Del

A Metacomm

IAN BUCHA

Deleuzism

For Tanya Buchanan

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A Metacommentary

Ian Buchanan

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Acknowledgements

It is characteristic of philosophical writing that it must continually confront the question of representation. In its finished form philosophy will, it is true, assume the quality of a doctrine, but it does not lie within the power of mere thought to confer such a form. Philosophical doctrine is based on historical codification.

(Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*)

Part One

Deleuzism

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Introduction:

The Problem of the Two Books

> A great book is always the inverse of another book that could only be
> written in the soul, with silence and blood.
> (Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*)

Every writer writes two books, Melville says, one for which we need only
ink, and another which is inscribed in blood and anguish on our soul.[1]
(Borges's stunning fantasy of writing the same book, word for word, but
from scratch, and thereby enriching the original without actually copying
it, is taken as corroboration of Melville's insight by Deleuze.[2]) Deleuze's
unvarnished admiration for this percept can be seen in the fact that he
makes it his own, which is to say Deleuze does not only recite it from time
to time, either to have us savour its ludic wisdom, or to exploit its
talismanic appeal, he actually builds his entire hermeneutic programme
around it. His rejection of psychoanalysis, semiotics, and all forms of
structuralism, which as we shall see in the first chapter stems from a
wholesale rejection of any form of expressionist reasoning, which of
course includes representation, can be traced to an 'elementalising'
meditation of his own – found threaded throughout his work – on this
mysterious image. The fundamental theoretical problem Deleuze has with
psychoanalysis – the one that leads Freud into error, he says – is that it
supposes its signifiers are adequate expressions of its signifieds, such that
one can always decipher the latter in the former (obviously enough, both
semiotics and structuralism are guilty of this too). It amounts to thinking
one can read the book of the soul in the book written in ink, which cannot
be done because that book, as Blanchot said, is defined by its absence.[3]
Yet if we still want to read that other book, then some new hermeneutic
relation must be established – Deleuzism.

From this angle, the problem Deleuze engineers for himself as his
starting point seems practically insurmountable. For while the image of

the two books admits to there being something like a manifest content and a latent content, inasmuch as it does not allow one to represent or express the other, it implies a strange sort of relation that seems not to entail any direct communication. Of course, Deleuze is by no means the first philosopher to have elaborated such an abstruse schism. Indeed, much of western philosophy is similarly built around apparently insuperable schisms: for instance, Plato separated image and copy, and Hegel ramified this by segregating appearance and reality. If it were only for the fact that they created a hermeneutic out of a schism that Deleuze counted these two as his enemies we would have to charge him with bad conscience, since evidently he resorts to the same strategy himself. But as I've indicated already, it is not the fact of an originating schism that Deleuze objects to, but rather the assumption that the schism can so readily be bridged with so simple a mediating device as expression. While such a device preserves the integrity of the two terms, rigorously maintaining the copy status of the copy and the original status of the original, according to Deleuze it does not actually explain the relation between the two but in fact actively suppresses the very question.

In our time, as Deleuze shows, the oedipal-complex is the most significant example of an expressionist formulation being used to suppress inquiry into the nature of the relations bridging an originating schism, namely Freud's own 'Copernican revolution' (to use Kant's term).[4] By splitting the mind into two communicating, but incommensurable halves, the conscious and the unconscious, Freud was able to solve the problem of parataxis (which, in his honour, we today know as a 'Freudian slip') by arguing that it evidenced the persistence of a deeper, in essence inaccessible set of cognitive processes that have somehow eluded both our censor and our translator, which under normal conditions would either inhibit the flow of raw thoughts into the conscious or recode them to conform with its conventions. Up to this point Deleuze is in agreement with Freud, he even follows a similar procedure in his own work of using error and nonsense to recover the logic of sense and meaning, and he most certainly adheres to the notion of the unconscious as uncoded flow (desire).[5] His disagreement with Freud turns on Freud's explanation of censorship. In short, whereas Freud says we repeat because we repress, Deleuze says we repress because we repeat; the implication being that for Freud Oedipus is a cause, something we cannot entirely repress and are therefore condemned to repeat, while for Deleuze it is an effect, something that serves to obstruct our vision of the true cause.[6] As I will illustrate at length in the first chapter, Oedipus is not even a quasi-cause in Deleuze's view.

By making the unconscious into a classical theatre playing but a single drama, of which the conscious is an everlasting figuration, Freud destroys his own hermeneutic insight by making the two halves commensurable all over again. His expressionism is thus a sad form of that subsumption of difference perpetrated by philosophy everywhere in Deleuze's view of things. The Deleuzian challenge is therefore to think the difference between two incommensurable series like the decoded flow of desire and the coded flow of thought without recourse to strategies of homogenisation such as expressionism amounts to in practice in the hands of everyone except Spinoza (the special case of Spinoza's expressionism will be discussed in the second chapter).[7] The difficulty of this peculiarly Deleuzian challenge resides in preserving radical difference, not overcoming it, in the determination of a form of communication that achieves the seemingly impossible, namely a connection of heterogeneous series that does not compromise their heterogeneity. 'Would not "too much" difference between the series render any such operation impossible? Are we not condemned to rediscover a privileged point at which difference can be understood only by virtue of a resemblance between things which differ and the identity of the third party?'[8] How, in other words, does one get to the book of the soul from the ink book without making it into something like a signified? Some kind of 'communicating' term is required to bring about the full Deleuzian hermeneutic revolution, a dark precursor.

Dark precursors are those moments in a text which must be read in reverse if we are not to mistake effects for causes, as Freud does. But how do we recognise them? It is at this point that we must acknowledge and comprehend the pre-eminence Spinoza is accorded by Deleuze, for Spinoza's premise that our way of knowing condemns us to inadequate ideas is found reiterated here. So is Spinoza's condemnation of expressionism as emanation, which I will explain in more detail in the first chapter. More importantly, for our present purposes, it is Spinoza's solution, his explanation of the process by which inadequate ideas can be made to give rise to adequate ideas, that saves Deleuze from a seemingly impossible situation. Not only that, it provides Deleuze with his rationale for his whole enterprise – it is the motivation of his devices. It may also be that Deleuze and Spinoza are vilified for the same reasons. ('It is said that Spinoza kept his coat with a hole pierced by a knife thrust as a reminder that thought is not always loved by men.'[9]). Yet, as Negri reminds us, Spinoza was not killed, either by instruments of the State, the Church, or any of their more zealous adherents. So we must suppose the leap he inaugurated was somehow in step with the times, his own and

ours too.[10] For as both Negri and Deleuze assert, Spinoza was a philosopher of the future, a prince. Is that future Deleuze's present? By pursuing adequate ideas and by not being deceived by inadequate ideas in any of their many guises – superstition, religious dogma, political doctrine, ideology and so forth – we make ourselves free, where free means living in harmonious relations with others.[11] This sublime vision of collective existence persists in Deleuze's thinking, giving it a historicity too little mentioned.

But we shouldn't think this is what nomadism means (it is merely an example of a viable and actually existing alternative to the dominant capitalist paradigm, not a model or prototype). We should however read his work as utopian in the strictest sense of the word. The best society, he argues, following Spinoza, is one that exempts thought from the obligation to obey. 'As long as thought is free, hence vital, nothing is compromised. When it ceases being so, all the other oppressions are possible, and already realised, so that any action becomes culpable, every life threatened.'[12] The pursuit of adequate ideas is alone what keeps thought free. Thinking on this question (how does one get to adequate ideas from the inadequate ones we are condemned to?), one realises that the complexity of Deleuze's work is a function of the difficulty of this task. If one finds shifts and variations in his work – for instance, one might consider the whole of *A Thousand Plateaus* to be a rewrite of the 'Savages, Barbarians, Civilized Men' chapter of *Anti-Oedipus* – then it is undoubtedly owing to the fact that an enormous amount of 'working-out' (experimentation, in other words) is necessary to get beyond inadequate ideas.[13] By the same token, if one can consider *What is Philosophy?* to be a moment of secondary revision, as I do, it is also due to the fact that the entire oeuvre is the working-through of a single problem. His methods reflect his rationale: the aim is to reach a plateau of adequate ideas.

Sometimes it isn't possible to actually set foot on this plateau because language isn't up to the task of constructing it. So Deleuze resorts to evoking it by whatever means he has to hand. In view of this, we need to read his work with an eye to what he provokes (in this sense he is a true utopian): we have to assume his method of presentation is strategic and try and work out what he is trying to do (it would be a travesty as well as an extraordinarily reactionary step to start asking what he means!). The physics of his ideas, as I will call it, is oftentimes in need of its own metaphysics, a discourse dedicated at once to presenting a new conceptualisation of the social and creating the conditions of acceptance necessary to its uptake. Deleuze may style himself as a 'private thinker' but his discourse is anything but free of rhetoric, by which I mean, bereft

of any effort to persuade readers to his way of thinking.[14] Jameson was probably the first to be properly suspicious of Deleuze's rhetoric, and not merely dismissive as his detractors and sceptics tend to be. As I will argue in the second chapter, Deleuze's style needs to be grasped in a detached way if we are not to fall victim to its blandishments. Which means, even if he is not a dialectian, we must be!

I will conclude this introduction with what Deleuze called a declaration of intent.[15] It is my argument that the hermeneutic problem emblematised in the mystical image of the two books preoccupied Deleuze throughout his entire career. It needed a particular mode of presentation to present it and it finds its rationale in Spinoza's ethics. As such, this book of metacommentary, as it might be best to call it, has been built around the twin problem of reading Deleuze and reading with Deleuze (the essential form of his pedagogy).[16] In order to get to Deleuze's own 'other' book, I have used methods which are out of sympathy with the established Deleuzian protocols, such as the moratorium on dialectics. But as I will try to show, Deleuze actually used dialectical procedures himself, so it seems perfectly valid to turn around and use them on his thinking too. By the same token, Deleuze also counselled the need to find one's own take on a philosopher, to gather from them a certain essence – an arrow, he called it – and move on. So to offer a vividly new picture of Deleuze, even if, or perhaps because, it seems the most assiduously non-Deleuzian picture ever offered, is in fact the most Deleuzist thing one can do. As Deleuze said, the only true repetition is a repetition of absolute difference.[17] He extended this idea to the writing of the history of philosophy by saying every commentary should aim to produce a double of maximal difference.[18] Thus, my hope is that this book too will be a double.

Its own double is much inspired by Fredric Jameson's *Late Marxism*, which I think is a masterpiece of philosophical acuity and one of the finest examples available of a making one's own of a body of work. As will become obvious, Jameson is my intercessor, and the spirit of his work lives here as the source and energy of the critical distance needed to make one's own an incredible body of work such as Deleuze's without also being submerged by it. Metacommentary is a kind of tonic one takes when one feels too close to a subject, or discourse, when it gets to be more like a possession or absorption than a reading. Deleuzism, then, is what one gets when one has managed to cease being Deleuzian without at the same time having become something else (Jamesonian, Derridean, or whatever). The aim of this book, then, is neither to be exhaustive nor comprehensive, but suggestive. For instance, there is no extended treatment of Deleuze's film books, or his book on Bacon, nor is there a strict

evaluation from a philosophical point of view of his use of Hume, Nietzsche, Kant and so on. My feeling is that many such bases as these have already been amply covered and that there is little to be gained from covering them again, so I have preferred to focus on those aspects of Deleuze's work that appear to have been either neglected or somehow taken for granted.[19] The ambition of *Deleuzism* is rather to suggest the possibility of an *other* reading of Deleuze that would enable his work to be systematically applied (not just applauded). If this book is anti-Deleuzian, then it is so in what I take to be the spirit of Deleuze's project, namely the rejection of all forms of slavishness in favour of (liberating) creativity. My intent, in short, is to extract from Deleuze's project an apparatus of social critique built on a utopian impulse. Its insistent question is 'how does it work?'

Notes

1. '[T]hat which now absorbs the time and the life of Pierre, is not the book, but the primitive elementalising of the strange stuff, which in the act of attempting that book, has upheaved and upgushed in his soul. Two books are being writ; of which the world shall only see one, and the bungled' (Melville 1971: 304).
2. Deleuze 1994: xxii.
3. Deleuze 1997: 150.
4. Although he does not use the Kantian term, Freud does compare psychoanalysis to the wound to man's narcissism Copernicus is said to have inflicted by decentring the earth. Freud 1973: 326.
5. Cf. Deleuze 1990a.
6. Deleuze 1994: 18, 105.
7. It may be speculated that Spinoza is the 'prince of philosophers' in Deleuze's view because on his reading Spinoza's *Ethics* manages to render in ink both aspects of the book and its double. Cf. Deleuze 1990b: 345.
8. Deleuze 1994: 119.
9. Deleuze 1988b: 6.
10. Negri 1991: xvii.
11. On this point, there is no clearer indication of Deleuze's passion for Spinoza as the philosopher of freedom than the passage from Malamud's *The Fixer* he quotes at the beginning of *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*.
12. Deleuze 1988b: 4.
13. For a brief description of 'experimentation' as Deleuze's way of doing philosophy, see Stengers 1997: 55–6.
14. While I would not go so far as to claim that Deleuze's rhetoric solves the problems of philosophical figuration it necessarily confronts, such as the caesura between the verbal and visual, I do agree with Polan in thinking that Deleuze's writing style needs to be seen as a conscious attempt to perform philosophy. Cf. Polan 1994: 233.
15. 'The weaknesses of a book are often the counterparts of empty intentions that one did not know how to implement. In this sense, a declaration of intent is evidence of real modesty in relation to the ideal book' (Deleuze 1994: xix).
16. 'We learn nothing from those who say: "Do as I do". Our only teachers are those

who tell us to "do with me", and are able to emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures for us to reproduce' (Deleuze 1994: 23).

17. This is the point Deleuze draws from Borges's incredible story, 'Pierre Menard, the Author of the *Quixote*'. The 'most exact, the most strict repetition has as its correlate the maximum of difference' (Deleuze 1994: xxii).

18. 'In the history of philosophy, a commentary should act as a veritable double and bear the maximal modification appropriate to a double. (One imagines a *philosophically* bearded Hegel, a *philosophically* clean-shaven Marx, in the same way as a moustached Mona Lisa.) It should be possible to recount a real book of past philosophy as if it were an imaginary and feigned book' (Deleuze 1994: xxii).

19. On Deleuze and film, see Rodowick 1997a; 1997b; and Dienst 1994: 144–69; for a philosophical evaluation, see Hardt 1993; for an account of Deleuze's work on Bacon, see Polan 1994.

Chapter 1

Prehistory, or the Adequacy of Desire

> The history of philosophy, rather than repeating what a philosopher says, has to say what he must have taken for granted, what he didn't say but is nonetheless present in what he did say.
>
> (Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*)

Deleuzism is the set of presuppositions logically prior to everything Deleuze ultimately says, but never actually expressed by him – his double.[1] It may be true that some of these presuppositions and assumptions do not surface at all, but that does not mean they were not in existence from the outset. By presuppositions I do not simply mean undisclosed prejudices. What I really mean is the set of urgent problems and their accompanying solutions Deleuze was motivated by like so many wounds. Before he wrote his first books, he could only assume transcendentalism was a problem; once he'd written his book on Hume he could say why it was a problem and suggest how it might be overcome. Until then, though, it was an insistent problem, something he felt he had to address. In the same way, his proposed solution, transcendental empiricism, was merely a presupposition, a dream he harboured for many years, until it was fully worked out in his later books. He had first of all to imagine something beyond the Hegelian milieu he felt trapped in before he could construct it. In reading Deleuze today we have to decipher this feeling of urgency in the many extraordinarily deft philosophical moves he performed throughout his long career.[2]

To speak of Deleuzism then is not to speak of the history of Deleuze's thought, but its prehistory. Prehistory, it is true, is a somewhat nebulous term. It cannot refer to events leading up to an Event, because that is still the province of history. As such, it cannot be conceived as causality. So long as a continuity between a sequence of events, in this case a chain of concepts, or ideas, can be established then history still has something to say. Prehistory enters its own, however, at the point when that sequence

falters and becomes inexplicable by the old criteria, even though it might still appear to continue, as happens, for instance, in the case of Deleuze's version of empiricism in comparison with, say, Berkeley's.[3] It indicates a leap, not a trend. Through prehistory, then, I mean to address what I find is the most distorting and limiting aspect of present studies of Deleuze, namely that curiously unthought, but much touted de facto horizon (totalisation), his putative anti-Hegelianism, which also masquerades as anti-Platonism, anti-dialectics, and the fantasy of an 'other' tradition of philosophers. Now, Deleuze's work is no doubt inspired by an anti-Hegelianism of sorts, but that does not in itself explain why he should make that turn, unless it was sheer, banal modishness, which is scarcely interesting.

While it is undoubtedly tempting to see Deleuze's anti-Hegelianism as symptomatic of a deeper current in French philosophy, the same one that is said to have swept Derrida, Foucault, and others, along their merry way, it is far more useful to view it as part of a proposed cure (the same is true for Derrida and Foucault).[4] At this point, though, we have to widen our perspective considerably if we are not, after all, to turn around and see Hegel as *the* problem. Hegel has to be seen as problematic for reasons other than purely history of philosophy reasons if the vehemence and breadth of the campaign against him is not to be seen as disproportionate, perhaps even a little hysterical. Philosophy itself has to be placed into a larger context for us to see this profoundly deep-seated enmity as an important source of intellectual animus.[5] Undoubtedly, part of the problem French philosophers had with Hegel was (as Jameson has astutely pointed out) his symbolic stature, albeit mistaken, as the philosopher of closure, of totalisation felt as totalitarianism.[6] Overturning Hegel could, therefore, easily be construed as being motivated by oedipalist longings to be rid of a domineering father. And while I don't doubt the pertinence of such a diagnosis, again inasmuch as it turns cure into symptom it misses the mark.

More generally, it is, I think, sterile and pointless to search for the origins of Deleuze's many philosophical innovations in the work of any of his predecessors, Hegel fully as much as Nietzsche, as is the fashion these days.[7] And by no means do I exclude from this his own 'named' lineage, ascending from the Stoics to Bergson.[8] One may rightly speak of a Spinozist inspiration, or a Nietzschean move, even an anti-Hegelian impulse, in relation to Deleuze's work, but this doesn't justify the conclusion that their work is somehow, in the most blandly mechanical way possible, the *cause* of the permutations Deleuze will subsequently put philosophy through. It was precisely this diachronic conception of the

history of thought that came to a grinding halt thanks to Deleuze's generation, his own absurdist image for his anti-genealogical relation to his putative forefathers is an apt illustration of the synchronic conception he himself held (he claims to give them children!).[9] Misrecognition is the problem here, I believe: the largely undue emphasis placed on Deleuze's 'personal' desire to escape philosophy misreads a disciplinary constraint as a cognitive one, and makes it seem Deleuze had to read Nietzsche in order to find some clear space in which to think new thoughts.[10] His practice was rather more Borgesian, or Menardist, than this strict notion of genealogy would allow.[11]

In reality, as Deleuze's practice amply illustrates, and by his own admission, Deleuze treated philosophers (as well as artists and scientists) as resource kits for his own project – his claim to have found an 'other' line of philosophers is probably an ironic attempt to placate institutionally powerful, but basically conservative colleagues still insisting philosophy be read diachronically, one thought begetting another according to a prescribed breeding plan; if not, then one wonders if it isn't an oddly sentimental romanticisation (which is to say, narrativisation) of what is proclaimed everywhere else to be a heterogeneously conceived multiplicity, a type of philosophy that could have no precise lineage. If the metaphor of the tool-kit is to be used at all profitably, then it must be taken to mean that Deleuze treats his predecessors as, say, artisans treat theirs: just as a stonemason will steal a neat solution to the problem of creating seamless facades, or architraves that seem to vault towards the heavens, which are part and parcel of his daily practice, so Deleuze takes solutions to particular problems he has encountered in the course of his own daily practice from other philosophers.[12]

Sometimes it is purely a methodological hint that Deleuze takes from them, as I will show is partly the case with Spinoza, while at other times it is an ethic, as it is with Nietzsche, but usually it is a peculiar problematisation that Deleuze prizes most highly in the philosophers he interrogates. Deleuze lumps his subjects together as belonging to an 'other' tradition, and in so doing leads his readers wildly astray. This 'other' tradition is a product of his own philosophising, and he admits as much when he says something happens between them in 'an ideal space'.[13] This is genealogy as an event, an act of thought in other words – his thought. Ironically, to try to recover a sympathy between the respective philosophies is to engage in precisely the practice he eschews most, namely the history of philosophy. So perhaps it was a cruel joke on Deleuze's part to suggest any such sympathy exists. At any rate, as I will show, it simply is not necessary to deal with historical and epistemological problems like

Kant's patent antipathy to Hume and Leibniz's strong disagreements with Spinoza. The reason for this is that by force of a powerful synchronic turn, Deleuze treats the philosophers as characters in a drama, not authors in the classic sense, thus he turns the issue of their differences into a problem of relations.[14] When he says something happens between them he means that as in drama the various characters interact in such a way as to illuminate a single problem.

   Much more pressing, though, than whether Deleuze belongs to this or that tradition of philosophy is the issue of whether or not his philosophy is purely private, which it would be if it was engendered solely by philosophical concerns. This is why I have suggested a periodising move is necessary. Only by this means can we decide if his project has any connection or relevance to the times in which he found himself. It is therefore far more productive to consider whether Hegel's thought, as one of the then dominant forces in philosophy (largely thanks to the efforts of Kojève and Koyré) was suddenly – and well-nigh, cataclysmically – found wanting in the face of a newly emerging social situation. At a certain point shortly after the Second World War, when fractiousness had almost overnight become the order of the day (Algeria), when new and unexpected alliances (students and factory workers) seemed to spring up out of nowhere like so many flowers, and when capital had triumphantly succeeded in privatising all existence (digital culture[15]), did Hegel's work no longer seem adequate to the needs of the times? Did it seem to belong to an era that had passed? In hindsight, then, anti-Hegelianism may turn out to have been the noisy precursor to an epistemic shift, which insofar as it can be connected to the turbulence of the times, as either belated response or concerted registration, may then serve duty as the basis for a specifically (French) philosophical, and properly periodising index.[16] And indeed it was precisely towards an understanding of 'the times' that Deleuze directed himself.

> We ought to establish the basic sociotechnological principles of control mechanisms as their age dawns, and describe in these terms what is already taking the place of the disciplinary sites of confinement that everyone says are breaking down. It may be that older means of control, borrowed from the old sovereign societies, will come back into play, adapted as necessary. The key thing is we're at the beginning of something new.[17]

   This prediction that old forms of control may return in newly imagined guises finds interesting resonance in *Blade Runner*, which, as we shall see, speculates a technologically sophisticated recrudescence of the classic

mode of production, built on slavery. For the moment, though, my hypothesis is that Deleuzism finds its urgency and rationale – if not its actual philosophical lineaments – in the cobblestone-hurling, geopolitically paranoid, socio-historical situation in which Deleuze's philosophy emerged, namely that cynical and disenchanted era which came to call itself the society of the spectacle. (Deleuze himself called it, variously, the age of cynicism, the society of control, and sometimes even the modern era.) The significance and necessity of drawing a correlation between the socio-historical situation and the situation of philosophy itself is brought into stark relief in the opening pages of *What is Philosophy?* where it is announced that the former has succeeded finally in destroying the latter. The very taste for philosophy is lost, the authors cry, which means our only hope of developing a critique of capital that is not born of capital is lost too.[18] In the earlier books, there was more hope. In *A Thousand Plateaus* the decisive concern is a pragmatic matter of designing a philosophy that can support an ideal of acephalic communism, which they set about doing with much brio and confidence; while in *Anti-Oedipus* – written in the very midst of a more or less global, cultural revolution – it is a question of finding the revolutionary path that is not also the fascist path, which again they claim to do with much brio and confidence.[19] In both these cases, the existence and relevance of philosophy is taken for granted, but by the time they came to write their last book together this was no longer the case. Now philosophy must be saved from mere opinion.[20]

The other way of reading anti-Hegelianism, which would tend to confirm the proposed periodisation, and about which suspiciously little has been said in relation to Deleuze, is as a turn towards Marx, who, in some lights, is the greatest of all anti-Hegelians.[21] And one does not have to be an Althusserian to see this, Marx himself is entirely unequivocal: 'My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly the opposite to it.'[22] Now, Deleuze's turn to Marx, if that is indeed the obverse of his turn away from Hegel, need not be treated as a latent form of Althusserianism because evidence of a Marxian inspiration is abundantly obvious throughout his work, though perhaps nowhere more obviously than in the formulation of desire as production in the opening pages of *Anti-Oedipus*.[23] Here, like Marx in the famous introduction to *Grundrisse*, Deleuze and Guattari insist that production can only ever be social, and, as such, at once equate production and consumption and refuse a relation of identity between the two, preferring instead, as Marx before them did, to opt for a notion of multiplicity that respects specific differences within a general understanding of their

functional unity.[24] The deepest connection between Deleuze and Marx, then, at least from the perspective of their mutual antagonism towards Hegel, is the sheer fact that like Marx he treats production as a necessary abstraction by which to begin with the concrete.[25] (One wonders if this isn't what the greatness of Marx would have turned out to be, in Deleuze's hands.)

   This correlation of desire with production is without doubt the most important postulation in the whole of *Anti-Oedipus*, not merely because it gives that work its peculiar pro-Marxist and anti-Hegelian spin, but because without it none of the subsequent arguments would hold. It enables a second, and equally crucial, postulate that provides the means for Deleuze to turn his brand of pure philosophy into social critique, namely the proposed parallelism between desiring-production and social production.[26] This doubly articulated postulate, as it might be more accurate to think it, is the volcano-chain of continuity connecting all of Deleuze's work.[27] Desire, which surfaces here and there under different names like so much unconstrained magma, but always with the same basic hypothesis in place and the same critical function to perform, is the true bottom line. But it is also one of the least understood aspects of Deleuze's work. The sheer number of different interpretations of this crucial concept amply attests to the fact that a clear understanding of it is lacking. I want to suggest, though, that much of the mystification surrounding desire can be cleared away like so much thick smoke, simply by determining its function within the Deleuzist project as a whole. But here we run into a snag: desire seems to have two functions, or at any rate, two different kinds of definitions that seem equally possible and similarly plausible. From the point of view of the Deleuzist doctrine, desire – despite its host of names and guises (becoming, life, and so forth) – is, or at least can be treated as, simply that untranscendable horizon which, once posited, has the effect of rendering everything else immanent to it (the 'wage earner's desire, the capitalist's desire, everything moves to the rhythm of one and the same desire').[28] Yet, in that it is posited as a first cause for everything – without distinction between either humans and nature or humans and machines – desire is as much an enabling totalisation (first definition) as it is an audacious philosophical hypothesis (second definition).[29]

   Derrida's 'differance' is, I would suggest, the best theoretical cognate for desire because like 'differance' it is 'neither a word nor a concept'. It too belongs to an order, announced in movement, that resists 'the opposition, one of the founding oppositions of philosophy, between the sensible and the intelligible'. And similarly, since it too 'derives from

no category of being, whether present or absent', desire also lacks a place, somewhere to begin to trace its lineaments, an origin that does not put into question all possible origins. Thus desire has to be understood, just as differance has to be understood, as serving a strategic function – it enables a certain phenomenon to be thought, but does not claim to be adequate to it.[30] Desire neither expresses, nor represents anything, it rather indicates a certain movement and a break in that movement of all things.[31] Differance too conjoins – and must too confront the patent impossibility of such a conjunction of transverse categories – temporisation and spacing as its basic function.[32] If the periodising hypothesis I have suggested be made is carried to its full philosophical conclusion, then it is striking that in the same period, but by completely different means, and for almost anti-pathetic reasons, two such noted theoreticians – Deleuze the last great empiricist, Derrida the last great transcendentalist – should engineer the same type of aconceptual grounds for themselves. Not only does it confirm the existence of an already well-known trend (anti-Hegelianism), it also suggests, perhaps, that the key philosophical problem of the era was the lack of a means of writing or speaking about things that did not at once distort and transmute them.

What all philosophers of note seem to suffer in this period is a profound feeling of not being able to say what they mean, except at a price. Lyotard took this further than anyone by trying to think through a possible legislation that could somehow, at a higher, juridical level, alleviate the stress of the failure of words.[33] In both Deleuze and Derrida, however, what we find are strategies designed to circumvent this feature of philosophical language that through extreme twists and bizarre reaches seem to want to render the metaphoric literal. In short, we have to remind ourselves to ask what does desire do? Well, in addition to being a foundational move (first definition), it is also a vigorous cancellation or negation of previous philosophies (second definition). It effects three basic changes: it collapses recording and consumption into a single process of production; it stipulates that humans and nature belong to one essential reality, the producer-product; it defines itself as a kind of process that is neither an infinite perpetuation, nor a goal or end in itself.[34] 'Hence everything is production: *production of productions*, of actions and passions; *productions of recording processes*, of distributions and of coordinates that serve as points of reference; *productions of consumption*, of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pain. Everything is production, since the recording processes are immediately consumed, immediately consummated, and these consumptions directly repro-duced.'[35] And, therefore, as Marx puts it, nothing simpler for a Hegelian

than to posit that they're identical, which is of course precisely not what either Marx or Deleuze and Guattari concludes.[36] Instead, Deleuze takes a surprisingly Kantian turn and defines these three equivalent types of productions – production of production, recording and consumption – as specific types of syntheses, which together produce the unconscious.[37] At this point desire as process reveals itself as a methodology.

> In what he termed the critical revolution, Kant intended to discover the criteria immanent to understanding so as to distinguish the illegitimate uses of the syntheses of consciousness. In the name of *transcendental* philosophy (immanence of criteria), he therefore denounced the transcendent use of syntheses as appeared in metaphysics. In like fashion we are compelled to say that psychoanalysis has its metaphysics – its name is Oedipus. And that a revolution – this time materialist – can proceed only by way of critique of Oedipus, by denouncing the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious as found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a transcendental unconscious defined by the immanence of its criteria and a corresponding practice that we shall call schizoanalysis.[38]

His very method is anti-Hegelian, to be sure, but if it corresponds with Marx's anti-Hegelianism, then perhaps it is not as indifferently anti-dialectical as he insists. On this evidence, it may be that we should read positively, what otherwise appears a purely negative or negating statement, notably Guattari's claim that 'the most tangible effect of *Anti-Oedipus* was that it short-circuited the connection between psychoanalysis and the left'.[39] The implication, I take it, is that an amplification of Marx is the surest cancellation of Freud. This fits with what I find is the most crucial meta-theoretical claim in *Anti-Oedipus*, namely that it is our patent addiction (or to put it another way, our immodest lack of a self-critique) to oedipalist conceptions of self and society which inhibits our understanding of its productivist depths.[40] We need de-oedipalising, they say, in order to see what the real problems are.[41] In other words, the true target of Deleuze and Guattari's critique, as it is staged in their pointed repudiation of all the sacred cows of psychoanalysis, is neither Freudians nor Lacanians, indeed none of the many schools of psychoanalysis that flourished in the wake of these 'fathers', who would hardly listen anyway if they were as invested in and by Oedipus as it is claimed, but all the other disciplines – history, philosophy, literary studies and so on – who, under the spell of psychoanalysis, fail to take a properly materialist approach.

It is this materialist approach advocated by our authors which is their most Marxian piece of anti-Hegelianism: it follows in all the essential points Marx's famous right-siding of Hegel – it too stands the dialectic

back on its feet.[42] Marx critiques Hegel for falling 'into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself' when in fact his 'method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind'.[43] Abstractions do not lead us to the concrete because they assume the concrete must be uncovered by a process of reduction, the analytic movement from a speculative conception of the whole towards the simplest concepts; in this way an abstract-dialectics ends up defining the concrete as the higher unity or concentration of the determinations it makes and so, by stealth, makes the concrete the product of thought, all while pretending to have found it elsewhere. 'It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [*Anschauung*] and conception.'[44]

As Deleuze has said, the matter of where to begin is crucial to a philosophy because it means eliminating all presuppositions.[45] Hegel's basic fault, on Marx's view, is to have gotten off on the wrong foot by supposing appearance and reality to be distinctly different. He finishes where he should better have begun, with the concrete, which in consequence winds up being the subject of thought instead of its object, able only to express its other. In effect, his conclusion is only a higher order abstraction than the one he began with. This, according to Althusser, is Hegel's dominant model of thought, its flaw in his view is that 'it presupposes in principle that the whole in question be reducible to an *inner essence*, of which the elements of the whole are then no more than the phenomenal forms of expression'. The problem with this is that in order to be effective – 'to be applicable everywhere and at every moment' – it must endow the whole with a spiritual nature.[46] In the extremely volatile period (the late 1960s through to the early to mid 1970s) in which Deleuze and Guattari wrote their first collaboration, anti-Hegelianism, when it didn't simply mean an allegiance to the Althusserian school, meant anti-expressionism (or anti-historicist to use its other codename).[47] As such, it was easily the most stinging critique of the times – one thinks here of de Certeau's disarmingly mildly-worded critique of Foucault, which levels precisely the same criticism at panopticism that Althusser makes of Hegel's deployment of inner 'essence'.[48]

Heterology, de Certeau's useful codeword for any unselfconsciously expressionist theoretical formulation, is, it turns out, precisely what Deleuze and Guattari accuse Freud of practising with respect to desire.[49] By positing an adequacy between myths and dreams, Freud makes desire

expressive, or worse, prevents it from being anything besides expressive, and that is his greatest sin in Deleuze and Guattari's books.[50] Freud's hermeneutic revolution consists in the postulation that dreams are reproductions, by other means, and under the gaze of a stern censor, of our unconscious thoughts and feelings, which themselves vary not at all. Dreams can always be interpreted because however different they may be on the surface in their manifest content, their deep structure is constant – nothing but Oedipus, as Deleuze and Guattari would say. Therefore, to interpret them one needs only to decipher their specific codification of the latent, but insistent oedipal drama that our unconscious cannot seem to desist from playing out night after night. Sooner or later everything leads back to daddy–mummy, such that every dream, every fantasy, every manifestation of desire can be taken as an expression of daddy–mummy, but only because it is treated as a classical theatre not a factory. Everything might have turned out differently, psychoanalysis might easily have been revolutionary, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, had Freud not made one (to their minds) fatally false connection between his response to Sophocles' play and the structure of the unconscious.

> It is as if Freud had drawn back from this world of wild production and explosive desire, wanting at all costs to restore a little order there, an order made classical owing to the ancient Greek theatre. For what does it mean to say that Freud discovered Oedipus in his own self-analysis? Was it in his self-analysis, or rather in his Goethian classical culture? In his self-analysis he discovers something about which he remarks: Well now, that looks like Oedipus![51]

The Interpretation of Dreams ventures to suggest that the reason the tragic destiny of Oedipus continues to affect all of us so profoundly, even after two thousand years, is that 'it might have been ours – because the oracle laid the same curse upon us before our birth as upon him. It is the fate of all of us, perhaps, to direct our first sexual impulse towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous wish against our father. Our dreams convince us that that is so. King Oedipus, who slew his father Laïus and married his mother Jocasta, merely shows us the fulfilment of our own childhood wishes.'[52] Freud's crucial assumption, which Deleuze and Guattari endeavour to demonstrate is fallacious, is that the drama stirs us because it touches a raw nerve, that our angst is immediate. He thus mistakes as genuine anxiety that peculiar kind of gratification he would himself later think much more about under the aegis of the notion of the uncanny. In spite of his virtually unparalleled genius for interpretation, Freud makes an astonishingly direct reading of

Oedipus. And this alone, Deleuze and Guattari seem to say, should have made the great man suspicious. Their critique of Freud, which is also the basis of their de-oedipalising strategy, is that at this crucial moment, when by connecting literature and desire he makes one of the great leaps of thought in the modern period, he falls victim to a displacement – a type of lure he himself was the first to identify. 'Oedipal desires are the bait, the disfigured image by means of which repression catches desire in the trap.'[53]

Freud's direct take on *Oedipus* acts as if repression is expressive of desire; it presumes that if incest is prohibited then we must desire it. 'The law tells us: You will not marry your mother, and you will not kill your father. And we docile subjects say to ourselves: so *that's* what I wanted! Will it ever be suspected that the law discredits – and has an interest in discrediting and disgracing – the person it presumes to be guilty, the person the law wants to be guilty and wants to be made to feel guilty?'[54] Prohibitions, in other words, are calculations, and we are deceived if we act as though the true nature of what they proscribe can be read directly from what is specifically banned. 'For what really takes place is that the law prohibits something that is perfectly fictitious in the order of desire or of the "instincts", so as to persuade its subjects that they had the intention corresponding to this fiction. This is indeed the only way the law has of getting a grip on intention, of making the unconscious guilty.'[55] As such, what initially looked like a binary model in which the prohibition adequately expressed the prohibited, in fact turns out to be a complicated, tertiary structure in which the sense of adequacy of expression itself intervenes as a decoy 'third term'.

In effect, Oedipus is three things at once: it is the displaced image repression gives rise to (and on which it is subsequently enacted, though falsely); it is also the instrument of that repression (it supplants desire); and it is a repressive model for us to conform to. 'Repression cannot act without displacing desire, without giving rise to a *consequent desire*, all ready, all warm for punishment, and without putting this desire in the place of the *antecedent desire* on which repression comes to bear in principle or in reality ("Ah, so *that's* what it was!").'[56] Insofar as we identify with Oedipus's plight we feel that we really do possess dark incestuous longings, and we give up these longings in the best interest of the social because we've been taught they are incompatible with the structural needs of collective life. But on what grounds should we accept Freud's presumption that this process of identification is in fact as straightforward and direct as he takes it to be? Ironically, it is only if we assume that the libido itself cannot invest the social field directly,

without any form of mediation at all, as Freud seems to, that we must accept that it instead identifies – immediately – with mythic structures. If, however, we assume that the libido is capable of directly investing itself in the social field then all the various mediating devices Freud deploys appear as so many strategies of containment and can therefore be dispensed with, this being what de-oedipalising actually amounts to doing.[57]

On this view, Oedipus does not explain the workings of our desire, but must itself be explained, for it turns out that it is, to use Jameson's useful concept, a libidinal apparatus ('a machinery for ideological invest-ment').[58] Our ability to invest so deeply and unreflexively in Oedipus is what, finally, must be explained, because in reality it does not express desire, it constrains it by transvaluing it. In other words, in order for Deleuze and Guattari to make their case against Freud they must supply a mechanism of desire capable of producing and being satisfied with Oedipus that is not a simple recapitulation of a Marxian false conscious-ness thesis, which is still congruent to Freud, nor a silent reiteration of the various expressionist theses they denounce. And insofar as such a mechanism is delivered, we can consider Deleuze's prehistory to come to an end at that point. Like Marx, contra Hegel, they attempt to set things right by making a new beginning, a new type of beginning in fact, one which, as in Marx, starts with a 'rational abstraction', namely production in general (as process). Desire as process, as production, is as much of a corrective as Marx's general production is, but the target is now Freud as a cigar-smoking, bearded Hegel.[59] It is precisely 'idealism' they accuse him of.[60] This is why I have said desire is the true bottom line, because at this point no methodological prestidigitation can save them from a poorly conceived 'rational abstraction'.

If desire cannot satisfy the twin (negative) demands of being neither silently Freudian, nor silently expressionist, then the game is up. It must also satisfy the positive demand that it invest a social field with sufficient energy to explain all of its enterprises, yet do so without falling into either an unwarranted abstraction, or an untenable ontologisation. If my above mentioned correlation with desire and differance holds, then we must expect it to be a rather fluid notion, however rigorous its definition. Deleuze defines desire by what it does: it 'constantly couples continuous flows and partial objects that are by nature fragmentary and fragmented. Desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and breaks the flows.'[61] This means in order to understand what Deleuze means by desire, if we are to see what it actually does, we must first of all ascertain what he means by flow and breaks in the flow. Already, though, we can

see that as a concept desire is composed of two processes that it neither comprehends, unifies, expresses or represents, but somehow merely indicates, but only from a machinic point of view that is interested in how things work and not what they mean. Yet, as I have suggested all along, this very resistance should be read as rhetorical, or strategic (as Derrida put it). It is a philosophical version of a laying bare the device, it conspicuously confounds one type of reading in order to prompt us to make another.

