, they betray how strongly they are still influenced by traditional moral and West European conceptions of education. They want to imbue their proletariat with a social value. This is only possible with moral concepts. But here Bakunin had the incredible courage to see the *Lumpenproletariat* as the harbinger of the future and to appeal to the *canaille*.[37] What fulminating rhetoric:

> In my view, the flower of the proletariat is above all the great masses—the millions of uncivilized, disinherited, wretched and illiterate people whom Mr. Engels and Mr. Marx would consign to the paternal domination of a very strong government. In my view, the flower of the proletariat is precisely this inexhaustible cannon fodder of all governments—this great mob, still little touched by bourgeois civilization, which bears in its

> womb, in its passions and instincts, all the seeds of the socialism of the future.

Nowhere has the decisive educational antagonism been so powerfully exhibited as in this statement. It sets the stage whereon the essence of the present situation is clearly recognizable and Catholicism stands as a political force.

Since the nineteenth century, there have been in Europe two great masses opposed to West European tradition and education, two great streams crowding their banks: the class-conscious proletariat of the big cities and the Russian masses estranged from Europe. From the standpoint of traditional West European culture, both are barbarians. Where they have a sense of their own power, they proudly call themselves barbarians. The fact that they met on Russian soil, in the Russian Soviet Republic, has a profound justification in the history of ideas. However dissimilar and even antagonistic the two groups, however inexplicable the whole process in terms of all previous ideological constructs and the specific theory of Marxism, the alliance is no accident of world history.

I know there may be more Christianity in the Russian hatred of West European culture than in liberalism and German Marxism. I know that great Catholic thinkers deem liberalism a more malevolent enemy than avowed socialist atheism. I know this formlessness may contain the potential for a new form that might also give shape to the economic-technical age. Having withstood everything, the Catholic Church need not decide these questions. Here also, it will be the *complexio* of all that withstands. It is the inheritor.

There is, nevertheless, a type of decision the Church cannot avoid—a type of decision that must be taken in the present day, in the concrete situation, in every single generation. With respect to such decisions, the Church opts for one side or the other, even though it does not declare itself

for any of the contending parties. Thus it stood on the side of the Counterrevolution in the first half of the nineteenth century. On this basis, I maintain: In that remote skirmish with Bakunin, the Catholic Church and the Catholic concept of humanity stood on the side of the Idea and West European civilization, closer to Mazzini than to the atheistic socialism of the Russian anarchist.

NOTES

1. [*Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, published posthumously in 1898. *Memoirs, Being the Reflections and Recollections of Otto Prince von Bismarck*, 2 Vols., Trans. by A. J. Butler (New York: H. Fertig, 1966). Trans.]

2. [The *Kulturkampf* was initiated when Bismarck passed laws in 1871/72 aimed at the state veto of the clergy. These laws were in response to the Vatican Council or *Vaticanum* (1869-1870), which raised the papacy to the status of an absolute monarchy and thus changed the relation between Church and State—not only with the Vatican's demand of absolute freedom in the training of the clergy but in its assumption of ethical superiority *vis-à-vis* the state. In 1887 Bismarck ended the *Kulturkampf* by capitulating to the Curia. Trans.]

3. [Marc René Montalembert (1714-1800), a French military engineer and writer. Trans.]

4. [Jean Baptiste Henri Lacordaire (1802-1861), a French ecclesiastic and orator. Trans.]

5. [Both of these quotations appear in English in Schmitt's text, but there is no clue as to their author. Trans.]

6. [Cardinal Desiré Joseph Mercier (1851-1926) preached the revival of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans.]

7. [Michael Felix Korum (1840–1921) worked for a settlement of the *Kulturkampf*. Trans.]

8. [Felix Antoine Philibert Dupanloup (1802–1878), Bishop of Orleans, opposed the dogma of papal infallibility both before and during the Vatican Council, but was one of the first to accept it once it was decreed. Trans.]

9. [Marcionism, a sect formed by the heretical Roman leader, Marcion (170?), accepted no scriptures other than the ten Pauline epistles and a gospel altered from Luke. It rejected the doctrines of the Incarnation and Resurrection, and taught a form of dualism whereby the God of the Jews is different from the God of the Christians. It practiced an extreme form of asceticism and lasted until the seventh century. Trans.]

10. [Johann Joseph von Goerres (1776–1848), a German writer who upheld the power of the Catholic Church. Trans.]

11. [In Schmitt's analysis of political romanticism, he notes that it was never a part of romantic conceptual or actual reality to attempt to change the world, but rather to resolve its reputed dualism by a leap into a "higher third" realm, which in reality is only another realm from which one might escape with an either/or. On Goerres and the "higher third," see Carl Schmitt, *Political Romanticism*, trans. by Guy Oakes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), pp. 31, 49, 87f, 120, etc. Trans.]

12. [Joseph Ernest Renan (1823–1892), a French philologist and religious critic. Trans.]

13. ["Every victory of Rome is a victory of reason." Trans.]

14. [Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem (1861–1916), a French physicist who also wrote on religion. Trans.]

15. [*Les Soirées de Saint-Petersburg* (Paris: Cosson, 1821). Trans.]

16. [Louis Veuillot (1813–1883), a Catholic layman who advocated absolute papal supremacy. Trans.]

17. [Léon Bloy (1846–1917), a Catholic layman who preached spiritual revival through suffering and poverty. Trans.]

18. [Robert Hughes Benson (1871–1914), a priest and writer who became privy chamberlain to Pope Pius X. Trans.]

19. [Paul Charles Joseph Bourget (1852–1935), a French novelist and literary critic. Trans.]

20. [This quotation is from Francis Thompson, "Shelley, an Essay," in *The Dublin Review* (July 1908). Trans.]

21. [Hippolyte Adolphe Taine (1828–1893), a French literary critic, philosopher and historian. Trans.]

22. [Jacques Benigne Bossuet (1627–1704), a French theologian and gifted orator. Trans.]

23. ["Repräsentation und repräsentative Organe," *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Berlin: O. Haering, 1900). In Schmitt's famous lecture at the Handels-Hochschule in Berlin on January 18, 1930, he specifically criticized Jellinek for separating jurisprudence and sociology: *Hugo Preuss: Sein Staatsbegriff und seine Stellung in der deutschen Staatslehre* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1930). Trans.]

24. [The Erfurt Program was adopted at the Congress of the German Social Democratic Party in 1891—a year after the fall of Bismarck and the end of the antisocialist legislation that had made the party illegal in 1878. Trans.]

25. [Kautsky's pamphlet first appeared as a series of articles in *Neue Zeit* (1906, Vol. 21, Nos. 1–3). See Karl Kautsky, *Die Sozialdemokratie und die Katholische Kirche*, Second Revised Edition (Berlin: Buchhandlung Vorwärts, 1906). Trans.]

26. [Rudolf Sohm (1841–1917) was probably the most brilliant dogmatic jurist of his time. Working in a period in which the conflict between Romanists and Germanists was not as sharp as it had been, he was attracted to both Roman and Germanic law and, later in life, also to canon law, and achieved equal fame in all three. Trans.]

27. [Ernest Hello (1828–1885), a French Roman Catholic author of philosophical essays with a strongly mystical bent, who influenced the Roman Catholic revival in the nineteenth century and still had many admirers into the twentieth century. Trans.]

28. ["I appeal." This and the following French quotations appear in Léon Bloy, *Salut par les Juifs* (1892), Second Edition (Paris: G. Cres, 1924), pp. 88–90. Bloy indicates that he took the story from Ernest Hello. Trans.]

29. ["Fearfully without appeal." Trans.]

30. ["I appeal for justice to your glory." Trans.]

31. [The United Nations could be substituted. Trans.]