Deleuze's materialism is at its most material in the notion of the flow, it is also at its most machinic because flows only become apparent to us when they can be interrupted, and this is the function of machines. 'Every machine, in the first place, is related to a continual material flow (*hylè*) that it cuts into. It functions like a ham-slicing machine, removing portions from the associative flow: the anus and the flow of shit it cuts off, for instance; the mouth that cuts off not only the flow of milk but also the flow of air and sound; the penis that interrupts not only the flow of urine but also the flow of sperm.'[62] Associative flows, are ideal forms by which we apprehend the affect of the messier, practical flows of blood, shit and sperm – we *feel* them as endless. 'The term *hylè* in fact designates the pure continuity that any one sort of matter ideally possesses.'[63] Nomad existence can be defined in terms of flow, as can capitalism, evolution and semiotics, such is the extension Deleuze is prepared to give this term. 'At the limit, there is a single phylogenetic lineage, a single machinic phylum, ideally continuous: the flow of matter-movement, the flow of matter in continuous variation, conveying singularities and traits of expression.'[64] Matter-flows, *hylè*, the schizophrenic flux, replace being, or at any rate give being a kick in the pants (as Lacan might put it), with the effect that everything we want to call understanding has to be seen as either an arrest of this flow, an extraction from it, or a passing into it.

> An organ may have connections that associate it with several different flows; it may waver between several functions, and even take on the régime of another organ – the anorectic mouth, for instance. All sorts of functional questions thus arise: What flow to break? Where to interrupt it? How and by what means? What place should be left for other producers or antiproducers (the place of one's little brother, for instance)? Should one, or should one not, suffocate from what one eats, swallow air, shit with one's mouth?[65]

Flows, Deleuze repeatedly suggests, cannot be seen unless they are interrupted. 'Far from being the opposite of continuity, the break or

interruption conditions this continuity: it presupposes or defines what it cuts into as an ideal continuity. This is because [. . .] every machine is a machine of a machine. The machine produces an interruption of the flow only insofar as it is connected to another machine that supposedly produces this flow.'[66] As has already been indicated, not all breaks are of the same order: in fact, Deleuze says there are three major types. There are some breaks that are detaching which must not be confused with other breaks that are slicing off and these must be not confused with still other breaks that are yielding of a residue. The first sort, the detaching break, or schizz, detaches mobile stocks, flying bricks, that is, semiotic units that have already been overcoded (Vinteuil's little phrase), which it reconnects with other bricks to form new chains (think how often Vinteuil's little phrase actually recurs in Proust and how many different connections it makes between characters and their situations). The second type draws off a certain amount of energy from the flow as so much surplus value, recording it for future use. The third type of break, which may be called the subjective break, yields the subject as residuum, who then exists alongside the machine itself, functioning as a part adjacent to it (like disposable income).[67] Now, these breaks may in turn be apprehended as indices of the modalities of desire, 'in process' as it were. What they point us to is the three types of synthesis with which Deleuze renders concrete his 'rational abstraction'. Or, to put it another way, he constructs his solution using three syntheses that have a tendency towards concretisation (the whole of Deleuze's elaboration of a theory of virtuality can be brought back to this one, manifestly Marxist point).[68]

> The first mode has to do with the connective synthesis, and mobilises libido as withdrawal energy (*énergie de prélèvement*). The second has to do with the disjunctive synthesis, and mobilises the Numen as detachment energy (*énergie de détachement*). The third has to do with conjunctive synthesis, and mobilises Voluptas as residual energy (*énergie résiduelle*).[69]

Concretely, then, desire as production has three processes, and accordingly three faces: as we have already seen, there is a production of production (connective synthesis, or bricolage) to be reckoned with; as well as a production of recording (disjunctive synthesis, or Numen); and a production of consumption (conjunctive synthesis, or Voluptas). Freud too saw these processes Deleuze and Guattari insist, but when confronted by their potentiality made a wrong turn each time.[70] Their most incisive correction of him is thus able to be conducted via a single, question (which *Difference and Repetition* prepared the ground for[71]): Why does

Freud consistently choose the transcendental path over the immanent one?[72] According to Deleuze and Guattari's view of things, these three processes indicate three crucial moments in the genesis of psychoanalysis – as science and school – when, had he chosen the immanent path and not the transcendental, Freud might conceivably have made his discoveries genuinely libratory instead of sadly imprisoning. His cardinal crime was to have chosen lines of determination over immanent principles of individuation. 'Oedipus informs us: if you don't follow the lines of differentiation daddy-mummy-me, and the exclusive alternatives that delineate them, you will fall into the black night of the undifferentiated.'[73] (Hegel's greatest fear!) Whatever the cogency of their philosophical objections may be, it is patently obvious from this particular unfolding of their anti-dialectical stance that above all else 'transcendental' is simply a codeword for exclusionist – in the counter-culture sense of the word – while 'immanence' functions as a utopian figure of tolerance.

The first synthesis, the connective synthesis of production, has an inclusive (partial and non-specific) and an exclusive (global and specific) mode. As we've heard, it mobilises libido as withdrawal energy. It is perhaps easiest to think it in Spinozist terms, since that is undoubtedly its source of inspiration. What this means, at least in regards its ideal mode, namely the inclusive, is that we expend the quantum energy of our libido to form any such new connections between ourselves and the surrounding environment, which includes other people, that prolongs or enriches existence (in the beginning, we are ourselves only more or less stable composites of such connections). It is inclusive because no hierarchy predetermines who or what we may connect with (rhizome), though the types of connections we may make are limited to those that prolong life and those which shorten it. Here, Spinoza's great intervention, his transformation of morals into ethics, which ensues from the heretical proposition that if the body wants something it must be good, is found reformulated, but intact at the heart of the revolutionary programme underpinning Deleuze's work. 'Desire does not "want" revolution, it is revolutionary in its own right, as though involuntarily, by wanting what it wants.'[74] Any restriction on the nature of the connections a body may make is thus construed as counter-revolutionary, despotic and unacceptable to the needs of a free society. On this view, the exclusive mode of the connective synthesis is explicitly cast an illegitimate use of the process.

The difference between the two modes can be seen in the two ways in which homosexual desire is codified by different readings of Proust. On the one hand, there are those readings that trace lines of guilt, treating all the abundant loves as so many accursed passions – Marcel's love for

Albertine fully as much as Albertine's alleged love for the girls at Balbec beach. It all comes down to a problem of choice, a paranoiac 'either/or': either Albertine loves Marcel, or she doesn't; either Albertine loves Marcel, or she loves girls; either Albertine is faithful to Marcel, or she doesn't truly love him; and so on. By the same token, either Marcel loves Albertine for herself, or he loves her because she recalls Swann's love of Odette, or even his own love for his mother, and perhaps behind that his ambivalent affection for his hypochondriac aunt, Leonie. Through a hierarchy of choice, a little bit of order can be injected into things – the search given a transcendent object that would render it complete by supposing something had been missing all along, whether that be love, time, fidelity, or truth. On the other hand, there is an affirmative reading built around a schizophrenic 'either . . . or . . . or' which sees infinite possibility as the secret sharer of all exclusive choices: 'everyone is bisexual, everyone has two sexes'.[75] In order to love Marcel as she does, and in order for Marcel to be so deliciously tortured by her as he is, Albertine must love girls too, or at least appear to, and he must see his mother in her. One can certainly hear a Nietzschean form of affirmation being expressed here as well: as Deleuze's rendering of the Eternal Return argues, it is never a matter of regretting how things have turned out, but always of finding out how to embrace the past such that it can be said to have conditioned the present in the most positive sense.[76] I could not love Albertine the way I do had she not betrayed me so heartlessly. On this view, her guile becomes simply one more ingredient in a complicated mix that does not thereby preclude its opposite.[77]

> We do not deny that there is an Oedipal sexuality, an Oedipal hetero-sexuality and homosexuality, an Oedipal castration, as well as complete objects, global images, and specific egos. We deny that these are produc-tions of the unconscious. What is more, castration and oedipalisation beget a basic illusion that makes us believe that real desiring-production is answerable to higher formations that integrate it, subject it to transcen-dent laws, and make it serve a higher social and cultural production; there then appears a kind of 'unsticking' of the social field with regard to the production of desire, in whose name all resignations are justified in advance.[78]

The second synthesis, the disjunctive synthesis of recording, which mobilises the Numen as detachment energy, also has two modes relating to legitimacy of use: free (legitimate) and restricted (illegitimate). Numen is the transformed libidinal energy released by the production of produc-tion process; it is libido rendered divine by the fact that inasmuch as it is a

force of anti-production given off by the force of production it appears as the holy source of productivity itself. This is Deleuze and Guattari's own version of heterology, for what they are referring to here is the mysterious, well-nigh miraculous process whereby something historically contrived like capital can come to seem strangely emanative, and godly, when surplus value is produced. 'Machines and agents cling so closely to capital that their very functioning appears to be miraculated by it. Everything seems objectively to be produced by capital as quasi cause.'[79] Again a Spinozist interpretation proves helpful, for on Deleuze's view of it emanation is a bad or reductive version of immanence. Yet another botched choice by Freud! 'Emanation is at once cause and gift: causality by donation, but by productive donation.'[80] This is another way of saying that a cause has been falsely or misleadingly attributed. Consequently, to suggest that Oedipus is emanative may well be the most condemning of all the criticisms extended to Freud by our authors for it amounts to an accusation of reasoning by convenience.

> Let us remember once again one of Marx's caveats: we cannot tell from the mere taste of wheat who grew it; the product gives us no hint as to the system and the relations of production. The product appears to be all the more specific, incredibly specific and readily describable, the more closely the theoretician relates it to *ideal forms of causation, comprehension, or expression*, rather than to *the real process of production on which it depends*.[81]

The legitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis, by contrast, recognises that Numen is only apparently a causality, and that real causality resides elsewhere. The legitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis is an immanent and anti-emanative (or what we might also call, anti-bad transcendentalism) one, that is to say, one interested in real or productive causes not ideal causes. As the example of Spinozism teaches, this means it attributes causality from the perspective of univocity.[82] Of course, in Spinoza univocity refers to God as Being. Here though it has a different referent, though the same basic function: it refers to an untranscendable horizon, but since it is no longer God at issue this horizon cannot claim necessity.[83] Rather it is an arbitrary totalisation that serves as a surface of inscription upon which desire will leave its mark. This in turn means it is in essence a dialectical procedure – it creates a new perspective from which to grasp phenomena, to bring together the disparate without thereby eradicating difference. As I will argue throughout this book, Deleuze's anti-dialectical stance cannot be taken at face value, nor treated as though there was only one kind of dialectics, namely the bad Hegelian kind. For as we see here,

Deleuze himself does not shy away from using dialectical procedures. As such, all the terms corresponding to this anti-emanative manoeuvre, which in the main means the 'body without organs' and the 'plane of immanence', which are more or less equivalent anyway, will have to be re-evaluated in terms of their mediating function.[84] In effect, Deleuze and Guattari deliver their *coup de grâce* to Freud in classic Marxian style: by taking a univocal perspective, they shift the goal posts on him in such dramatic fashion he ends up appearing to be playing with himself, and not part of a larger team.

All of which goes far beyond accusing Freud of ignoring the social, political and historical content of Schreber's ravings.[85] Or failing to see the significance of the military and religious organisation of the Wolf-Man's obsessions.[86] It interposes a whole new level mediation, which I have characterised as a shifting of goal posts so as to preserve a sense of flatness and not create a hierarchy of levels where there isn't one. By the same token, insofar as the Marxist hermeneutic uses a hierarchy of levels to grasp the interconnectedness of all things, then it too could just as usefully be figured as a broad, flat surface covered with concentric circles demarcating different 'zones'. As such, one can easily substitute the rhizome for any basically Marxist hermeneutic and suffer little in the shift. The principle virtue of the move, as I see it, is that it enables a change of metaphors, from top-down, to zoom-in and pull-back, which puts to rest once and for all the false dichotomy of 'up there' versus 'down here'.[87] With this change of perspective, Freud's all too personalist approach is trounced by a global one encompassing all the extra-personal aspects he chose to ignore, or else sought to see in their most subjectivist light (war as melancholia and mourning). By this means, Oedipus is transformed from an inner cause into an interiorised product that is the result of external pressures.

Behind the lure of causality Oedipus presents, there lies, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the luminescent manifestation of a mechanism of defence.[88] They thus refute Bateson's thesis that it is the double-binds created practically unconsciously by the family dynamics that induces schizophrenia, and suggest instead it is Oedipus that the already schizo-phrenic cannot tolerate and their catatonia is a defence against its manipulations – they do not want to be triangulated so they clam up. In short, Oedipus and the double-bind are one and the same thing.[89] Oedipus, they say, is what we fall back on when the oscillations of desiring-production – under the dominant eye of social production – between (what Laing referred to as) breakthrough and breakdown become too much to bear.[90] Such is the fear some people have of the

schizophrenic limit, the blank wall, that it feels better and safer 'to fall under the law of the signifier, marked by castration, triangulated' than to continue to risk dissolution in the schizophrenic flux.[91] Oedipus is therefore a personally satisfying means of resolving contradictions, not a theoretical answer. And anyway, the true schizo, the truly schizophrenising theory, would not wish to resolve their contradictions in this fashion, 'with vague syntheses of identification . . . like the last of the Hegelian philosophers'.[92] Instead, they would affirm it by bringing the whole into view via a practice of what Deleuze and Guattari suggestively describe as 'continuous overflight' (or, what amounts to the same thing, a ceaseless 'zooming-in and pulling-back').

   Now, just as a portion of the libidinal energy of the production of production process (connective synthesis) is converted into Numen by the recording of production process (disjunctive synthesis), so a part of this energy is converted into an energy of consumption (Voluptas) by the third synthesis, the conjunctive synthesis ('so it's . . .').[93] To put it another way, whereas the disjunctive synthesis refers to the process of perception, the correlation and coordination of sense-data in other words, the conjunctive synthesis refers to our affective experiences (in phenomenological terms, it is like the difference between noema and noesis). It is in fact a distribution of affective intensities across the surface of the body without organs (as egg).[94] It is an intense 'I feel' that cannot be reduced to an identification, nor confused with a representation (though these may in fact help us to grasp its affect, but only ever in a weak sense). '(*I feel that*) I am becoming God, I am becoming woman, I was Joan of Arc and I am Heliogabalus and the Great Mongol, I am a Chinaman, a redskin, a Templar, I was my father and I was my son.'[95] The temptation is to dismiss these affects as so many grand delusions, but though they may be deliriums it is a serious misprision Deleuze and Guattari argue to treat them as straightforward hallucinations because their cathectic charge cannot simply be neutralised by obvious facts – not even when they're obvious to the schizo, who nevertheless feels the truth lies elsewhere, on another plane ('You trying to tell me my ass isn't a wolf?').[96] The 'I feel' is in fact the material from which hallucinations and delusions are composed.[97]

> It is the function of the libido to invest the social field in unconscious forms, thereby hallucinating all history, reproducing in delirium entire civilisations, races, continents, and intensely 'feeling' the becoming of the world. There is no signifying chain without a Chinaman, an Arab, and a black who drop in to trouble the night of a white paranoiac. Schizoanalysis sets out to undo the expressive Oedipal unconscious, always artifi-

cial, repressive and repressed, mediated by the family, in order to attain the immediate productive unconscious.[98]

As is the case with the previous two syntheses, the conjunctive synthesis must be evaluated from the perspective of use, and again it is a matter of legitimacy. The legitimate use is what we've just seen, a description of a certain affect ('I feel') corresponding to a profound and well-nigh telluric sympathy between the body and the earth, their mutual becoming. Its basic disposition is gregarious, but in that strangely individualist and revolutionary way that distinguishes crowds from mobs: 'No, I am not of your kind, I am the outsider and the deterritorialised . . .'[99] The illegitimate use is, on the contrary, segregative, but 'mobbing', and entirely reactionary – its mode is to be found throughout Conrad (as Marlow says of Jim, 'he was one of us'). What the two uses of the conjunctive synthesis amount to then is different ways of investing in the social, both operating at the level of the unconscious not the conscious (as Deleuze and Guattari argue, unconscious and conscious investments are not of the same type, 'even when they coincide or are superimposed on each other'): the reactionary mode invests desire in conformance with the interests of a dominant class, but operates on its own account; the mode Deleuze and Guattari consider revolutionary invests desire in what they call a transversal manner, which means it operates in such a way as to cut across barriers of race, class and gender.[100] It sets in motion new types of flows that the old, established breakflows (Oedipus in league with the family and the State) cannot handle and have to adapt themselves to or else be destroyed. Hence their confidence that one drop of pure desire is enough to revolutionise the world.

Taken together, this tripartite system of syntheses (connection, disjunction and conjunction) may be grasped as the basis of a Deleuzian hermeneutic that with a little effort may be extrapolated in such a way as to prove transportable. More importantly, it serves to define Deleuze's method: 'To trace back from images to the structure would have little significance and would not rescue us from representation, *if the structure did not have a reverse side* that is like the real production of desire.'[101] We can already see an application of it in the repudiation of Oedipus: the three things Oedipus at once is all turn out to be effects of an illegitimate use of each of the three syntheses. The exclusive mode of the connective synthesis gives desire a false image of itself: it teaches it to be a 'person', that is, a constrained composite of desiring-production – Oedipus! – that wants only what it is told is forbidden. The disjunctive synthesis is the instrument of this particular bracing of desiring-production because it

implants the oedipal structure in the very heart of desire: everything you want, it says, is an emanation and desperate outcrying of this triangle (you can only escape it by going deeper into it). Finally, it renders itself inescapable through a segregative deployment of the conjunctive synthesis: instructing us, in no uncertain terms, that 'to be one of us' Oedipus is the model you have to conform to. What Deleuze and Guattari's hermeneutic amounts to then is a utopian project – it teaches us to look for three types of dark precursors (displacements, internalisations and identifications) and see them as missteps, literal wrong turnings that head heedlessly down the nightmarish road of false consciousness, naturalisation and ideology and stand in urgent need of righting.

Deleuze and Guattari's three syntheses of desiring-production are, I want to suggest, important rewrites, or better, retoolings, of a classic Marxist critical terminology. False consciousness, naturalisation, and ideology are rewritten as effects. Although it may sometimes seem like it, thanks largely to the vehemence of their rhetoric, Deleuze and Guattari are not rejecting false consciousness, naturalisation, or even ideology out of hand when they denounce the explanatory power of these terms. Their quarrel is rather with anyone who would claim them to be causes, or even indices of causes, when they are in fact nothing more than effects. Of course, what they really object to is the proposition that effects are expressions of causes, which is an extension of Deleuze's more basic quarrel with the system of levels that various theories of representation have sought to impose – surface and depth, manifest and latent, signifier and signified, and so on, right back to the Platonic distinction between original and copy. So although in some lights it might seem that desire simply replaces the hidden terms in these binaries (depth, latent and signified), that isn't the case at all. For while Deleuze says that desire is repressed by representation, he does not allow that its particular form of repression endows it with meaning in the way that, say, surface is animated by depth, or the manifest can be conceived as a figuration by other means of the latent, not even that a relation of delayed identification obtains.

Therefore, representation and desire cannot be correlated with any of the major coordinating binaries deployed in this century with the aim of comprehending culture, neither surface and depth, nor manifest and latent, and particularly not signifier and signified. It does, however, strike a productive chord with one of Spinoza's key, critical binaries, namely the crucial relationship between adequate and inadequate ideas. Mindful of the duplicitous ease with which this could be turned into a dialectical argument where there isn't one, I nevertheless want to suggest

that this particular binary can be used to comprehend the entire Deleuzian project. And indeed that will be my strategy. It will be my argument that it is only Deleuze's project, if it can be extracted from the density and profundity of his speculations, and not his particular concepts, which by Deleuze's own definition of them must remain tied to his project, that can serve as the arrow Deleuze says a philosopher leaves behind for his or her successors to pick up and fire at their own targets. It is the Deleuzian project that Deleuzism renews. Its essential problematic, as Deleuze and Guattari admit, is the fact that desiring-production has to be induced on the basis of representations, which is to say, discovered where it is not.[102]

This project can thus be seen to turn on the conversion of inadequate ideas (passions) into adequate ones (desire). This, as Negri's work on Spinoza affirms, is the heart and soul of Spinoza's utopian project, it is his way of generating a philosophy of joy rather than sadness.[103] It is this 'joyous' mechanism, which, of course, Deleuze renews in his own way, that I shall try to adduce here as succinctly as possible, and without succumbing to the temptation of formulating it in dialectical terms.[104] To begin with, then, it can be stipulated that passions are affections of the body that cannot be explained by the nature of the body.[105] As such, they are passive affects, not actions. Because we are not the cause of such affects, our idea of them can only be inadequate. Now, inadequate ideas are what we are condemned to so long as we do not inquire after causes.[106] Adequate ideas, therefore, are what we have when causes are known.[107] How we attain adequate ideas, which is to say, how we overcome whatever obstacles stand between us and a secure knowledge of causes, is clearly enough the crucial question.[108] As we shall see in Chapter 3, this methodological question is also the basis of what may be termed Deleuze's ethics. Given their seeming negativity, we might start by considering the factors weighing against adequate ideas, and so clarify right away why passions do not imply negativity, nor necessitate negation. According to Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, we are given to inadequate ideas because we fall prey to superstition.[109]

Superstition is Deleuze's catch-all rubric for the concatenation of sad passions, weak and inadequate ideas, fears and their corresponding hopes, in short, any kind of bitter-spirited angst that 'delivers us over to phantoms'.[110] Phantoms are illusions we are happy not to see as illusory – ideology, in the bad sense, or what Deleuze and Guattari would later call 'opinion' (from which all misfortune derives).[111] There is no need to negate these illusions, though, because as soon as their falsity is exposed they disappear like so many vampires caught in the morning sun. Nonetheless, the task of philosophy is to denounce all such mystifications

because so long as they obtain they separate us from our true capabilities.[112] However, adequate ideas are not attained simply by consciousness-raising: a freshened awareness of the lure ideology presents does not amount to an increase in our knowledge of our peculiar abilities and powers, it does not banish sad passions altogether, it merely mitigates one the major sources of them. The greatest of all illusions is that an ideological purification, or better still, purging, is all it takes to reach an adequate idea of our true powers. One has, rather, to get back to the multiplicity of relations between things and bodies, as well as bodies and bodies; back, that is, to the most basic of our manifold ignorances, the fact we do not yet know what a body can do. In effect, one has to reckon with the fact that Deleuze suggests Spinoza's conception of the body must be taken as a model if we are to think in terms of power (which in its different modes refers at once to desire and the repressing apparatus of representation).[113]

Passions, as I've said, inhibit our attainment of adequate ideas, but until we know why that is a problem we are not going to understand them at all, and we are only going to understand their problematical nature when we know what adequate ideas are. This is why we must take up the question of what a body can do: only in this way will we be able to apprehend desire as constitutive, and thereby see passions in their truly obstructive (repressive) guise. Since passions can in fact be converted into actions their repressiveness is of the nature of an existential paralysis rather than a genuine negativity, or threat of a fall into nothingness. And one has only to become conscious of them to burst free of their stranglehold. The practical extension of this position can be seen in Guattari and Negri's overtly polemical tract, *Communists Like Us*, which, similarly inspired by Spinoza, proclaims that the ultimate revolutionary transformation is to be effected by the creation of a 'new subjective consciousness'.[114] Rather than expose false consciousness, or denounce bad faith, what the Spinozian mechanism of the transformation of passions into actions adopted by Deleuze (as well as Guattari and Negri) dictates is a complete change of consciousness – not merely new thoughts, or a change of lifestyle, but a radically alternate path for which the term 'becoming' scarcely begins to indicate the intensity.

My point, then, is that none of Deleuze's books are conceived with a purely philosophical objective in mind; there is always a higher, or wider, goal in view, namely the transformation of society itself, and philosophy is merely the chosen tool. And it is clear that if he could compose music, for instance, with equal adroitness he would give up this particular tool in an instant and spend his time fashioning compelling symphonic works

instead, which imposes on us the view that philosophy must always be kept in its properly functional place and not be allowed to stray into the lofty realm of being an end in itself. It must do something. From this perspective, Deleuze's style of writing and his meditations on style and writing become all important for they define what it is he wants to do by mapping the limits of what it is possible to say, his goal always being to push a little further along from this or that limit-point. Deleuze's fantasy is to contrive a form of writing that says no more than what it does and does no less than what it says.[115] His frequent emphasis on the need for experimentation in philosophy should be taken to mean that philosophy must confront representation as both its limit and its condition of possibility; as such, philosophy is primarily, if not ultimately, a problem of representation.[116]

Given that Deleuze's primary assertion relating to representation is that we must find the means of escaping its clutches, we can conclude that any such experimentations philosophers should choose to engage themselves in must be of the order of a practice of de-representation (a working-through of passions), one whose ultimate goal, moreover, must finally be the achievement of something like non-representation (adequate ideas). This final form would presumably be desire, which in the Deleuzian scheme is what everything begins with and returns to. Now, however fantastic this may seem, and it is undeniably fantastic in scope, this must be Deleuze's strategic aim, or else the idea of escaping representation is a hollow, throwaway piece of rhetoric unworthy of further consideration. That it isn't this may be discerned in the fact that Deleuze himself does not treat it that way at all. His long, extremely elaborate and immensely detailed description of the emergence of representation is anything but empty rhetoric. It should be read as strategic, though, and not as a bare, objective delineation of the history of a process, because in effect what it does is specify the conditions under which representation may in fact be overturned. By making representation the repressed face of desire he not only constructs a hermeneutic that will enable him to detect the workings of desire in every facet of all legible phenomena, he also posits a primordial flux into which representation can be dissolved.[117]

If philosophy is not merely to contribute to this malaise still another mean-spirited critique it has to offer something hopeful, utopian even, and in Deleuze's case it is joy. Philosophy, in his hands, is a means of clearing away those baleful passions obstructing our access to joy, but it doesn't – indeed can't – work by fashioning imperatives ('you will have fun!'). It can only proceed by 'demonstration'. His doctrine, then, is not to be found in a secret instruction manual, but in his praxis, which must be

conceived precisely as a concrete response to the times. His key 'demon-stration' is *What is Philosophy?*, which seeks to present an adequate, or sufficient account of philosophy. Why he should want to do that is found in the twin volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, which may be read as prefigurations of this later work inasmuch as they define the problem to which it will supply a solution. This problem, we find, which is a problem of the times, is bad group politics. But the deeper rationale and explanation needed to understand why this solution should be proposed and not any other is to be found in the books on Spinoza and Nietzsche. I will therefore read all of Deleuze's monographs as clarifications of problems encountered in the course of developing a philosophical re-sponse to the times.

This means Deleuze's oeuvre will be read coextensively (at infinite speed as Deleuze puts it), not consecutively (relative speed), which most commentators have seen as necessary but fraught with embarrassing contradictions. How can one read and admire Kant alongside Hume, Spinoza alongside Leibniz, Bergson alongside Nietzsche and so on? Deleuze's own answer is not, it seems, satisfactory, and it is been clarified and corrected several times over by anxious historians of philosophy, clouding up an actually quite clear picture. Deleuze says he took tools – his codeword for concepts – from each of the philosophers he wrote monographs on, and these he said enabled him to do philosophy. From this we can readily derive an answer to the evidently contentious question of how such a disparate collection of philosophies can be read at once. If concepts belong to problems, then the current that links them all together must be in the shape of a problem, and this only needs to be adduced to show that however at odds these philosophers may appear they all deal with the same issue. 'The collective problem, then, is to institute, find, or recover a maximum of connections. For connections (and disjunctions) are nothing other than the physics of relations, the cosmos.'[118] A physics is needed to explain cosmic synthesis, but a metaphysics is needed to present it. Unfolding this two-handed philosophy will be the task of the next chapter.

Notes

1. Contrary to what has become something of a convention in Deleuze studies, I do not give primacy to Deleuze's conceptual persona, as do Ansell Pearson (1999), Brusseau (1998), and Stivale (1998), but rather to his project, for the very good reason that in Deleuze's own reading of philosophers, the elaboration of their conceptual persona is always a function, that is to say a derivative, of their project as he identifies it.

2. As Michael Hardt notes, Deleuze's political project, as it would come to be developed throughout his career, can be seen in his very first publications, indeed as early as 1953. I read his subsequent work, then, as a veritable becoming-concrete of this intuition, with all due modification. Hardt 1993: xviii.

3. 'Of course, every history of philosophy has its chapter on empiricism: Locke and Berkeley have their place there, but in Hume there is something very strange which completely displaces empiricism, giving it a new power . . .' (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 15).

4. In this respect, Michael Hardt's discussion of Deleuze's anti-Hegelianism is, I think, definitive, but it stops just short of asking this question, which I am arguing has to be raised if being anti-Hegel is not to be found to be 'mechanically' caused. (Cf. Hardt 1993: ix-xv. But see also Descombes 1980: 9–54.) Still, this is preferable to the opposite tactic of ignoring the Hegelian background altogether, as Massumi seems to, in favour of a pronounced emphasis on Deleuze's creativity. Cf. Massumi 1992: 4.

5. 'What I most detested was Hegelianism and dialectics' (Deleuze 1995: 6). See also Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 14–16.

6. Jameson 1981: 54 n. 31.

7. It is also decidedly unDeleuzian. 'There are, you see, two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what signifies, and then if you're even more perverse or depraved you set off after signifiers. And you treat the next book like a box contained in the first or containing it. [. . .] Or there's the other way: you see the book as a little non-signifying machine, and the only question is "Does it work, and how does it work"?' (Deleuze 1995: 7–8).

8. In this respect, I find Ansell Pearson's project in *Germinal Life* (1999) to be completely misguided insofar as it is treated as a book about Deleuze. However, if it is read as being about a certain Deleuzian solution to a modernist problem of two irreconcilable types of nihilism, then it is very interesting. My point is that Deleuze does not need to be reinvented as a biophilosopher, nor made to seem more Bergsonian than he is in order to undertake this type of project. Moreover, such reinventions and recuperations ultimately serve only to re-instate the very sort of history of philosophy Deleuze tried desperately to unshackle himself from.

9. Deleuze 1995: 6.

10. No-one fosters this image more sedulously than Deleuze himself: 'It was Nietzsche, who I only read later, who extricated me from all this [i.e., the history of philosophy]' (Deleuze 1995: 6).

11. Deleuze is an avid enthusiast of what could be called a Menardist protocol of reading: 'this new technique is that of the deliberate anachronism and the erroneous attribution. The technique, whose applications are infinite, prompts us to go through the *Odyssey* as if it were posterior to the *Aeneid* and the book *Le jardin du Centaure* of Madame Henri Bachelier as if it were by Madame Henri Bachelier. This technique fills the most placid works with adventure' (Borges 1970: 71).

12. Hardt's emphasis of the selectivity of Deleuze's reading of other philosophers, and the fact that he clearly reads them with an eye to his own project, constitutes an extremely strong argument against any reading of Deleuze that would seek to identify him as either anti-Hegel or pro-Nietzsche. He is at all times, Deleuzian. Hardt 1993: xix.

13. Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 15–16.

14. Here one is reminded of Marx's comment that the sequence of economic categories has to be determined not by their respective periods of historical

decisiveness, but 'by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their natural order or which corresponds to historical development' (Marx 1973: 107).

15. TV, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is the ultimate privatisation of the public. 'This gives private persons a very special role in the system: a role of *application*, and no longer of implication, in a code' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 251).

16. Ronald Bogue hints at a similarly epochal reading, but ultimately does not go beyond a purely philosophical rationale. Bogue 1989: 2–3.

17. Deleuze 1995: 182.

18. 'Philosophy has not remained unaffected by the general movement that replaced Critique with sales promotion' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 10).

19. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 17; 1983: 239.

20. In fact, it is to the struggle against opinion that Deleuze and Guattari ultimately ascribe *What is Philosophy?* (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 203).

21. For an examination of the relationship between Deleuze and Marx, see Holland 1997; Jameson 1997.

22. Marx 1976: 102.

23. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 306. Cf. Hardt 1993: 77–9; Stolze 1998.

24. Marx 1973: 99; Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 42.

25. Marx 1973: 85; Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 1.

26. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 10.

27. Deleuze uses the metaphor of the volcano-chain to describe the discontinuous yet coherent interconnection of Spinoza's scholia. Deleuze 1990b: 345. The metaphor itself seems to have been taken from Malcolm Lowry. Deleuze 1990a: 155.

28. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 239.

29. 'Desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and breaks the flow' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 5).

30. Here, one cannot fail to hear the stirring echo of Adorno: 'To define identity as the correspondence of the thing-in-itself to its concept is *hubris*; but the ideal of identity must not simply be discarded. Living in the rebuke that the thing is not identical with the concept is the concept's longing to become identical with the thing. This is how the sense of nonidentity contains identity' (Adorno 1973: 149).

31. Derrida 1982: 3–7.

32. Derrida 1982: 9.

33. Lyotard 1988.

34. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 4–5.

35. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 5.

36. Marx 1973: 93.

37. Thus, as Hardt has suggested, it is better to think of Deleuze as post-Kantian than post-Hegelian because his strategy of circumventing Hegel involves a return to and a development of Kant. Hardt 1993: 53. See also Patton 1996 and Smith 1996.

38. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 75.

39. Guattari 1984: 49.

40. 'By failing from the beginning to see what the precise nature of this desiring-production is, and how, under what conditions, and in response to what pressures, the Oedipal triangulation plays a role in the recording of the process, we find ourselves trapped in the net of a diffuse, generalised oedipalism that radically distorts the life of the child and his later development, the neurotic and psychotic problems of the adult, and sexuality as a whole' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 49).

41. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 81.
42. 'The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell' (Marx 1976: 103).
43. Marx 1973: 101.
44. Marx 1973: 101.
45. Deleuze 1994: 129.
46. Althusser and Balibar 1970: 187. For Deleuze's explicit endorsement of this reading of Marx see Deleuze 1994: 186.
47. Cf. Jameson 1981: 26–7.
48. de Certeau 1984: 62.
49. 'By joining sexuality to the familial complex, by making Oedipus into the criterion of sexuality in analysis – the test of orthodoxy par excellence – Freud himself posited the whole of social *and* metaphysical relations as an afterward or a beyond that desire was incapable of investing immediately. He then became rather indifferent to the fact that this beyond derives from the familial complex through the analytical transformation of desire, or is signified by it in an anagogical symbolisation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 58).
50. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 54.
51. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 55.
52. Freud 1976: 364.
53. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 116.
54. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 114.
55. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 114–15.
56. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 115.
57. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 4.
58. Jameson 1981: 30.
59. Deleuze 1994: 108.
60. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 111.
61. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 5.
62. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 36.
63. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 36.
64. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 406.
65. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 38.
66. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 36.
67. 'Let us consider, for example, the milk the baby throws up when it burps; it is at one and the same time the restitution of something that has been levied from the associative flux (*restitution de prélèvement sur le flux associatif*); the reproduction of the process of detachment from the signifying chain (*reproduction de détachement sur la chaîne signifiante*); and a residuum (*résidu*) that constitutes the subject's share of the whole' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 40).
68. On the tendency to concretisation see Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 221. On 'virtuality' see Rodowick 1997a.
69. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 41.
70. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 27.
71. The three syntheses are prefigured there. Cf. Deleuze 1994: 118.
72. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 78.
73. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 78.
74. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 116.
75. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 69.
76. Deleuze 1983: 68.

77. Deleuze 1994: 105–6, 124.
78. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 74.
79. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 10–11.
80. Deleuze 1990b: 170.
81. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 24.
82. Deleuze 1990b: 180.
83. 'The body without organs is not God, quite the contrary. But the energy that sweeps through it is divine, when it attracts to itself the entire process of production and serves as its miraculate, enchanted surface, inscribing it in each and every one of its disjunctions' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 13).
84. 'Mediation is the classical dialectical term for the establishment of relationships between, say, the formal analysis of a work of art and its social ground, or between the internal dynamics of the political state and its economic base' (Jameson 1981: 39).
85. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 57.
86. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 34.
87. Although he was actually a critic of it, de Certeau has been made to seem the prime agent behind this debate in cultural studies (for instance, see Soja 1997: 313). But as I have argued elsewhere, his aim was rather to find a point of mediation that could encompass both perspectives without compromise. Cf. Buchanan 1996.
88. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 80; 314.
89. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 80.
90. The three syntheses of desiring-production are in fact brought into direct alignment with social production by Deleuze and Guattari as the basis of a periodising move. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 224.
91. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 135.
92. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 76.
93. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 17.
94. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 84.
95. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 85.
96. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 31.
97. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 84.
98. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 98.
99. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 105.
100. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 105.
101. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 308–9.
102. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 314.
103. 'By means of the clear and distinct idea every affection can be purified and sublimated. There exists no affection of the body on which it is not possible to fix the sign of clarity and distinctness. The mind destroys the external causes, the excesses, regulates the appetites and desires, and orders and links the affections of the body according to the order required by the intellect. In this frame joy and love can and do become active forces capable of directing the affections of the body' (Negri 1991: 170).
104. 'In Spinoza mechanism is referred to something deeper, but this through the requirements of an absolutely immanent pure causality. Causality alone leads us to consider existence, and causality is itself enough to resolve the question' (Deleuze 1990b: 233).
105. Deleuze 1990b: 219.
106. Deleuze 1990b: 273; Deleuze 1988b: 19.
107. 'An idea that we have that is adequate may be formally defined as an idea of which we are the cause; were it then the material and efficient cause of a feeling

we would be the adequate cause of that feeling itself; but a feeling of which we are the adequate cause is an action' (Deleuze 1990b: 221).

108. Deleuze 1990b: 221.
109. '*Superstition* is everything that keeps us cut off from our power of action and continually diminishes it' (Deleuze 1990b: 270).
110. Deleuze 1990b: 270.
111. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 206.
112. Deleuze 1990b: 270.
113. 'In order to really think in terms of power, one must consider the matter in relation to the body, one must in the first place free the body from that relation of inverse proportionality which makes all comparison of powers impossible, and thereby also makes impossible any assessment of the power of the soul considered in itself. The question, "What can a body do?", must be taken as a model' (Deleuze 1990b: 257).
114. Guattari and Negri 1990: 19.
115. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 133.
116. 'To overturn the theatre of representation into the order of desiring-production: this is the whole task of schizoanalysis' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 271).
117. 'To trace back from images to the structure would have little significance and would not rescue us from representation, *if the structure did not have a reverse side* that is like the real production of desire' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 309).
118. Deleuze 1997: 52.

Chapter 2

Deleuze's Project:
The Method in his Madness

> Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry.
>
> (Karl Marx, *Capital*)

The certainty that Deleuze is doing something radical and new in his work has given rise, quite rightly, to a corresponding uncertainty as to how to read his work. For one thing, his style appears a little mad, ideas and concepts seem to fly right off the page. For another, it is quite difficult to pin down just what his method or system is, and it is no use at all to say it is rhizomatic since that only adds complexity to an already dense image. Thus, as a first question, readers of Deleuze must determine how exactly they will read his work. So far this has been the pattern of practically every commentary on Deleuze: they all begin with this vexed question. Some, I would say, have not worried enough about how to read Deleuze, being content to work with an at best superficial sketch, while others seem to have worried too much, becoming paralysed in the process by their own concerted attempts at fidelity.[1] One thing is clear to me, in order to make anything of Deleuze's work one must be at once sympathetic to the system of his thought, and yet – precisely because of this simpatico – antipathetic to the temptation of adherence ('those who do not renew the image of thought are not philosophers but functionaries').[2] And, of course, it is precisely this paradoxical demand which makes Deleuze such a difficult and tantalising philosopher: he seems to offer the secret joy of a private language.