32. [In *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, Schmitt writes: "For Proudhon and Bakunin, anarchism meant a battle against every sort of systematic unity, against the centralized uniformity of the modern state, against the professional parliamentary politician, against bureaucracy, the military, and police, against what was felt to be the metaphysical centralism of belief in God. The analogy of both conceptions of God and the state forced themselves on Proudhon under the influence of restoration philosophy. He gave this philosophy a revolutionary anti-state and anti-theological twist, which Bakunin drew out to its logical conclusion" (p. 67). At the conclusion of *Political Theology*, we read: "For the anarchists, every pretension to a decision is necessarily harmful, because true social order is naturally revealed if the immanence of life is not disturbed by such pretensions. Of course, this radical antithesis compels them to make a decision against the decision. Bakunin, the greatest anarchist of the nineteenth century, exhibits the strange paradox that in theory he must become the theologian of the struggle against theology and in practice the dictator of the struggle against dictatorship" (p. 66, translation altered). Trans.]

33. [Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) was one of the major architects of the Italian state and also a political and social thinker. Influenced both by French romantics and Saint-Simon, he reacted against the rationalistic elements of eighteenth century thought but absorbed the principles of democracy. From Condorcet he took the doctrine of the indefinite progress of mankind and developed an essentially intuitive view of divinely guided historical evolution progressing through stages. He designated the new stage as the "social epoch," which would be inspired by a new religion to replace obsolete Christianity. Mankind would be reorganized according to the principle of association, and since this principle required individual freedom and political equality, all nations would presumably adopt a democratic and republican form of government. However, freedom and equality were not conceived as substantive but as instrumental to the individual in performing his duty. The workers' movement begun by Mazzini's Italian followers in the 1860s lost out to Bakuninism in the 1870s and to Marxism in the 1880s and thereafter. Trans.]

34. [The migration of peoples, especially the movement into Southern and Western Europe of the Teutonic peoples, Huns and Slavs, from the second century A.D., reached its peak in the fifth and sixth centuries with the settlement of Norsemen in England and France. Trans.]

35. [Brains. Trans.]

36. [At once contemptible and picturesque. Trans.]

37. [Mob. Trans.]

Appendix

THE VISIBILITY OF THE CHURCH: A SCHOLASTIC CONSIDERATION

Carl Schmitt

Everything that can be said about the visibility of the Church stems from the following two tenets: "Man is not alone in the world"; "The world is good, and what evil there is in the world is the result of the sin of man." Both obtain their religious significance from the fact that God has become man. If one speaks of them at all, it should not be to convince heathens or transcendentalists but rather as if conversing with a Christian, because the point is not to discover the irrefutable but to find the truth.

Historians of early Christianity, who have concluded that the first Christians and even Christ himself were indifferent to the things of this world because they expected the end of the world tomorrow or the day after, base themselves on a trite psychopathological analysis of such behavior. Whether or not their psychology is right is of no interest to those of religious persuasion, for whom it is much more a question of whether it is right to let mundane things take their own course, since the world may end tomorrow or in millions of years. From a religious standpoint, the poverty of their psychology can be seen by anyone horrified at the inevitable prospect of his own death. A true believer has no doubt the world will end tomorrow or in the near future.

The psychological effect of apathy and indifference can also be obtained by dwelling on my own death, which I must face in the foreseeable future or even more in the unforesee-

able present, rather than on history or on my career. The fact that the world still has not come to an end, despite the expectation of believing Christians, does not disprove their religion. Conversely, it is also true that millions of people who expected to live more than a hundred years have died. Why should Christians be interested in the end of the world at all, whereas today an autonomous spiritualist is interested only in himself and believes every man is his own judge (and consequently his own executioner).

When man stands before God, the world and all its inhabitants become as nothing. There are no friends or lovers to stand by him. There are no companions in the kingdom of God; no marriage and no contract. No one can write books about the Kingdom of God. All the touching words written about it have come from those who have never been there. No one, not even a genius, has spoken the last word, and the Word of God can only say no ear has ever heard it.

Whoever speaks is no longer alone in the world. However, it would be false to say man is alone in the world and God is not with him. Instead of the alternative, that would be a combination of both. Man is either alone or in the world. As long as he is truly alone, he is not in the world, that is, he is no longer even a man, and as long as he is a man and in this world, he is not alone.

Only God is alone. The feeling of indescribable, insurmountable loneliness no man of value ever loses, the certainty one can never expect help from another in the most important things, the knowledge no man can console another and any consolation based on the approval of other men or contact with them is only a creature comfort and a dangerous illusion — all these verities do not prove man is truly alone in the world. They are indications of a sinful world and of the longing for God, who is alone. It would be sophistry, betraying either the crudest materialism or confusing man with God, were one to conclude from the

loneliness of God that man is closest to Him in his greatest physical and psychical loneliness (as if mighty Tamerlane would compare himself to Almighty God) and that his relations with God were only a personal matter, that it would be more appropriate to pray to "My Father" than to "Our Father."

Although God is alone, He is also omnipresent in the world. To take refuge in God does not mean to flee the world or even to abandon it and withdraw into pure spirituality, as though it were something incommensurable with religion, to leave it to its own devices (then the best in the world would indeed be a command) instead of letting its law proceed from the mouth of God. Those moments in which man's longing for solitude in God is already fulfilled in this life are allowed only to the elect few, as recompense and consolation for long and active service. But no one is entitled to turn a subjective experience into the criterion of a proper Christian life. As with all essential things, one must strive for success never as the result of one's own endeavors but always and only by the grace of God.

A religious experience should not be obtained from a psychic phenomenon. A didactic political system seeking to shape human behavior in such a way as to guarantee this experience (and guard against the illusion of some private sensation) would in all probability do everything necessary to create something so esoteric it would always be protected against any profane interference. For if true solitude is in God, then the way of man to God must not be a negation of community with other men, any more than suicide can be considered an act of mortification in a Christian sense. Whether someone can be called a true Christian has nothing to do with the intensity of impatience with which he seeks to bind himself to God but rather with the path he takes. The path is determined by the law of God, that is, the *pan rema* with which Christ admonished the tempter when he

challenged Christ to make bread from stones.[1] It means the rejection of the immediacy, which Christ the mediator and His means (the Church) would overcome in order to still the hunger for God.

Everything lawful in this world destroys everything individual. The statement that all men are equal before the law has the accuracy of an analytical judgment, so that, if reversed, a law can be defined as that for which equality exists. A natural law no less than its prototype—the juridical law regulating human relations—respects a distinction between persons. The first, most primitive allusion to a contract made the participating individuals into contracting parties—into opponents, who can no longer say they have changed their minds, that "in fact" they wanted something different, that it is a violation of their "innermost self" to compel them to fulfill the contract or anything of the kind. The fact man is not alone in the world leads to the conclusion that it is no longer a question of his individuality.

If the lawfulness of human relations develops according to its own immanent and purely mundane logic, then there will no longer be any respect of an individual in history. All institutions established to guarantee that man may make the most of himself in his little room or apartment, or in the framework of laws, or wherever, will not protect him from the possibility that one fine day he may be taken from his abode and made to understand what it means not to be alone in a God-forsaken world.

Before God, man is nothing. But only in the world is he truly without hope. No lawgiver would ever be so wise and so benevolent as to save man from the consequences of worldly lawfulness. But God saves him in this world through a fabulous upheaval in that He grounds all lawfulness in every word that proceedeth out of His mouth. If a Christian obeys authority because it is grounded in and bound by God, he obeys God and not authority. This is the

only revolution in world history that deserves to be called great—Christianity provided a new foundation for mundane authority. The great proviso which makes this acknowledgment not something hypocritical but rather contingent appears to the historian as a "peculiar mixture of radicalism and conservatism."[2] For a political program which views property, income, or even education as its constituent elements, this mixture is absurd. But its wealth of contradictions has many counterparts (for example, the mixture of pride and humility in the devotional formula "by the grace of God") and is only an expression of the fundamental dualism that has dominated the world since the beginning of Christianity.