What I mean by this, however, is that the last thing needed right now is the docile acceptance – or worse, celebration – of some hazy, well-nigh mystical, kind of ineffability of the deeper meaning of Deleuze's work, as this potentially ludic position might ultimately insist upon; rather, to the contrary, there is a need for a certain violence, a strong will to renew at all

costs. For my own part, I want to insist that Deleuze's work needs to be grasped as a representation, as the attempt to say something quite particular, however peculiar, that insofar as it creates radically new forms of philosophical figuration, needs the semiotic antipathy of a guerilla to fathom fully.[3] To show what I mean by this I propose to read Deleuze and Guattari's final collaborative piece, *What is Philosophy?*, as a hermeneutic key to their joint work, as well Deleuze's own; one which, moreover, has all the hallmarks of an exercise in secondary revision.[4] My claim that one has to be already Deleuzian to comprehend Deleuze is, as I hope to show, not merely a conceit, but the necessary conclusion one reaches in trying to reconcile the two quite different answers Deleuze and Guattari give to the central question of that book. My claim that one has to cease being Deleuzian stems from the difficulty of trying to present their twofold answer to what philosophy actually is. On the one hand it is the invention of concepts, they say, but on the other hand, it is an aspect of the thought-brain.

This latter point, I will argue, only makes sense if you read it from the perspective of the former. But to be able to see this, one needs to entertain the possibility, more or less savagely repressed by Deleuze and his disciples, of a dialectical reading, a reading which breaks free of his rhetoric by apprehending it *as* rhetoric. What appeared liberating to Deleuze's earliest readers, his great hermeneutic revolution of asking how texts work and not what they mean, is in fact something of a distraction. No-one has looked beyond it to ask what does Deleuze's philosophy do?[5] At least none of his disciples have; they're still stuck on celebrating how it works. Yet in order to reconcile the two different answers Deleuze gives to his own question of what philosophy is, we must raise this somewhat impudent question. His second answer, that philosophy is one aspect of the thought-brain, cannot be an answer to the question 'what is philosophy?' since, in the very least, it presupposes the thought-brain as a still higher concept to which it owes its meaning and cogency. So in spite of the fact that it is offered as an expansion and practical completion of the preliminary definition of philosophy given in the opening pages, its genealogy is distinctly different. It is inaugurated by an entirely different question, one that points to the problem of the evolution of the thought-brain, not, as it initially seemed, the history of philosophy; or rather, as it seems to me, it broaches a wholly new kind of question that effectively turns the history of philosophy into a kind of evolutionary psychobiology; but, instead of presuming the biological explains the philosophical (through the persistence of the instinctual in the cultural for instance), it assumes the biological must already be philosophical, or else philosophy could never have evolved.[6]

The profound incoherence of a philosophy that presents itself as the comprehension of a thought-brain, whose existence it must stipulate in order to exist, is clarified, I will suggest, by treating it as a figurative problematic.[7] It is not a contradiction which must somehow be resolved by the introduction of some new form of synthesis; it is, rather, the unembarrassed, and therefore affirming, acknowledgement of the sheer impossibility of the one truly philosophical project philosophy has – namely, accounting for its own existence without recourse to other discourses. What Deleuze is searching for in all his books, and seems to feel he might have found in *What is Philosophy?*, is a philosophy (which must now be taken to mean both a system of thought and a model of expressivity) capable of articulating its own evolution from the time of the primordial ooze on, for it is only in this way that it can adequately account for its own possibility in its own terms and thus be truly autopoietic. As I have already suggested, Deleuze's solution, which is only the shiny side of a darker problem, is to argue that biology in its very evolution must already be philosophical, that, in effect, philosophy is the product of the same process that sees molecules become animalcules, and fins become feet or wings. That darker problem is, of course, the difficulty itself of imagining, let alone justifying, a philosophy able to admit it is a kind of accident, as life itself is, without thereby losing any of its rigour as a 'higher' form of cognition.

For this reason, the most effective way to grasp Deleuze's work is in terms of a tension between its underpinning physics (second aspect) and its manifest metaphysics (first aspect).[8] This particular division is taken from Negri, who uses it to articulate a certain ambivalence at the heart of Spinoza's work; for virtually the same reasons, it seems applicable to Deleuze (who uses the same terminology himself).[9] Now, if it is true, as I have suggested above, that philosophy in its second aspect as one of the three powers constitutive of the thought-brain only becomes available to us when we're already Deleuzian, when, in effect, we've accepted that the mission and vocation of transcendental empiricism is the confrontation with this enormously complex figurative problematic, then I must, as a matter of practical necessity, commence my argument with a description of philosophy in its first aspect, the invention of concepts. What I aim to adduce at this point is the system of thought Deleuze presents as the necessary condition of his philosophising, which is to say, I want to specify as precisely as possible how one goes about practising Deleuzism. My implication is that the contentious matter of how to read Deleuze needs to be settled right away, and the only way to do that properly is to take our cues directly from Deleuze.[10] This is by no means foreign to the

spirit of Deleuze's work. He offers countless hermeneutic tips, and never shies away from stating just how his work should be approached.[11] Sometimes he makes jokes about it, like saying his book can be treated like a record (just drop the stylus anywhere and take it from there[12]); other times he coyly pretends it is a mere tool-kit[13] he is offering when in fact it is closer to a new technology (it being a better approximation to say transcendental empiricism is to philosophy as television is to the media industry, than, say, the relation between a hammer and carpentry, because what it does, as television once did, is create new discursive possibilities[14]); but most of the time he is in earnest, like when he says you have to take an author as a whole, and can't allow yourself the luxury of picking and choosing.[15]

   An important implication, which underpins my approach to Deleuze's work here, follows from this last point because it raises the problem of ruptures and inconsistencies within the oeuvre of a single author and how one should treat them. One cannot ignore them, of course, Deleuze says, but neither should one make a fetish of them either. His approach is rather to treat any such shifts as so much 'working-out' (experimenta-tion). 'The logic of someone's thought is the whole set of crises through which it passes; it's more like a volcanic chain than a stable system close to equilibrium.'[16] In other words, taking an author as a whole means seizing them in terms of a project – implicit or explicit – and using that to smooth over false starts, without reducing them to stages or phases. Yet it is an odd kind of totalisation because it positions the whole adjacent to the field, as a kind of fifth wheel, and not either subordinate or super-ordinate to it. So, to speak of the whole is always to speak of something extruded by the oeuvre. It is a procedure that is at once immensely forgiving, in that it doesn't endeavour to score points (as de Certeau put it), and amazingly self-assured (that Nietzschean taste for saying things your own way); as such, it is both ethos and method.[17] My determination to grasp Deleuze's oeuvre in terms of a project is thus precisely an instance of Deleuzism at work. It is an attempt to engage with his work as he himself engaged with the work of others, and, it is hoped, as much a demonstration as it is an application.[18]

   Nowhere is he more prescriptive than in *What is Philosophy?*, where philosophy is presented as a *combinatoire*. All the many metatextual remarks he studs his previous books with are here congealed. But, perhaps the most remarkable statement in the whole book is the one it opens with: that its authors have always known what philosophy is.[19] It is remarkable not only for its blatant conceit, but for the suggestion of redundancy it makes. It is as if they are saying the present book is

unnecessary, at least for them, since they already know what philosophy is (and therefore do not need the opportunity of a book to work things out for themselves), but possibly for us too, if we've read them carefully enough. So what possessed them to write such an evidently redundant book? Well, they give two answers, neither of which jibes completely with the other. On the one hand they say they could not have written the book before now because the taste for it didn't exist; no-one was ready to read it in other words. (They also say it is the kind of book only old men could write, but this doesn't explain their motives, it merely lends an air of eccentric authority to their endeavour by casting them as tribal elders.[20]) But on the other hand they say philosophy is under such dire threat of corruption that they felt they had to write the book now in order to save philosophy from itself, first of all, and second, from the barbarians at the gate.[21] So right from the outset we are alerted to the fact that this book is not a description of philosophy for philosophy's sake, but a concerted attempt to achieve something with philosophy in a situation they take great care to specify.[22] Their message, it turns out, is that it is impotent to merely say what philosophy is, one must do it, but more importantly, do it on one's own terms.[23]

Before developing this claim further I want to first of all dwell a little on the implications of the startling opening statement – that they have always known what philosophy is. Yes, it is conceited, but it is not merely conceited. It is, I believe, our strongest hermeneutic tip on how to read *What is Philosophy?* It tells us right away that this book is not going to contain anything new, and that anything that appears new will in reality be a revision of an already existing idea (to the extent that this is not spelled out clearly I think it is still fair to describe it as secondary revision). Everything we need to make sense of this book can be found in *A Thousand Plateaus*, but, by the same token, everything we need to make sense of *A Thousand Plateaus* is to be found in *What is Philosophy?*[24] It might even be said *What is Philosophy?* is to *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* as *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is to *Madness and Civilisation*, *The Birth of the Clinic* and *The Order of Things*. In other words, the strongest proof we have that Deleuze's work should be conceived as a singular project is the deep-seated continuity (albeit of a volcanic-chain variety) between his works expressed here as redundancy. And I do not just mean his collaborations with Guattari – the monographs, too, are integrated into this grand scheme. Identifying the nature of this project is not straightforward by any means, and it is not until *What is Philosophy?* that it is presented as an aim in itself, as something their philosophy must explain, but as I have suggested it is never far from view either.

The continuity between Deleuze's works proves, I argue, it should be treated as a singular project, while the fact it is a project disproves any claim (including their own) that it isn't dialectical. The most compelling evidence I can offer in support of this argument is the fact that in defining what philosophy is Deleuze and Guattari not only construct a *combinatoire* which, however complicated in structure it may be, and however capable of absorbing complexity it in fact is, is still nonetheless a structuralist device. They also take the form of that *combinatoire* from their previous work on the nature and function of the unconscious. Any nagging doubt that Deleuze and Guattari do in fact reconstruct philosophy as a *combinatoire* should be dispelled by this fact alone. What it means is that their treatment of philosophy as but one aspect of the mind is anticipated in the very structure they attribute to it; it also means philosophy could not but be one aspect of the mind. In other words, putting it bluntly, they've always known what philosophy is because they've always known how the mind is constructed, and, by the same token, they've always known how the mind is constructed because they've always known what philosophy is. To put it in Deleuzian terms, philosophy as a mode of thought and the mind needed to think those thoughts are mutually presupposed by the observer. A double articulation is needed to think this, and it is precisely double articulation as a mechanism (*combinatoire*) that underpins Deleuze's thought, which is why philosophy is presented in two aspects at once.

If there is any hint of disingenuousness in their undertaking it may reside in the fact that they do not present their diagram of philosophy's fundamental coordinates as a *combinatoire*, but they might also have thought it was so obvious it didn't need a second telling. It is obvious because the only way philosophy can save itself, they say, is by relearning what it is exactly that concepts do, and who it is that has the right to deploy them. Chiefly, this amounts to a refined appreciation of the concept as a 'philosophical reality'.[25] In effect, then, all philosophers, and all philosophies, irrespective of their particular concerns are said to do exactly the same thing on at least one level of abstraction, which, crudely, but perhaps not altogether unjustly, we may call *la pensée philosophique* (of course Deleuze and Guattari would themselves call it the plane of immanence). At this level of abstraction it is only a dialectical presentation that saves the plane of immanence from folding in on itself and taking on the mask of the natural, from transmuting into *la pensée sauvage* in other words, which is precisely not what Deleuze and Guattari intend. It is only by seeing that the plane of immanence solves a certain problem implicit in the figuration of their ideas that it can be saved

from the charge of restoring a natural philosophy of the kind that presumes the physical can give rise to knowledge of itself without mediation. For that is what in effect it is: mediation.[26]

Nowadays it is an axiom of Deleuze and Guattari studies that they are anti-dialectical. Numerous citations can be given as evidence of this because Deleuze and Guattari never stop saying they're anti-dialectical, it is a kind of mantra with them.[27] But in going along with them on this we do ourselves a profound disservice, I believe, because we neutralise one of the most effective tools we have for mobilising their work towards positive political ends and consequently fall tendentially into a paradigm of pure description of the adjectival kind. More importantly, it assumes that there is only one kind of dialectics, which is patently not the case. I would agree wholeheartedly with anyone that said Deleuze and Guattari's approach was not dialectical if that meant synthesising, but would disagree strongly if instead it meant historicising – which is to say, creating the means to 'distance' the present as an 'event' from itself as 'mindless immediacy' or 'flux' – and as Jameson has amply demonstrated, one conception of dialectics does not imply the other. Perhaps one reason the implicit historicising operation Deleuze and Guattari's work undertakes has not been seen is that, in general, historicisation can follow one or other of two separate paths (historicisation of the object, or historicisation of the subject) that, as Jameson puts it, only 'eventually meet', and, as I would add, in our current critical climate one has tended to eclipse the other.[28] The third position – Marxism – that Jameson partakes of, is perhaps is the only perspective left from which to view this parting of ways.[29]

Now in the full flush of infinite semiosis (however misconceived this is as a reading of Derrida, or simply for itself) on which postmodernity turns, it has become extremely difficult to speak of – let alone historicise – the object, or any of the various versions of the subject that have evolved since the advent of poststructuralism. Yet, oddly enough, it was precisely as a historicisation of the object, namely the sign, that this whole adventure began. Deleuze's work belongs to this prior – explicitly revolutionary – moment of what, in view of what was to come, we might now call, after de Certeau, the 'great instauration' of poststructuralism. His outright rejection of all forms of interpretation and his trenchant formalism (interpretation's Other) together suggest that Deleuze never deviated from this, now subterranean path of historicising the object, never made the fateful crossing to the 'other' side, the subject, as did many of his contemporaries – Baudrillard most notably – who, having vanquished the object had nowhere else to go, nowhere else, in other

words, to mourn its passing or repent its murder. Given that Deleuze and Guattari verily do use the concept to survey the social in this mediated, that is to say 'historicising' way, why is it made to seem that to even put the word 'dialectical' in the same sentence as Deleuze and Guattari is to commit some kind of heinous profanation of their work?

Who benefits from this rigid policing? It would appear that by some strange twist of events Deleuze and Guattari have been transformed into figureheads of exactly the kind of politics they explicitly and caustically castigate – namely, conservatism. For insofar as we do not see their indubitably sexy terminology as the introduction of so many estrangements, we reduce it to either the merely descriptive, or, worse, a kind of glossy repackaging of the social. With this caution as my watchword, let me now map out their *combinatoire* so as to illustrate more fully what Deleuzism means. Philosophy, they say, consists in nothing but the construction of concepts, but, as they are also very careful to add, concepts cannot be constructed any old where or by any old one. One needs to be a philosopher, to start with, and one needs to construct a plane of immanence before anything else can be done. These prescriptions taken together give us our starting point: philosophy comprises three elements – philosopher, plane of immanence and concepts – which to understand Deleuze and Guattari properly must be rendered distinct. Here we need only follow the superbly calculated architecture of Deleuze and Guattari's work to arrive at first base, the apprehension of the elements.

As I've noted already, Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy as the activity of constructing concepts, which amounts to saying where there are concepts being invented there is philosophy.[30] So simply by defining concepts they can, following a fractal logic, build their entire picture of philosophy, and subsequently art and science too, around a single point of contact with the received world of philosophy. What is easy to forget in the exhilarating sweep of all this, however, is that philosophy itself is already a concept, already part of a still larger framework, and is therefore mobilised as both something to be understood and our means of understanding that something. This is why I have suggested Deleuze's work belongs to the adventure of the object, not the subject. Contrary to our expectations, conditioned as they are in an age of free-floating subjectivism, Deleuze sets out to renew philosophy by freshening its very object – the concept – not by retooling its methods, aims or themes: in short, its subjective side. This is the moment then to think the concept in its specificity. In what follows, my argument will be that both the elaboration of the conceptual persona and the plane of immanence follow

a process that should itself be called conceptualisation. It follows that Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is only fully explained if their conception of the concept as a mechanism is made clear.

Now, I do not mean to suggest that the concept is in any way generative, which would be to contradict Deleuze and Guattari's own conception of philosophy as coadaptative at the very outset. In fact, the notion of coadaptation will be crucial to our understanding of the way the tripartite structure Deleuze and Guattari imbue philosophy with avoids transmogrifying into an explicitly dialectical theory of levels.[31] But I do want to suggest it performs an estranging function; that, in practice, conceptualising and estranging are functionally equivalent because both have the effect of separating thinking as a historical process from thoughts as timeless events, but more importantly, both do so in a purposefully conspicuous way. The goal of estrangement is to reveal 'social situations as processes', so it consists in creating *mise en scènes* suitably jarring enough to make audiences perceive this conception of history *as* both different from their own, and what is more, instructive in itself.[32] This latter pedagogic aim, explains, it seems to me, what it is that Deleuze and Guattari hope to achieve in coining so many neologisms – it estranges conceptuality itself.[33]

Concepts are not what philosophers think about, but what they think with; as such, the concept is knowledge, but knowledge of itself.[34] So our definition of a concept must also be our definition of thinking itself as a process, in its philosophical aspect at least. This means the concept is practically impossible to think 'for itself' because it is always already thinking about something else. This something else is its precondition, and must therefore be logically prior, but in Deleuze's formulation is never succeeded as such, never cancelled out and dispensed with.[35] Concepts are not the product of a negation of this other, by which I mean, of course, the originating problem. Concepts and problems have a coadaptive, symbiotic relationship in Deleuze's thought that is best apprehended in ethological terms: concepts as solutions can only be thought via their problems as need, and problems as need must give rise to concepts as solutions (the leopard's claws solve the problem of grasping prey; fleeting prey demand claws). The test of a concept is whether or not it has conceived its problem astutely or not, whether it has managed to break free from the twin shackles of presupposition and predetermination dogging all forms of thought; the test of the problem is whether or not it has rendered these things visible or not by pitching them towards a crisis.

The primacy Deleuze and Guattari attribute to the concept should therefore be taken quite literally. The concept is at once building block

and method, which is as must be if philosophy is to be the act of creating concepts. But, as they prudently qualify, this does not mean the creation of concepts is in any way equivalent to the production of novelty because concepts are neither empty forms, new discoveries, nor engineered products. However, the fact that they are created gives us an important cue: the concept must refer to a creator, otherwise it must be supposed that they either pre-exist philosophy somehow or else evolve spontaneously. It is to this creator that the concept owes not merely its existence, but its power, its competence, its very potential too.[36] In saying this, though, they do not reduce philosophy to a weak subjectivism; on the contrary, the subject to whom a specific philosophy is attributed is conceptualised too, if it may be put that way, and defined as a conceptual persona. Why not say the philosopher is the creator, and leave it that? Because to do so would be to say that the interior of a concept is actually not in the concept at all, but elsewhere, in the mind of the creator for instance. To conceptualise the creator is to restore the concept its interiority, which it turns out is the creator, but it is also to affirm the impersonality of philosophy – philosophy speaks in us, long before we ever get to speak philosophically.[37]

This is at once profoundly structuralist in its conception, and, as I will suggest, an important modification of structuralism. What Deleuze objected to most forcefully in his role as historian of philosophy was the historicism underpinning the discipline's code of practice.[38] His way of evading it was to reverse its polarity and emphasise the synchronic over the diachronic. In his scheme, the philosopher may be dead, but his or her persona lives on for an eternity; indeed, before philosophers can live and breathe, before they can even pick up a pen and set down a single thought, he or she must first craft, or else discover, this eternal figure of the conceptual persona, through which to channel their energies and ideas.[39] This figure gives character to thought, lending it consistency and body, but also introduces a gap between the philosopher and his or her philosophy that I will read as an estrangement of a relationship usually treated as unmediated, if not altogether natural, much in the way historians were once thought to be disinterested conveyors of facts without style or flourish. If it is well conceived, the conceptual persona remains fresh and new, alive, no matter how many long years pass between the moment of conception and reception. So from a historical point of view the conceptual persona represents both a problem and a solution. And in order to see it in a properly Deleuzian light, it is precisely the problem which institutes it as solution that we need to get a fix on.

The conceptual persona is problematic inasmuch that if these char-

acters are truly eternal then any talk of progression or genealogy must be abandoned as impossible, which is of course precisely what Deleuze is aiming for when he says they do not have history, only becoming.[40] Genealogy, as he understood it in its history of philosophy sense, is repressive – 'philosophy's own version of the Oedipus complex'.[41] What is most problematic about it, at least in the first instance, is the very designation of Deleuze's formulation of philosophy's past as history. Histories record births and deaths, and favour most strongly those deaths which can be seen from a different angle as births – the death of structuralism as the birth of poststructuralism, for instance. Sometimes this coincidence of events can be reconfigured as causality, but if not, it at least has the satisfying appeal of a continuity, however much of an anathema that may turn out to be (surely the point of poststructuralism is that all such historicist-motivated clean breaks as the one supposed to have been instigated by Derrida at a certain conference in Baltimore are rendered not merely suspect, but utterly illusory). If philosophers and philosophies do not die, then a history of thought that works by plotting stages along a timeline is going to wind up spatialised before too long, its precious sequence of diachronically conceived dots swelling into an enormous, flat, ultimately useless, synchronic blot. This assumes, however, that the timeline (itself only the shadow cast by temporality) can only be constructed against the life of the ideas and the thinkers themselves, when in fact it can also be constructed around the modes of change.

'We can only make headway with these questions' Deleuze and Guattari claim, 'if we give up the narrowly historical point of view of before and after in order to consider time rather than the history of philosophy'.[42] The inspiration of this 'stratigraphic' time, as Deleuze and Guattari refer to it, is clearly structuralist. What Saussure began to distinguish between, and what Foucault later transformed into a fully fledged model of history, is the distinction between (as Jameson puts it) 'causes that are external to a phenomenon and causes that are somehow intrinsic to it'.[43] In the place of geographical barriers, both cultural and physical, population shifts and transformations in the mode of production, Saussure substituted internal points of exhaustion within the structure of language itself as his key points of interrogation. Most of these were psychological, or else physiological – the memory capacity of humans, the strictly limited ability to produce and reproduce new sounds, the frailty of hearing, and so on. For Foucault, such limit points were mostly of a technological nature, without necessarily being of a machinic order – the panopticon, for instance, was the product of a particular

regime of visibility, not that regime's point of origin, and it passed into obscurity because visibility itself, mimesis in other words, reached its limit. The next leap came when the regime of visibility broke free of referentiality altogether and moved surveillance on to a more abstract plane – no longer the person, but the person's image, their credit rating and such like. But, Deleuze insists, neither regime is technology driven; rather, the technological development mirrors deeply rooted mutations of capitalism itself.[44] For Deleuze, these interior points of exhaustion, wherever they are detected, are philosophy's problems, which is not the same thing at all as saying they are the problem with philosophy. I might add, this is why he says criticism is useless – its problematising is of the second order, the problem-with or external variety, not the first order, the internal, problem-as-impulse kind.

My implication, though, is that Deleuze's problem-based philosophy is achieved by power of a synchronic turn. Now, according to Jameson, the synchronic turn was structuralism's most radical advance, and ultimately the source of its rapid exhaustion too, so we should expect that Deleuze will somehow have modified structuralism's enabling premise. Before we come to this, though, it will be as well if we spend a moment considering why Deleuze should even want to take this path. My suspicion is that Jameson's explanation of why structuralism took hold in general is true for Deleuze too. The advantage of structuralism, as it was soon discovered, is that although it harboured the problem of a profound flattening out of phenomena which could only be remedied by the introduction of a further binary, *langue/parole*, the radical splitting of diachronic and synchronic histories introduced by Saussure enabled structuralism (somewhat perversely given its intrinsic anti-historicism) to seize the history of thought as the history of its models.[45] Anyone who thinks that this was somehow merely an unthinking adherence to fashion on Deleuze's behalf need only turn to his two books on cinema to see that he regarded structuralism's peculiar form of privileging the synchronic an especially potent tool. The natural history of cinema he proposes is precisely structuralist inasmuch as it locates the source of change in cinema in aesthetics, not the industry itself, and while not ignoring external causes altogether these are kept in a strictly subordinate relationship to internal matters of style.

Yet, paradoxically, it is in his treatment of style that he differs most markedly from structuralism. Like Saussure, Deleuze conceives his object of analysis, philosophy, as a total system – complete at every moment, however much it can be shown to have changed through time – locked into a perpetual present, pregnant with all the future possibilities of

thought (becoming). In Jameson's view, this can be digested as an existential move because it implies a higher, ultimately personal and literally gestalt philosophy encompassing all possible philosophies that while not denying history does not take it into account either.[46] And this is its fatal flaw. The initially enlightening abstraction, the supposition of a binary, which is achieved first by severing the present from the past, but more fully by isolating internal causes from external pressures, turns out to be a shortcut to solipsism, and, as Jameson puts it, 'it becomes problematic to what degree the object of study is the thought pattern of the linguist himself, rather than that of language'.[47] So the deeper problem the notion of the conceptual persona must solve is this: how can a history of philosophy be conceived in non-subjectivist terms without recourse to antiquated fantasies of objectivity as contained in historicism? This is where an appreciation of Deleuze's intensely modernist treatment of style becomes crucial, it saves him from the abyss of structuralism without propelling him into the recondite morass of proliferating *mise en abîmes* that is poststructuralism.[48]

Style, according to Deleuze, is what liberates philosophers from themselves, allowing them to become imperceptible (which neither means vanishing nor fragmenting, but involving, folding and implicating); it is an externalisation of an impulse which, when released in the world, takes on an exuberant life and existence of its own. At first glance this must appear contradictory. How can an externalisation be conceived as an inward fold, when surely that must imply internalisation? And of course it must, but look at what is externalised – an impulse to become-other, to get outside of and beyond one's self – and what is internalised: the subject, not the beyond, or the Outside. The subject is able to become-other to the extent they are released from the constraints of ego and subjectivity and enfolded into a larger, though not necessarily higher order. My point is that one can only truly become-other in Deleuze's view by escaping molarity and embracing molecularity and that has nothing to do with acting differently. It is not just a matter of a man wearing a dress, or a woman wearing a suit, or a boy barking like a dog, or a girl mewing like a cat – it is not a form of transvestism. Molecular difference is a difference in kind, not degree, and, as Deleuze has shown, this is achieved by subtraction not addition.

Now we may begin to appreciate the specific nature of Deleuze's structuralism because what this implies, as I will illustrate presently, is an unparalleled emphasis on syntax in its definition of style. The concept, by force of its totalisation, pushes ad hoc components into a syntagmatic relation, making it impossible to add or subtract a new element without

changing the structure of the whole.[49] This is his crucial modification of structuralism; for it was precisely its inability to grasp transformations in syntax that in Jameson's view finally rendered structuralism inert.[50] Style occurs on the level of syntax or it is nothing, according to Deleuze, which is genuinely remarkable because syntax is generally taken by linguists to be untouchable. As it should be, if in fact it is the condition of possibility of all phrases – but is it? Deleuze, for one, doesn't see it that way. Following Hjelmslev he treats syntax as a form of expression, which means it is at once the limit of the expressible and the site where expression itself can be most radically renewed. True style cannot be merely a matter of altering certain characteristics of language use, such as one finds in new rhyming schemes, it must be a transformation of language itself, the opening of it to new vistas. In order to effect this syntactical mutation, style exposes the inherent mutability of the reigning organisational principle of language use by cancelling what is unique to it as a form of expression. It can do this because that hierarchy was only ever an illusion to begin with, or better a misprision – a swarm taken for a series as Deleuze might have put it.[51] In other words, the primary fault of structuralism is its insistence on the immutability of form and the redundancy of content; in the fervour of its revolutionary impulse, it forgets the essential lesson of modernism: a new form of thought is also the elaboration of a new kind of sentence.

Near to the end of *Marxism and Form*, in a luminous couple of pages, Jameson provides us with an extraordinary prefiguration of Deleuze's position on style. It is a mistake, Jameson argues, to think authors deal essentially in themes, that their works are simply disquisitions – albeit of 'another' type – on such great concerns as love, honour and death. Even an author like Hemingway, famous as much for the books he wrote as the animals he killed and the wounds he sustained, his life experiences being the indispensable support of his art, cannot be apprehended in this way, he argues, because in reality his 'deepest subject is simply the writing of a certain type of sentence, the practice of a determinate style'. And it is in fact style, from both the reader's and author's point of view, that actually counts as 'the most "concrete" experience in Hemingway'. It is the sheer process of writing itself that stands out as the essential event, whether it proves adequate to the task it sets itself (it is not the death of an elephant we wish to observe, but whether the language will be commensurate to it). So while it may appear that Hemingway's influence and popularity derive from an ethical content in his works – his trenchantly red-blooded refusal of the inauthentic in life – this is a misrecognition. What appears to be 'first and foremost a life experience, is in reality merely a projection of the

style itself'. It is not life vividly rendered, but a new sentence electrifyingly conceived. 'Thus one is wrong to say Hemingway began by wishing to express or convey certain basic experiences; rather he began by wishing to write a certain type of sentence.' His great discovery was that he could attain new forms of expression by concentrating on syntax, practically ignoring semantics.[52] And it was certainly Hemingway's belief that his style had a prismatic form, that nothing could be added or subtracted without destroying the whole.

What Hemingway did, according to Jameson, is concentrate on the arrangement of the objects his words would later describe, a technique he extended to the elaboration of dialogue too. The arrangement of objects enabled his famous omissions: he could speak of things that had happened without rendering the actual event by focusing on the position of things before and after some occurrence never put into evidence. So, for instance, in the following passage (chosen almost at random) we see the forest disappear, then the wasteland vanish beneath a snowfall, all without a 'full' connection of cause to effect. 'The forest of oak trees on the mountain beyond the town was gone. The forest had been green in the summer when we had come into the town but now there were the stumps and the broken trunks and the ground torn up, and one day at the end of the fall when I was out where the oak forest had been I saw a cloud coming over the mountain. It came very fast and the sun went a dull yellow and then everything was grey and the sky was covered and the cloud came on down the mountain and suddenly we were in it and it was snow.'[53] Content, Jameson contests, is, in this instance, the pretext for the sentence which ultimately contains it, not the meat we extract from it. Here the ravages of war and the change of season are brought together in a single passage but to no allegorical purpose; rather it is a demonstration of the capacity of language to circumscribe dense events in such a way as to retrieve a sequence of existentially purified moments. As such, Hemingway's style is like an announcement of his ability, a showing of his skill at a certain craft, and it is this that attracts our empathy, not the actual content of his stories. Jameson prefigures Deleuze here because what this suggests is that we tend not to see the style for the persona, though it is in fact style that releases the persona into the wind.

This is the source of much confusion, Deleuze says, because too often philosophers are treated as types, when in reality they are the only ones to have achieved true individuality. When Deleuze says style is a style of life too he doesn't mean the actual author's life (how many elephants they might have shot, for instance), but the projection of that life through style. It isn't what is recounted that counts but the selection – why talk about

this not that? 'It will be argued that most philosophers' lives are very bourgeois: but is not Kant's stocking-suspender a vital anecdote appropriate to the system of Reason? And Spinoza's liking for battles between spiders is due to the fact that in a pure fashion they reproduce relationships of modes in the system of *Ethics* as higher ethology.'[54] These vital anecdotes are sufficient in themselves to produce a portrait of a philosophy – not just the philosopher – because they are so many demonstrations of the way it invents new modes of existence and new possibilities of life. (One wonders then what should be made of the scarce, but doubtless carefully chosen, vital anecdotes Deleuze has made available concerning himself: his famous refusal to travel, for instance, his precious health, his untrimmed fingernails, his dislike of eating, not to mention his suicide.) Methodologically, it is the very perversity of the respective anecdotes that enables us to see the difference between the figures or types a certain philosopher uses to conjure with, and the conceptual persona that actually envelopes the work. What it permits us to see is the distinction between a life itself which is stylised, and a work infused with the used-up contents of a life. Unequipped to deal with the former, philosophy and literary criticism alike have tended to overemphasise the latter.

   One of the first illusions philosophy must shatter then is the mistaken conflation of philosophers and psychosocial types. Instead one must develop a correlation between the two, for it is often the case that philosophers adopt certain psychosocial types as a means of making contact with their historical milieu. It gives them a face we can readily recognise because it is the face of the epoch itself; thus, in this century philosophers have been exiles, migrants, nomads, strangers, outsiders, natives, revolutionaries and so on. We straightaway know both the character and purpose of these types: exiles long for a home stolen from them and feared forgotten; migrants embrace the different as new, the familiar as old; nomads resist the ever-present temptations of sedentary life; strangers work at their ennui, keeping themselves in a state of perpetual disgust so as not to become what they despise; outsiders nourish their resentment and secretly yearn to be embraced as natives; natives establish their credentials by moving nativity on to a plane other than genetics (the best natives are always from elsewhere); revolutionaries, meanwhile, turn *ressentiment* into hubris, and hubris into action. The psychosocial type connects the philosopher to the social but, as I hope is obvious, at a price, and that price is conformity. The philosopher must concede ground to the categorical imperatives of the type or else blow his or her cover and risk falling into the enforced obscurity of misapprehension. Yet, and this is the eternal struggle all philosophers

must face, the philosopher is, as Negri puts it, 'hidden to the degree that he is socialised and inserted in a vast and adequate cultural society'.[55]

Deleuze reads types, following Nietzsche, as symptoms. 'For any proposition is itself a set of symptoms expressing a way of being or a mode of existence of the speaker, that is to say, the state of forces that he maintains or tries to maintain within himself and others [. . .] In this sense a proposition always reflects a mode of existence, a "type".'[56] Any philosophy, then, may be assessed in terms of the type required to sustain it and the type by which it may be apprehended due to the signs it displays (or, to put it differently, the way it interpellates us). Could Adorno have written *Minima Moralia* anywhere except Santa Monica? Do the jaundiced vituperations of the 'culture industry' thesis appeal to us because we too feel disenfranchised from the fairy tale of modern life?[57] According to Deleuze, Nietzsche points us to two different diagnoses here: *ressentiment* ('a damaged life' is precisely one no longer capable of action) and bad conscience (we scorn most bitterly what we long for most powerfully).[58] Separating a conceptual persona from its sexier double, the psychosocial type, is as much a matter of apprehending a philosophy truly as it is an ethic of reading. When Deleuze says a philosopher must be allowed to ask his or her own questions, he means to say that the reader must work through their own issues elsewhere and leave the philosopher to say what he or she has to say.[59]

The great philosophers, according to Deleuze, are able to transform these too limiting imperatives into character traits, aspects of a personal style, or better, a stylised persona, and save themselves from being typecast. Sometimes, though, this job is left to the great readers of philosophy, witness Deleuze's own heroic view of himself (nowhere more evident than in his monographs, each of which is explicitly cast as an attempt to save a philosopher from bad, reductive readings).[60] The psychosocial type is the weak or reductive form of the necessary depersonalisation all philosophers must undergo. Against this, we can measure and assess the conceptual persona as the strong or creative form. So while psychosocial types and conceptual personae refer to each other constantly and occasionally even combine with one another they never fuse into a transcendent amalgam.[61] What prevents this synthesis is the sheer fact that the conceptual persona fully as much as the psychosocial type is a formal device. However motivated a device may be, by which I mean whatever motivation is attached to it, it does not change in itself, it simply vibrates with greater or lesser resonance. This, in turn, presupposes a still higher formal category able to hold both these devices in suspension, as it were, something of the order of defamiliarisation perhaps, and someone

or something able to manipulate them. Without this higher order, without dialectics in other words, Deleuze cannot hope to escape the charge of dualism: if his terminology does not estrange philosophy and philosophers in a particular, though perhaps still to be revealed, manner, then it can do nothing more than call on us to take sides in a feud it self-servingly ignited.[62]

Clearly, then, the concept does not describe or contemplate a scene, it cuts it out. Not as a sculptor reveals form in stone, but as a potter wrenches a lump of clay from the earth.[63] Now this does not mean the concept is entirely freestanding, but it does mean its organisation is intensive rather than extensive. It is not freestanding because it presupposes a plane of immanence. And, insofar as it is a serious attempt to lay out as fully as possible the very conditions of the thinkability of a concept, which is not to say its conditions of possibility, the postulation of a plane of immanence, as philosophy's necessary ground, is Deleuze and Guattari's most blatant dialectical manoeuvre. What it does is give all philosophers the right to conceive their ideas in an atmosphere of their own choosing, it is literally the creation of a hothouse for concepts, a place where they can thrive in a shelter specifically built for them.[64] It is dialectical because it attempts to think the ground *as* ground, which is to say as prephilosophical, and at the same time conceptualise that ground as something philosophers construct by fiat (the very antithesis of a ground) and impose on the world as a new way of framing it.[65] It therefore recognises and bids to grapple with the consequences of the fact that philosophical grounds as much as concepts do not fall from heaven or rise up from the earth without our making it happen.

What I mean to suggest by this is that Deleuze's plane of immanence is the creation of a context in which competing voices can function as perspectives on a particular problem. In effect, it is the presupposition of a form of expression into which concepts can insert themselves as a form of content. However, as Deleuze's own example of the theatre readily shows, it is actually the reversibility of these two forms, the fact that the form of content can always become a form of expression, and vice versa, that turns out to be primary, and not either of the specific forms themselves, which amounts to saying the relation between the plane and the concept is dialectical in the literal sense of needing to be read twice. Theatre, so long as it is cruel, is a living example of the way a ground, or any putative limit, is folded into the very thing it grounds, or what it is supposed to be limiting, by the determinate fact of its role as ground, making it abundantly clear that a ground is a process, not the mysterious origin we pretend it to be. And of course, the usefulness of this process

hinges on the initial decision concerning distribution – what is deemed grounding shines a very peculiar light on the grounded, and its brilliance will vary considerably according to the nature of its construction.[66] I would suggest, though, it is not the traditional split between script and performance that is either the most luminous choice in itself or the nearest to what Deleuze had in mind. Bearing in mind that it is the relation between the plane of immanence and concepts that I am trying to bring into view here, my choice would be the distinction between a performance space and the performance itself.[67]

On this view, the plane would be a *combinatoire* composed of such tangible variables as the theatre building itself, the splintery boards of the bare stage, the empty stalls, the vacant ticket window and the unemblazoned sign out the front, but also such intangibles as the quality of its light and air, not to mention harmonics; the concepts, meanwhile, would be the actors, themselves by no means empty-handed or idle: they bring a script with them, they devise a *mise en scène*, they stage a dialogue with the conventions of theatricality and they engage an audience. However, at the moment of performance a grand reversal occurs. The combination of actors, script, *mise en scène* and audience turn the bare stage into an imaginary space and the stage ceases to be a form of expression apprehending the players as form of content and becomes, as the frame in painting ultimately does, a kind of content in its own right. As all *metteurs en scène* know, the physical limits of the theatre are scarcely limits at all in the metaphysical sense, they are rather the materials of their craft. Fully as much as clay is the material the potter works with rather than pottery's limit-point, so the stage is what the theatre works with. In fact, most would go so far as to insist that a theatre is only so much empty space until it is performed in, the implication being that it is practice that is the ultimate precondition of material, not the other way round.

Returning to Deleuze, this means the separation of the plane from the concept is a dialectical artifice whose operation consists in rendering the contours of the concept sharper by positing a dense background, just as the moulded shape of a sculpture is best seen against the shapeless density of clay, the earth itself. There is, however, a still more important, but far less visible, implication to be considered here, which has to do with Deleuze's transformation of ideality. If the actors are the concepts they are in effect embodiments of ideality because they stand in the place usually given to the ideal, namely the conceptual. Yet inasmuch that they are performers apparently reliant on a script, the eidetic would seem to lie elsewhere, or else we have misjudged things and the actors are not analogous to concepts at all. In fact, though, the analogy does hold

because by power of folding ground and grounded into one another (which in Platonic terms is the model into its copy, but in a moment will be rewritten as retention and anticipation), Deleuze displaces the eidetic from its traditional position on the side of the script – the abstract precondition for a performance – to the performance itself. In Deleuze's view, a theatrical performance is never what could properly be called an interpretation – or, to put it differently, if it were only that we would be justified in thinking it a botched affair – because its central operation does not consist in the extraction of some hidden meaning or other, but in the delineation of singularities.