What rightly can be considered and perceived as human personality exists only in the realm of mediation between God and the mundane world. A man totally dedicated to God is as little an individual as one totally immersed in the mundane world. Individuality coexists only in that God keeps the person in the world. The person is unique in the world and thus also in the community. His relation *ad se ipsum* is not possible without a relation *ad alterum*.[3] To be in the world means to be with others. From a spiritual standpoint, all visibility is construed in terms of a constitution of community. The members of the community derive their dignity from God and thus cannot be destroyed by the community. But they can only return to God through the community. Thus arises a visible Church.

Man is not alone in the world. God stands by him. Thus the world cannot destroy him. But man is not alone in the world also in the original sense, that is, he is in the company of other men. Thus he remains in his relation to God in the community and its mediation.

The visibility of the Church is based on something invisible. The concept of the visible Church is itself something invisible. Like all reality, it loses its actuality in

relation to God because God is the only true reality. Thus the true visibility of the Church is invisible. There is no invisible Church that is not visible and no visible Church that is not invisible. Thus the Church can be *in* but not *of* this world.

An arrangement making the invisible visible must be rooted in the invisible and appear in the visible. The mediator descends, because the mediation can only proceed from above, not from below. Salvation lies in that God becomes man (not that man becomes God). Just as Christ had a real body, so must the Church have a real body. This often repeated metaphor assumes an argument of the highest dignity because it refers to an identity in the logical structure of both processes and concretely manifests the marvelous structure of this same "mediation," which constitutes the essence of the Church.

One cannot believe God became man without believing there will also be a visible Church as long as the world exists. Every religious sect which has transposed the concept of the Church from the visible community of believing Christians into a *corpus mere mysticum*[4] basically has doubts about the humanity of the Son of God. It has falsified the historical reality of the incarnation of Christ into a mystical and imaginary process. In so doing, one of course arrives at a postulate of immediacy, namely, that Christ was not merely born in Bethlehem in Palestine in the year 1 but for every man everywhere and in every age. But that is no longer the physical, visible incarnation, which the most inward of all Christians, [Sören] Kierkegaard, maintained with such fervor.

No age, no people, no individual would dare ask that Christ be born again—in reality. The audacity of such a notion is clear to everyone. The justification of the sentiment lies in that no one can ignore the fact that the concrete historical process of the incarnation of Christ is bound with

the concrete present—the visible institution that bears the unbroken chain.

Although God became man and man heard his Word in human speech, the dualism that came into the world through the sin of man also affected the Word. It made a means of earthly aims out of the heavenly body of divine thought, even as right has been deformed into a means of material might, and the identity of good and useful turned into the deceptive antithesis of autonomy and heteronomy. This ghastly confusion, this loss of the transparency of life, of thought and language, is the most effective means of sin, with its total lack of agreement, its veiling of evil in utility, and the irresistible logic of its vested interests. Through the horrible contraposition of right and might, it has succeeded in making the visibility of the Church into something invisible in a material sense, thereby making it necessary to distinguish between true visibility and factual concreteness.

The visibility of the Church derives from its essence, which is mediation. But mediation remains a task that must be regenerated constantly. Thus it is possible that any historical reality acts politically, as does the Church, that is, in the general sense of the "official" Church, despite the fact it is not identical with the visible Church. Yet the generally accepted view is itself already a falsification. The visible Church is always the official Church, which means that, as far as it is concerned, the transformation of spiritual tasks and functions into [public] offices, the separation of the office from whomever happens to occupy it, is essential. Should the Church eliminate the distinction between the essential and the accidental, and make an official announcement in the mundane political sense that the inessential can become the essential or even that the false can become the true, then it would be possible to distinguish between the official and the visible Church.

Persons and measures embodying power to represent the Church at any given moment are not identical with the visible Church. Otherwise, might—the mere factual—would again become right, and the wicked claim could be made that sin and all its works would disappear with the Church. What was not admissible with Christ—to bring the human into conflict with the divine and concrete-factual reality into opposition with the idea—is possible on the next level of mediation—in the Church, which is exposed to the means it wants to influence.

The religious possibility of Protestantism is based on the distinction between the visible and the concrete Church, which will obtain as long as there is sin in the world and men are still sinners—until the Day of Judgment. Yet the justification for the possibility of Protestantism does not lie in the division of the Church. The visible Church also contains within itself the protest against what is wickedly concrete and merely historical, and it does not require any other new Church of its own for this protest.

The visibility of the Church can by no means be negated by a visible Church, because every Church is visible by definition. The negation is directed only against what is concrete and accidental. Everyone is as great as what he negates. Objections raised against the human and concrete Church have been addressed to the divine and visible Church. On the basis of a misunderstood visibility, the conclusion has been drawn that visibility makes reasonable reform impossible and that, as with everything mundane, it is the work of the devil. But the visibility of the Church is as little the work of the devil as is the creation of the world. It always remains a task whose fulfillment makes the concrete Church visible, but this fulfillment is always incomplete.

The individual's critique is never deprived of the foundation. As soon as there is contact with God, even through

many levels of mediation, the revolutionary power of faith can no longer be abolished. Also in the Church, there is the maxim that one must obey God more than man. The proviso that this belongs to the power of every individual is so strong and sublime that it is valid even with regard to the infallible instance. Of course, there is always the Jesuit's objection, that the pope was infallible. But whether the given pope was in fact the legitimate pope could not be decided with reference to his infallibility. Among several rival popes, there can be only one legitimate pope.

Carried to its logical conclusion, there is even the possibility that in times of the utmost confusion the Antichrist would become pope, should God allow it. But he would be no legitimate pope, therefore also no Vicar of Christ on earth, only one with the factual semblance of a "legitimate pope." The incongruity between the concrete and the visible Church would then become a clear contradiction—the worst punishment for the evil of man, more terrible than the division of the Church, which for both sides is still a severe retribution. However, despite all the obscuring, the few true believers would remain even then the visible Church, would hold to the unbroken chain of the imitation of Christ in the priestly, educational and pastoral offices in a visible, that is, juridical continuity. Then, too, they should not abandon the world and leave it to its own devices. The end of the world, which they would await and whose awaiting would keep them steadfast, would not be Nirvana but rather a new and transfigured world that is nevertheless the same world.

He who is lost in sin would of course not see the visible Church, would notice nothing and not let anything disturb him in his daily routine. But he has never noticed anything. He could also see nothing in the greatest worldly night of the Church, wherein the visible Church can be recognized also in its mundane glory. The Church remains, like each

of its members, always *peregrina in saeculo et pertinens ad civitatem Dei.*[5]

Whoever recognizes how deep is the sin of man is compelled by the incarnation of God to believe that man and the world are "by nature good," because God can will no evil. Whoever has an eye for identities sees that the doctrine of paradise, of the original goodness of man "by nature"—transformed into the philosophy of nature — is the doctrine of the priority of life over death. Organic nature did not develop from the inorganic. Life did not develop from death. Life is not a mushroom growing out of death. Death is a lack of life. God is not a product of the natural selection of devils. The devil is the wretched result of the absence of God, as is all evil an absence of good.

The lawfulness of the visible world in the Christian conception is thus by nature good. The juridical regulation of human relations existed before evil and sin, and was not its result. On the basis of the most important human relation, marriage, which was raised to the level of a sacrament and a legal institution, Saint Augustine considers it necessary to emphasize that God instituted marriage *ante peccatum hominis ab initio*,[6] as woman was created from man *ante peccatum*.[7] Marriage, however, has become the foundation of an allegory whose most profound significance lies in that all its components are consecrated—that the woman conduct herself toward the man as the man toward his Church, and as the Church toward Christ the mediator. It presents a whole hierarchy of mediation, the ground of which is none other than the Word of God. The consolidation of these relations as legal relations, the transition to the firmer foundation which religiosity obtains in the framework of the Church, as love in marriage, the limitation of the pneumatic in the juridical, also follow the rhythm of the origin of the visible in the invisible God. But it always retains its unity, because God also is only one.