   Extracting singularities, as we shall see in the next chapter, is the basis of what may be called Deleuze's ethics; what is more, it is precisely from the image of the actor that it is derived. In Deleuze's view, playing a role does not amount to assuming a character, or somehow adopting, how-ever temporarily, a persona besides one's own. A role, he suggests, is really a theme (a dimension beyond and infinitely greater than the personal – the fourth person as Deleuze puts it – but also very different from thematisation). It is constituted by 'communicating singularities', that is to say, an inter-linked set of perfectly individuated features: a certain wry smile, a subtle limp, a slight hunch, a lisp and so on (all of them components of an event still to come). When one plays Richard III it is not another man's life one must re-enact, but a peculiar kind of cruelty that one must actualise. The limp and the hunch are not features of a physical being, but integral components of this peculiar cruelty. This is not to suggest that Richard III is cruel because he limps or has a hunch, and that one should try to accentuate a feeling of resentment, but rather that his cruelty is itself hunched and limping. This is what it means to discover the event inside the action. What the actor does, in effect, is isolate the essential components of a pure, expressed form of cruelty (for instance) from within an impure admixture of cruel actions, in order to express it again in his or her own way. How actors do that is matter of great concern and interest to us, for it involves a process of conceptua-lisation. When we read a script or watch a performance, the sense of the role happens in us, it is expressed elsewhere, to be sure, but it is our bodies that passively endure its meaning. However, when we act it out, we will it for ourselves and make it happen in others. We take charge of the event, we counter-actualise.[68]

   It seems, then, that when Deleuze describes philosophy as a theatre not only are we to take him at his word but we should accept the extension of this claim too: philosophers are actors. They too must discover the essential components of an event to come, namely the concept. Similarly,

the concept is not a description or representation – much less an encoding – of an action, but its sense. What is truly distinctive about the concept, according to Deleuze, is that it renders its components inseparable. It is a set of relations that is whole, complete and perfect. No purely paradigmatic changes can be made to a concept, all change is syntagmatic – changing one component alters the whole. Within the set, the components themselves are distinct, though of course inseparable, and they relate to each other in such a way as to give the concept consistency. By the same token, these components may themselves be taken as concepts at any time; as such every concept can be related to every other concept.[69] And of course, the concept is always already related to a specific plane which it implies but does not constitute. But this only describes its character, not how it works, or how it is contrived. Hence there is an uncanny, Alice-through-the-looking-glass feel to Deleuze's concept of the concept inasmuch that it too is what it describes, yet cannot be. It is the gap between the concept itself and the concept of the concept that beckons a dialectical reading; it is Deleuze's insistence on radical immanence that quashes any such reading (which is always coded negatively by Deleuze as an intervention by an external force).

Concepts, Deleuze insists, do nothing more than survey their components at infinite speed; what is more, they do not get mixed up in the state of affairs in which they are effectuated.[70] Accordingly, the really interesting question, it turns out, is not 'what is a concept?' but 'what does a concept consist of?' We really only find out what a concept is, by which I mean what it does, by asking 'What are its components?' and still more pointedly, 'What are components?' Here Deleuze's shorthand example of the concept of a bird proves especially instructive. 'The concept of a bird is not found in its genus or species but in the composition of its postures, colours, and songs: something indiscernible that is not so much synesthetic as syneidetic.'[71] Postures, colours, songs, these are the components, obviously enough, but how are they arrived at? Our only clue is that the concept is said to be more syneidetic than synesthetic, which is to say, it is composed more of idealities (but not Ideas) than figurative responses, creatively contrived thoughts standing for perceptions. When Deleuze denies that any of the terms he uses are metaphors or even so much as figuratively conceived it is because to his mind they are conceptualisations, that is to say, creative extrapolations of the indiscernible ideality of a thing, whether that thing is purely ideational or lumpishly physical.

The key implication of this is that in Deleuze's philosophy the phenomenal does not give rise to the conceptual in an immediate fashion. Given that Deleuze is a self-proclaimed empiricist, this is both surprising

and puzzling, and would seem to demand some system of mediation. This would at least save it from the embarrassment of what must either be miraculous concepts of the type that fall from the sky, or pure projections of the type philosophy simply dreams up. What, in other words, connects the concept to the real it is supposed to survey? My suggestion is that where, in a different discourse, one would find mediation, in Deleuze one encounters something I find it helpful to call conceptualising. In practice, conceptualising means isolating the (by definition) indiscernible eidetic core of a set of practices or an event without being blinded by the scattered images we have learned to associate with it. Instead of an Idea, or some other form of the categorical, what this process deduces – it is, as we shall see, based on perception – is a formal system of composition, or *mise en scène*. As such, it might also just as accurately be said that the concept is an amalgam of perceptions raised to a higher power (i.e., the conversion of inadequate ideas into adequate ones). The key question, then, is the nature of the selectivity involved in the original perception. Are certain things simply so vivid they cannot be ignored, or does the philosopher exercise some discretion? We select according to need, Deleuze says.

> The thing and the perception of the thing are one and the same thing, one and the same image, but related to one or other of two systems of reference. The thing is the image as it is in itself, as it is related to all the other images to whose action it completely submits and on which it reacts immediately. But the perception of the thing is the same image related to another special image which frames it, and which only retains a partial action from it, and only reacts to it mediately. In perception thus defined, there is never anything else or anything more than there is in the thing: on the contrary, there is 'less'. We perceive the thing, minus that which does not interest us as a function of our needs.[72]

The question that now arises is what constitutes interest? Deleuze defines interest as 'the lines and points we retain from the thing as a function of our receptive facet, and the actions that we select as a function of the delayed reactions of which we are capable'.[73] This helps only to the extent that we know what is meant by 'receptive facet' and 'delayed reaction'. Fortunately, an explanation of both is forthcoming. In fact, Deleuze goes on to define the subject, or centre of indetermination as he more precisely calls it, as an assemblage of these three 'moments'.[74] In the first moment, as we've just witnessed, we go 'from total, objective perception which is indistinguishable from the thing, to a subjective perception which is distinguished from it by simple elimination or

subtraction'.[75] In the second moment, which is no longer subtractive, the objective perception (the universe) is incurved and reorganised so as to surround the subjective image, or perception proper. 'What is called action, strictly speaking, is the delayed reaction of the centre of inde-termination. Now, this centre is only capable of acting – in the sense of organising an unexpected response – because it perceives and has received the excitation on a privileged facet, eliminating the remainder.'[76] Finally, the third moment in the production of the centre of indetermination which is the exercise of our so-called 'receptive facet' is absorption without selection. That is to say, perception does not simply let pass what it does not select, consigning to an unremembered oblivion all it apprehends but finds no immediate use for.[77] Far from indicating a fault or failure in perception, this 'full' interval between perception and action, or what Deleuze calls 'affect', is an absolutely necessary given.[78]

> For we, living matter or centres of indetermination, have specialised one of our facets or certain of our points into receptive organs at the price of condemning them into immobility, while delegating our activity to organs of reaction that we have consequently liberated. In these conditions, when our immobilised receptive facet absorbs a movement instead of reflecting it, our activity can only respond by a 'tendency', an 'effort' which replaces the action which has become momentarily or locally impossible.[79]

What is called delayed reaction is effectively a process of learning, it takes the perceived into itself and finds a use for it. Of course, the other name for this is habit. Herein lies the essential connection Deleuze makes between Bergson and Hume, indeed all the authors in his famed series of 'other philosophers'. It is best seen in the implicit correlation he draws between intuition and empiricism: both produce or give rise to the subject via a passively synthesising process of perception-action Deleuze calls contemplation. 'Contemplations are questions, while the contractions which occur in them and complete them are so many finite affirmations produced in the same way as presents are produced out of the perpetual present by means of the passive synthesis of time.'[80] At this stage, with a view towards the larger question we have been concerned with in this chapter, namely the reconciliation of the two aspects of philosophy, I want to focus on only one of the several implications of this twofold structuring of contemplation. Now we will be able to see just how philosophy doubles itself and what it means: both that we are what we think and that we think because we are.

Therefore, it is not merely – or only – our concepts that are more syneidetic than synesthetic, but ourselves as well. We are as much

composed of idealities as we are capable of forming them. 'The passive self is not defined simply by receptivity – that is, by means of the capacity to experience sensations – but by virtue of the contractile contemplation which constitutes the organism itself before it constitutes the sensations.'[81] Philosophy in its second aspect, philosophy as biology in other words, is what we must now turn to. And, as we've seen, the key to this is contemplation; it is the fabled process that is the same in biology as in thought, which can therefore give rise to a body (physics) as well as a mind (metaphysics), and, what is more, can unite the two without dissolving their difference.[82] Insofar as the inner dynamic of Deleuze and Guattari's presentation of this concept is concerned, it is worth noting that philosophy in its first aspect is pointedly said not to be a form of contemplation. 'It is not contemplation, for contemplations are things themselves as seen in the creation of their specific concepts.'[83] Contemplation, Deleuze and Guattari go on to say, is a machine for manufacturing Universals, as such its concepts are like so many illusions clouding the real work of philosophy. The confusion arises, they helpfully explain, when a concept is mistaken for a plane, as happens when immanence is made immanent to something, since this something cannot but be a concept.[84]

As such, the immanence of contemplation must be restored before it can assume its true place as the keystone to Deleuze and Guattari's twofold thought. It finds its redemption in the conclusion to *What is Philosophy?*, where it is aligned with the mystery of passive synthesis, the process which conjoins thought to the thought-brain, philosophy with its evolution.[85] Contemplation is the means we have of converting the chaos of undirected stimulus (excitation) into directed stimulus (sensation), and in turn, of transforming sensation into thought, but it is not exclusive to us, all creatures, all things, from salts to sea anemones, have it too. Now, instead of being a Universal, a core 'I think' to be sought in all things via transcendental reduction, contemplation *is* universal, an immanent 'it thinks' as the basis of all matter, organic or inorganic. This 'it' that thinks Deleuze and Guattari call a 'microbrain': 'Not every organism has a brain, and not all life is organic, but everywhere there are forces that constitute microbrains, or an inorganic life of things.'[86] Yet insofar as this process can be thought philosophy must produce its concept, at which point it becomes a transcendental term once again.[87] However, it is now of a completely different kind: it is transcendental to immanence, it is a purposefully wrought survey of a vast process, but is not in itself a direct product of that process. This, in an ultra-shorthand way, is what transcendental empiricism actually means.

Note, though, that it is said philosophy must produce the concept of contemplation. Curiously enough, this amounts to saying philosophy and contemplation are not the same thing, which would seem to contradict the assertion above that contemplation unites the two aspects of philosophy. Uniting is not the same thing as homogenising so we can perhaps dispense with this concern. More disturbing is the fact, as we've already seen, that Deleuze and Guattari hold that the concepts produced by contemplation are illusory, which by power of its authenticity/inauthenticity binary would seem to preclude any union of thought and thought-brain at all. If, by definition, the thought-brain's concepts are inauthentic, and philosophy's authentic, then doubtless the most urgent question is how can the former give rise to the latter? How do inauthentic thoughts become authentic ones? One might have been prepared to accept the reverse formulation, however naturalistic, but this seems a little mad (indeed, all its proponents, from Spinoza, through to Nietzsche and Bergson have been thought a little mad). In the very least, it posits an autonomy for philosophy that unless we are to abandon the idea that contemplation is the keystone to this whole edifice must be explicable by contemplation.

This autonomy does not owe its existence to the truism that a self cannot contemplate a self, as though to say Deleuze and Guattari had made some kind of error in their thinking and were trying to cover their tracks by separating a philosophical self from the contemplative one; on the contrary, it owes to the fact that contemplation is a form of synthesis. 'Psychology regards it as established that the self cannot contemplate itself. This, however, is not the question. The question is whether or not the self itself is a contemplation, whether it is not in itself a contemplation, and whether we can learn, form behaviour and form ourselves other than through contemplation.'[88] Deleuze insists that we are nothing other than amalgams of contemplations, but he also allows that not all contemplations occur on the same level. It is the separation of contemplation into two basic levels, which express themselves as passive synthesis and active synthesis, that enables Deleuze to account for the autonomy of philosophy without having to posit it as some kind of gestalt Other. Contemplation manufactures things, what Deleuze calls signs, which must in turn be subjected to contemplation if they are to be understood and not merely sensed, but this form of contemplation is of a later, higher order. Ultimately it refers to the difference between retention and anticipation.

We are made of contracted water, earth, light and air – not merely prior to the recognition or representation of these, but prior to their being sensed.

> Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations. At the level of this primary vital sensibility, the lived present constitutes a past and future in time. Need is the manner in which this future appears, as the organic form of expectation. The retained past appears in the form of cellular heredity.[89]

These levels are real, not arbitrary, because of the way contractions (even habits have to be contracted) can become so ingrained that they slip from view, becoming a part of the apparatus itself, whether that be the body or the mind. One does not need to recollect the long process by which the arm evolved from a foreleg, and the foreleg from a fin, and so on, in order to be able to throw a curve ball; that data is nevertheless stored in the deepest recesses of our being, our DNA, and we draw on it to our very depths in throwing curve balls, but never give it a second's thought. However, having said that, it cannot be said that all we need to throw a blistering curve ball is the recently acquired memory of technique, for without the recessed memory of what an arm can do, all the coaching in the world would be useless. Our very flexibility (torsion versus tension) is a sign to be interpreted by our skill. 'In other words, the active syntheses of memory and understanding are superimposed upon and supported by the passive synthesis of the imagination.'[90] For coaching to be effective, then, it has to induce a resonance between the two levels of retention and anticipation; it does this by foregrounding (extracting) the difference between the two – what one can do, and what one is doing, making the former the measure of the latter. And this we come to understand is what Deleuze means when he says everything happens in between.

But we also see that contemplation stands in the place where it would make sense to insert a notion of dialectical synthesis – if philosophy is in fact a higher order apprehension of sense-data than simple perception then how does one get to it except by negation? My point is that we've seen contemplation's mechanism, that is, its immanent form, but that doesn't tell us why it isn't a dialectical synthesis, or how it negotiates the blank space left by its absence. To see that we now need to explore its structure, or more particularly its transcendental form. On this point, I want to suggest that Deleuze takes its structure from Spinoza's concept of expression, or rather attributes it to him as a way of negotiating a suspected antinomy in Spinoza's thinking his sympathisers have for the most part elected to pass over in silence. As so often is the case in Deleuze's work, what we encounter here is a creative philosophical solution put forward to solve what is initially conceived as a history of philosophy problem. Because expression is the concept Deleuze pro-

poses to make the fulcrum of his interpretation of Spinoza, as a historian he must explain the comparatively scanty attention given to the idea by previous commentators. In other words, if the idea of expression is as important as Deleuze insists it is, both for an understanding of Spinoza's system, and for determining its relation to Leibniz's thought, but even more crucially for explaining the origin and development of Spinoza's and Leibniz's respective systems, then why is it subject to so little critical attention? 'Some completely ignore it. Others give it a certain indirect significance, seeing in it another name for some deeper principle.'[91] But none, Deleuze implies, have recognised its true importance, which he argues can only properly be seen when expression is taken for what it must be, rather than what it appears to be. Here, enacting his perhaps most vital – yet undoubtedly least noted – reversal, Deleuze claims that expression is a solution to a problem, not a problem itself.

If we try to derive an explanation of expression, however, we are bound to fail, according to Deleuze, and, what is more, it is this peculiar methodological obstinacy on the part of the commentators that has plagued all previous attempts to reconcile expression's place in Spinoza's thought not a lack of clarity in Spinoza. 'The idea of expression is neither defined nor deduced by Spinoza, nor could it be. It appears as early as the sixth Definition, but is there no more defined than it serves to define anything. It defines neither substance nor attribute, since these are already defined (Definitions 3 and 4). Nor God, who might equally well be defined without reference to expression.'[92] And it is only when we comprehend why it must be the case that expression is neither defined nor deduced that we gain hold of a rich Deleuzian understanding of Spinoza, grasp his expressionism in other words. Spinoza's key question, Deleuze claims, is this: 'Is there not some way that various properties deduced independently might be taken together, and various points of view extrinsic to a given definition brought within what is defined?'[93] And, of course, there is, and that is to take the perspective of the Absolute.

> It is no longer a matter of finite understanding deducing properties singly, reflecting on its subject and explicating it by relating it to other objects. It is now the object that expresses itself, the thing itself that explicates itself. All its properties then jointly 'fall within an infinite understanding'. So that there is no question of deducing Expression: rather is it expression that embeds deduction in the Absolute, renders proof the *direct manifestation* of absolutely infinite substance.[94]

Now, to be clear, I must emphasise that I do not mean to extend this parallel so far as to suggest an analogy between Deleuze's key elements –

chaos, non-philosophy, and philosophy – and Spinoza's. For however tempting it may be to render chaos, non-philosophy and philosophy in terms of substance, attribute and mode (or some such other configuration), such an action is born of a spurious logic, which Deleuze utterly rejects.[95] The point about planes of immanence is that just such analogies cannot be drawn because concepts by force of their creator's signatures are unique to their makers and not transportable.[96] However, one can utilise the relationship between the concepts a philosopher proposes because relations are by definition external to their terms, which means the philosopher did not construct them, but rather called on them (this is the logic underpinning Deleuze and Guattari's elaboration of the rhizome, which is precisely a type of relation). What is analogous in Deleuze and Spinoza, precisely because Deleuze gives it to Spinoza even as he claims to have taken it from Spinoza, is the set of relations between the three key elements (chaos, non-philosophy and philosophy in one, and substance, attribute and mode in the other), only in Deleuze it is no longer an expressionism, but a contemplationism. Contemplation embeds philosophy in chaos, without reducing it to chaos.

Now it is perhaps time to settle the matter of just which question it is that philosophy as an aspect of the thought-brain is an answer to. Philosophy, Deleuze says, is what shelters us from pure chaos by giving it a bit of order. This prompts the more general question of what constitutes 'us'? And it is this problem which is Deleuze's presiding concern throughout all his works, from his very first on Hume to his last on literary criticism – not the elaboration of a transcendental form of empiricism, as so many of his commentators insist, because that is only a tool for a very specific job, namely the working out of the problem of the evolution of the subject (note that I do not say the development of a concept of subjectivity). We get stuck on the development of a radical empiricism as the sum total of Deleuze's achievement if we forget to ask what in fact Deleuze hopes to do with it, beyond challenging some of the more cherished axioms of philosophy. Yet in every book Deleuze has written the same problem is raised again and again, and solved again and again, in such a way that by the time he comes to write *What is Philosophy?* he is ready to bring it all together in one volume, and finally do something with philosophy (here, all his experimentations finally pay off): from the perspective of impersonal matter, he produces a philosophy capable of accounting for its own existence. Philosophy in its first aspect is the doctrine needed to get us to perceive this second, but ultimately primary, aspect: the thought-brain itself. And unless we see it as a representation in the figurative sense we must see it as a restoration of natural philosophy.

It is true, no doubt, that the unthought and the nonphilosophical do not propel thinking in any way, and cannot and should not be conceived as either negatives or negations, but as I've said above, this is not the only form the dialectic can take, so there is no reason to suppose any of this. It is enough for our purposes to note that for Deleuze philosophy has a perimeter defined by an internal rule of composition. Sometimes its edges are sharp and other times fuzzy, but in either case the fact remains that there is a point at which philosophy ceases to be without referring to either a nihilistic dissolution of substance or an existentialist advent of nothingness. This vanishing point is a point of contemplation not absorption, it is the moment when philosophy surrenders to the artistic or the scientific impulses its elements are always on the verge of unleashing. In other words, it indicates a moment when one view of the world, previously thought pure, gives way to another, and in doing so admits to itself that purity was only ever a fantasy, a far from innocent lullaby the paranoid philosopher sang to ward off the fear of chaos. Now, to call the thinking through of this dialectical is obviously going to be contentious, but insofar as it is contemplative isn't that exactly what it is? It makes philosophy a peculiar way of confronting something that is by definition inimical to thought.

Notes

1. For examples of critics who have not worried enough about the question of how to read Deleuze see Michael Hardt's interrogation of some of Deleuze's recent detractors, Hardt 1993: 22–3; 37–8. Indeed, it is Hardt who has shown just how vital it is to be self-reflexive in one's reading of Deleuze; the question of how to read Deleuze is in many respects the 'deeper drama' (as Jameson might have put it) of his commentary.
2. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 51.
3. Another way of putting this would be to say with Hardt that recognising Deleuze's selectivity is also to recognise its agressivity, its 'total critique'.
4. I read it as the functional equivalent of Foucault's *Archaeology of Knowledge*, a concerted attempt to avoid being misunderstood.
5. Deleuze, though, is himself very far from ignoring this question. 'We always come back to the question of the use of this activity of creating concepts, in its difference from scientific or artistic activity. Why, through what necessity, and for what use must concepts, and always new concepts, be created? And in order to do what?' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 8–9).
6. This position is already to be found in *Anti-Oedipus*: 'It is not a matter of biologizing human history, nor of anthropologizing natural history. It is a matter of showing the common participation of the social machines *and* the organic machines in the desiring-machines. At man's most basic stratum, the Id: the schizophrenic cell, the schizo molecules, their chains and their jargons' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 289).
7. As Jameson puts it, 'the deeper problem with the concept of contradiction [. . .] is

representational. Contradiction is always one step beyond representation: if you show it in its conflicted moment, you freeze it over so rigidly that it tends to take the form of an antinomy. If on the contrary you anticipate its resolution, you empty it of all its negativity and generate the impression of a rigged ballot' (Jameson 1994: 5).

8. Here I extend Hardt's point that *Expressionism* is manifestly organised around the division of *Forschung* and *Darstellung*, or what Hardt usefully transcodes as speculation and practical logic, to all of Deleuze's work. This is not to contradict Hardt's claim that the earlier work is organised around destruction and construction, but rather to suggest that any such destruction as these works carried out was always done in view of a larger and essentially speculative project. I believe Hardt's own crucial observation that Deleuze's philosophy is aggregative, that he doesn't change perspectives, but builds on a single one in fact supports this interpretation, if the project as a whole is viewed as a becoming-concrete. Hardt 1993: 57–8, 86–7. Cf. Marx 1976: 102–3.

9. Negri 1991: 60; Deleuze says, 'the unconscious belongs to the realm of physics; the body without organs and its intensities are not metaphors, but matter itself' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 283).

10. Even if I do not agree with Boundas's articulation of Deleuze's reading habits as being necessarily serialised, I do agree with his stipulation that to read Deleuze effectively one must read as he does. Cf. Boundas 1994: 101.

11. 'There are, you see, two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and then if you're even more perverse or depraved you set off after signifiers. And you treat the next book like a box contained in the first containing it. And you annotate and interpret and question, and write a book about the book, and so on and on. Or there's the other way: you see the book as a little non-signifying machine, and the only question is "Does it work, and how does it work?" How does it work for you? If it doesn't work, if nothing comes through, you try another book. This second way of reading's intensive: something comes through or it doesn't. There's nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It's like plugging in to an electric circuit. [. . .] This second way of reading's quite different from the first because it relates a book directly to what's Outside. A book is a little cog in a much more complicated external machinery' (Deleuze 1995: 7–8).

12. Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 3.

13. Deleuze and Foucault 1977: 208.

14. For this reason, as I have suggested elsewhere, Deleuze may in Foucault's terms be properly described as a founder of discourse. Cf. Buchanan 1997: 109.

15. 'I dislike people who say of someone's work that "up to that point it's OK, but from there on it's not much good, though it gets better later on". You have to take a work as a whole, to try and follow rather than judge it, see where it branches out in different directions, where it gets bogged down, moves forward, makes a breakthrough; you have to accept it, welcome it, as a whole. Otherwise you won't understand it at all' (Deleuze 1995: 85).

16. Deleuze 1995: 84.

17. Cf. de Certeau 1986: 191; Deleuze 1995: 6.

18. Such an approach is not without precedent: for instance, Philip Goodchild (1996a) grasps Deleuze's oeuvre in terms of 'Life', Daniel Smith (1997) focuses on his 'clinical project', while Michael Hardt (1993) uses Deleuze's anti-Hegelianism as his foci.

19. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2.

20. This recalls Don Juan's lesson concerning paths, and the way to decide which one

to follow, which it seems to me is the question Deleuze and Guattari want to put before us concerning philosophy. This is a question, he says, only an old man asks. 'My benefactor told me about it once when I was young, and my blood was too vigorous for me to understand it. I will tell you what it is: Does this path have a heart?' (Castaneda 1968: 106).

21. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 10.
22. 'It had to be possible to ask the question "between friends", as a secret or a confidence, or as a challenge when confronting the enemy, and at the same time to reach that twilight hour when one distrusts even the friend' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2).
23. 'For, according to the Nietzschean verdict, you will know nothing through concepts unless you have first created them – that is, constructed them in an intuition specific to them: a field, a plane, and a ground that must be confused with them but that shelters their seeds and the personae who cultivate them' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 7).
24. 'I have read in a French weekly that people are unhappy with *Mille Plateaux* because, especially in a book of philosophy, they expect to be rewarded with a bit of sense' (Lyotard 1992: 11).
25. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 11.
26. 'Although the plane is presupposed by philosophy, it is nonetheless instituted by it and it unfolds in a philosophical relationship with the nonphilosophical' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 93).
27. For instance: 'What I most detested was Hegelianism and dialectics' (Deleuze 1995: 6).
28. Jameson 1981: 9.
29. Deleuze's project of creating an ultimately immanent form of philosophy is consonant with (though coded differently) the central contention of *The Political Unconscious* 'that Marxism subsumes other interpretative modes or systems; or, to put it in methodological terms, that the limits of the latter can always be overcome, and their more positive findings retained, by a radical historicising of their mental operations, such that not only the content of the analysis, but the very method itself, along with the analyst, then comes to be reckoned into the "text" or phenomenon to be explained' (Jameson 1981: 47).
30. 'So long as there is a time and a place for creating concepts, the operation that undertakes this will always be called philosophy, or will be indistinguishable from philosophy even if it is called something else' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 9).
31. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 77.
32. Brecht 1964: 193.
33. Some 'concepts must be indicated by an extraordinary and sometimes even barbarous or shocking word, whereas others make do with an ordinary, every-day word that is filled with harmonics so distant that it risks being imperceptible to a nonphilosophical ear. Some concepts call for archaisms, and others for neologisms, shot through with almost crazy etymological exercises: etymology is like a specifically philosophical athleticism (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 7–8).
34. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 33.
35. 'All concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or understood as their solution emerges' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 16).
36. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 5.
37. As Deleuze puts it, it is 'a strange business, speaking for yourself, in your own name, because it doesn't at all come with seeing yourself as an ego or a person or a subject. Individuals find a real name for themselves, rather, only through the

harshest exercise in depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multi-plicities everywhere within them, to the intensities running through them' (Deleuze 1995: 6).
38. 'I belong to a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy' (Deleuze 1995: 5).
39. 'Philosophy constantly brings conceptual personae to life; it gives life to them' (Deleuze and Guattari 1914: 62).
40. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 96.
41. Deleuze 1995: 5.
42. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 58.
43. Jameson 1972: 8.
44. Deleuze 1995: 180.
45. The very notion of a conceptual persona is structuralist, I would suggest, or least enabling of a structuralist type of history. 'In any case, the history of philosophy must go through these personae, through their changes according to planes and through their variety according to concepts' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 62).
46. Jameson 1972: 6.
47. Jameson 1972: 39.
48. I follow Jameson in defining modernism according to its peculiar 'trans– or even anti-aesthetic vocation – the will of the great modernist works to be something more than mere art and to transcend a merely decorative and culinary aesthetic, to reach the sphere of what is variously identified as the prophetic or the metaphysical, the visionary or the cosmic, that realm in which aesthetics, politics and philosophy, religion and pedagogy, all fold together in supreme vocation' (Jameson 1994: 80).
49. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 90.
50. Jameson 1972: 39.
51. 'Serialism and Structuralism either graduate characteristics according to their resemblances, or order them according to their differences. Animal character-istics can be mythic or scientific. But we are not interested in characteristics; what interests us are modes of expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion' (De-leuze and Guattari 1987: 239).
52. Jameson 1971: 409–12.
53. Hemingway 1935: 9.
54. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 72–3.
55. Negri 1991: 5.
56. Deleuze 1983: x.
57. For an affirmative reading of Adorno's status as exile see Jameson 1990: 139; Said 1994: 40–4; for the contrary view see Davis 1990: 47–54.
58. Deleuze 1983: 112.
59. Deleuze's remarkable retort to one of his keenest readers is ample testament: cf. Goodchild 1996a: 185 n.8.
60. Nietzsche, for instance, is saved from misreadings of him as a forerunner to fascism, while Foucault is saved from misreadings of him as a nostalgic anti-quarian, and conservative Bergson is transformed into a revolutionary.
61. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 67–70.
62. This charge has indeed already been made. Cf. Jameson 1997: 411–12.
63. The abstract-machine, their earlier codeword for concept, is said to have 'cutting edges' for precisely this reason (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 141).
64. For instance, Deleuze says of Nietzsche's conceptual analyses that they 'will always be ineffective if the reader grasps them in an atmosphere which is not that of Nietzsche' (Deleuze 1983: xii).
65. Concepts need to be constructed in 'an intuition specific to them: a field, a plane,

and a ground that must not be confused with them but that shelters their seeds and the personae who cultivate them' (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 7).

66. Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 50–1.
67. 'It is not surprising that, among many of the authors who promote it, *structuralism* is so often accompanied by calls for a new theatre or a new (non-Aristotelian) interpretation of the theatre: a theatre of multiplicities opposed in every respect to the theatre of representation, which leaves intact neither the identity of the thing represented, nor the author, nor spectator, nor character, nor representation which, through the vicissitudes of the play, can become the object of a production of knowledge or final recognition. Instead, a theatre of problems and always open questions which draws spectator, setting and characters into the real movement of an apprenticeship of the entire unconscious, the final elements of which remain the problems themselves' (Deleuze 1994: 192).
68. Deleuze 1990a: 150.
69. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 19.
70. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 21.
71. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 20.
72. Deleuze 1986: 63.
73. Deleuze 1986: 63.
74. Deleuze 1986: 66.
75. Deleuze 1986: 64.
76. Deleuze 1986: 64.
77. 'There is inevitably a part of external movements that we "absorb", that we refract, and which does not transform itself into either objects of perception or acts of the subject; rather they mark the coincidence of the subject and the object in a pure quality' (Deleuze 1986: 65).
78. Deleuze 1986: 65.
79. Deleuze 1986: 65–6.
80. Deleuze 1994: 78.
81. Deleuze 1994: 78.
82. This was foreshadowed in *Anti-Oedipus* in the discussion of the suggestive ambiguity of DNA as a hermeneutic device. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 328.
83. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 6.
84. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 49.
85. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 212.
86. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 213.
87. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 6.
88. Deleuze 1994: 73.
89. Deleuze 1994: 73.
90. Deleuze 1994: 71.
91. Deleuze 1990b: 17.
92. Deleuze 1990b: 19.
93. Deleuze 1990b: 21.
94. Deleuze 1990b: 22.
95. This does not mean he wasn't tempted into making such analogies himself, only that his whole system of thought recoils from analogy as a kind of false repetition. For examples of Spinozist analogies see Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 309, 327.
96. 'In the end, does not every great philosopher lay out a new plane of immanence, introduce a new substance of being and draw up a new image of thought, so that there could not be two great philosophers on the same plane?' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 51).

Chapter 3

Transcendental Empiricist Ethics

> Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing
> else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us.
>
> (Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*)

It is easy to see why Deleuze's ethics are so inspired by the Stoics. What
their ethics considers the essential moral task of the individual to be, we
recognise as the vocation Deleuze attributes to philosophers by right: the
invention of concepts. On this view, philosophy patently is a style of life,
too, as Deleuze often insists. The good Deleuzian citizen would indeed be
one who conceptualises, or at least had a little sympathy for those who
do. This means any exploration of the process by which concepts are
invented is also an examination of an ethical existence; for one is ethical
only insofar as one conceptualises (and if one conceptualises, then one is
ethical).[1] But it would be an utterly banal form of philosophy if it were
motivated purely by an empty desire to conceptualise for the sake of
conceptualising, if, in other words, its only pretext for constructing
concepts was the sheer novelty value of the new concepts themselves.
Yet if the hard-won immanence of his philosophy is not instantly to be
lost, sufficient motivation for the energetic conceptualising Deleuze
practises must be found within the very process itself. It is in this sense
that it might be said concepts must have an ethics.

   Ethics, in Deleuze's work, thus stand in the place normally occupied by
ideology – how well it manages to resist becoming ideological in the bad
sense remains an open question, if only because it is too little asked. I
would add, though, that what appears to be the primary motivation
(pretext) of Deleuze's philosophy, namely the much exalted notion of Life
– which, not incidentally, has lately been the subject of a quite extra-
ordinary theological treatment – is undoubtedly the most ideological (in
the bad sense) and least ethical (in the good sense) aspect of his work. The

same should be said for the entirety of the mythopoeic dimension of Deleuze's work, which I would argue needs to be investigated for its figurative aims, not embraced for itself; something Deleuze himself off-handedly tells us is the case when he remarks that Casteneda's work is all the more interesting for being in all likelihood a hoax.[2] Its interest lies in the programme it constructs for breaking free of a certain, established mode of perception, not in the eccentricities of the Yaqui way itself. Similarly, one might be forgiven for thinking Deleuze's thought is advocating a nomadic existence in favour of a sedentary one, he is certainly enthusiastic enough about it to make it seem so, but that would be to misconstrue demonstration for demagoguery.

My point is that Deleuze's philosophy does not find its pretext in some hazy fantasy of becoming a plains Indian, or Steppes peasant. These are merely figures, ways of making the point that our conception of philosophy is not the only possible one, nor the only true one, that, in other words, there are other ways of thinking and doing things from the way we do. Their alterity has the salutary value of posting limits which can then be transcended or subsumed by the still larger doctrine of transcendental empiricism.[3] Now, however utopian and dialectical this may be, and we will be examining this issue later, it nevertheless plainly does not take us nearer to an understanding of Deleuze's motivation. For that, I believe we need to meditate on the extremely interesting question of why Deleuze should be so passionate about a project like producing a philosophy capable of articulating itself without recourse to other discourses. Having just read Deleuze's work as an extended solution to this problem we now need to consider why it should be this problem and not any other that Deleuze would make his life's work. In other words, we have to read the solution in the light of the problem, and square the circle so to speak by asking 'How does *it* work?' This means finding out what he meant by his constant references to Life, if not a theology.

My claim, in the previous chapter, that Deleuze follows the path of a critique of the object, not the subject, can here be made a little more concrete by taking up an extreme example such as Auschwitz and philosophy's barely adequate reaction to it. Whereas Jameson's version of metacommentary is a critique (by subsumption) of competing interpretations, Deleuze's version of it, noology, is a critique of the very form of thought, the fact that thought *has* a form – whether in the guise of interpretation or philosophy – which according to Jameson's criteria is the content proper to an objective analysis.[4] The crucial problem is not whether a particular thought is conformist or not, Deleuze argues, but the fact that it has *a* form, because this means it is already in conformity with

a model taken from elsewhere – the State, the Socius, the Market – but no longer seen, as such. From conformity it is but a short step to complicity, as Deleuze sees it, and it is precisely this 'failing' which he claims is the most damaging consequence of thought's formalisation *as* thought. 'The State gives thought a form of interiority, and thought gives that interiority a form of universality.'[5] Nomadism, as the most radical extension of this critique, is the attempt to engender a form of thought that owes nothing to these – or any other – established models, nor has any commerce with them (the charge of complicity obviously being the more serious). Appropriately enough, the spirited consummation of this venture is an anarchistic rejection of critique itself.

As Adorno rightly points out, insofar as a transcendental approach is taken, any form of critique philosophy might choose to make is always going to be 'always already' defeated by Auschwitz because no pre-existing Idea is adequate to it and any Idea we may cobble together afterwards is going to reek of this original (suppressed) failure. 'If thought is not measured by the extremity that eludes the concept, it is from the outset in the nature of the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to drown out the screams of its victims.'[6] As such, if it is indeed true that – transcendental philosophy having failed in its attempt – it is only empiricism that can deliver concepts capable of disclosing their context (namely their unmitigated failure to either predict or prevent Auschwitz), then an empiricism of this sort would seem literally demanded of us. It would of course have to be of a type that did not duplicate the failures of its opposite number, as traditional forms of empiricism can readily be shown to do (just as Auschwitz defeats preconceived Ideas, so it refuses to yield immediate sense in an empiricist fashion, its murky greyness mocking our attempts). What is needed therefore is a purposely-wrought philosophy of immanence able to construct its own concepts, able therefore to produce a theory of Auschwitz on the basis of Auschwitz.[7] 'Only empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimensions of the visible without falling into Ideas, and how to track down, invoke, and perhaps produce a phantom at the limit of a lengthened or unfolded experience.'[8]

As Adorno was among the first to recognise, Auschwitz is the supreme test of a philosophy's integrity, which in practical terms means its willingness to put all its cards on the table, and, as I am tempted to claim, Deleuze's is the first to meet its requirements. Yet that is precisely what must not be claimed. The problem here is that insofar as Auschwitz is conceived as any kind of test (theoretical or moral) we risk turning it into what Jameson calls a 'libidinal apparatus', that is, something capable of

soaking up ideological investment in a way that does not appear ideo-logical, but simply 'right'.[9] A philosophy able to meet its demands soon appears heroic to us, perhaps even noble, covered as it is in the brassy glory of being able to think that thought and articulate that idea which before now no-one else has managed to do. By playing up the drama of the nomad thinker versus the sedentary thinker which Deleuze uses to stage what is new in his philosophy, it is precisely a transformation of it into a libidinal apparatus that we risk, and this risk gets all the greater when we raise the stakes by introducing 'tests' of the dimension of Auschwitz.[10] The worst outcome that could happen for Deleuzism in relation to Auschwitz would be for the nomad thinker to be seen to succeed where the sedentary thinker is seen to have failed, then he really would have to be considered a hero. This, I take it, is why Deleuze and Guattari so often counsel sobriety: it protects us from that other, non-philosophical form of transcendentalism which likes to think it has found the *one* true answer.[11]

Deleuze's celebration of the partitive form in literature needs to be brought full circle and injected into our apprehension of philosophy itself, such that we speak of *some* philosophy, not the *one* philosophy; it calls for a modesty which for obvious reasons proves exceedingly difficult to sustain in the analytic situation (it is like asking a psychoanalyst to resist being the one who knows and still maintain a therapeutically effective transference).[12] What the hapless philosopher confronts most pointedly, I would suggest, by turning towards the extreme and bringing his or her philosophy to bear on Auschwitz, is his or her own desire in a raw state, for that is what lays beyond all limits. And this, as Freud announced at the beginning of the twentieth century, is the one thing for which we are the least equipped by mental existence in our age: the very notions of self and society are containment devices whose job is to keep desire on a leash. It is to protect us from the perplexity of unmediated desire, this inner chaos bewitching us all, that we have invented philosophy, art and science, according to Deleuze and Guattari; in fact, so necessary are these forms to our well-being and stability, they have been folded into the very structure of the thought-brain itself, such that we should say the elaboration of mediation is the primary activity of humans. The plane of immanence, the plane of composition, and the plane of reference all stand between us and chaos and draw their inspiration from chaos itself, which they permit themselves to sip in measured doses as Rasputin is famed to have done with arsenic. 'A concept is therefore a chaoid state par excellence; it refers back to a chaos rendered consistent, become Thought, mental chaos-mos.'[13]

Here, then, we must reckon more fully with the dialectical notion of contemplation, which I have suggested is the functional core of all Deleuze's thought. Empiricism's secret strength in the way Deleuze formulates it is, I want to argue, its ability to confront the ideational shadows of such libidinal impulses as truth, freedom and justice without recourse to either of the two major forms of denial, negation or hypostatisation. It is precisely its logic of sense, I will suggest, that enables it to do so. This is, it seems to me, a far greater accomplishment than the overturning of Platonism, and what is more, it is undoubtedly why Deleuze is so admiring of Primo Levi: rather than simply recount his terrible ordeal at the hands of his Nazi captors, and judge them in the name of truth, justice and freedom, he finds a means of conceptualising Auschwitz, a way to bring forth its sense: shame. Shame, Deleuze argues, is a powerful incentive for philosophy, and what makes it political.[14] It is doubtful anyone has written more poignantly on the topic of shame than Primo Levi. He does not confuse victim and executioner, as abhorrent a piece of casuistry as could be wished for, but nor does he gloss what it takes to be a survivor, one of the saved and not one of the drowned. Surviving is oftentimes a shameful affair, even if it is a blameless one.[15] ('Every victim is to be mourned, and every survivor is to be helped and pitied, but not all their acts should be set forth as examples.'[16]) In Deleuze's terms, Levi counter-actualises his experiences and produces shame as a concept.[17] This is precisely what Stoic ethics demands. In this respect, as we shall see, Levi's work is something of a lesson in the fine art of inventing concepts – a process which, as he shows, begins with counter-actualising.

It is also a salutary reminder that a logic of sense is always already a theory of the formation of the subject, which is something I will develop further in what follows. Sense is that mysterious fourth dimension of the proposition first discovered by the Stoics (then again by Ockhamites in the fourteenth century, and once more by Meinong). The other three more commonly known dimensions are denotation, manifestation and signification: denotation concerns the relation between a proposition and state of affairs; manifestation concerns the relation between a proposition and the one who utters it; signification concerns the relation between the word and universal or general concepts, as such it is the only relation which enjoys necessity; so what does sense concern? 'The question is as follows: is there something, *aliquid*, which merges neither with the proposition or with the terms of the proposition, nor with the object or with the state of affairs which the proposition denotes, neither with the 'lived', or representation or the mental activity of the person who

expresses herself in the proposition, nor with the concepts or even signified essences?'[18] If so, and we designate that thing 'sense', then sense is going to be 'irreducible to individual states of affairs, particular images, personal beliefs, and universal or general concepts'.[19] It will surpass all these things, proving once more it is the outside of thought that is philosophy's richest province.

So what is this *aliquid* thing called sense? 'In truth, the attempt to make this fourth dimension evident is a little like Carroll's Snark hunt. Perhaps the dimension is the hunt itself, and sense is the Snark.'[20] Unlike the Snark, we may not consign sense to being all in the mind because that is not where it is located, and besides it has no physical or mental existence whereas the Snark does (it is a Boojum). Nor can we give it a purely practical existence either, though to be sure it exists only in use, because in itself it is splendidly impassive. It does nothing, and can only be inferred. 'Sense is that which is expressed.'[21] It cannot exist outside its expression, so rather than say it exists it is better to say it inheres or subsists. Yet it does not merge with the expression, but in its aliquidity remains distinct without ever becoming properly substantial. Inextricability should not be mistaken for identity, though, because the expressed retains its own objectivity and bears no resemblance to the expression. It is an attribute, to be sure, 'but it is not at all the attribute of the proposition – it is rather the attribute of the thing or state of affairs'.[22] So while it subsists in language, it happens elsewhere, in bodies and things. Extracting sense, or what is also sometimes referred to as the delineation of singularities, is the first step in producing a concept, which in its final form is an expression of the unity of several, formally selected singularities; ultimately, though, it means raising the attribute of a state of affairs to a higher power, making attribution an active rather than a passive process.

Deleuze calls this process counter-actualisation.[23] It is, I will suggest, the practical basis of a transcendental empiricist ethics; it is what one does if one is ethical, if one is worthy. Becoming worthy of what happens to us amounts to reaching a detached perspective on things where what happens to us is willed by us, not merely endured. It is a matter of being equal to the event, and thereby being the sense of what happens. We cannot, of course, simply will things to happen to us which are outside our control – the actions of others, acts of God and Nature and so on – as though we possess the power of telekinesis and expect them to unfold according to our design. Such constraints as the real places on us are always to be respected, no matter how far our flights of fancy may conduct us. But what happens and the event are not the same thing. 'The event is not what occurs (an accident), it is rather inside what occurs, the

purely expressed. It signals and awaits us.'[24] The event is the sense *we make* of what happens. We might bemoan a misfortune, or resign ourselves to it, or take charge of it (become worthy, in other words) by saying, as Joe Bousquet did, we were born to embody it.[25] To the extent we take charge of events we counter-actualise what occurs, we see beyond actions and live the purity of the event, the crystal of sense awaiting us in all phenomena.

Levi shows that shame has two dimensions. On the one hand, people do shameful things; shame is thus the name given after the fact to certain actions which from the point of view of the present we see we should not have done. But on the other hand, people fail to do certain things because they feel ashamed; in which case, shame is the name we give to a future pathway something in the present prevented us from taking. In the first instance it is clearly the appalling activities of the Nazis that are shameful, so we may call this productive shame the shame of despotism. It is the shame of what Levi calls, with many misgivings, 'useless violence', that is, violence intended only to cause suffering, not to further any strategic or tactical aim.[26] Of course, this mode of shame pretends to have its own hierarchy of disgrace, but to invert its abominable values and treat them as a sliding-scale from the merely bad to the utterly repugnant is to confuse a founding argument with its extension.[27] By the same token, it may well be a shame in Sade's universe to pass up any source of gratification no matter how extreme its cost to self or others but one can only feel that particular trope of remorse if one is already Sadean. In other words, sadism is more a justification for sadistic acts than an explanation, but it is still not justification enough.

Contiguous to this productive shame of despotism is the inhibitive shame of humanism. This shame takes two forms: tenebrous and luminous. In its glorious light, it is the sense of shame we are supposed to feel for doing what it takes to live, and in some extremes for the very fact of continuing to live, and it bathes all who espouse it in a righteous glow. The righteous never feel its barbs, though. It is always 'others' who must live in the inhospitable shadow cast by the bright light of an idealism that failed to foresee the camps despite having engendered them. Those who espouse this notion of shame think of it as luminous, whereas those who actually endure it feel it as tenebrous. Here one does not have to follow Adorno and Horkheimer in thinking Enlightenment thought led European civilisation directly to the gas chambers to see that idealism fostered genocide. Much more important, and ultimately far more shameful, indeed Levi calls it a global shame, is the barrier of silence and numbness that was let fall right across the world so no-one would

have to trouble themselves to figure out what to do about Hitler's proposed 'solutions', which although vague in detail were unequivocal in intent.[28] As Levi puts it, the question that should be asked is not who knew about the death camps and can therefore be reasonably held responsible for not acting against them, but who honestly could not have known?[29] Humanist shame is touted by many, but felt by few. As such, a still more precise definition can now be offered: it is the shame of hypocritically holding others to a set of values that state it is better to die nobly than live ignobly while doing little or nothing oneself to save them; it is a shame which none but the victims actually felt, however needlessly on their part. Questions like 'why not escape?' or 'why not revolt?' thus bear the most pungent taint of *ressentiment*.

Very far from innocent, the shadow this luminous power of shame is able to cast causes death in very direct ways. So, while it may be true that we can only hold global shame indirectly responsible for the deaths of the camp victims, because apathy and timidity create an environment in which a tyrannical regime can flourish, but cannot be said to cause such regimes to come into being, this does not mean humanism is without a direct function. A very simple, but utterly pitiless equation is given by Levi to explain this. Even if the monstrously hard labour, savage beatings, extremes of temperature, untreated illnesses, and so on, did not kill you, the 'decisively insufficient' food ration surely would; 'the physiological reserves of the organism being consumed in two or three months, death by hunger, or by diseases induced by hunger, was the prisoner's normal destiny. This could be avoided only with additional food, and to obtain it a large or small privilege was necessary; in other words, a way, granted or conquered, astute or violent, licit or illicit, to lift oneself above the norm.'[30] If you don't cheat others, at least in the sense of putting yourself first and above all, you will die. This is the inexorable law of the camp; for some, however, adherence to this law was too great a price to pay for survival and consciously or unconsciously they declined to pay the tariff and were consumed. Experience taught that survival was granted to very few without some compromise.[31]

The compromises were of course many and varied; they ranged from ensuring one's soup was served from nearer to the bottom of the cauldron than the top, to holding one's bladder so as never to be the last to use the pot and so be obliged to undertake the onerous duty of emptying it, to explicitly prostituting oneself. Uppermost on the minds of survivors, though, according to Levi, is the feeling of failure they all suffered in the years after the ordeal, when a shadow descended on their hearts. By turning inward, as was necessary, and concerning themselves only with

themselves, the survivors felt they had somehow failed a test of their humanity because being human means having a care for others.[32] Here we come to the terrible crux of Levi's analyses, for what he shows is that the one who turned his back on a fellow sufferer is not the same one who later felt mortified for having done so, although outwardly they may appear to inhabit the same body. With characteristic acuity and economy, Levi puts it like this. 'It is man who kills, man who creates or suffers injustice; it is no longer man who, having lost all restraint, shares his bed with a corpse. Whoever waits for his neighbour to die in order to take his piece of bread is, albeit guiltless, further from the model of thinking man than the most primitive pygmy or the most vicious sadist.'[33] Foucault may have been prepared to wager in 1966 that man would one day disappear like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea, but Levi shows this had already taken place some twenty years earlier.

The camps separated man[34] (in Foucault's sense of being a sociological invention) from his himself, as it were, reducing him to a barely coherent set of survival behaviours that in Levi's view cannot be analysed, far less judged, by criteria established outside of the camps themselves.[35] This is why his meditation on shame is so important, it raises to the power of concept what may otherwise have remained simply an evocative impression which however galling it may have been would not have had the same effect. Concepts are characterised by their selectivity, their concision and their intensity, whereas impressions are purposefully vague so as to allow as many extensions as possible. And we know right from the outset that it is precisely a set of concepts Levi hoped to produce, because he offers his memoirs not 'in order to formulate new accusations' but rather to 'furnish documentation for a quiet study of certain aspects of the human mind'.[36] If his hopes were realised it should be possible to extract concepts from his work and add them to the large stock of concepts philosophy watches over. As Deleuze points out, this is by no means a docile process of accumulation; new concepts are not like memories, they cannot be layered one over the other. Rather, they enact a terrible violence on existing concepts, forcing them all to prove their viability before the new concept, or sink into disuse.

Shame, Levi shows, is the limit-test of man. His horrendous experiences led him to conclude only man feels shame, or can act shamefully, and, what is more, it is only man that can be judged by man. What philosophy must wonder, then, is whether or not shame is constitutive of man, or an extension? Does shame indict man, or create him? Biblically, it should be concluded that man is constituted by shame, that is, born of it and born into it, but Levi's analyses suggest otherwise. Any shame for which we can

neither atone nor stop atoning for, is, on Levi's evidence, at once an invitation to act out shameful fantasies and a potent (if sometimes self-destructive) inhibition, because in both cases it implies an interiorisation of self-judgement. (Despots would escape it by acting abominably and placing themselves above it, while humanists would pretend they have already been judged and found beyond reproach by sitting in judgement of others.) In other words, man behaves shamefully because he does not own up to his shame, he visits it upon others, invests it in a god, all so as not to have to endure it himself. Levi's essential lesson concerning shame, then, is that it is in fact an extension of humanity: where there is man, there is shame, and conversely where shame is absent, there is no man. The camps did not reveal that the man is essentially a beast, but rather that he is an armature of habits binding a body to a paradigm of behaviours called sociality that only the most extreme conditions can penetrate and sheer away. Shame is a part of man.

So, when Deleuze says a writer can have no better reason to write than to confront the shame of being a man he is not making quite the moralistic plea he perhaps appears to be. He is not saying that those who take up a pen should spend their time detailing their crimes, petty or large, personal or collective, making every book a kind of doomsday moral manifesto. In fact, the very last thing he thinks a book should be is anecdotal and personal.[37] Instead what Deleuze means is that writers should inquire into what is man's by right, that is, make him own what he would dearly love not to: his shame, his perversity, his madness. As these affects, as Deleuze calls them, visibly become extensions of man, so philosophically they become intense because they lose their transcendental dimension by being attached to so earthly a premise as man. If man is the condition of shame then shame cannot be transcendental, much less holy. Without an immanent form of philosophy to preserve its sense, however, it would fall by the wayside and lose its power to indict. So what Deleuze's transcendental empiricism must find a way of doing is preserving the conceptual force of shame while at the same time draining it of all its pretensions to grandeur. It is not only a new philosophy that Deleuze hoped to produce, but a new man too (this, as I will argue in the next chapter, is the aim of becoming-woman and its point as a concept).

Deleuze's profoundly Nietzschean inspiration shines through here most strongly. If shame is truly an extension of man then the only passage beyond it is the reinvention of man. Only a new type of man – an overman still to be imagined (one that has become-woman, we may wager) – can cease being shameful, because the old one is shameful by definition. Only a philosophy of immanence can envisage this without thereby announ-

cing the arrival of a god. Therefore, the fundamental ethical question is: how must man be composed that he can be reinvented (where reinvented means precisely not replaced, but broken down into basic constituent parts and imagined differently, put together afresh)? In view of establishing an active mode of ethics such as this question beckons, Deleuze set himself two tasks: the first was to understand man as he is; the second was to discover a mechanism by which he could become other than he is. As such, the basic problem to be confronted here is the problem of the formation of an active subject, rather than the passively synthesised subject we've so far encountered. Following Hume, Deleuze proposed this problem be stated as follows: 'how can a subject transcending the given be constituted in the given?'[38] To put it another way, what he aimed to do is reconcile the paradox of a subject which is at once the product of its environment, of what happens, accidents and such like, and yet still capable of producing that environment, of willing it.

In more general terms, that is, from the perspective of a form of analysis such as cultural studies, which is interested in a wide range of issues, from the persistently essential, like gender, to the most resolutely relative, like sexuality, the problem is this: if a subject is wholly *transcendent*, actually or virtually, then it cannot be effected by the society it inhabits. A *transcendent* subject is, by definition, beyond the reach of such constitutive systems as the judiciary, or psychiatry. It conditions them: it is judge, juror and psychiatrist, the one who diagnoses and condemns. Only a subject that is *given* can be said to have been shaped by the social, or somehow felt the impact of a force greater than itself, or better still, been constituted by forces external to itself. But a subject who is completely *given* and not at least partially *transcendent* cannot have an effect on the social order. It is born at once with the social, and lives and dies according to a diastole and systole outside itself, but not different from itself. The aim of Deleuzism, I want to argue, should be to provide a theory of culture that can accommodate both of these considerations, and it is precisely this that Deleuze offers. Empiricism is Deleuze's solution to this problem, but it is not just any old sort of empiricism we are dealing with here and certainly not the form of empiricism we post-Kantians take for granted.

The classical definition of empiricism is, of course, that it is the theory according to which knowledge not only begins with experience but is derived from it. This definition, proposed as it is by the Kantian tradition, foreshadows the Kantian turn to the question of how *a priori* synthetic judgements are formed. Its tendentiousness is obvious. As Deleuze says, '*why* would the empiricist say that? and as the result of which ques-

tion?'[39] Deleuze has two main objections to the Kantian definition: first of all, he says, 'knowledge is not the most important thing for empiricism, but only the means to some practical activity'; and second, 'experience for the empiricist, and for Hume in particular, does not have this univocal and constitutive aspect we give it'.[40] The classical definition, by defining empiricism in experiential terms, ignores completely the role of *relations*. For 'Kant, relations depend on the nature of things in the sense that, as phenomena, things presuppose a synthesis whose source is the same as the source of relations. This is why critical philosophy is not an empiricism.'[41] Yet for Deleuze, it is precisely the manner in which relations are derived that is decisive. 'We will call "nonempiricist" every theory according to which, *in one way or another*, relations are derived from the nature of things.'[42]

The empiricist catchcry which emerges from this refutation is as simple as it is profound: relations are external to their terms.[43] The epistemological and methodological importance of relations to Deleuze's version of empiricism is best seen in his repudiation of the experiential definition. Although Hume invests experience with two distinct senses, seemingly confirming the supposed centrality of that notion, neither of these senses are properly constitutive, in Deleuze's view, so experience cannot contribute to a theory or definition of empiricism; only relations present themselves as constitutive, as I will explain below, so it is only relations that can serve to define empiricism. In the first sense, experience, as 'a collection of distinct perceptions', cannot be constitutive because relations are not derived from it. In fact, it is precisely *in* experience that relations, which 'are the effect of the principles of association', constitute the subject. In the second sense of the word, the denotation of various conjunctions of past objects, 'we should again recognise that principles do not come from experience', but, on the contrary, 'experience itself must be understood as a principle'.[44] Deleuze's most general claim, then, is this: our experience of the world is meaningful only insofar as we institute relations between perceptions and it is these relations that makes experience cohere sufficiently to be called understanding. These relations are not founded in experience, but rather in human nature.

This means that our way of experiencing the world – our actual apparatus for cognition – is distinct from our experience. As such, our construction of the world is an integral aspect of our experience of it; in fact, we experience it *as* we construct it. 'In short, it seems impossible to define empiricism as a theory according to which knowledge derives from experience.'[45] Empiricism, rather, is a theory of relations which are external to their terms, and if cultural studies is ever to make full use

of Deleuze it is this 'theory' which it must come to terms with. Now, according to Deleuze, the determination that *relations are external to their terms* is the condition of possibility for a solution to the empiricist problem: *how can a subject transcending the given be constituted in the given?*[46] It is this 'solution', as it were, that gives rise to transcendental empiricism, for what it does is flatten the ascension of the transcendental term so that the synthetic process is rendered as a movement across a surface instead of a rising-up. Thus, in order to ascertain whether or not empiricist methods are going to be valuable to cultural studies, we have to determine whether or not the externality of relations can contribute anything to an understanding of how culture operates.

So, to begin with, we might ask: what does it mean that relations are external to their terms? Foremost, it 'means that ideas do not account for the nature of the operations that we perform on them, and especially of the relations we establish among them'.[47] In other words, the relations between ideas do not inhere in the ideas themselves, but in human nature. 'A collection of ideas will never explain how the simple ideas are regularly grouped into complex ideas.'[48] The method of grouping ideas is in principle external to what it groups, as such the relations between ideas it institutes are also external. 'And if they are external, the problem of the subject, as it is formulated in empiricism follows.'[49] To see how this is possible, we have to interrogate the decisive relation between the principles of association and the subject. According to Deleuze, association both transcends and differs from the imagination, which is to say, it affects the imagination.[50] This is the basis of what Deleuze describes as the 'coherent paradox' of Hume's philosophy: 'it offers a subjectivity which transcends itself, without being any less passive'.[51] That is to say, the subject is constituted in the given but is able to transcend the given. This is possible because the relation between the imagination and the principles of association which are in operation there is dynamic.[52]

Association, then, far from being a product, which would involve an unnecessary hypostatisation, is in fact 'a rule of the imagination and a manifestation of its free exercise'.[53] As such, it, at once, acts as a guide to the imagination, thereby giving it uniformity, and constrains it. It is through this relation that the imagination becomes human nature. 'The mind, having become nature, has acquired now a *tendency*.'[54] The notion of *tendency* is anthropological, and in this sense humanist, since it postulates that the individual is composed of social codes, and can thus be interrogated via those codes. By the same token, this is precisely why transcendental empiricism is not humanist: the subject thus posited is a fragmented one. Although the subject is said to have transcended itself,

that does not then mean that it is a transcendental subject. It does not stand outside that which it organises or makes cohere; rather organisation and coherence – made possible by the principles of association – take place in the subject. 'Empirical subjectivity is constituted in the mind under the influence of the principles affecting it; the mind therefore does not have the characteristics of a pre-existing subject.'[55] It transcends itself to the extent the mind becomes a subject.[56] 'In Hume's empiricism, genesis is always understood in terms of principles, and itself as a principle.'[57] The subject, therefore, can only be apprehended via its constitutive principles – which must be external or they could not be apprehended in themselves – and chief among these is *habit*. 'Habit is the constitutive root of the subject.'[58]

Habit is the supreme paradox cultural studies must confront. The paradox of habit, of course, is that it is formed by degrees (therefore it is constituted not constitutive), *and*, at the same time, it is a principle of nature (therefore it is constitutive not constituted).[59] It is not however a paradox cultural studies must resolve. On the contrary, the tension implicit in this paradoxical figuration of the subject is what must be preserved. An important axiom follows from it, namely that the subject invents the very norms and general rules it lives by.[60] Despite appearances, habit is not the same thing as habitus, not as Bourdieu understands the term anyway. In Bourdieu's formulation, *habitus* is an acquired 'system of generative schemes' with 'an infinite capacity for generating products – thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions – whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production'.[61] The transcendental empirical subject, in contrast to Bourdieu's conception, is as much the product of self-invention, as it is the consequence of a conformity to existing structures. In the given, the subject is without agency: he or she is simply one particle among many and must move and sway with the ebb and flow of the social tide. To gain agency, the subject must transcend the given. How the subject *transcends* the given is perhaps the most vital question we can ask of Deleuze's version of empiricism. It is the process of counter-actualisation, I would argue, which enables the passively synthesised subject to become active – to self-fashion, as it were.[62]

Counter-actualisation, I want to argue, is that process which Deleuze in his more specifically philosophical discussions describes (following Artaud) as the necessary effort needed to think, and not simply have thoughts cross one's mind like so many feral bats. My implication is that it is a concept which can usefully be enlarged upon without at the same time destroying its specificity. The concept of counter-actualisation

posits that 'uses' insofar as they are deliberate and fully willed are in fact creative acts. Through the practices of everyday life – the multiplicity of 'uses' social structures are put to, the regulatory bodies that shape culture *and* cultural commodities, the already appropriated, and about to be appropriated, the many and various items that combine with desire to produce culture – the passively formed subject becomes active. This pivotal 'mechanism' is liberating for cultural studies inasmuch as it enables a rigorous definition of a subject which is capable of particularising the universal, and, as a result, able to put the so-called normative institutions which ordinarily govern his or her existence to his or her own use. It is, I suggest, an *active* form of governmentality. Counter-actualisation, Deleuze argues, is what the free can do, or more precisely what the free do; by free he means free of resentment and envy (the free do not try to profit from their wounds, they want only to own them).[63] But it is also, I will argue, a path to freedom. 'Men's only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable.'[64] Thus becoming must start with that which is diametrically opposed to man as the standard of existence, namely a becoming-woman, but it can't stop there.

Notes

1. See, for instance, the marvellous comparison of the Stoic sage and Zen master: both invent tests – koans – which serve to expose the absurdity of signification, and the nonsense of denotation, both of which operations are preconditions to the proper construction of the concept as Deleuze formulates it. Cf. Deleuze 1990a: 136.
2. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 161–2.
3. 'You should not try to find whether an idea is just or correct. You should look for a completely different idea, elsewhere, in another area, so that something passes between the two which is neither in one nor the other' (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 10).
4. Jameson 1981: 9.
5. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 375.
6. Adorno 1973: 365.
7. Contrary to Ansell Pearson, then, I am arguing that it is precisely the concept's facility to be self-positing that enables it to perform a positive and powerful form of cultural critique. Cf. Ansell Pearson 1999: 203.
8. Deleuze 1990a: 20.
9. Jameson 1979: 9–11.
10. This is, I take it, the further problem that the suspicion of a dualism in Deleuze and Guattari's writing would arouse. Cf. Jameson 1997: 414.
11. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 1.
12. Deleuze 1997: 3.
13. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 208.
14. Deleuze 1995: 172.

15. Adorno, too, made note of this shame: he admits, 'it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could no longer write poems. But it is not wrong to raise the less cultural question whether after Auschwitz you can go on living – especially whether one who escaped by accident, one who by rights should have been killed, may go on living. His mere survival calls for the coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which there could have been no Auschwitz; this is the drastic guilt of him who was spared' (Adorno 1973: 362–3).
16. Levi 1988: 9.
17. For alternative readings of Levi, which tend to stress the moral and political imperatives of his work more than I have, see Sodi 1990.
18. Deleuze 1990a: 19.
19. Deleuze 1990a: 19.
20. Deleuze 1990a: 20.
21. Deleuze 1990a: 20.
22. Deleuze 1990a: 21.
23. I must thank Eugene Holland for drawing my attention to this crucial concept.
24. Deleuze 1990a: 149.
25. Deleuze 1990a: 148.
26. Levi 1988: 83.
27. On this point, see Levi's remarks on Grushenka's fable of the little onion in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Levi 1988: 40.
28. Levi 1988: 65.
29. Levi 1988: 4.
30. Levi 1988: 26.
31. Levi 1979: 98.
32. Levi 1988: 58.
33. Levi 1979: 177–8.
34. I use 'man' throughout in the sense that Deleuze gives the term, namely as that which must ultimately be replaced by some new form. I retain usage of it to signal all the more strongly the urgency of its replacement.
35. Cf. Levi's comments on psychoanalysis, Levi 1988: 65.
36. Levi 1979: 15.
37. From this point of view, the gonzo-like approach taken by Stivale (1998) among others of writing about one's encounter with Deleuze's thought as opposed to extracting 'little ideas' and inventing concepts is, strictly speaking, unDeleuzian.
38. Deleuze 1991: 86.
39. Deleuze 1991: 86.
40. Deleuze 1991: 107–8.
41. Deleuze 1991: 111.
42. Deleuze 1991: 109.
43. Deleuze 1991: 101.
44. Deleuze 1991: 108.
45. Deleuze 1991: 108.
46. Deleuze 1991: 107.
47. Deleuze 1991: 107.
48. Deleuze 1991: 107.
49. Deleuze 1991: 98.
50. 'We can now see the special ground of empiricism: nothing in the mind transcends human nature, because it is human nature that, in its principles, transcends the mind; nothing is ever transcendental' (Deleuze 1991: 24).
51. Deleuze 1991: 26.
52. 'The effect of association appears in three ways. Sometimes the idea takes on a

role and becomes capable of representing all these ideas with which, through resemblance, it is associated (general idea); at other times, the union of ideas brought about *by* the mind acquires a regularity not previously had, in which case "nature in a manner point[s] out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one" (substance and mode); finally, sometimes, one idea can introduce another, so that the essence of relations becomes precisely this easy transition' (Deleuze 1991: 25).

53. Deleuze 1991: 24.
54. Deleuze 1991: 25.
55. Deleuze 1991: 29.
56. 'The subject is the effect of principles in the mind, but it is the mind that becomes subject; it is the mind that, in the last analysis, transcends itself' (Deleuze 1991: 126–7).
57. Deleuze 1991: 66.
58. Deleuze 1991: 92–3.
59. Deleuze 1991: 66.
60. Deleuze 1991: 86.
61. Bourdieu 1990: 55.
62. The manner in which 'appropriation' is used here should not be compared with Heidegger's use of this term since the primary concern is neither understanding nor interpretation. However, it may profitably be compared with his concept of the care in the sense that it is care that produces the subject. The difference between 'care' and 'appropriation' (as I have used the term) might best be described in terms of their underlying aspirations. Heidegger says he is not interested in a 'philosophy of culture', whereas that is precisely my concern. Heidegger 1962: 203, 211, 242–4.
63. Deleuze 1990a: 152.
64. Deleuze 1995: 171.

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Part Two

Applied Deleuzism

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Becoming-woman and the World-Historical

> 'Don't let us stop here' cried Isabel. 'Look, let us go through there! Bell must go through there! See! see! out there upon the blue! yonder, yonder! far away – out, out! – far, far away, and away, and away, out there! where the two blues meet, and are nothing – Bell must go!'
> (Herman Melville, *Pierre or The Ambiguities*)

For Deleuze nothing much happens until the point of imperceptibility is reached, that mysterious point where the two blues meet, and are nothing. So becoming-woman cannot be seen as an end in itself, in it both man and woman are still perceptible. It is a process whose effect consists in destroying both generality and particularity, Man and *the* man, but also Woman and *the* woman. Not even that is enough, however, to become properly imperceptible because self-inspection still remains; one needs to push past this point too, and only then does one reach the blue yonder of imperceptibility, a close-up so extreme that even the one of oneself disappears from view.[1] This is the ultimate aim of all becoming, pushing beyond something unbearable to a new, oceanic sensibility and logic.[2] In order to understand becoming-woman, and why we must all follow its course according to Deleuze and Guattari, we have to start by seeing it in its proper light as a problem-solution.[3] Then we will see that its scandal[4] is that of all utopian ideas, it promises at once to abolish all that we know and care for (however ambivalently) and create a society we are unsure we want to live in.[5] Most importantly, what it does insofar as it ignites our ire is expose the addictiveness of our culture, and insofar as it does this it succeeds even if its vision fails.[6]

This is of course Jameson's great insight into utopian texts: they work to the extent they compel us to think differently.[7] Succeeding by failing means succeeding in forcing us into thinking something we had previously resisted – whether by denial, repression, or a more straightforward failure of the imagination – despite the fact we do not immediately

become what we read about, a new person.[8] The utopian text fails on two counts: it does not deliver the utopian society it beckons, inasmuch that we do not immediately enter its realm as we read it, except on an imaginary plane; and its promise is always flawed somehow because perfection is not imaginable, except as extinction and that is the one thing we are constitutionally incapable of imagining. Yet insofar as we are brought up against this wall of an unimaginable beyond – shown the limit of our society and ourselves, in other words, which in reality amounts to a taking stock of what would bring it all crashing down – we grow from within, expand in the middle.[9] This is different in important respects from the customary point of interest theory has taken in transgression – from Sade through to Bataille and Klossowski – which revolves around the one, unmistakably Hegelian point, that to see the limit is already to transform it, move it a little further out.[10] This is why, from a certain point of view, the most deeply utopian texts are not those that propose or depict a better society, but those that carry out the most thoroughgoing destruction of the present society. For Deleuze, however, simply seeing/transgressing the limit is not enough to release us from perceptibility because it preserves the idea of the limit. One must do more, but what?

The answer is becoming-woman, where becoming-woman is the basis of a total critique.[11] However to see what this actually entails, the answer and problem have to be restored to their original – or at any rate originating – context, namely that dimension of Deleuze's work he proposed to call clinical (the very notion of becoming-woman is, after all, taken from Deleuze and Guattari's reading of the Schreber case, which contra Freud they interpret as an instance, par excellence, of schizo-phrenic becoming not paranoia mixed up with cross-dressing).[12] To my mind, the single most important text in this respect is his commentary on Herman Melville, 'Bartelby; or, The Formula', which appears in his last book *Essays Critical and Clinical*. There he shows that becoming-woman is, in the first instance at least, what he calls 'a procedure'. That is to say, it belongs to the same class of behaviours as Little Hans's various obses-sions – his fear of being bitten by a horse and so on – but differs in that it belongs to the next stage along, no longer neurosis it has become psychosis. A procedure is not a mechanism of defence, strictly speaking, because it occurs too late for it to be of any use in stopping the onslaught of those alien feelings and compulsions we indifferently call madness. It is rather like a contract one establishes with one's mania: if the procedure is followed one is allowed to live freely; if not, one is paralysed.[13] This freedom to live is not of course the same freedom enjoyed by people mercifully free of psychosis, it is rather the freedom of someone who has

moved into an alternate universe where things are measured differently, valued differently and generally held together by an entirely fresh set of rules. As Deleuze notes, the sheer incomprehensibility of Bartelby's actions, for example, owes precisely to the fact that he has invented a new logic, '*a logic of preference*, which is enough to undermine the presuppositions of language as a whole'.[14]

According to Deleuze, the metamorphosis of neurosis into psychosis occurs in three distinct stages, which insofar as it happens at infinite speed may be said to be instantaneous and simultaneous. These stages can nevertheless be mapped (Deleuze's term for plotting out moments of intensity, which are like so many points of an incurving of the universe), as follows. In the first instant, a formless trait of expression is opposed to an image, or the expressed form, which is put into flight by this unbound trait. In *Pierre*, for instance, the disquieting smile of an unknown young man in a painting is somehow set adrift in Pierre's mind because of its resemblance to his father's smile. When he sets it against the image of his actual father, things begin to fragment.[15] The one already free trait of expression frees all the others and the father's image breaks into its components and the subordinating power of resemblance itself is eventually destroyed.[16] Neither the image of *his* father nor the image of The Father remain, both have been radically atomised. The process of an unformed matter conforming to a formed type, the child growing up to resemble a dominant or influential parent – what psychoanalysis calls identification – is rendered impossible now because its twin coordinates, particularity and generality (*his* father and The Father), are eroded beyond repair. Consequently, identification is exchanged for a proximity, or contiguity of particles. In short, zones of indistinction are established. 'Life alone creates such zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach and penetrate them in its enterprise of co-creation.'[17]

In the second instant, then, the once strong identification exerted by the formed image over the conforming subject is replaced by a new type of relation, an alliance rather than a filiation. As the advent of what Deleuze calls indiscernibility, this is the stage that can properly be called becoming. 'Pierre does not imitate his father, but reaches the zone of proximity where he can no longer be distinguished from his half sister Isabel, and becomes woman. While neurosis flounders in the nets of maternal incest in order to identify more closely with the father, psychosis liberates incest with the sister as a becoming, a free identification of man and woman.'[18] Now this does not mean Pierre begins to act like Isabel, or starts to imitate her in anyway, which patently he does not do. Becoming does not work that way – it is more cosmic than that, though not less real for being so. As

Deleuze tirelessly reminds us, becoming is a dual process.[19] First of all particularity and generality must be undone, then – and only then, I should add – zones of indistinction, alliances that are not filiations, can be created. How must a man look at himself to see a correspondence between himself and a woman? How must a woman be looked at such that a correspondence between her and a man can be seen?[20] Formed types have to give way to formless traits: a smile, a frown, a sigh. Pierre recognises Isabel as *his* sister, and so cannot love her as he loves Lucy, but neither can he see her as A Sister, their estrangement has unsistered her.[21] She recognises him as *her* brother, but soon takes them both beyond brother–sister to a kind of cosmic unity based on the mystery of their mother, and a prophetic inscription in a guitar.[22]

In taking Melville's *Pierre or The Ambiguities* as his example, Deleuze makes a strange and exciting leap that brings becoming-woman into sharp relief. He suggests that *Pierre* is the antecedent of Musil's *The Man Without Qualities*, claiming the cosmic love between Ulrich and Agathe mirrors Pierre and Isabel's own mad passion. By so doing, he isolates and subsequently classifies the enigmatic brother-sister incest relationship as a procedure, rather than a perversion. This is the third instant. Having freed itself of identification, psychosis now 'pursues its dream of establishing a function of universal fraternity that no longer passes through the father, but is built on the ruins of the paternal function, a function that presupposes the dissolution of all images of the father, following an autonomous line of alliance or proximity that makes the woman a sister, and the other man, a brother'.[23] From the dark depths of psychosis, becoming-woman prophesies a new society, but in the negative: it does not indicate what that new society will look like, it pinpoints what would have to be destroyed to release it. The list is very short. It indicates just one intolerable fact: what Deleuze usefully calls the father function, which is construed as the need to conform to an established model (Man) that is empowered by the ownership filiation implies. Becoming-woman is a solution to the unbearable fact that we become our parents because they own us. Its procedure consists in reordering the universe along fraternal rather than paternal lines. In this instance, the face of man truly would be washed away like some drawing in the sand at the edge of the sea.

The high point of this fraternal society, which according to Deleuze is most fully realised in *Wuthering Heights*, is the acknowledgement that brother and sister are one, though still different. Their difference, however, is no longer of an essential nature, it is purely functional, more a valency than a property. Speaking of Kate and Penthesilea, Kleist provides an apt image: he says they are marked merely by a 'plus' or 'minus'

sign, which is to say they are of 'one and the same nature, but imagined under opposite circumstances'.[24] This mark is by no means indelible, the polarity is ceaselessly reversed.[25] What should not be overlooked in all this, though, is the fact of a peculiar relation between the two, which however inessential it may be nevertheless has an insistence that needs to be grappled with. Deleuze's final image is therefore the most crucial: he says brother and sister (Heathcliff and Catherine, Pierre and Isabel, Ulrich and Agathe) are to each other as Ahab is to Moby-Dick, 'each one becoming Ahab and Moby-Dick by turns'.[26] In the hermeneutic universe Deleuze creates, which in spite of appearances is not truly mythopoeic, aligning all these characters with Ahab means aligning them with 'monstrosity' and imbuing them with the power of 'originals'. Obviously enough, these two terms will need to be explained more fully, but so does the claim that Deleuze's analyses are not truly mythopoeic because his constant recourse to manifestly mythopoeic critics like Lawrence, Fiedler and Canetti (not to mention their predecessors Melville and Whitman) would seem to put that beyond doubt.

What we need to remind ourselves is that for Deleuze the crucial question is never 'what does it mean?' but 'what does it do?' So even if the first step must of necessity be an explanation of meaning, the next step must follow hard upon it and indicate what it accomplishes. It gets us nowhere to ask what becoming-woman means, we must instead find out what it does. This is not because we must adhere to Deleuze's method like well-behaved disciples, but because if we do not apprehend his method first of all we will not be able to see how his concepts are formulated or distributed. In this respect, Deleuze is much like Nietzsche, the meaning and nature of his concepts varies according to who enunciates them.[27] The becoming-woman one finds in Brontë, Melville and Musil is not of the same order as the becoming-woman he adjures society to undertake. To be sure, they are related, but there is still a leap to be made between the two orders. Within that frame, then, the movement is, I will suggest, from diagnosis to something like indictment. From this point, I will proceed in a twofold fashion: I will begin by explaining what 'monstrosity' and 'original' mean; then I will show how they work; in turn, and by way of 'demonstration', I will then show that Deleuze's analyses are not mythopoeic at all.[28]

Truly impressive monsters, the properly monstrous in other words, are already originals, but not all monsters are original, nor are all originals monsters. Innately depraved, monsters belong to that other universe Sade called Primary Nature, a terrible supersensible realm, 'which, knowing no Law, pursues its own irrational aim through them'.[29] Secondary nature,

by contrast, operates under the sign of reason and on the side of the Law and laws. Primary Nature gives rise to two different types of monsters: on the one hand, there are the demonic monomaniacs like Ahab and Heathcliff, while on the other hand, there are the strangely angelic hypochondriacs like Billy Budd, Catherine and above all Bartelby. 'And although the two types are opposed in every way – the former innate traitors and the latter betrayed in their very essence; the former monstrous fathers who devour their children, the latter abandoned sons without fathers – they haunt one and the same world, forming alternations with it.'[30] In its literary incarnation, at least, becoming-woman clearly means becoming monstrous, which itself means breaking free of laws and the Law by whatever measures are necessary: murder, betrayal, perversion, but also self-sacrifice, immobility and love. Such characters, if they are perverted or saintly enough, if, in other words, they can sink to the bottomless depths of depravity of a Juliette or rise to the unparalleled heights of saintliness of a Justine, can be considered originals. 'Figures of life and knowledge, they know something inexpressible, live something unfathomable.'[31]

Original characters – and it must be constantly borne in mind that it is precisely characters that are at issue here, not clinical cases – are to be distinguished from the simply remarkable ones Melville says by the fact that they have managed to escape the twin determinations of generality and particularity and thereby become something truly extraordinary. 'Even the words they utter surpass the general laws of language (presuppositions) as well as the simple particularities of speech, since they are like the vestiges or projections of a unique, original language [*langue*], and bring all of language [*langage*] to the limit of silence and music.'[32] It is their literary function which interests us here: although they are beings of Primary Nature, originals are inseparable from the world of secondary nature where they exert their effect. Originals reveal the emptiness and absurdity of secondary nature, our world.[33] Most novels can only hope to produce one original character, and indeed the bulk of novels do not produce any at all. Melville manages to populate his best novels with two, the demonic *and* the angelic, and therein lies his greatness in Deleuze's view. This poses special problems that insofar as Melville solves them can serve to define the greatness of his artistry. How does one reconcile two originals? More to the point, how does one reconcile the Primary Nature of originals with the secondary nature of humanity? 'If humanity can be saved, and the originals reconciled, it will only be through the dissolution or decomposition of the paternal function.'[34] Hence becoming-woman.