The idea obtains its visibility in the Word, just as a breath of air becomes a sound when it is forced through a reed. Despite the restriction, the formulation (the transferring to another legality, as in speech and language)—the Word—was God. Only the Word could become flesh, because the embodiment of the Word is already visualization and the incarnation of man a further step in this substantiation. Even as a man would give himself over to an alien power whose laws he dare not transgress, so divinity entered humanity and then the great institution of mediation: the Church, a corporate entity. Were this evil, then no Word of God would have been possible.

The unity of God assumes the form of a legal succession in the historicity of a mediation through mortal man, because only in this way could it be made visible in time. One God. One Church.

Today, monotheists think it enough to say they find it impossible to hold the Word in such high regard. They are so pretentious as to hold that their independent feeling for God need not be bound by ties to the Church. That is like a man going to a bordello because his marriage is so strong he need not be bound by a monogamous relation. There are even Christians who hide their faith so well that in the world one can see only paganism and idolatry.

Since God actually became visible man, no visible man should leave the visible world to its own devices. To do so would be to cut the thread that ties God to the world at its center: visible man. He would then not have two souls but none, and then two roles: the "pure" Christian who serves God in the most extreme invisibility; and, separate therefrom, the one who serves mammon in the most manifest visibility and is proud of the fact he has liberated *spiritualia* from its logically sordid association with *temporalibus*.

Given that there is nothing without authority, an imitation of God developed in the world from the imitation of Christ—

an arrogant caricature of divine order. Now the merciful God Himself must flee. He remains at the side of sinners and criminals, even of a man who, out of desperation, blasphemes Him. But He is not to be found among those who dare to assign Him his functions and to limit His jurisdiction and competence *vis-à-vis* the imitation of Himself.

The devil has his own legality. He is not nothing, but something, even if something lamentable. Were he nothing, the world would not be evil but rather nothing. He is not the negation of God, only His miserable and malicious aping, which is punished with its own horrible norm of development. Faith without works leads to works without faith. The man so exacting that to him every formulation of the infinity of God appears contradictory and insincere, who remains silent for sincere reasons because every word would be a lie if he did not simultaneously make a serious effort to destroy his own concrete visibility, would tomorrow lie in equal sincerity because only the lie would be the true expression of an untruthful nature. In place of the visible Church appears a Church of the visible, a religion of material evidence, and the man who rejects everything official because it would be untruthful arrives at something more untruthful than everything official, namely the official rejection of the official.

NOTES

This chapter is a translation of "Die Sichtbarkeit der Kirche: Eine scholastische Erwägung," in *Summa: Eine Vierteljahresschrift* (1917), pp. 71–79.

1. [Cf. Matthew 4/3–4: "And when the tempter came to him, he said, If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread. But he answered and said, It is written, Man shall not live by bread alone, but by *every*

word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God" (italics added). Trans.]

2. [Cf. Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teachings of Christian Churches*, translated by Olive Wyon (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 2 Vols. Trans.]

3. [In an earlier work Schmitt observed that the un- and post-Kantian belief that nature is good and men are "by nature good" is "not a sociological phenomenon, nothing *ad alterum*," that "the sociological nature of language, the relation *ad alterum*, that is, the practical purpose, is that which makes it ugly." See Carl Schmitt, *Theodor Däublers "Nordlicht": Drei Studien über die Elemente, den Geist und die Aktualität des Werkes* (1916), Second Edition (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), pp. 53 and 43, respectively. Trans.]

4. [B]ody with mystical qualities.

5. [A stranger in the secular world and reaching out to the City of God. Trans.]

6. [From the beginning before man's sin. See *The City of God*, translated by Marcus Dods (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), Book XIV/22, p. 469. Trans.]

7. [Before sin. Ibid., Book XIII/14, p. 422. Trans.]

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About the Translator

G. L. ULMEN is a senior editor for *Telos: A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought*. Dr. Ulmen has published widely on juridical and political issues in both Europe and the United States. His latest book is *Politischer Mehrwert: Eine Studie über Max Weber und Carl Schmitt* (1991).