How can fraternal society be realised? It already has, according to

Deleuze. The reconciliation of the inhuman and the human, or Primary Nature and secondary nature, occurs spontaneously, Deleuze argues, because it is not a personal problem, but a historical, geographical and political one. 'It is not an individual or particular affair, but a collective one, the affair of a people, or rather, of all peoples.'[35] Fraternal society is formed the instant man divests himself of those characteristics constituting his essential violence, idiocy and villainy; when he relinquishes self-consciousness and all sense of property and peculiarity. Now it must seem somewhat premature to declare that this has already occurred when all around us sickeningly contradictory evidence can be found. If anything, these traits seem to be evolving, rather alarmingly I must say, into cultural values: these days, it is good to be peculiar, it is good to own property, and self-consciousness is an ideal to be attained at any price. It does not aid Deleuze's cause much to note, in the face of this, that he was really speaking of a people still to come. It is true, he says all great writers lack a people and only ever write for a people found exclusively inside themselves, but this should not be taken to mean that Deleuze is merely a dreamer, that his fraternal society is a mere pipe dream. Nor, I might add, should it be taken to mean he was overhasty in pronouncing its arrival. What we must remember is that the fraternal society is realised in and by a literary text. Then we need to ask: how does it work?

   In reality this is a dialectical question because it proposes and relies on a distinction between literature and life, or more specifically texts and their effects. The two orders of becoming-woman cannot be understood without this split, because while it is true becoming-woman in its first or clinical phase is a psychotic procedure, in its second or literary phase it is a device, something capable of inducing an effect in a reader. So although it does seem at times that the entire clinical project simply rests on a quite breathless exaltation of an idiosyncratically contrived list of great writers, it actually consists in identifying (and, undeniably, celebrating) those writers capable of introducing a little mania into the mainstream of thought and language.[36] In the end, it is not because Masoch – to turn to a writer whose ambiguous situation, at once patient and artist, was immensely fascinating to Deleuze – delineates masochism that his work is important, although that never ceases to be a factor, but because he creates characters and situations we cannot fail to recognise, yet cannot fully understand either.[37] Now, I want to suggest this bifurcation be characterised as follows: in the first, still clinical instance becoming-woman is a procedure, in precisely the clinical sense Deleuze gives it, but in the second or literary instance it is a device, in the sense Russian formalism has invested that term. It is this metamorphosis from proce-

dure to device that marks the transition of becoming-woman from diagnosis to indictment. Deleuze's clinical project can now be defined as an attempt to unpack the different kinds of motivation – which is to say, indictments – that have been attached to particular devices, such as becoming-woman (but there are others as well).

This definition has a number of advantages, it seems to me, and is amply supported, I believe, by the fact that Deleuze does not hesitate to distinguish between art and non-art. Although it is true there is a constant slippage in Deleuze's writing and thinking between the purely literary examples and those drawn from clinical case studies – between Roussel and Wolfson, Alice and Little Hans – his actual use of examples is never less than precisely wrought. He is always extremely careful to differentiate between writing he considers art and writing he considers purely formulaic. For example, Wolfson's writing is not art, Deleuze says, but a coping mechanism.[38] It lacks an artistic bent, whereas Masoch's writing (which may seem procedural inasmuch as it outlines a training regime) is, in Deleuze's view, precisely not 'purely formulaic' because it is inspired by artistry, not a peculiar or personal psychiatric economy. His writing has a different ambience to Wolfson's, the difference being Masoch's formulas work for us, whereas Wolfson's do not. Indeed, in Deleuze's view, this is what makes it pathological rather than artistic, the new figures of life and knowledge Wolfson creates remain trapped in his psychotic procedure.[39] A true artist would be someone who found a means of breaking free of the constrictions of the pathological procedure to let loose into the air the marvellously creative lines of flight it is able to generate. The really interesting question, then, is how are procedures turned into devices?

There are probably a dozen different ways in which the procedure can be transformed into a device, but Deleuze concentrates on just one: stuttering. Stuttering is what a character may do ('stut, stut, stutter'), or be said to do ('he stuttered'), but neither of these cases interests Deleuze as much as the possibility of language itself stuttering. 'This is what happens when the stuttering no longer affects preexisting words, but itself introduces the words it affects; these words no longer exist independently of the stutter, which selects and links them together through itself.'[40] Stuttering, in other words, is a mode of composition, as well as an affect. It consists in attaching as rigorously as possible a form of expression such as 'he stuttered' to a form of content that is in itself 'stuttering', so saying and doing are not merely combined but ramified. This amounts to a veritable laying bare of the device, for what in effect Deleuze is referring to here is the way in which a writer suffuses a work with a peculiar intonation by harmonising – which amounts to creating – a series of

counterpoints ('Gregor's squeaking through the trembling of his feet and the oscillations of his body').[41] The device of the indicated form of stuttering is what allows the work as a whole to be made to stutter (to give it a stuttering atmosphere, in other words) because in drawing attention to itself it prompts us to listen for echoes elsewhere, it beckons us to make connections between things that might otherwise have seemed independent – a failing voice and a trembling torso.

To the extent that the procedure draws attention to itself, it too can be considered a device. Of course, the level of intensity of this attention will vary according to the manner in which it is laid bare, so to speak, and this is where the difference between an artistic and pathological deployment of a device or procedure will be most clearly seen. 'For when an author is content with an external marker that leaves the *form of expression* intact ("he stuttered . . . "), its efficacy will be poorly understood unless there is a corresponding *form of content* – an atmospheric quality, a milieu that acts as the conductor of words – that brings together within itself the quiver, the murmur, the stutter, the tremolo, or the vibrato that makes the indicated affect reverberate through the words.'[42] By this stage, however, the procedure has already been converted into a device. So we need to see if the process for reaching this point can be derived somehow. Our first and most important clue is Deleuze's stipulation that the pathological can be transformed into the artistic. This acknowledges that literature as a body of techniques, as well as a body of works, has the means at its disposal for converting sterile formulas into vibrant, quivering effects, and directs us to look at formalist apprehensions of literature. Our second clue, given immediately above, is Deleuze's perception that procedures are forms of expression and not forms of content, as might perhaps have been expected. I would argue, though, that in the literary situation, where it takes the form of a reversal, this expectation is in fact realised. There, the procedure as a form of expression is converted into a form of content. At which point the diagnosis becoming-woman is an indictment.

So how is all of this accomplished? It seems to me that it happens in four stages. First of all, the artist empties the procedure (*form of expression*) of its pathological associations (*form of content*), which is where technique comes into the equation. Naturally, no one technique can be relied upon here, either in the short or long term. What worked for Kafka – his machines, his talking animals, his endless deferrals – may not work for another artist, but that doesn't mean he cannot be learned from. Otherwise, not only would 'Kafkaesque' be meaningless, there would not be any K-function either. According to Deleuze's reading of it, and this still only amounts to the description of an effect rather than an articula-

tion of a technique, Kafka's work teaches that the procedure is able to absorb artistic content only to the extent it can expunge the personal from its form of expression; the more impersonal it can become, the more artistic it can be. Impersonality, he shows, is achieved in two main ways: first, by stripping objects of their formal characteristics so as to release the power of indefinite articles and partitives (this inaugurates a series of profound decompositions, running from being *the* woman, to becoming *a* woman to becoming-woman); second, by recognising that relations are external to the terms they determine an arbitrary and free – mad – mode of connection can be substituted for the sombrely formal conjugation (one may become, then, man-and-woman, and is freed from having to choose between being a woman or a man).

Emptied, the procedure is rendered amenable to a suffusion by a properly artistic content. This is the second step, and it too is an uncertain process without guarantee of success. Basically, though, this move is akin to what in music is called transposition, wherein a form as structure is preserved in the face of perhaps radical changes in instrumentation, pitch or tempo. This does not take place in isolation, however, as though it were possible to generate a genuinely 'empty' container. Rather, emptying is coextensive with filling, step three. By the same token, what now serves as filler must itself have been emptied. Elsewhere, and by other means, the artistic content the procedure now fixes upon must somehow have already been rendered fugitive, its material made available, as it were, or it would not be able to form a new compound. This is not to say that art is only ever a ham-fisted bricolage or pastiche of already existing images, sounds and ideas, as is fashionable to think these days under the sign of Mercury (surely the postmodern God par excellence), that, in short the new is no longer possible. On the contrary, fugitive content is precisely the new. The very process of 'rendering fugitive' is a renewing one, inasmuch that it unchains a form of content from a form of expression grown crusty and releases it into the wind, like a bird-song.

Think, for instance, of the way Messiaen 'listens' to birds and 'transcribes' their calls into music. He has to adjust its tempo for a human heart, use chords to capture a timbre only the tiny throat of a chaffinch can produce, and omit intervals so fine our instruments are unable to execute them, and this is for the sake of his musical portraits which aim to be as faithful as possible, not his more playful compositions which treat bird-songs as malleable material.[43] At once he 'hears' with an ear attuned to the specificity of bird-life, from its ethological purpose (call and response) right down to its physiological condition of possibility (heart-beat, size of the throat, and so on), and one marvellously well versed in

the concrete limits (competence) and fabulous potentialities (performance) of human instruments. When he cannot reproduce a sound exactly, or does not choose to do so, he can nonetheless preserve its place in the diurnal sequence of songs and silences birds uphold, albeit on a human scale, so even if a particular form of content eludes him he can still capture the form of its expression. More importantly, as ethology teaches, our songs are territorial, amorous and communicative too, and in this respect may be considered to have an analogous function to bird-songs, irrespective of whether their expressed content is utterly at odds or their forms of expression clash.

Of course, one does not have to cross between species to witness this continuity of function over a discontinuity of form and of content – in our own time love songs have been crooned and thrashed. Function, then, is an always already higher category than either form of content or form of expression. The essential lesson Kafka teaches us, in the end, is that it is 'absolutely useless to look for a theme [to which may be added both "procedure" and "device"] in a writer if one hasn't asked exactly what its importance is in the work – that is, *how it functions* (and not what its 'sense' is).'[44] Function, I want to suggest, inscribes a dialectic at the heart of all Deleuze's thinking such that we can only pretend to understand the difference between the two orders of becoming-woman without it. For, as the above has tried to show, the difference between the two is precisely a matter of function, that is to say, it can only be retrieved at an order distinct from the level of its inscription. It seems clear that becoming-woman in its psychotic form is a way of warding off the necessity of making a choice (one becomes-woman so as not to have to become either a man or a woman); whereas, becoming-woman in its artistic form points up the unbearableness of such choices as society forces us to make (one creates a becoming-woman so as to illustrate the suffering such choices as having to decide between being a man or a woman induce); but in neither case is it possible for this variance in function to be simply lifted off the page, as it were, and put into evidence. Instead, one has to inquire more deeply.

What this deeper inquiry aims to discover, insofar as it focuses on function, is a higher order of 'meaning' which, looked at in purely functional terms itself, cannot but be equated with either or both what Marxists call 'ideology' and Russian formalists 'motivation', because it similarly imbues the literary with a world-historical effect. Obviously enough, this is why I have suggested Deleuze's clinical project be understood as an inquiry into the motivation of literary devices. My hope in establishing a contiguity if not a correspondence between Deleuze's work

and Russian formalism is not, however, that the distinction between the two be corroded and lost from view, but rather that it be preserved and serve to estrange both projects.[45] Not only is it impossible to present the full force of Deleuze's unquestionable originality of thought in isolation from other modes of inquiry, it is also impossible to assess any weaknesses or too rapidly formulated glosses that may lurk there as well. By the same token, and this is my own deeper purpose, matching Deleuze's terminology with functional equivalents in other discourses is, I think, the surest way of opening his work to non-Deleuzians. And it is my belief that for the most part one has already to be a Deleuzian to understand Deleuze's work, and insofar as this necessitates a certain blindness to the outside of Deleuze that is a problem standing in need of immediate redress.

The fourth step, then, is the uptake – motivation – of the procedure by an intently literary discourse. Now, my use of 'intently' here is quite deliberate, and, as I will insist, completely warranted, despite its apparently humanist taint. Straightaway, I can say by 'intently' I certainly do not mean to imply anything so theoretically retrograde as authorial intention, but I do mean style, however passé that term may be in an era which pretends not to be able to see originality anymore. It may well be that Deleuze's most radical move is also his most reactionary one, his strong endorsement of style, that modernist of modernist tropes. Style, Deleuze always says, should be conceived as something necessary to both the work and the author, which as we've heard is what he means by saying it is always a style of life too.[46] Here necessity means the impetus behind a certain literary effect, or why the author should want to achieve that effect. In other words, it refers precisely to motivation, which I see as the literary extension of the more clinically oriented term 'motive', something that can be clearly seen in the following summation of the K-function Deleuze and Guattari attribute to Kafka.

> In his passion for writing, Kafka explicitly conceives of the stories as a counterpart of the letters, as a means to disavow the letters and the persistent trap of subjectivity. But the stories are imperfect in this respect, simple stopping points or breathing spaces. It is with the novels that Kafka reaches the final and really unlimited solution: K will not be a subject but will be a general function that proliferates and that doesn't cease to segment and spread over all the segments.[47]

In short, different modes of writing, and different moments within modes, serve very different purposes – in Kafka's case, stories cool a passion letters fuel, while novels lift that passion on to a higher plane. A

summary of Deleuze's clinical project may now be attempted. To begin with, like a true diagnostician, Deleuze starts by isolating symptoms. He does this by separating out the different modes of enunciation found in a work – or, more usually, in an oeuvre since Deleuze's preference is to tackle the whole – assigning each mode a specific, if undiscovered purpose. In the case of literary works, this amounts to determining whether the motifs and assorted other stylistic flourishes one encounters are merely ornamental, and therefore of little interest, or somehow necessary to the organisation and structure of the work – true style. Then it is a matter of deciding whether they are devices or procedures. Following this, Deleuze seeks to explain the purpose behind the choice of mode in a twofold way: first of all, as it relates to the author's needs, and second, as it relates to language and society as a whole, us, in other words. His position is that one does not write a novel when a letter will do, nor does one write a fable when a realist drama is required. This is, then, from a hermeneutic point of view, precisely the aim of Deleuze's famously 'new' question, 'how does it work?', which, importantly, springs from a clinical origin.

What I have tried to show in the forgoing is that it relies on all four steps taken together for its power. By which I mean, quite literally, all at once, not in sequence, as it were. It would not do to leave any of the steps out of consideration nor allow any one of them greater prominence than the others. In any analysis of a clinical text, or rather the clinical in a text, we need to: (1) determine how a procedure is emptied of its intrinsically pathological content; (2) find out what new content it has been suffused with; (3) see where this new content comes from, what has been rendered fugitive by its movement in other words; (4) discover the motivation holding the transformation of procedure into device together, rendering it sensible in fact. Let me try to demonstrate this very briefly by mapping the four steps on to *Wuthering Heights*. To start with, as we have seen, Deleuze isolates the brother–sister incest relation, and thereby makes it his hermeneutic key, but in a twofold way: on the one hand, *Wuthering Heights* is read as a figurative commentary on incest as a clinical problem, but, on the other, incest is noted for its peculiar means of commenting on the world-historical. The four steps listed here map this doubling of the text, the clinical's becoming-critical, but only insofar as it is read for the sake of function. Deleuze's dialectics consist in a raising-up of function and a cancelling of theme and story. My reading of *Wuthering Heights* will thus have a quite radical lean to it in that it will not foreground narrative structure in the customary way.[48]

Brontë utilises both tactics for emptying the procedure mentioned

above: she draws on the power of the indefinite and the multiple to destroy generality and particularity, and her plot structure favours cosmic connection by systematically obstructing conjugation.

> 1.   Generality: Heathcliff has but one name, which although he is able to bestow it upon a wife and child and so fix them within a lineage it does not serve to designate his patrimony, but, on the contrary, declares his dejection (it is the name of an already lost child).
>
> 2.   Particularity: Catherine, meanwhile, turns her name into a multiplicity – Earnshaw, Heathcliff, Linton are all tried on for size, making it impossible to see *her* for the attachments she makes ('the air swarmed with Catherines').[49]

Marriage, ironically, is Brontë's foremost weapon against conjugality. Catherine marries Linton and cuts herself off from marrying Heathcliff, so their love must live on another plane. Heathcliff accepts Catherine's unholy gift and marries Isabella, not only cutting her off from her brother, but turning her into a proxy for his vengeance against Linton for stealing Catherine away. Their love is practised like a black art on a plane of mutual betrayal, that ultimately is poisonous to Catherine. 'I'm tired, tired of being enclosed here. I'm wearying to escape into that glorious world, and to be always there; not seeing it dimly through tears . . .'[50]

The monstrous price both are prepared to pay for their affection lifts it above mere incest, and makes it cosmic. Catherine marries Linton in the hope of using her husband's money to establish Heathcliff somehow, so as to permit him to escape the tyranny of her brother's most uncharitable guardianship. She offers up Linton's sister to Heathcliff as recompense for her own lack of judgement in marrying Linton and not Heathcliff, and in the process brings her husband's wrath upon herself. Finally she dies rather than live with Linton and thereby be without Heathcliff. He, meanwhile, does who knows what to get rich, and by exploiting the weaknesses of his former guardian uses his wealth to take control of Wuthering Heights, including its rightful heir. He marries and all but destroys his rival-in-love's sister; he infiltrates Catherine's heart once again and takes Linton's wife back. And after her death he contrives to marry his son to her daughter so as to absorb the Linton estate completely. He revenges himself by utter annihilation only, no half-measures are accepted. The same is true of Catherine, who wills her own death rather than accept the various compromises diurnal existence imposes. And it is precisely as a monstrous pair that they should be read. In this respect, it is perfectly possible and entirely plausible to read Heathcliff and Catherine as analogous to Ahab and Moby-Dick; they too partake of

a mad pursuit that exposes the limits and absurdities of the world in which they are trapped, and more to the point, the world that entraps us.

Now, as to the matter of whether this makes sense to be read as a becoming-woman we need to look at what the cosmic-incest device renders fugitive. Catherine and Heathcliff, like Kate and Penthesilea, are, as Kleist put it, plus and minus, the same substance differently imagined. Catherine says: 'My love for Heathcliff resembles the eternal rocks beneath – a source of little visible delight, but necessary. Nelly, I *am* Heathcliff – he's always, always in my mind – not as a pleasure, any more than I am always a pleasure to myself – but as my own being – so don't talk of our separation again – it is impracticable . . . '[51] And for his part, Heathcliff says: 'I *cannot* live without my life! I *cannot* live without my soul.'[52] Catherine is *his* life, a fact borne out by his presence in her mind; he must be there because as his soul she envelopes him, that is why their love is *necessary*. Catherine and Heathcliff do not choose each other, they find each other. But while they do not marry each other, they do not choose to marry otherwise. Catherine feels Linton is forced upon her, he is the only solution she can think of to the intolerable situation her father's death put Heathcliff in. Likewise, Heathcliff does not choose Isabella, he simply seizes upon her as a convenient means of revenge. And of course it is their miserable failure to endure separation that is the strongest measure of their belonging to one another.

Why becoming-woman? To begin with, Heathcliff insofar as he is one with Catherine is always less than a man. And inasmuch that Catherine is the property of a man (the feminine quality suffusing Heathcliff as quantity), not a man's property (not somebody's wife or daughter), she is always more than a woman. Their cosmic union releases their separately imagined qualities (Heathcliff's murderous activity and Catherine's suicidal passivity) as singularities and blends them together to form a zone of indistinction (Heathcliff's skulking dogs and Catherine's icy wind). Their love shears them of the affect needed to form bonds with other people: neither parents, nurses, siblings, wives or husbands, even children, can penetrate their armour. None of the customary social ties, not the filial, and certainly not the conjugal, are able to divide them from their love. This brings us to step three, because what this does is render fugitive those very ties: it brings into question the obligations such ties entail. It seems right to refer to this as becoming-woman because it is undoubtedly due to feminism, to woman writers of the strength and passion of Emily Brontë, that such questions have been raised at all. Society will not allow them to be simply plus and minus to each other, it demands they each become something definite – a man and a woman –

and then in a classic double-bind manoeuvre prohibits them from being man and woman to each other.

We need not look any further for our motivation: becoming-woman is an indictment on precisely this intolerable situation. Catherine says it all. 'Oh, I'm burning! I wish I were out of doors – I wish I were a girl again, half savage and hardy, and free . . . and laughing at injuries, not maddening under them! Why am I so changed? why does my blood rush into a hell of tumult at a few words? I'm sure I should be myself were I once among the heather on those hills . . . Open the window again wide, fasten it open!'[53] If she is mad, it is society, with its stupid and impossible rules of propriety, that has made her so. Peace is only to be found outside its reach, on the heather, in the wind. At this point the procedure has well and truly become a device. The issue we now need to examine in more detail is how it is possible for a literary text to function as an indictment on the world-historical.[54] To do this we need to explore a little further just what that now quite famous question 'how does it work?' actually implies. Deleuze's formulations are somewhat cryptic, and will take some unpacking. What is clear, though, is that 'working' is precisely a literary effect, and its point so much motivation of a device.

> Even in his failure, the writer remains all the more the bearer of a collective enunciation, which no longer forms part of literary history and preserves the rights of a people to come, or of a human becoming. A schizophrenic vocation: even in his catatonic or anorexic state, Bartelby is not the patient, but the doctor of a sick America, the *Medicine-Man*, the new Christ or the brother to us all.[55]

Two points need to be made here. First, in Deleuze's view, all literature takes the form of a collective enunciation. Against the tide of structuralist and poststructuralist opinion, Deleuze defines language by indirect discourse, not direct communication, and since this necessarily implies a third party it is a social rather than subject-determined definition. In sympathy with Pasolini and Vološinov, he holds that language begins with hearsay, or reported speech, not an immediate exchange of information between interlocutors.[56] Bees don't have language, Benveniste said, because while a bee can communicate to other bees where pollen is to be found, those same bees cannot pass that message on to others. The second party of bees cannot communicate the message of the first bee to a third party, therefore bees do not have language. By the same token, if our dog barks at us to announce the presence of an intruder we cannot pass on the message to another dog, so it doesn't have language either. At least, not for us. What we fail to grasp, what we do not hear in the dog's bark, is its

reflexiveness, the speaker's actual opinion on what they are saying – barking! For, as Vološinov explains, nothing characterises indirect discourse better than its intractability to a simple or mechanical derivation of it from direct discourse. One cannot go from direct discourse, such as an exclamation like 'Not bad!', to indirect discourse, in this case, something like 'He says that it was not bad . . .', because the indirect form relinquishes all its compositional and inflectional markers and relies solely on its content. As Vološinov puts it, indirect discourse 'hears' differently to direct discourse: 'it actively receives and brings to bear in transmission different factors, different aspects of the message than do the other patterns'.[57] What this forces us to recognise, Deleuze argues, is the fact that language is subject to intrinsic determinations before it is conditioned by extrinsic ones, with the important implication that a study of language cannot be conceived in isolation from pragmatics.[58] Deleuze calls these intrinsic determinations, order-words.

The social nature of language is not properly founded, much less seen, Deleuze cautions, until it is demonstrated that 'enunciation in itself implies *collective assemblages*'.[59] This in Deleuze's view is the exemplary value of indirect discourse: it invalidates the (by now largely outdated) assumption that language begins with either individuated statements or determined subjects because it can neither be reduced to a sequence of qualified direct statements nor tied to a specific subject. It requires a still larger notion to encompass it properly, that is to say, to apprehend it for itself and not reduce it to an anomaly. Context is only a partial answer; it still amounts to an external determination of something that really can only be conceived as internal. The inadequacy of context for the purposes at hand is nowhere better seen than in Foucault's analysis of the modality of enunciation.[60] His sequence of searching questions, commencing with 'who speaks?' demonstrates, at once, the exhausting analysis needed to retrieve context and the futility of doing so. For even after we have ascertained who the speaker is, what supports them in their discourse and who benefits from the statements they make, all of which information surpasses the merely contextual in any case, we are still no nearer to an explication of how their statements actually work. A doctor's unearthly ability to make us quake with fear by saying we're ill owes little to the degree hanging on the wall behind them; that is merely a licence, not a true power.

If Deleuze's notion of the order-word can be summarised simply, it would be to say that it is the ability to transform health into a commodity which must be attained that truly defines the doctor's power. 'You're ill' is always already an imperative to get well, an *order*-word in the strictest

sense. But it is not only medical practitioners who can bring this order-word to bear, virtually every institution in our society deploys it.[61] Bank accounts can be sick, buildings can be sick, whole economies can be sick, as can car engines and even the sound of our stereos. Everywhere we are enjoined to get well: invest more, replace your air-conditioning unit, take your money and run, put your car on the hoist, buy a new hi-fi. It is said that advertising works by posing problems it then proposes to fix via the purchase of a particular commodity. Isn't this what medicine does? It too poses a problem, our ill health, and it too offers a remedy we must buy – not merely the services of the GP, or the products of a pharmaceutical company, but the whole idea of getting well. Medicine says 'you're sick' and 'it is bad to be sick', the particular and the general. This isn't to say the practice of medicine isn't born of genuine knowledge, or that it is only so much sales talk, but to recognise that our very interest in being well needs to be explained and isn't explained by an individual's indisposition. Deleuze's own exceedingly Foucauldian conclusion is this: 'the statement is individuated, and the enunciation subjectified, only to the extent that an impersonal collective assemblage requires it and determines it to be so'.[62]

Pasolini says, if one listens carefully to it, one can hear that indirect discourse 'doesn't presuppose an addressee but a chorus of addressees – in short, a chorus listening to and recognising the experiences from which the deduction of the norm is born'.[63] Its epic quality owes to the fact that it is impersonal, it speaks to a people, not a specific person. But this must be seen as the radical potential of language. For in the first instance, indirect discourse – insofar as it amounts to the controlled distribution of order-words – is the saturation of language by power in the form of a will to dominance. We get to that other, radical form of indirect discourse by becoming-woman. The second order of becoming-woman, as may now be seen, consists in subjecting language itself to 'procedures', that is, by transforming the merely pathological into literary devices it elevates personal statements into choral ones. Now, order-words are not an explicit category of statement, like commands for example, but rather the internal and perhaps never enunciated relation between a statement and its implicit presuppositions. Consequently, order-words are not found in the realm of commands only, as we might suppose or even wish, but in every aspect of everyday life bound by a 'social obligation', which of course excludes very little. 'Every statement displays this link, directly or indirectly.'[64] So one should expect becoming-woman to be an immense, but also ambiguous and pernickety task.

The fact that enunciation is necessarily collective means, and this is my

second point, any isolation of symptoms we make is always going to be a diagnosis of a disorder affecting the collective as a whole. This is why Deleuze says great writers are physicians, not patients. Even those writers, like Masoch, who seem ill, and appear only to be concerned with themselves, have this power Deleuze insists because through the agency of their various 'procedures' they are able to take language to its limit and make it pass into silence, or music. By so doing, by making language falter and seem fallible, they place before us our addiction to a certain logic – 'good sense' – and make it seem strangely illogical to continue to cling to it. Yet they do not achieve this by proposing an alternative logic, one that would simply supplant the logic it evidently subverts. Instead, great writing 'cracks open' our logic (for Deleuze this means Platonism in any of its forms) to expose not a hidden depth, but a broader expanse than was first let on. The first to do so were the Stoics; their 'procedure' was paradox, a weapon of great power. 'Paradox is initially that which destroys good sense as the only direction, but it is also that which destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed identities.'[65] In effect, what paradox reveals is the inadequacy of both good sense and common sense as benchmarks by which to apprehend language as a whole; it shows something still larger, still more encompassing must be supposed if language is not to be reduced to a caricature. Deleuze's most stinging condemnation of Kant, then, is his claim that Kant, and by extension, Husserl, never managed to break free of their attachment to common sense.[66]

The extent to which we find a paradox difficult to comprehend is the extent to which our thinking is limited by some form of orthodoxy. The same is true of behaviour. If Masoch's designs elude us it is because we keep trying to measure them against a preconceived table we have of what counts as normal. Here normal is not so much a moral judgement, though it never stops being that, as a fixed limit to thought, that which we console ourselves is our sheet anchor. It is normal, we assume, to seek pleasure, so that is what Masoch must be doing albeit by abnormal means. It is not normal to seek pain, so Masoch cannot really be doing that, even if that is how it appears. So we arrive at the paradox of pleasure in pain. And here our thinking grinds to a halt, satisfied it has done its job. In reality, though, all it has done is pushed the problem deeper underground: the paradox of pleasure in pain is not an explanation of anything, it is rather a further call for one. At which point, there are two paths open: the first, which psychoanalysis takes, is to treat the paradox as the symptom of a deeper problem, namely a host of unresolved oedipal issues; the second, which Deleuze takes, is to treat the paradox as the solution to a problem.

And as radical as this first appears, it is still quite a superficial manoeuvre because it does not break free of interiority (the problem is still with Masoch). So it is without much surprise that we find Deleuze enacting a far more radical move.

The far more radical move, and the one which owes precisely to a recognition of the necessarily collective nature of enunciation, is his stunning insight that the principle obstacle to our understanding of masochism is our utterly unwarranted assumption that Masoch's malady is purely a personal thing, his problem not ours. Deleuze's counter-claim, in effect, is that Masoch's behaviour only appears paradoxical because it is deprived of its world-historical dimension, namely 'the agricultural communes of the steppe, religious sects, the minorities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the role of women in these communes and minorities, and in panslavism'.[67] When just this much of its world-historical context is restored it becomes obvious, Deleuze says, that it is not masochism as an individual mania or sexual malady, much less a perversion or peculiar taste, that we find in Masoch's texts, but a highly evolved response to certain very specific conditions of the world-historical. As such, Masoch's 'procedures' are to be read as steps for altering the world so that the cause of his intolerable suffering is eradicated, not as so many bizarre ways of getting off. We get to this reading by treating Masoch's 'procedures' as devices, as a way of making language stutter; or, to put it conversely, by treating Masoch's work as symptomatic of a purely personal illness, we forget it was novels Masoch wrote and allow ourselves to slip into thinking his books were manifestos, or some other allegedly unmediated form.

By insisting Masoch be read for his contributions to the art of the novel and his novels be read in light of their world-historical dimension, Deleuze restores what in a different light appear as symptoms their properly figural function. This, in turn, demands we delineate the figurative dimension Deleuze attributes to stuttering. Stuttering breaks the natural seeming connection between words or images in a sequence with the effect of rendering both the relation between the terms and the terms themselves problematic. In this respect, stuttering is clearly analogous to both Brecht's *Verfremdung* and Russian formalism's *ostranenie*. But not only in practice. The very term 'stuttering', which, thanks to its estrangement and defamiliarisation, we now perceive to be a concept, is itself an estrangement and defamiliarisation of a milieu. It estranges the relation between the merely clinical and the potentially critical, showing the habitual ignorance each shows for the other to be purely arbitrary, thereby giving stuttering an entirely new, and completely political,

dimension not suspected at all in its first formulation. It defamiliarises the exclusively personal province of stuttering and lends it a global scope, making it something that can effect language as a whole, not just one rather hapless individual.

Now we can make the final leap and see just how becoming-woman is able to rise above its clinical origin and become a critical term of considerable force: it juxtaposes a pathological form of expression with an artistic form of content. It is this combination which transforms the diagnosis into an indictment. This it seems to me is the whole point behind Deleuze's immoderately controversial use of 'schizophrenia'; it is an estrangement not only of the term itself, but of a social situation that would deny its pervasiveness. As I said at the outset, the most deeply utopian texts are not those that propose or depict a better society, but those that carry out the most thoroughgoing destruction of the present society. This is why monsters like Ahab, but also Heathcliff and Cathe-rine, can be read as utopian. It is also the reason why they should not be read mythopoeically, at least not insofar as Deleuze is concerned. The fraternal society they prophesy via their inveterate becoming-woman is a utopian response to the world-historical, an inspired called for change. This is what I was referring to when I said that for Deleuze a genuine cultural revolution does not begin until we move beyond mere transgres-sion. I would suggest, then, following Jameson's account of utopian texts, that the fraternal society needs to be read as a machine for releasing utopia, not a representation of it.[68] Becoming-woman is just such a machine.

Why becoming-woman? Why not simply becoming-other? I think the enigma is the answer. It works because it provokes; it matters because it works. Undoubtedly it is scandalous because it would see the end of both the categories Woman and woman, but it would do so in the interest of a new society that no longer used or needed such divisions. It is in view of this that Deleuze says a book of philosophy should be part detective novel and part science fiction. 'By detective novel we mean that concepts, with their zones of presence should intervene to resolve local situations.'[69] To be sure, this isn't a politics in the micropolitical sense, but it might just be what inspires such a politics. Suspicious, in any case, of all micropolitical projects, for the fact that they can always turn fascist at any time, Deleuze makes it his priority to clarify philosophically what it is a politics is actually striving for, knowingly or not, and why. In that sense his project is perfectly and usefully described as utopian. And this is the science-fiction part. 'We believe in a world in which individuations are impersonal, and singularities are pre-individual: the splendour of the pronoun

"one" . . .'[70] The very term, becoming-woman, confronts us, then, with our addiction to and trenchant desire for duality, for the kind of difference that prevents access to the One-multiple.

Notes

1. Deleuze 1997: 25.
2. 'If becoming-woman is the first quantum, or molecular segment, with the becomings-animal that link up with it coming next, what are they all rushing toward? Without a doubt, toward becoming-imperceptible. The imperceptible is the immanent end of becoming, its cosmic formula' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 279).
3. 'Although all becomings are already molecular, including becoming-woman, it must be said that all becomings begin with and pass through becoming-woman. It is the key to all the other becomings' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 277).
4. Elizabeth Grosz, for instance, lists seven strong objections to Deleuze and Guattari's deployment of this concept. Cf. Grosz 1994b: 189–90; cf. 1994a: 161–5.
5. One of the most potent anti-utopian tropes, according to Jameson, is the fear that Utopia will be unexciting, amounting to dull existence cleansed of danger and other life-threatening excitements. Jameson 1991: 335.
6. Rosi Braidotti's (1994: 169) complaint that Deleuze and Guattari do not take 'sexual difference' into account in their elaboration of a new philosophy of difference is an example of precisely the kind of addiction to an established convention that I am speaking of here because surely Deleuze and Guattari's point in not speaking of sexual difference is that the concept of becoming-woman is meant to eliminate precisely that, our clinging to old modes of differentiation.
7. Jameson 1991: 208–9.
8. Cf. Jameson 1982: 153; 1975: 239; 1973: 59.
9. Deleuze calls this interest in limits 'an economics of everyday life'. The limit indicates the point beyond which any further action will irremediably alter the structure and form of the presently organising assemblage. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 438.
10. Cf. Jameson 1994: xvi.
11. For a lucid explanation of Deleuze's vision of 'total critique', see Hardt 1993: 28–30.
12. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 19. On this point, it is worth observing that the notion of the body without organs is taken from Schreber too, with Artaud supplying the actual term and example of an attempt to construct a BwO that went horribly wrong.
13. On this point, the example of Little Hans is still pertinent. 'Is there an as yet unknown assemblage that would be neither Han's nor the horse's, but that of the becoming-horse of Hans? An assemblage, for example, in which the horse would bare its teeth and Hans might show something else, his feet, his legs, his peepee-maker, whatever? And in what way would that ameliorate Hans's problem, to what extent would it open a way out that had been previously blocked?' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 258).
14. Deleuze 1997: 73.
15. Deleuze 1997: 77.
16. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari's comments on Kafka's drawings 1986: 6–7.
17. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 173.

18. Deleuze 1997: 78.
19. 'Becoming is always double, that which one becomes becomes no less than the one that becomes – block is formed, essentially mobile, never in equilibrium' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 305).
20. 'Suppose a painter "represents" a bird; this is in fact a becoming-bird that can occur only to the extent that the bird itself is in the process of becoming something else, a pure line and pure colour' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 304).
21. 'Therefore, forever unsistered for him by the stroke of Fate, and apparently forever, and twice removed from the remotest possibility of that love which had drawn him to his Lucy; yet still the object of the ardentest and deepest emotions of his soul; therefore, to him, Isabel wholly soared out of the realms of mortalness, and for him became transfigured in the highest heaven of uncorrupted Love' (Melville 1971: 142).
22. 'I am called woman, and thou, man, Pierre; but there is neither man nor woman about it. Why should I not speak out to thee? There is no sex in our immaculateness. Pierre, the secret name in the guitar even now thrills me through and through. Pierre, think! think! Oh, canst thou not comprehend? see it? – what I mean, Pierre? The secret name in the guitar thrills me, whirls me, whirls me; so secret, wholly hidden, yet constantly carried about in it; unseen, unsuspected, always vibrating to the hidden heart-strings – broken heart-strings; oh, my mother, my mother, my mother!' (Melville 1971: 149).
23. Deleuze 1997: 78.
24. Letter to H. J. von Collin, 8 December 1808 (Kleist 1982: 181).
25. Deleuze 1997: 80.
26. Deleuze 1997: 85.
27. Deleuze 1997: 103.
28. Demonstrations, 'says Spinoza, are the eyes through which the mind sees' (Deleuze 1990a: 22).
29. Deleuze 1997: 79.
30. Deleuze 1997: 80.
31. Deleuze 1997: 83.
32. Deleuze 1997: 83.
33. Deleuze 1997: 83.
34. Deleuze 1997: 84.
35. Deleuze 1997: 85.
36. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 203.
37. 'If the characters, situations, and objects of masochism receive his name, it is because they assume, in Masoch's novels, an unknown, immeasurable dimension that surpasses the unconscious no less than individual consciousness' (Deleuze 1997: 53).
38. Deleuze 1997: 10.
39. Deleuze 1997: 20.
40. Deleuze 1997: 107.
41. Deleuze 1997: 108.
42. Deleuze 1997: 108.
43. Messiaen 1994: 94–5.
44. Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45.
45. For an important caution concerning the relation between Deleuze's work and Russian formalism, see Polan 1994: 253.
46. Deleuze 1995: 100.
47. Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 84.
48. The two strongest readings of *Wuthering Heights* from the perspective of narrative are Gilbert and Gubar 1979: 248–308; Jameson 1981: 126–9.

49. Brontë 1965 [1847]: 61.
50. Brontë 1965 [1847]: 196.
51. Brontë 1965 [1847]: 122.
52. Brontë 1965 [1847]: 204.
53. Brontë 1965 [1847]: 163.
54. This, it seems to me, is what is missing from Ansell Pearson's otherwise extremely interesting discussion of the utopian function of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of a people still to come. Cf. Ansell Pearson 1999: 198.
55. Deleuze 1997: 89–90.
56. 'Language is not content to go from a first party to a second party, from one who has seen to one who has not, but necessarily goes from a second party to a third party, neither of whom has seen. It is in this sense that language is the transmission of the word as order-word, not the communication of signs as information' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 77).
57. Vološinov 1973: 129.
58. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 77.
59. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 80.
60. Foucault 1972: 50–5.
61. Jameson's extremely interesting claim, that America's most potent export is consumerism itself, could be interpreted precisely as the extension of a peculiarly American order-word into the world-historical. Jameson 1998b: 64.
62. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 80.
63. Pasolini 1988: 79.
64. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 79.
65. Deleuze 1990b: 3.
66. Deleuze 1990b: 98.
67. Deleuze 1997: 54.
68. Jameson 1994: 56.
69. Deleuze 1994: xx.
70. Deleuze 1994: xxi.

Assemblages and Utopia, or Things don't have to be this Way

> I do not know for sure, but it may be that our epoch has brought with it an 'upgrading' of the utopian – only it is not called this anymore. It is called 'science fiction' . . .
>
> (Ernst Bloch, *The Utopian Function of Art and Literature*)

Deleuze's most utopian idea, but not his only one, is that one can think differently – not merely new thoughts, but an entirely fresh way of thinking. It is neither the point of origin of thought (whether from the outside or not) nor the content of thought (thoughts of war and the steppes or the city and the streets) that is decisive, rather it is the manner or mode that can be new and distinct, though it may have been around for quite a while. Nomadism, for instance, has been with us for many centuries, but its mode of thinking is yet to be tamed by its sedentary counterparts. This may only mean, however, that it remains to be thought through, that, in other words, it is fresh still only because no-one has unsealed its jar and sampled its contents. One imagines, then, that nomadism is caught in a kind of intellectual aspic, which is another way of saying that what is important about nomadism is its ability to stand as a figuration of an *other* mode of thought, not its content as such, which may turn out to be so much briny jelly. Nomadism is, therefore, better apprehended as a form, with its content being retained as only the necessary conditions for its presentation, not the strange endorsement of some eccentric kind of neo-cosmopolitan, bedouinism.[1]

This is, I believe, the major reason why Deleuze says a book of philosophy should be at once a species of detective novel and a work of science fiction: it needs both a narrative of problems and solutions and a speculative form with which to estrange it, to prevent it from being subsumed by causality, and becoming just another history of the repression of ideas.[2] In this way, the repression of nomadism can stand as a

figuration for the dogmatism of thought today without having to pose as its cause; in its very difference it says, with respect to our situation, things do not have to be the way they are, but for a series of tiny slips (which have the habit of ramifying) they might have been otherwise. But this is only possible because in the literally novelistic form of the 'assemblage' Deleuze has fashioned a structure capable of registering, at once (and without antinomy), contingency and necessity; that is to say, the 'assemblage' is a structure which, like the novel, is able to articulate the slide into oblivion of one mode of thought together with the rise to dominance of another without having to explain it in terms of either succession or negation, but can instead stage it as a coadaptation. Its inspiration, if not its actual model, is, I want to suggest, Bakhtin's notion of the polyphonic novel (which in Bakhtin's view Dostoevsky invented).[3]

> What unfolds in his works is not a multitude of characters and fates in a single objective world, illuminated by a single authorial consciousness; rather, a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world, combine but are not merged in the unity of the event. Dostoevsky's major heroes are, by the very nature of his creative design, not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own directly signifying discourse.[4]

Perhaps the most refined articulation of this 'polyphonic' form of philosophy-cum-historiography is to be found in Deleuze and Guattari's purposefully schematic history of the divergence of royal science and nomad science: 'one consists in "reproducing", the other "following". The first involves reproduction, iteration and reiteration; the other, involving itineration, is the sum of the itinerant, ambulant sciences'.[5] The difference between following and reproducing can be understood as the difference between a fixed viewing platform external to the thing being observed (reproduction) and being carried away by the flow itself (following). Deleuze isn't joking, then, when he attributes the power of the new to surfing.[6] However, it isn't their respective creativity that is of primary concern; rather, for Deleuze, what is crucial is that royal sciences give rise (through formalisation) to a power of autonomous development, while nomad sciences do not.[7] It is for the lack of this power, which in an emergent capitalist economy is all important, that nomadic sciences fail to thrive, and ultimately wither and die (hence the importance of Deleuze's several attempts to formalise nomadism). Because it cannot be integrated with other social and philosophical imperatives, changes in the condition and understanding of labour, to name but one, nomadism finds itself without the means of prolonging itself, of extending itself into new

domains, and falls into a stubborn inertness.[8] It doesn't die or vanish altogether, though, but it only survives in the form of a diagram, and it is this that Deleuze and Guattari revive, or at any rate dangle before us.

The conclusion to be drawn from this comparative history (and from Deleuze's comparative approach in general) is, I think, a deeply utopian one. And not as might perhaps have been expected either a spiritualist or metaphysical one. It bespeaks a fantasy that no society has to be organised in the way it is, that there is always another way, and that the choice is not purely one of fate or historical circumstance, but can always be activated by thinking differently. Deleuze's many histories of lost forms of thought are to be read, I believe, as demonstrations of this fact; to be sure, all these histories seem to be accompanied by an exhortation to revive the deceased, repressed, lost or forgotten forms, but it is not their primary function. Deleuze is no maharishi, however much we might want him to be. His little noticed but crucial ambivalence towards even his favourite 'other' way of thinking, nomadism, is evidence enough, I feel, that he is not touting any of them in the manner of a guru, but rather, in the manner of a teacher, using their existence to build confidence in the possibility of creating a fresh new way of thinking. By saying nomadism is not a better way, but just another way, he denies us an easy solution to present problems – swapping nomadism for sedentary ways will not suffice to save us, he seems to be saying, we have to go much further than that.[9]

Deleuze's notion of the assemblage gives us a properly utopian confidence that things can change because it is defined as being in continuous variation – which is not to say flux – a notion which, like polyphony itself, finds its strongest definition and exemplification in music. The assemblage presupposes both the nomadic and the royal forms described above and only escapes the charge of dualism by power of being a dialogue between these two poles; or to put it another way, through the sheer fact of its own structural monism – as Deleuze might have put it. There are no rhizomic assemblages or arborescent assemblages, only assemblages that are more or less rhizomic and more or less arborescent. To be sure, a stronger tendency towards one or other of these two poles can always be detected and named – this one fascism, the other nomadism – but the truth is the further one pushes in any direction the harder one is pulled the opposite way: it is the sad fate of successful anarchists to impose anarchy as a form of government and so undo everything they'd worked for at the moment of its achievement. The distinction Deleuze and Guattari seek, then, is never between the assemblage and something else, but the internal limits of a possible assemblage.[10] What we see here, which is central to all

of Deleuze and Guattari's thinking, is a double articulation, which, as I will explain below, in fact means tetravalency. At the heart of their analyses then, that which can be either rhizomic or arboreal is the assemblage. It is the specific or concrete nature of the organising principle that 'rhizome' or 'tree' names, not the selection of content.

So, an actual tree can be rhizomic just as a tuber can be treelike depending on circumstances, which means we need a mechanism capable of thinking the tree and rhizome together. And, I might add, far from being the delirious, well-nigh hallucinogenic notion it is often taken to be, the rhizome is actually a very controlled form. When grass grows it does so according to a predetermined set of possibilities, its freedom is that of poiesis not absolute anarchy.[11] This larger mechanism is of course the assemblage. The assemblage replaces and reconfigures that staple sociological and philosophical concern, the relationship between man and his world. It does so by, first of all, suspending the *a priori* unity of its defining terms – man (including the body) and world (including the mode of production) – and, second, imbuing relations themselves (not merely economic and social relations, but physical, chemical and territorial relations as well) with a primacy born of a reversal of the usual hierarchy subordinating relations to terms. It is, in short, an organisation of relations that is external to its terms, which is not to say independent of them. It is anchoring without being grounding. Initially Deleuze took this idea from Hume, as we've already seen, but went on to find it under many different guises in a host of other authors. Composed of relations, the assemblage is not, however, reducible to them, it has its own vitality. It also has its illnesses.

Stratification is the assemblage's greatest malady, according to Deleuze and Guattari, and ultimately comes in three forms which I will discuss in a moment. For now, though, I want to concentrate on the relation between strata and the assemblage. At the outset, it needs to be noted that it is its doubly articulated structure which enables an assemblage to be both rhizomic and arborescent, which is to say stratified. Their debt to Hjelmslev ('that dark prince descended from Hamlet') is deep.[12] So variable is stratification (double articulation), a general model for it cannot be given, Deleuze and Guattari insist, only a relatively simple case. It may be described as two operations that logically succeed one another but in actual fact take place simultaneously. The first articulation is an autonomous process of selection (*substances*), and, subsequently but still autonomously, of grouping together (*forms*), like particles attracting like in other words, while the second is a process of consolidation (*forms*) and putting into effect, the actualisation of the potential created by the

grouping (*substances*). 'In a geological stratum, for example, the first articulation is the process of "sedimentation", which deposits units of cyclic sediment according to a statistical order: flysch, with its succession of sandstone and schist. The second articulation is the "folding" that sets up a stable functional structure and effects the passage from sediment to sedimentary rock.'[13] Each articulation, moreover, has its own code and its own territory, meaning they both possess form and substance and the division between the two is not of that order. And, as if that were not complicated enough, one also has to reckon with the fact that not only does each articulation form binaries within itself between each of its segments, but between each articulation there are 'biunivocal relationships obeying far more complex laws'.[14] The clarification of this mess of interlacing and transmuting relations is attributed to Hjelmslev.

Hjelmslev might have seen himself as a linguist, but to Deleuze and Guattari he is a Spinozist geologist, theorist of 'stratification' *par excellence*. 'Hjelmslev was able to weave a net out of the notions of *matter*, *content* and *expression*, *form* and *substance*. These were the strata, said Hjelmslev.'[15] *Matter* is the baseline for all thought, all activity. It is a thin membrane separating chaos and its opposite, resembling both without being either. It may be recognised by its character: it is 'the unformed, unorganised, nonstratified, or destratified body and all its flows'. We know it by many other names: the body without organs, the plane of consistency, the plane of immanence, to give just the three most common. *Content* refers to formed matters considered from two points of view. Insofar as it refers to matter that has been 'chosen' it indicates *substance*; but if that matter is chosen in a certain order it indicates *form*. And since one cannot fail to make a selection in an ordered manner, the completely aleatory being as much a form of order as the consciously arithmetic, form and substance cannot be separated except as an exercise of thought (a purely modal distinction).[16] *Expression* refers to functional structures, which must also be considered from a dual point of view: the form of their organisation, and the substance of the compounds they form.[17] The distinction between expression and content is real, however; it is the reason 'double articulation' can be transformed into such a flexible mechanism.

> Since every articulation is double, there is not an articulation of content *and* an articulation of expression – the articulation of content is double in its own right and constitutes a relative expression within content; the articulation of expression is also double and constitutes a relative content within expression. For this reason, there exist *intermediate states* between content and expression, expression and content: the levels, equilibriums,

and exchanges through which a stratified system passes. In short, we find forms and substances of content that play the role of expression in relation to other forms and substances, and conversely for expression.[18]

The key implication of this, as they go on to warn, is that expression and content are purely arbitrary designations, there are no essential forms of content, nor any essential forms of expression. Both are the product of a reciprocal presupposition and a general relativism.[19] In other words, what is crucial to their thinking is the elucidation of a certain type of relationship capable of producing contents as forms by expressing them, not the delineation of specific data, which is why an assemblage may be called machinic. It has no intrinsic affect. The point is not to be able to say fascism is molar, or the situationists were molecular, although both such claims are made, but rather to show that one is never far from being the other, and may always become the other because each is a subspecies of the same process, the same assemblage. Guattari, particularly, was suspicious of all revolutionary movements (leftist as well as rightist) for just this reason.[20] As we have already seen, trying to explain the fact that fascists turn revolutionary and revolutionaries turn fascist is the central task of *Anti-Oedipus*. Rather than say strata may be either molar (arboreal) or molecular (rhizomic), as though it were a phylogenic distinction they were making, Deleuze and Guattari hold that the process of stratification produces both molar and molecular forms which are indivisible from one another.

As I noted above, there are three main sources of stratification according to Deleuze and Guattari: the organism, signifiance and sub-jectification.[21] Each of these terms refers to a specific hermeneutic imperative, which, insofar as our authors are concerned, destine us to botch the assemblage altogether, and wind up drawing our own eye (as Jameson so aptly puts it); as such, it seems useful, albeit a little blunt, to reclassify these imperatives as interpretative errors, for that in the end is what they amount to. What we have here in effect is a set of paradigmatic errors, all of which can be further broken down and rewritten as misuses of the three syntheses of desire. Clearly enough, what Deleuze and Guattari object to most strongly is the sheer fact of being told what and how to think; as is the case with most revolutionaries, their objections to these strata take the form of trenchant refusals of what they take to be orders. 'You will be organised, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body – otherwise you're just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted – otherwise, you're just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement – otherwise you're just

a tramp.'[22] Ultimately, what stratification refers to is any type of obstruction to a clear view of the assemblage, which in reality means, any type of conceptualisation that does not *produce the assemblage*. This objection extends to all forms of interpretation because on Deleuze's view interpretation is not a productive process, but a parasitical one.

While their specification of three forms of stratification does not pretend to be an exhaustive list – it is implied, for instance, that new forms could always emerge – it is nonetheless an instructive selection. For what it does is point to the three dominant hermeneutic models of Deleuze and Guattari's era, namely psychoanalysis, structuralist semiotics and Marxism. Each of these discourses are presented as contaminants of an essential purity, the assemblage, which it took the investigations of Deleuze and Guattari to discover. Psychoanalysis, they say, gets distracted by its need to organise the body, to sort out the distribution of erogenous zones and divide the genital from the non-genital. It is, they think, obsessed by the body, haunted even, because the body is that uncertain variable that forever threatens to throw everything into disarray. Once we let the body guide us, all reason vanishes, or so psychoanalysis fears. But because it takes a developmental view of the body, it is condemned to misunderstand it altogether. Psychoanalysis begins with an image of a perfectly integrated subject whose body has been brought into line with its socialised mind and wonders how it could be that someone could fail to become this. As Freud's keen interest in 'slips' illustrates, psychoanalysis is a psychology of failure; both in its origins and its interests, psychoanalysis is dedicated to unmasking bad copies of a preestablished Idea.

Whatever Guattari's practical objections to psychoanalysis may have been, and however just they were, it is clear Deleuze's stemmed from his indisposition to Platonism in any of its forms.[23] Its interpretative error, it turns out, is not so much its apparently unhealthy fascination with either the organism or the organisation of the body as its insistence on a dialectic of Idea and Copy.[24] Semiotics, too, partakes of the same error. It opposes the signifier as copy to the signified as Idea and so misunderstands the fundamental nature of language, which according to Deleuze and Guattari resides in the realm of indirect discourse, or rather the copy of the copy realm of the simulacra, and consists in the production of sense not the conveyance of meaning. Signifiers alert us to truer, hidden meanings it calls signifieds, thereby teaching us to be dissatisfied with surface meanings; its primary operation is thus an imposition of a difference of levels between an absent 'other' full of meaning but without substance and an empty presence full of substance but without meaning. Its interpretative

error is precisely its insistence on this uncanny, enabling division. In contrast to Derrida, who, in his own confrontation with signifiance, sought to amplify the permeability of the membrane separating signifier and signified (illustrating that the presence of the signifier is every bit as doubtful as the absence of the signified), Deleuze relocates it. He turns the membrane into a desert by rotating it such that it becomes the surface and both the signifier and the signified became its occupants. In other words, what he does is remove the difference of levels, which again is a matter of anti-Platonism because it substitutes a humorous mode of selection (an art of the surfaces) for an ironic one (a genealogy based on eminence, equivocity and analogy).[25] In the process he turns signifiance into a mad pursuit instead of a detective story, Melville not Poe.

Subjectification is a very different kind of an interpretative error to the two already mentioned. Its delineation is very different too: for a start, it is not born of anti-Platonism; rather, its dispute is with a patent confusion of method and object found in a wide range of social science discourses. Subjectification, in its most mechanical sense, refers to the dual process in which, first of all, unformed subject matter is fixated by an external force, that is, given a precise form, and then, second of all, held accountable to that form by that same external force. For example, the unfederated but nonetheless plainly operable coalition of contracted contemplations medical science and philosophy alike call the body is fixated by them through that very appellation ('body'); in turn, this category is their frame of reference, it expediently renders 'bodily' all that can be shown to be either an appurtenance or a component of that hitherto unnamed set of relations. If they then actively forget this process they are guilty of subjectifying.[26] At this point, the body ceases to be a convenient totalisation by which to gain an understanding of apparently related phenomena (part and parcel of the speculative methodology Deleuze applies under the aegis of becoming-concrete), and instead becomes a thing claiming to possess its own unique ontology (object); or, to use an older terminology, it is reified. In this form, a hermeneutic procedure which unthinkingly duplicates the subjectifying procedures of agencies of power (the State, the Church, and the Market, to name the three most potent), subjectification is an error.

It is not an error, however, to discern such subjectifying procedures – which Deleuze says Foucault does better than anyone because he invented the concept – or to expose their minutely executed machinations and make manifest our often uncritical interdependence on them (for instance, the way pedagogy depends on discipline and practises normalisation even as it preaches individuality).

> Foucault designates the Athenian city as the first place in which sub-
> jectification was invented: this is because it is, according to the original
> definition which he gives to it, the city which invented the line of forces
> which runs through the *rivalry of free men*. Now, from this line which
> makes it possible for one free man to command others, a very different one
> branches off which has it that a man who commands free men has to be
> seen as a master himself. It is these optional rules of self-mastery which
> constitute subjectification, and this is autonomous, even if it is subse-
> quently called upon to inspire new powers.'[27]

In other words, as Deleuze frequently stresses, Foucault did not restore or
resurrect the subject – as he is often mistakenly acclaimed for doing,
particularly by sociology – for that would in effect renew its power to
reify and thereby reproduce the very effect he was trying to specify. On
the contrary, he reconfigured it as a process so its power of reification
could in fact be made visible.[28]

Although strata are a form of sickness unto death for the assemblage,
they are not in themselves imperishable. They are prey to a host of
corrosive practices. Destratification, as Deleuze and Guattari call this
process of freeing oneself of the sickening burden of strata, is both easy
and dangerous. What you have to do is invent techniques for a kind of
self-destruction that has nothing to do with the death drive. It is not only,
and certainly not merely, an existentialist concern; it is also a form of
critique analogous to deconstruction in its sheer power to transform
through inhabitation. 'This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a
stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advanta-
geous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialisation,
possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here
and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a
small plot of new land at all times.'[29] This is, of course, precisely what
Deleuze and Guattari routinely do to every discursive formation they
happen to encounter: for instance, they latch onto psychoanalysis like
hungry ticks, they find its weaknesses (its Platonism), they pursue its loose
threads (schizophrenia), they disentangle its knots (the death instinct),
and in the process they retool it (schizoanalysis). But this isn't the only
way one can destratify psychoanalysis's hold on the body. The trouble is,
though, many of the other procedures are a lot riskier – besides schi-
zoanalysis, one can use drugs, self-starvation, alcohol, sex, madness, and
so on, to destratify, but as can readily be imagined, it is easy to go too
far.[30]

The schizo is their ever-present example of someone who took things
too far, albeit by force of circumstance not choice.[31] Wildly destratifying

is far worse than not destratifying at all, the first will almost certainly kill you while the second will merely stultify.[32] Now, obviously enough, it is the life-affirming affects of destratifying techniques that are desired, not their deadly effects, so the great question of our age is whether one can be had without the other? Here the general premise of this chapter can be seen in its utopian light because it is an axiom of Deleuze's thought that 'any effects produced in some particular way (through homosexuality, drugs, and so on) *can always be produced by other means*'.[33] Hence Deleuze's keen interest in Henry Miller's claim to be able to get drunk on pure water.[34] In view of the banal but doubtless pertinent realist objections that might be raised at this point, it is worth noting that Miller's claim rests on a careful delineation of different types of drunkenness: alcohol, he argues, gives rise to its own form of drunkenness, which he referred to as ecstasy; while water may be made to induce an other form entirely, which he defined as exultation.[35] The distinction is crucial, and not in the least bit specious: drunkenness as exultation not ecstasy is an upward surge of the soul in the body not the soul's stricken flight, so to speak, which makes it an intensifying drunkenness not an escapist one.

Now, while it is true that for Deleuze and Guattari the assemblage replaces the old philosophical concern of man and his world, apparently rendering obsolete a phenomenology of the life world, it also serves a heuristic function, amounting – as I hope the above delineation suggests – to a veritable hermeneutic system. And in fact the first of Deleuze and Guattari's concrete rules which enjoins us to discover the territoriality of an assemblage, for there always is one, they say, reads exactly like a hermeneutic programme. Discovering the territoriality of an assemblage means finding its limits (step one) and determining its composition (step two), and in so doing finding out how it relates to other assemblages (step three), none of which, of course, can be done in isolation from and without cognisance of the plane that renders it sensible (step four).[36] Territoriality is, in this respect, as much a geopolitical fact, something Deleuze and Guattari would attribute to all thought, as an enabling presupposition. It says that all phenomena are grounded in a territory – in the same (infinitely variable) way – via an assemblage. So, however different individual relations between man and his world may be, the structure of those relations remains consistent. Accordingly, what in their hands was an inference becomes in ours a deductive system: we can apply the assemblage as a grid, whereas they had to propose it.

My implication, of course, is that Deleuze and Guattari's analyses are readily convertible into a programme. As such, their thought is amenable to that mode of inquiry Jameson called transcoding, which in an older

language is the history of models of thought. This in turn, opens the way for a dialectical, or better, a historicising, reading of their work, which, in this instance, would mean placing their thought in a discontinuous sequence and asking why this model of thought now, under these circumstances? Despite their famous distaste for dialectics, such a process of historicising thought is anything but alien to their work. They make use of, and indeed construct, many such models themselves, and, what is more, by no means exclude their own work from this procedure. For instance, in their discussion of music, they distinguish two models they define as logically prior to their own position – classicism and romanticism – and themselves identify with something they hesitate to call modernism.[37] Such models are conceived both diachronically and synchronically by Deleuze.[38] He is conscious that certain models belong to quite specific historical periods, but he also allows that models may persist beyond their time, as it were, by force of the fact that they are models, their sheer formalism enabling them to survive their proper period (the notion of the Baroque being the most fully worked-out example).[39]

To test this a little more rigorously I will take up my own example and see if this model can in fact be *applied*. I will refer to *Blade Runner* because it seems to me that the complexity of the speculative world it implies stands in need of a notion like the assemblage in order to explain it, while the narrative itself appears to be an elaboration of divergent 'ways' of thinking. This choice has the advantage of allowing me to present Deleuze's hermeneutic programme in direct contrast with one of his primary antagonists, psychoanalysis, because interpretation of this film has almost exclusively resorted to Freud and Lacan to make sense of the complicated relationships it exhibits. From a hermeneutic point of view, Deleuze and Guattari's complaint against Freud that he never listens properly to his patients because – thanks to the device of the oedipal-complex – he knows in advance what they're going to say seems applicable to critics of *Blade Runner* as well. It is not my intention here to suggest that psychoanalytic interpretations of *Blade Runner* are in any way invalid, much less wrong, but I do want to suggest they stop right at the point where things start to get really interesting. Inasmuch as it functions as blockage, we can indeed see the usefulness of Deleuze's notion of stratification; psychoanalysis coats its topic with its own layer of discourse, and in consequence it does not come into contact with the true surface of the topic at hand.

We could put this slightly differently, by saying the psychoanalytic explanation fails to satisfy because it fails to find the obvious suscept-

ibility of *Blade Runner* to psychoanalytic interpretation sufficiently suspicious. It forgets to ask how it works, so it fails to inquire into the specific nature of the speculation its deployment of psychoanalysis entails. No doubt psychoanalysis has some very pertinent things to say about *Blade Runner*.[40] Kaja Silverman, for instance, is right on the money when she says that human psyches are just as much organised by fantasmatic memories as *Blade Runner* shows its Nexus 6 replicants to be, and that, as is the case with these replicants, it does not matter whether one's memories are authentic or not because the emotions they invoke are.[41] Indeed, psychoanalysis would be nothing without a certain acceptance of the existence and power of fictive memories (desire for the mother, fear of castration, and so on), or what Silverman calls 'imaginary inscriptions of the psychic structures into which we have been culturally inserted'.[42] Although I do not concur with it fully, Silverman's overall argument that the replicants are fictional vehicles for making two important psychoanalytic points – that those memories we call our past are less personal than cultural, and, that these memories are constitutive without necessarily being controlling – is, I believe, a strong and useful one, but not, ultimately, a satisfying one.

It does not ask, for instance, why so manifestly a psychoanalytically conceived notion of subjectivity and selfhood should be foregrounded in this way? In fact, it appears to accept the presence of so many psychoanalytic clichés as something akin to verisimilitude; as though to say, it is logical and right instead of outrageously funny that the word 'mother' should precipitate an explosive outburst from Leon. As such, its inquiry ends where it might more profitably begin, with the obvious fact of oedipalisation (Deleuze and Guattari's term for the process by which the Oedipus-complex is turned into a socialising device). In other words, what it sees as an affirmation of the fundamental principles of psychoanalysis is more interestingly seen as an overdetermined, figurative device. While there is no question that the replicants' gifted memories are meant to serve an oedipalising function – Tyrell says as much – that does not mean oedipalisation is not deployed as a demonstration of something besides itself, that it has no figurative function. What seems to be suppressed by the psychoanalytic approach, and what I want to suggest needs to be given greater scope in the interpretation of *Blade Runner* than psychoanalysis seems prepared to allow, is genre. It is more interesting, I think, to inquire into the figurative use of oedipalisation, than to rediscover its principle components all over again – as though we don't already know by heart what they are – which is as much, it seems, as psychoanalysis is equipped to do with *Blade Runner*.

And this, as Jameson has shown, is best done by using genre in a dialectical way.[43]

To this end, I will suggest that assemblage may be substituted for genre, that, in fact, it is a still more complex and subtle instrument for carrying out a dialectical reading than is genre and is for this reason particularly well suited to the problem of mediating generic discontinuity. It might be best if I begin by specifying in more detail the exact composition of the assemblage in structural terms. Here I will read Deleuze in strictly formal terms, which is to say, I will suppress his bedazzled content (bedouinism) in favour of his sober form. In general, I would claim Deleuze is in most respects a formalist, and indeed it has been my strategy throughout to illustrate the susceptibility of his discourse to formalisation. My rationale, though, has always been that Deleuze himself is constantly at pains to formalise his ideas via a process I have called conceptualisation. I would extend this now, on the evidence of the cinema books especially, and suggest he uses formalist insights in his interpretations of texts, that, in fact, his formal systems have a consistent hermeneutic application. Form, I would add, is the one thing about which too little has been said in relation to *Blade Runner*, due perhaps to the omnipresence of psycho-analysis.

First off, then, the assemblage is an open totality none of whose components can be changed without changing the whole; but it is also the sum of an infinitely mutable set of relations between relations (these relations, which obviously enough can never be completely closed, are given the specific name of abstract-machines); in turn, these relations between relations, these abstract-machines, open the assemblage up, allowing it to form relations with other assemblages; finally, there is the relation between the assemblage itself and the plane against which it can be thought and in fact thinks itself. [44] As such, there are four steps to be taken, but all at the same time as it were, or, if you prefer, at infinite speed. First, we have to establish the limits of the film as an open totality, such closure may be actual or virtual because it is an ideal closure that is at issue. It is a limit (of the type developed by Greimas) determined by an inner logic, not external circumstances.[45] Accordingly, this first step corresponds to structuralism's separation of an ideal *histoire* from an actual *discours*, and similarly turns on the living tension between the two. Next, we have to determine its abstract-machines, its devices in other words. Abstract-machines always take the form of schizzes or breakflows that interrupt one flow only in order to induce another. Our analysis should thus focus on flows and their obstacles. Indeed as we have already seen in the example of *Wuthering Heights* it may be said narrative is

nothing other than an articulated ensemble of flows and their obstacles (for instance, the flow of Catherine's love for Heathcliff and the schizz of her unwillingness to marry him because it would condemn them to poverty and social ostracism; or in the case of our present example, the flow of Rachael's love for Deckard and the schizz of her fear that her love isn't genuine).

The third step is perhaps best transcoded as the taking into account of intertextuality, which, in the case of *Blade Runner* at least, means factoring in its noir and science-fiction elements, its generic discontinuities. The last step is just as much a matter of induction as the other three because what constitutes the plane of composition of a film, or any artistic text, is by definition not something to be found in object form but must be extrapolated. We have to locate that mysterious 'thing' which the film is about and from which everything else appears to stem as its miraculate. For psychoanalysis, it is the oedipalisation of the replicants that is definitive, but I want to suggest it is the speculation that this oedipalisation supports that is in fact the true body without organs of *Blade Runner*. These last two steps draw the reader or viewer into the equation because intertextuality is as much a matter of recognition as it is composition. Likewise, the text's body without organs needs to be constructed in relation to a viewer. It is, as reader response criticism would describe it, a virtual object that is a union of the imaginative power of a viewer with the suggestive possibilities of the text itself. With a little poetic licence, what are described as abstract-machines may be rewritten along these lines as noema, in which case becoming-concrete in the Marxian sense finds itself redoubled as concretisation in Iser's sense.[46] This is what Lowry means, then, when he says writing is a machine that works.

Our first task, according to this programme, is to draw the diagram of *Blade Runner*, which is to say, specify its inner logic. A recognition of Deleuze's formalist tendency enables us to utilise some fairly traditional hermeneutic questions as a starting point, it being understood that the fourfold frame of the assemblage makes any such starting point a kind of beginning in the middle. To draw the inner limits of *Blade Runner* the primary formal question we need to ask, it seems to me, is whose point of view is the story told from? This question is prompted by the two, literally enigmatic (in the Barthesian sense) shots of an eye superimposed on – or maybe reflecting? – the city, we get at the start. These have all the qualities of dark precursors, and in this vein they may be apprehended as indexical. As Silverman points out, such a shot would normally be connected to a character within the film, creating a privileged point of view within the

narrative, but this does not appear to happen.[47] Before we decide whether it does or not, we can first of all ask what the image indicates, and it may be that this will lead to a solution.[48] The eye reflecting the city is, I think, an indication of a self-reflexive fantasy turned into a fixation: here the eye cannot only see itself seeing what it sees, but also sees that image imprinted on itself instead of fleeting before it in its usual ephemeral manner. But it also beckons a more 'totalised' interpretation, in Eisenstein's sense, which we are yet to fathom.[49] This is the sense in which it is enigmatic.[50]

The city on the eye reverses the usual image of the eye in relation to the city, rather than a bird's-eye view of the city in which the eye is implied, we get a view of the city imprinted on the eye. Actually we get both. What does this suggest? It suggests that the opening shots of the city are not purely establishing shots, but point-of-view shots; that is, the city is seen from above by someone besides us, or rather, we are seeing it through their eyes. This creates a space without occupant, a space which may potentially be filled by a fugitive omniscient narrator (what initially appeared to be a synthesis of conjunction actually turns out to be a synthesis of disjunction). In this regard, the identity of the eye becomes all important. But where is the image of the eye located, given that the shot is said to be a point of view it has to be visible to the eye in the screen as well as ours? I think it is a reflection on the inside of a windscreen of a flying-car: the city is thus behind the reflection and before the eye. Thus the eye sees itself and what it is looking at *at the same time*. Our main clue to its identity is its colour, but we also have the direction in which it is apparently travelling too. It is an eye going to scrutinise Tyrell Corporation. More than that, it is an eye that overlooks the work of other investigators who are similarly there to investigate Tyrell Corporation. So who is it? Gaff is the only one who fills all these criteria, which means from the perspective of the camera work he is the true narrator, not Deckard, whose voice-over would seem to belie Gaff's primacy.

This deduction is confirmed by the fact that Deckard is introduced to us by Gaff. To begin with, our hero is just a guy at a busy fast-food joint (a vagueness the voice-over once again interposes itself to correct). And, finally breaking with the point-of-view shot, Gaff is first seen over Deckard's shoulders. Filmically, this over-the-shoulder shot is the reverse shot we were waiting for to connect the blue eye to a character (the other pole of the disjunctive synthesis). As the narrative unfolds, it becomes more and more certain that Gaff is the eye that sees all (our totalising interpretation). At the end, it is Gaff's voice, and the trace of his presence, that provides the film with closure. The enigmatic ending is a question

mark placed over the certitude of the opening; at the beginning of the film we are presented with an all-seeing eye, Gaff's, and throughout the film we are encouraged to think that Gaff is constantly watching over Deckard, even when he is not explicitly by his side (his origami rendering visible this omnipresence as trace), and of course one must suppose he has sophisticated remote surveillance at his disposal too (cameras in Deckard's flat and so on); yet at the film's end we suspect the omniscient – much more than just panoptic – or, controlling eye cannot see everything, does not know everything. The eye has vanished, only its calling card remains, and even Gaff's voice is reduced to an echo. Deckard's wry smile suggests to us that maybe Rachael *can* live.

But, of course, this may also simply be wish-fulfilment on our part. Yet I do not think it is merely a happy ending we want, at least not in the romantic ('Hollywood') sense of true love winning out, but some kind of reassurance that authentic life is possible in a police state. This, I would argue, is what the film is ultimately about: resistance to the penetration of everyday life by the State. Its central speculation is whether or not any sort of freedom would remain if the State were to have unrestricted power. If, in other words, it had the power to deem a life-form unacceptable and enact a genocide against it, could that life-form persist? Or would it vanish? Here I have leapt ahead to the fourth step, but insofar as all that follows reads as a miraculate of this body without organs, such a leap is necessary. Confirmation of my speculation is to be found, somewhat unexpectedly, in the fact that even Tyrell, as powerful as he obviously is, must still pay lip service to the State. Not only does he have to admit the State's agents, the blade-runners, into his office and manufacturing premises, he also devotes considerable energy and investment to the development of ever more sophisticated replicants such as Rachael – his latest experiment – in the hope they will prove capable of evading detection by the State's agencies. What *Blade Runner* stages, then, is a confrontation in which the ingenuity of capital (Tyrell Corporation's ability to replicate humans) is pitted against the vigilance of the State (the blade-runners' ability to spot replicants).

So while it is true Tyrell's experiments are primarily to do with mind control, making it appear (as Žižek suggests) that capital has finally succeeded in penetrating the imaginary itself, this is only the necessary condition of some other – perhaps even 'ultimate' – speculation, not the crucial linchpin.[51] Given that from Tyrell Corporation's perspective, replicants are commodities, such control is in any event more a matter of performance than policing. What Tyrell Corporation wants is little different from what any manufacturer of a complex piece of machinery

would want, and that is confidence their products will perform as advertised, at least within the parameters of their guarantee. For Tyrell Corporation, the docility of the replicants is a quality-control issue, and their ulterior motive in producing reliable replicants a simple matter of market share. If replicants are not permitted on earth, then an entire market is lost, something no enterprise as large or obviously avaricious as Tyrell Corporation could or would tolerate. Its options, though, are limited to building markets elsewhere to compensate (going off-world) or finding a way of bypassing or causing to change the laws prohibiting its product (whether by evading detection, or proving finally that they can produce a safe and reliable product). Clearly, it pursues both options at once, as one would expect any major corporation to do. The point is that however powerful Tyrell may personally be as the 'head' or 'father' of his corporation, he is still situated within a mode of production, which he clearly does not control (the fact that his products are banned on earth is ample proof of his relative impotence in the face of State power).

What is especially interesting – as well as frightening – about this post-globalisation mode of production is its blatant (by which I mean, unashamed in the sense of that term we have already developed) resurrection of two particularly inhumane pre-capitalist forms, namely slavery and colonisation. For what replicants truly stand for is the awesome possibility of labour itself being literally turned into a commodity, actually stored in kind instead of being displaced into commodities, thus turning it into something you buy in exactly the same way as you buy butter, giving it a use-value as well. Its speculation seems to be that when the earth dies and the process of forging new life on different planets gets under way, extinct modes of production will be given new life because the conditions in which they once held sway will have unexpectedly returned. Now, though, the former limits to their extension, the strictly limited number of slaves available and the strictly limited amount of space able to be colonised, have both been overcome by advances in genetic engineering and the possibility of space travel.[52] As such, it may well be that technology would provide the means for slavery and colonisation to continue unchecked forever as dominant forms within this fantasised neo-primitive mode of production because it enables them to surmount their natural limit factors. From the perspective of the present, the speculation is of course that this is where technology is taking us. But that is not the darkest aspect of this scenario, far worse is the fact that it is plainly State-sanctioned: on the off-world colonies one may own slaves.

This speculation is our body without organs, what follows, then, which will take the form of a narratological analysis, but in fact accords with

our second step, the delineation of abstract-machines, is its miraculate. From this perspective, the crucial question we need to ask is who in fact is the hero of the tale? Or, indeed, if there is a hero in *Blade Runner* at all? One of the things that the voice-over does is direct our attention towards Deckard, offering him to us as the hero and narrator of the tale. As we've seen, he is not the only narrator. What I'd like to suggest now is that he is not the only hero. A second hero is presented in Roy Batty. Now, as it has often been noted, *Blade Runner* is a reinvigoration (third step – intertextuality) of film noir, in that it uses a chiaroscuro of light and shadow to create its effects and affects, as well as replicating much of the imagery of 1940s films – the femme fatale and the architecture[53] and so on – but what has not been mentioned very much is the narrative form of noir. Yet if we don't examine the form it is impossible to determine what *Blade Runner* is about, except to say it is a pastiche of an older aesthetic and thus somehow, but I think pathetically, postmodern.[54] Film noir, Deleuze says, particularly in the work of Howard Hawks, has a Small and a Large narrative form operating side by side. The tension between the two forms, Deleuze finds, proved especially important to the development of the genre.[55] Usually, but not exclusively, the Large narrative is given over to the hero, while the Small one is devoted to the villain as anti-hero. 'The point is that Small and Large do not merely designate forms of action, but conceptions, ways of conceiving and seeing a "subject", a story or a script.'[56]

The Small and Large are complementary forms, and this undoubtedly is the key to our sustained interest in noir: the hero never seems but a short step away from becoming the very thing he is chasing, namely a villain, while the villain always seems good at heart, that is, 'bad' only because of a 'forced' wrong turning from which there was no turning back. It is as though becoming itself had somehow been dramatised at the level of form, not just content. In *Blade Runner* the replicant is cast in a bad light because he or she escapes, and ceases to play their designated role in society (that of docile machine). In pursuing freedom, their cause is good, but in killing their actions are bad. The detective is good because he stands in for society and restores order, but he must act as his quarry does in order to catch them, therefore his actions are often bad, though his cause remains good. Hence the complementarity between the two. From a moral point of view, which as we know Deleuze does not subscribe to, what it fails to say is that ends do not justify means, namely killing, hence its scandal. Instead, it seems to be saying something like all life is precious, no matter how it is lived, but living is a hard business, and not everyone is up to it. If this is so, and one cannot fail to hear just a hint of Deleuze in

this formulation anyway, then it might be concluded that the noir bad guy is guilty only of not appreciating the value of life, and not meeting its challenge. My point is that 'Life' in Deleuze is not so much an ontological category as an evaluative, or better, transvaluative one: it is his body without organs, his speculative desert upon which everything else scurries about like so many miraculated insects.[57]

The situation at the start of *Blade Runner*, and throughout as an insistent schizz, is the sad fact that Deckard can't stomach killing replicants anymore, which as Rachael so pointedly reminds him is his business. We begin, then, not with an action hero of the type Mel Gibson and Arnold Schwarzenegger would come to embody in the mid to late 1980s, but rather with an ex-blade-runner, a retired gunfighter reminiscent of *Shane*. Here one is reminded that noir wasn't ever confined to gangster flicks, but also had its place in Westerns (formally, as Deleuze points out, both genres are built around a milieu).[58] Because of the infectious flow of panic associated with the presence of replicants on earth, circumstances are such that Deckard is forced to take up his old job once more, in spite of his sickness unto death. Deckard is like Shane: an ex-gunfighter who because his skills are needed by society cannot escape his profession. Like Shane, his first task is to become equal to the action his situation demands from him. This action must do two things: it must change 'The situation', that is, the one he has been called in to rectify, and 'His situation', namely his fate. This is the Large form, which we can represent as SAS' – situation, action, changed situation. Deckard's problem is that killing the replicants as ordered cannot change his situation: the more he kills the more he is tied to the State as a killing machine and the more miserable is his life; worse, he falls in love with someone he is supposed to kill, so if he carries out his duty his situation as someone sick unto death of killing will be fixed forever. Thus it is only by ceasing to kill that he can change his situation and actually begin to live, which is his new situation at the end of the film.

Inasmuch as Rachael complements Deckard (from the point of view of narrative progression, I mean) she functions as what Propp calls a donor, which as Jameson explains is the true pivot around which the storiness of the story revolves.[59] Her gift of love enables Deckard to attain ontological completeness, which in Deleuze's terms amounts to a transmutation of an exclusive use of the disjunctive synthesis into an inclusive use.[60] It isn't that her love transcends all else, which is the Hollywood myth, that 'saves' him, as it were, but rather the fact that love dissolves schizzes. In doing so, it doesn't reduce contraries to the same, but affirms the distance between the two, between man and replicant in effect, as that which

actually relates the two. Thus we can say of Deckard, as Deleuze and Guattari say of their own hero, the schizo, he 'does not confine himself inside contradictions; on the contrary, he opens out and, like a spore case inflated with spores, releases them as so many singularities that he had improperly shut off, some of which he intended to exclude, while retaining others, but which now become point-signs [dark precursors], all affirmed by their new distance'.[61] Our first glimpse of this is that tantalising dream sequence dropped from the first release, but restored in the second release, namely the director's cut. What is the white unicorn in soft focus a precursor of? Does the fact Deckard dreams it to the sound of Rachael's piano playing tell us anything? My speculation is that both the unicorn and the music ('I heard music' Deckard says, 'I heard music') herald from the same place, that always already collective plane, the prepersonal swarm that is *a* childhood.[62]

> We are often content to distinguish between daydreams or waking dreams and the dreams of sleep. But these are questions of tiredness and repose. We thereby miss the third state, which is perhaps the most important one: insomnia, which alone is appropriate to night, and the dream of insomnia, which is a matter of exhaustion. The exhausted person is the wide-eyed person. We dreamed *in* sleep, but we dream *alongside* insomnia. The two exhaustions, the logical and the psychological, 'the head and the lungs', as Kafka said, meet up behind our backs.[63]

So the narrative diagram of the Large form in *Blade Runner* can be drawn like this: in Deleuzian terms, Deckard is a swollen Oedipus at the outset of the film, he is trapped by the double-binds of his job (humans mustn't kill; you must kill replicants if you're human) with nowhere to go but into himself – he is oedipalised, in other words. In narratological terms, Deckard is ontologically incomplete because he is sick unto death. This is his situation as arrested flow. Then, he falls in love, his love is tested (can I love a replicant he is compelled to ask?), and it passes the test, he turns his back on society and escapes with the girl (action) and lives happily ever after, or finds the means of causing to flow and at least attains an understanding of the conditions necessary to his lasting happiness (changed situation). This brings about his ontological completion, which as we've seen in fact means the destruction of his globalised persona.[64] The extra footage added to the end of the film at the studio's insistence is thus redundant, though its dreamy blue quality is suggestive of the oceanic sensibility Deckard attains.[65] As such it can perhaps be treated as figural, if not figurative. At any rate, we already know what is going to happen: the only question is whether they get away with it or not.

And Gaff's 'trace', the mysterious origami unicorn, suggests they probably will not get away with it, or else, only to the extent that it suits the State's purpose.

Complementing this narrative is the Small form focused on Roy. The Small form is the inverse of the Large: action, situation, changed action (ASA'). Like Deckard, Roy too is ontologically incomplete: to speak like Heidegger, we could say his being-toward-death (which is what enables us to enjoy life) is not yet formed; or, to speak like Freud, we might say he has not yet made friends with the necessity of dying; but to speak like Deleuze we would have to say, Roy has not yet realised that there are two deaths and that one has to get past the first (the image of death, its simulacra, as described by Heidegger and Freud) to really live. 'Blanchot rightly suggests that death has two aspects. One is personal, concerning the I or the ego, something which the I can confront in a struggle or meet at a limit, or in any case encounter in a present which causes everything to pass. The other is strangely impersonal, with no relation to "me", neither present nor past but always coming, the source of an incessant multiple adventure in a persistent question.'[66] The I exists only to die, according to Deleuze's reading of Blanchot, so we experience this death repeatedly; the other aspect of death, its impersonal face, which only the unconscious knows, refers to a state of flux that precludes the coherence necessary to identity of any sort – I, you, me – making it impossible for 'us' to experience it. We are ignorant of this 'other' death, this true death which would release us from the burden of personalisation, 'because every representation of death concerns its inadequate aspect'. We have to discover the means of attaining an adequate idea of death before we can be free.[67]

Here then we can see the deep complementarity of the two forms. Both concern the necessity of depersonalisation if one is to attain Life: in the first case it occurs through a disavowal of an individual past (one's memories) in favour of a common future, while in the second, as we shall see, it means coming to terms with a common past so as to have an individual (but not personal) future, one's own death. As with all the replicants, Roy's initial action is to try to extend his life. So the first time he says 'time enough' we understand him to mean 'there's still time to save my life'. However, his meeting with Tyrell forces him to change his mind. There is no saving his life at all. Consequently, what he must do is accept that his time has been enough; he must, as Tyrell says he should, revel in his time. His life's spark may have burned faster than humans' do, but it has burned brighter too. When he dies, he says it is 'time to die', meaning, it is the right time to die, his time has come, there has been enough time.

The second, Small form, can be diagrammed as follows: first Roy tries to save his life (action), but he is made to realise it is impossible (situation), and he is therefore impelled to make friends with death (changed action). He is ontologically complete at the end because he has developed a mature being-toward-death. He has seen its other face.

This raises a really interesting formal question: who is Roy's donor? If we remember that the donor's role is to bring about the ontological completion of the hero, this being the narrative function of their magical assistance, then Roy's donor has to be whoever it is that shows him this other face of death in such a way that he sees in it an oceanic sensibility, not something to fear. That he does in fact come to view it this way is proven by his final confrontation with Deckard and subsequent death scene, which I will discuss in a moment. Our search for a donor does not take very long to complete. Only Tyrell fits this bill. He is the one who brings about the change in Roy's action by supplying him with sufficiently compelling information to bring about a change in his attitude to his own mortality. What Tyrell gives Roy which, in its own way, is perfectly magical, or at least metaphysical, is a gift of the certainty he is going to die (the reality of which he had hitherto failed to acknowledge). The primacy of this information is implied by its foreshadowing in Sebastian's apartment. The image of the boiling eggs says rather crudely that Roy's egg is cooked, his dream a futile one. By the same token, his quest throughout is precisely for this information: first from Chew, then Sebastian, and finally Tyrell ('facts' Roy says).

The two forms, the Small and the Large, converge in the final confrontation between Deckard and Roy, making it, I believe, the key scene in the whole film. Unexpectedly, but crucially, Roy is not killed by Deckard, but by time. His clock simply winds down and stops. Now, what is interesting about this is the fact that Roy's death reviles Deckard so much he is unable to work as a blade-runner again. This sickness unto death also confirms his view that replicant life is precious enough for him to (1) save one, and (2) make a life with one. That Roy saved his life gives him the strength to save Rachael's; that Roy avenges Pris and Zhora, and displays obvious sorrow for their loss, tells him that replicants too can love. This latter point becomes especially crucial when we take into consideration Deckard's own meditations on the possibility that he is in fact a replicant himself. In other words, his need to reassure himself that he can love a replicant is a variant form of Rachael's fear that replicants are constitutionally incapable of love. The primary fear of the replicant, once they have been made aware of their gifted memories, is that their emotions and their experiences too might turn out to be so much

programming, just another algorithm without authenticity. As we witness with Rachael, once she has accepted she is a replicant she immediately begins to doubt whether her emotions are her own (yet in a Cartesian sense, her doubt is her proof of the authenticity of her emotions): is it 'her' that is responding positively to Deckard's advances, or Tyrell's niece through her? 'I can't rely . . . ' she says, meaning, I can't know if I love, or another does through me. Who does Tyrell's niece love, we must then ask, if her animus, as it were, responds to Deckard? If Deckard is indeed a replicant, then whose animus inhabits his body? Tyrell's?

It is implied, though never stated, that these gifted memories are somehow rendered transmissible genetically. This gives memory an intelligible physical form to complement the metaphysical form we feel as if we've always known about. On this point, it is worth noting just how limited Tyrell's powers are; just how far from omnipotent he actually is. Tyrell can replicate codes and thus reproduce life, but he can't change codes once their sequence has begun to unfold. He captures them, but does not decode them. Thus he has not really cracked the code of life at all. Life remains a mystery. The replicants are thus sophisticated pieces of primitivism: they are a scientist's homeopathic homage to a god he refuses to acknowledge. Nevertheless, this is without doubt the most extraordinary science fiction idea in the film: that emotions and experiences can be rendered algorithmically. Replicants are not machines, not cyborgs in other words, or even androids in the strictest sense, but genetically enhanced humans. Their production is probably akin to what Huxley envisioned in *Brave New World*. But unlike Huxley's vision, *Blade Runner* does not say that replicants are socialised through a special upbringing that begins at infancy: they are flung into the world fully formed. And this is precisely the problem. Being born all at once an adult doesn't work. For reasons not fully understood, the replicants develop dangerous obsessions.

To overcome this, the replicants are gifted with memories, which are supposed to have a cushioning effect. But, as it turns out, it is not merely a past that they are given – which I imagine is all Tyrell intended, it perhaps being thought that the feeling of a past stretching out behind one is enough of a compromise with the inner clock to take the replicants' minds off longevity, or its lack thereof – but an entire childhood (*some* childhood). Tyrell, it seems, does not know the difference between memories of one's past forged in adulthood, and memories forged in childhood, otherwise he would have kept strictly to adults' memories and not have utilised his niece's memories. Although childhood of course belongs to the past, it must nevertheless be granted special status within our past; the

difference is that it is a developmental period which endows memories with very particular, but indiscernible significance. We cannot know until adulthood is reached, and sometimes not even then, what the significance of our childhood memories will be because we are constituted by them. As Deleuze says, only desiring-machines are truly functionalist, that is to say, formed in the same way that they function. Many of our childhood memories are preserved in the form of psychic infrastructure, which is outside our power to recall. As such, the unpredictability of the replicants should in fact have been expected if the gifted memories were taken from children, as we know was the case with Rachael, because the significance of those memories could not yet have had a chance to materialise. Because they are gifted to the replicants in this nascent form they are the very opposite of controlling.

Notes

1. The precedent for this obviously Jamesonian manoeuvre is Jameson's suggestion that Adorno's awkward anthropologisms be treated as so much motivation, 'as the content Adorno had to talk himself into in order to write vivid sentences' (Jameson 1990: 68). Following this same argument, I would suggest that Ansell Pearson (1999) makes the mistake of reading Deleuze's use of biology and biophilosophy as a source of content, not the elaboration of new forms.
2. Deleuze 1994: xx.
3. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 188.
4. Bakhtin 1984: 6–7.
5. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 372.
6. 'All the new sports – surfing, windsurfing, hang-gliding – take the form of entering into an existing wave. There's no longer an origin as starting point, but a sort of putting-into-orbit. The key thing is how to get taken up in the motion of a big wave, a column of rising air, to "get into something" instead of being the origin of an effort' (Deleuze 1995: 121).
7. 'They do not have the means for that because they subordinate all their operations to the sensible conditions of intuition and construction – *following* the flow of matter, *drawing and linking up* smooth space' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 373).
8. 'In the field of interaction of the two sciences, the ambulant sciences confine themselves to *inventing problems* whose solution is tied to a whole set of collective, nonscientific activities but whose *scientific solution* depends on the contrary, on royal science and the way it has transformed the problem by introducing it into its theorematic apparatus and its organisation of work' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 374).
9. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 372.
10. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 337.
11. Indeed, Guattari later substitutes 'autopoiesis' for both 'machinic assemblage' and 'rhizome', though he doesn't abandon either of these terms. Cf. Guattari 1995: 33–57.
12. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 43.
13. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 40–1.

14. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 41.
15. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 43. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 242–6.
16. '[S]ince substances are nothing other than formed matters, formless substances are inconceivable, although it is possible in certain instances to conceive of substanceless forms' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 44).
17. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 44.
18. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 44.
19. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 45.
20. 'There is no denying that the revolutionaries fought bravely against the police [in May 1968]. But the moment we leave the sphere of the struggle of interests to consider the function of desire, we have to recognise that the leadership of a number of left splinter groups approached the young in a spirit of repression, in order to contain and canalise the desire that had been set free' (Guattari 1984: 232).
21. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 159.
22. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 159.
23. For a survey of Deleuze's relation to Platonism and a discussion of what it means to be anti-Platonic, see Patton 1994. Patton's point that not all forms of anti-Platonism are the same is, I think, extremely salutary and too little mentioned.
24. Cf. Deleuze 1990a: 256.
25. Deleuze 1990a: 254.
26. With characteristic incision and wit, de Certeau described this process as 'cutting and turning': 'first, *cut out*; then, *turn over*. First an "ethnological" isolation; then a logical inversion' (de Certeau 1984: 62).
27. Deleuze 1992: 161.
28. Deleuze's many comments on the erroneous interpretations of Foucault's concept of subjectification are, conveniently, to be found in the collection of interviews, *Negotiations*. Cf. Deleuze 1995: 93; 95; 98; 110; 113.
29. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 161.
30. On this point it is worth mentioning a certain mellowing of a revolutionary ardour between the wars, as it were, for in *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari say you can't go far enough, but in *A Thousand Plateaus* they caution that you can go too far, that care needs to be taken not to slip into oblivion or catatonia. It is tempting to speculate that this change of heart is born of hard experience, a recognition that some aspects of the schizophrenising process do not 'work' quite as it was thought they would. The history of Guattari's clinical work at La Borde should prove extremely interesting.
31. One must take care not to destroy the strata altogether, for it is only by means of strata that we are able to function in the world. 'You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small supplies of signifiance and subjectification, if only to turn them against their own systems when the circumstances demand it [. . .] and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity in order to respond to the dominant reality' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 160).
32. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 161.
33. Deleuze 1995: 11.
34. Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 53; Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 166.
35. Miller 1965: 461.
36. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 503.
37. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 337–41.
38. For example, he argues that musicians from Wagner to Debussy and Cage and Boulez have all been animated by the same expressive problem; what has changed, however, is the conditions of that problem. Wagner's situation is not Boulez's, so their musical solutions are not the same. Deleuze 1993: 136–7.

39. Deleuze 1993: 56.
40. Cf. Silverman 1991; Marder 1991; Žižek 1993.
41. Silverman 1991: 119.
42. Silverman 1991: 118.
43. Jameson 1973.
44. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 88.
45. As Jameson argues in relation to Greimas' semiotic rectangles, far from stalling a dialectical analysis, such extremes of formalisation can in fact form the basis of just such an interpretative strategy. Cf. Jameson 1994: xiv; 1987: x; 1981: 47.
46. Iser 1978: 121.
47. Silverman 1991: 110.
48. Silverman, for one, interprets the significance of this scene as follows: 'The two shots of the blue eye . . . do not work to map out a spectatorial position for us on one side or other of the human/replicant divide, but to posit vision as the site of a certain collapse between those categories' (Silverman 1991: 110).
49. Deleuze 1986: 32–40, 70.
50. All narrative forms, Deleuze argues, can be apprehended in terms of the three types of question their opening poses – the short story or tale asks, 'What is going to happen?', while the novella asks 'What happened?' and, lastly, the novel integrates these two questions and asks, 'What is happening?' Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 192.
51. Žižek 1993: 200.
52. On the fatal weaknesses of the slave economy, see Anderson 1974: 77.
53. Film critic David Thomson describes the Bradbury Building as 'allegedly built for commerce but always more mindful of being available for *film noir*' (Thomson 1999: 90).
54. This it seems to me is as much as Shaviro's rather cursory gloss on *Blade Runner* is able to say. Shaviro 1993: 3–5. On the 'pathetic' function of film see Deleuze 1986: 34–5.
55. Deleuze 1986: 178–9.
56. Deleuze 1986: 178.
57. In this respect, I disagree with Smith and Goodchild, who both endeavour to develop a Deleuzian ontology from his deployment of 'Life'. Smith 1997; Goodchild 1996a.
58. Deleuze 1986: 145.
59. Jameson 1972: 67–8.
60. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 76.
61. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 77.
62. Deleuze 1997: 133.
63. Deleuze 1997: 171.
64. It is at this point that *Blade Runner* touches base with genuine noir. Deckard's existential angst recalls Marlowe's: 'You're not human tonight, Marlowe. Maybe I never was nor ever will be. Maybe I'm ectoplasm with a private license' (Chandler 1949: 80).
65. As such, I disagree with Silverman that the original 1982 ending is the most satisfying. Cf. Silverman 1991: 130.
66. Deleuze 1994: 112. See also, Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 330; 1987: 265.
67. Deleuze 1994: 114.

Chapter 6

Schizophrenic Utopianism

> Perhaps today, where the triumph of more utopian theories of mass culture seems complete and virtually hegemonic, we need the corrective of some new theory of manipulation . . .
>
> (Fredric Jameson, *Late Marxism*)

Within walking distance of the space where some of the best scenes in *Blade Runner* occur, namely the Bradbury Building on Broadway – that archetype of high modernism, which today is preserved like a museum piece amidst an inner city reproduction of a third-world shanty town, its refurbished rusticity belying its pretence at being a functioning commercial centre – is the stage for a very different kind of drama: the ongoing metacritique of postmodernity. I am of course talking about the Westin Bonaventure Hotel, which, as Derek Gregory has rightly observed, has become the very topoi of postmodernism.[1] (The essay which propelled this literally remarkable building into the spotlight, Jameson's 'Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', is correspondingly one of the most written about and commented on pieces of writing produced in the last two decades.[2]) Today, though, to approach the Bonaventure from this direction, up either Fourth St or Third St to Flower St, is to discover straightaway that one of the cornerstones of Jameson's argument (the lack of a traditional marquee entrance, and the consequent closed-face the hotel seemed to present to the city at street level) has been chipped away. There is now a marquee entrance on Flower St replete with all the bunting and embossed livery one would expect, which establishes a direct relation between the building and the street so that one can now enter the building on the same level as the lobby and check-in is situated. Is this just good business, or do we need to change our theory too?

According to Sean Homer, Jameson's reading of the Bonaventure 'was initially one of the most persuasive aspects of his analysis of postmodernism but has subsequently been subjected to a great deal of critical

analysis'.[3] This is simply a polite way of saying that in recent years Jameson's argument has been repudiated more often than it has been affirmed. What is interesting about this, besides the intensity of the felt need to denounce *this* reading of *this* building (why not his reading of *Lord Jim* too?), is the fact that such denouncements tend to be made following field trips to the Bonaventure. Upon finding it far less astonishing and disorienting than Jameson depicts it, critics seem to need to write back in anger, and bolstered by their own experience of the building (which they take as objective proof of their point) they feel justified in doing so.[4] It appears, then, that the reason *this* reading of *this* building is such a frequent target is its apparent ease of invalidation: one can say Jameson got it wrong simply by visiting the hotel and failing to be impressed by it, whereas it takes a great deal more work and perspicacity to put oneself in the position of being able to say the same of his interpretation of Conrad. But besides bad faith, what such arguments really prove is how satisfying the illusion of reference is, as well as how difficult it is to think in fact the loss of referentiality that postmodernity is supposed to entail, because what they all rely on is the assumption that the Bonaventure itself can be used to falsify Jameson's claims.

What such an assumption misses, because it glosses it too quickly I suppose, is the fact that the argument against Jameson, as well as Jameson's own, is based on the experience of the Bonaventure, not the building itself as objective referent (it has more to do with noesis than noema, if I may be permitted an artificial disjunction). Both responses are in fact completely subjective, and, what is more, self-consciously so – it being just as subjective to fail to be amazed as it is to be dizzied by it, though for some reason the sober response is allowed to see itself as objective and somehow scientific. In other words, what this particular debate exposes, and the reason why it interests me so much, is the incommensurability of the gap between perception and conceptualisation. Such an inquiry is exceedingly pertinent to Deleuze because many of his claims are far wilder than Jameson's quite reasonable (and by comparison, modest) assertion that he found the idiosyncratic arrangement of entrances and exits disorienting and that his reaction might serve as a figure for the larger fact that postmodernity itself, understood as an epochal convulsion if not a genuine shift, is giddying. For instance, how might one apprehend the very strange claim that Amsterdam is a city 'entirely without roots' except as a concept, when to treat it as a percept is to try to connect it to an expressive image, and that straightaway leads to all kinds of confusions?[5] As I've tried to show in the previous chapters, what is at stake here is a process I have found it useful to call con-

ceptualisation, namely the properly philosophical process of converting intuitions into concepts.

One of the greatest sources of confusion concerning Jameson's own process of conceptualisation with regards to the Bonaventure is the fact that he really isn't trying to offer a reading of the hotel space so much as use his intuited impressions of it as evidence of a peculiar cultural turn he identifies with postmodernity. Therefore, it is the epoch that he is conceptualising, not the hotel's architecture (the Bonaventure is a symptom of postmodernism, not an agent or cause of it). If we were to critique his reading, then, we would have to start from this fact. There would then be a range of questions we could usefully ask: does he convert the hotel into an expression of postmodernity?; or, alternatively, does he treat it as a representation of it? As we shall see, strictly speaking, neither is the case. My purpose, though, is not so much to critique Jameson's account as to offer my own differently conceived reading. What I will try to do, which because Jameson does not, often puts me in a position of disagreement with him, is offer a conceptualised reading of the hotel itself. Such a reading, I will argue, should attempt to define the building's mechanisms of manipulation because insofar as it is a business that must finally be what is primarily at issue. How does it draw people to itself? What kind of a libidinal apparatus, if it is one, is it? If anything is actually missing from Jameson's account, that he missed something being the most common objection to his reading of the Bonaventure, then I would say it is a consideration of the Bonaventure's manipulative capacities.[6]

I want to suggest, then, following Deleuze, that a very different reading could be given of both the Bonaventure itself and more generally of postmodern styles of architecture with respect to late capitalism than the one offered by Jameson simply by taking into account its day to day commercial operations – its associated flows of money and people. It is true, Jameson does not ignore the fact that the Bonaventure is a business. He notes that it is part of the renaissance of the downtown, by which he means, though without ever putting it in so many words, nothing other than property speculation (a topic he gets around to discussing a decade or so later); he also notes that the businesses within the hotel complex itself seem to have suffered in consequence of its strange design, pointing to tell-tale shop vacancies.[7] Beyond that, though, there is no consideration of its day to day operation, the sheer fact in other words that it is a hotel. Now, by the same token, it must be admitted that Deleuze does not dwell on architecture all that often. He keeps even his remarks on the Gothic architecture so pertinent to his conception of the Baroque to a bare minimum. Yet in that he often has recourse to spatial figures such an

extension of his work seems both possible and desirable. And indeed, such work has already begun, and my aim here is to extend that work further.[8] My argument, though, will be somewhat different from the current trend in that I will insist that any attempt to use Deleuze to discuss spatiality must be done in tandem with his discussion of the operations of capitalism.

   Our first task will be to get behind representation to the real production of desire. According to Deleuze, as we've already seen, if we want to apprehend desire for itself we have to look on the reverse side of any representation we are confronted with, whether that is a book, a dream, or a building. To get to that reverse side, though, we first of all need to seek out dark precursors, those minute and myriad indices of connections, disjunctions and conjunctions, in short, all the flows and their schizzes, which all but imperceptibly dot the surface of a text.[9] In the end, it comes down to this: flows and their schizzes.[10] One can already imagine that Deleuze would want to call the Bonaventure a rhizome because it does indeed seem to be constructed according to principles that counter architecture's usual hierarchies: it can effectively be reduced to the connections and blockages it creates with respect to the flows of people and the associative flow of money, these being our dark precursors. To begin with, internally it consists of a number of deliberate obstacles to movement up and down that tend to foreground the lateral in a way one is unaccustomed to in a building that from the street at least would seem to be governed by conditions of verticality: some levels of the mezzanine are connected only by stairs while others can be reached only by elevators, and not all lifts stop at all floors so if you get on the wrong one you are bound to overshoot your mark (they are least colour-coded so you can figure out which lifts go to which range of levels).[11]

   Yet, this very emphasis on the lateral has the effect of introducing a new order of verticality into this sector of the downtown because it is possible to enter the building from the fourth and sixth floors as well as the first and ground. It has the effect of stratifying the city, enabling its flows of people to conduct themselves on several levels besides that of the street. Indeed, the street falls into redundancy because of the two upper entrances, which face on to potted garden plateaus that branch directly into adjacent office buildings, thereby cutting a swathe across topological inconveniences. The small eateries and alfresco cafés one would expect to find at street level in a big city are to be found here instead on the fourth and sixth floors, which are given over almost entirely to such enterprises. And again, this shift can be read as a mutation of an established line. Instead of the long straight line of restaurants one finds at street level in

certain sections of the city, though not in the downtown any more, in the Bonaventure that line curls round on itself, becoming heliacal. The six-floor mezzanine is a vortex that concentrates the flow of lunchtime pedestrians, who, on the old system, would have been forced to pursue a line of dispersion. Accordingly, one might argue that rather than turn its back on the city, it actually taps into the inherent verticality of the new downtown, making it an active response to changes in the movement of people. One might also say, and indeed there would be no denying it, that this upward drive reflects a generalised fear and distaste for the street and the hapless souls condemned to it (something the sky cars envisioned by *Blade Runner* capture all too well).

Then again, one must wonder why in a city like Los Angeles where the dominant mode of movement is vehicular one would ever reckon the relation of a building to the street in terms of pedestrians. On this point, I think it is worth noting that the Bonaventure, according to its own proud boast, is built near the conjunction of six major freeways, and, it is implied, all the major conduits to other states, and of course other cities all over the world (at the endpoint of at least one conduit is LAX, where conveniently enough there is another Westin hotel), making it a nodal point in a nexus encompassing, if not the whole world, then at least the whole of Southern California. Whether it turns people away at ground level is thus immaterial beside the fact that it attracts people from much further afield – its pool of potential customers is not confined to happenstance pedestrians stumbling around the downtown in search of a place to eat or shop. Indeed, if it were, it doubtless could not support itself, so empty is the downtown on non-working days and after business hours. As such, it makes perfect sense for its sidewalk restaurant not to be anywhere near the curb – not even in sight of it, truth be told – because the flow of customers is downwards from the towers and out-wards, not inwards from the street. There are thus two sort of flows here: the first is an influx, sucking in the hotel customers from all around the world, the second is an outflux into the hotel's own businesses and then the city itself. To put it in Deleuze's terms, the first flow creates a body without organs, while the second is its miraculate.

The body without organs is without doubt the least understood and the most easily misunderstood of all the key components of the Deleuzian hermeneutic apparatus. It is, though, readily translatable into more familiar terminology: it primarily functions as a principle of totalisation. It is produced by the 'synthesis of connection, as that which is going to neutralise – or on the contrary put into motion – the two activities, the two heads of desire'.[12] (These two heads, as I've already mentioned

above, are flows and schizzes.) In this instance, the vortical action of the hotel is synthetic inasmuch as it brings enough people together to create a viable business centre, while its internal blockages encourage the dilatoriness needed for peaceful expenditure. What these people spend is thus a miraculate of this body of customers constricted into a commercial, critical mass. (The true outflux is of course a flow of money.) The hotel itself thus looms before us as a whole, a full body as Deleuze and Guattari put it, but not in a way that can be used to subordinate the many and varied interests of the specific elements of that body. The fact that it is a hotel we are talking about is not sufficient in itself to explain the motivations and actions of all the people who visit, inhabit or otherwise make use of its space. Yet, clearly enough, the fact of it being a hotel is nonetheless crucial to our understanding of these selfsame activities. It is thus a totalisation *on which things occur and move*, but do so according to their own interests.

Interestingly, the hotel presents itself precisely as a body without organs – its own body (as imagined by its brochure) radiates outwards, in a glorious series of concentric rings encompassing landmarks such as Bunker Hill, Dodger Stadium, the MOCA, Chinatown, all the way out to the Venice Pier. Thus an image of itself as centripetal screens the reality of its vortical mechanism, whose pull, it needs to be emphasised, is weakest the nearer one is to the hotel itself, where in an important reversal of its effect it becomes actively repelling (I mean, it doesn't pull in the street-dwellers, who on some days would be the only people around the hotel itself).[13] On this score, I think Davis is right to reiterate Jameson's point (though, of course he does not recognise it as such!) that the Bonaventure Hotel, whatever its aesthetic qualities may be, is inserted into a cityscape and a city-life that it cannot but alter, at times savagely, whether symbolically, by once again figuratively asserting class difference (a luxury hotel amidst, but excluding the urban working-class people who live and work nearby), or directly, by displacing the homeless and the low-income earners who once occupied its infamous Bunker Hill site.[14] But to accuse Jameson of complacency, by suggesting he turns his back on the raw facts of the matter, is to miss the point of his paper altogether.

The disjunction of this hotel and its surrounds, which finds figuration in its reflective shell, is, Jameson argues, a function of its disaffection with the utopian impulse at the heart of modernism.[15] Nothing could express his critical concern for the state of affairs we call postmodernism more succinctly or more patently. By the same token, Davis's equally evocative point that primitive modes of production surround the hotel like a sea of

pity, is, however salutary, no less wrong-headed in terms of a critique of Jameson.[16] For one thing – as Jameson himself replies – sweatshops are not pre-capitalist; but even if they were, Davis would still be off-beam, because, as Mandel points out, such an uneven admixture of modes of production is precisely what one should expect of capitalism.[17] For another, it also glosses the admixture of modes of production internal to the hotel itself, by which I mean the new generation of (globalised) itinerant merchants and journeymen (i.e., sales representatives and technical experts) who make use of the hotel as way-station and home-away-from-home. It is one thing to speak of the permanently displaced persons who used to occupy the site, but however baleful that story is we shouldn't let it blind us to the new stories being told in their place. Today, we have to reckon into our account people who in contrast might be called perpetually displaced persons.

These modern-day nomads are like the associative flows of money (rather than the other way round) in that they move with the money, following its flux in the same way that once upon a time miners followed mineral seams.[18] Now, though, they follow a huge variety of sources of fantastic wealth in addition to that which is still available from mining; and, let's face it, few places offer as many sources of fantastic wealth as Los Angeles. One thing that Davis does illustrate exceedingly well in his 'biography' of the city of Los Angeles, is that its history of amazing growth is owed entirely to the way it has opened itself to profiteering at every level – from the initial land speculation boom that turned a parched beanfield into a city through to the very fact of supplying that parched land with water. From a diachronic perspective, the Bonaventure can thus be seen as still another way of mining the 'natural' resources of Southern California: its target is the transhumants (as Deleuze and Guattari call them) whose business it is to follow the money, and who might otherwise have slipped by without being profited from.[19] On this enlarged view, the Bonaventure is no longer a body without organs in itself, but an apparatus of capture operating on a far vaster stage, that of the being of capital itself (the most luminous of all the bodies without organs).[20] It is thus a breakflow in the middle of vortex, not a vortex in itself.

If it is true that the 'primary determination of nomads is to occupy and hold a smooth space' then the sad truth is that nomadism cannot save us anymore – if it ever could! – because it is now engendered by capitalism.[21] The smoothest of all smooth spaces today is that which the heady operations of finance capital (which miraculously conjures money from money without having to detour via production) creates. Aptly enough, Jameson has characterised it as a kind of cyberspace.[22] This brings us to

Davis's most serious misapprehension of Jameson's account of the Bonaventure, which is a methodological one. His argument with Jameson rests on the absurd claim that totalisation 'homogenise[s] the details of the contemporary landscape' and thereby somehow extinguishes the phenomenal. In reality, Jameson's position is that the situation we call postmodernity has grown so complex and heterogeneous that an adequate totalisation of it is no longer possible.[23] Davis's lament feels all the more absurd when it is realised that what he seems to be calling for in chastising Jameson for not making adequate mention of the specific social and political context of the Bonaventure Hotel is in fact a *greater* totalisation. Not a little bemused with the fuss it continues to cause, but more than a little tired of defending it against all manner of wild accusations, Jameson has lately described 'totalization' as 'the hoariest of all negative buzzwords'.[24]

The itinerants who pass through the hotel are not the only elements missing from the fuller picture advocated, but not actually furnished, by Davis. There is also the staff of the hotel itself – that vast army of cleaners, waiters and waitresses, room service attendants, bell-hops, concierges, middle managers and senior executives, who collectively and mostly invisibly comprise the majority of the working parts of the hotel machine.[25] A host of issues present themselves for consideration now because this labour force is composed of a politically fraught admixture of men and women, white and other, gay and straight, rich and poor, salaried and non-guaranteed, young and old, workers.[26] By promising work, the hotel draws employees to itself from near and far. In return for a wage, it demands they identify themselves with its corporate image, not merely by wearing a uniform, but even more profoundly by conforming to an ethos (the customer is always right; it takes more effort to frown than to smile; service with a smile; prompt service; efficient service; and so on).

The smiling face of the Filipino woman who brings you your $11 cocktail in the Bona Vista bar is the face of the hotel – the hotel facialises itself by demanding from her a certain smile, a certain demureness and an unflappable tolerance for any idiosyncrasy whatever. And though you are only spending $11, and not even on her, she lets you act as though it were all the riches in the world you were doling out. Through inviting a vague but unmistakable libidinalisation her demure face encourages the fantasy that you somehow deserve what you're getting, that you've earned it, that you're worth it. Her face, her minutely calculated genuflections and conciliatory attentions are, as Dreiser scathingly put it, what 'Americans pay for'.[27] This drink is your reward for all your hard work. This is what

Deleuze and Guattari are referring to when they say capitalism substitutes relative limits for the absolute limits of desire – there is something remarkable in the fact that a mid-level executive can happily work an eighty-hour week and still think an $11 drink is a privilege!

From an ideological perspective, it seems that the trouble with totalisation, which, as an analytic instrument, is simply a means of identifying and naming the connections between the various forces and interests that compose a society, and nothing more, is too easily confused with totalitarianism, and ends up, rather weirdly, being taken as one with fascism. But, if 'the meaning of a word is its use, we can best grasp "totalisation" [. . .] through its function – to envelope and find a least common denominator for the twin activities of perception and action'.[28] It is, then, in fact one of the means criticism has at its disposal of detecting and describing fascism, and is perhaps the only means with a scope broad and detached enough not to be ensnared or seduced by the very thing it names. Its principal aim is to develop a perspective from which the connectedness of all things can be seen; not, as is perhaps true of totalitarianism, the elimination of difference by the monstrous imposition of the same. Therefore, to describe postmodernism as a cultural dominant is not to suggest that an intrinsically alien cultural force – too simply identified as 'American' – is somehow depriving the world of its political, religious and ethnic variety, as James Clifford (among others) seems to fear, but rather to say, that it is the superstructural expression of a rapidly changing but undeniably pervasive base.[29] What is in fact dominant, of course, is not a particular aesthetic style, or even a way of thinking about the world, but a mode of production.

Philosophically, a totality is something which, whether because of its inconceivable size (too immense or too minute), or because it is yet to be actually invented, or simply because it is still to be imagined, is – by definition – unknowable to us. Methodologically, as structuralism instructed us, 'a totality is a combination or permutation scheme, endowed with a closure of its own no matter how ineffably fluid and dynamic its processes may be'. In the case of truly elastic processes like chaos or catastrophe theory, it is only the closure representation provides that in fact makes them thinkable.[30] Closure of this type is anything but the end of the story insofar as the analysis of certain hitherto undisclosed phenomena are concerned: obviously enough, insofar as it is what actually makes that phenomena visible it is the inauguration of a problem not a solution. Here an important contrast can be made between Jameson's philosophical position, which might cursorily be classified as Hegelian, though it should also be seen as a profound modification

of Hegel, and the currently dominant Kantian tradition.[31] In the Kantian scheme, such unknowables as Nature, the Cosmos, Beauty and so on are converted into transcendental concepts, ready-made Universals as it were, and made to serve as the fixed coordinates of thought. In contrast, Jameson treats all concepts, including totalities, as problems, and in this respect adopts a position far closer to Deleuze than his repeated affirmations of Hegel would seem to allow. This is even true of postmodernism – for better or worse, the organising term of this discussion – which Jameson explicitly states 'is not something we can settle once and for all and then use with a clear conscience'.[32] On this definition, totalisation refers to the effort of thinking the structurally unthinkable, or more precisely the attempt to coordinate disparate data in such a way as to explain it without at the same time explaining it away.

Postmodernism, then, is a problem still to be fully worked out and while it is not without its problems, these are not to be found where they are commonly asserted to be. The problem is not that Jameson grounds his account of what he calls post-contemporary culture in a determining economic base, late capitalism. All theories must be grounded somehow (differance for Derrida, the plane of immanence for Deleuze, Being for Heidegger and so on), and that ground is always going to be (by definition) pre-philosophical, and therefore impossible to critique.[33] What can be critiqued, however, is the set of relations pertaining between a ground and its superstructure, and, observing that the term 'late capitalism' seems to collapse base and superstructure, necessitating a discussion of cultural phenomena alongside any and all discussions of economics, it is precisely as a set of relations that Jameson defines postmodernism.[34] So while the distinctions between such divergent philosophical grounds as differance, the plane of immanence and late capitalism are not lightly dismissed, or simply ignorable for the sake of producing an effective homology, they should not be fetishised either.[35] By the same token, however peculiar each of these grounds may be, we should not allow their individuality to blind us to the fact that each one represents a philosophical system consisting of a relation between a base and superstructure, which is to say, each one proposes an *a priori* totalisation – the plane of immanence, differance, just as surely as late capitalism, are all totalisations, even if they are not totalisations of the same type, with the same implications.[36]

On this view, the differences between these grounds become important only to the extent that they effect the specific nature of the recoding of a given text or particular situation they produce.[37] Jameson calls this piece of dialectical manoeuvring transcoding (his updated word for what he

elsewhere calls metacommentary).[38] The usefulness of this term lies not so much in what it names, though, as in the critical distance, or, better, estrangement, it creates. Although it may appear to be a homogenisation of all theories, or, even worse, an extreme form of relativism, it is in fact an attempt to historicise theory. By treating theories in this abstract way, their dependence upon a particular situation, and a certain formulation of a problem, can be emphasised. This, in turn, allows us to see that the real problem of postmodernism – and by extension, all theories – if indeed there is one, lies in the relational structure it proposes between itself and its base, late capitalism. Aesthetically, as is the case with what Jameson counts as its immediate predecessors modernism and realism, postmodernism is at once a reflection and registration of the conditions of the period it describes, which itself is determined, in the last instance, by the prevailing mode of production. If we take architecture as our example, which is – as is well known – the medium Jameson tends to favour in his own meditations on the subject, a very interesting second problem arises as soon as we try to describe the peculiarities of its aesthetic response.[39] For while it may be true that the Bonaventure Hotel is responding to the anomie of late capitalism by creating a kind of mini-city unto itself, in doing so, somewhat oddly, it actually seems to exacerbate that feeling, such that what began as the registration of a certain culturally felt ennui suddenly becomes one of its causes.

While it is tempting to see this as still another example of a perverse outcome, the fact that its underpinning logic – the aspiration to be a miniature substitute for a city – can also be found in the Eaton centre in Toronto and in the Beaubourg in Paris (to give only the examples Jameson uses), means that it is not an accident but a contradiction.[40] In short, it would confound the very logic of capitalism itself to deliberately create an environment that did not appeal in some way to consumers, so one has to assume, on the evidence of its repetition, that beyond its repelling first appearance there is something subtly compelling in the design of the mini-city. My speculation is that if it is true that the Bonaventure Hotel does in fact turn its back on the city in which it is situated, and I do not doubt this reading at all, then it is in view of becoming an enclave, a haven or refuge from the stresses of city life.[41] The implication I want to draw from this is that the so-called spatial turn of postmodern theory is in fact a reflection of an entrepreneurial counterstrategy to the unproductive chaos of modern life. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, what capitalism deterritorializes with the one hand, it reterritorializes with the other: it creates new forms of freedom by lifting old restrictions only to supplant them with profit-seeking axioms.[42] In

what follows I want to suggest a different answer to the one Jameson proposes; rather than see this contradiction as a 'return of the repressed', I see it as a stratagem – not a 'distraction', which lacks the sense of manipulation I believe is at work in postmodern space – whose specific version of the age-old 'bread and circuses' logic is as yet undisclosed.[43] This will in turn necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of Jameson's important claim that postmodern space is schizophrenic.

Support for this hypothesis may be found in the widely documented shift in feeling that has occurred in relation to the city in the past century. Where once it was associated with freedom, contrasting favourably with the depressing restrictions of the arch-conservatism and economic stagnation of the countryside, now it feels crowded, dangerous and oppressive.[44] As Benjamin's analysis of Baudelaire illustrates, the city began to seem fearful and shocking as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. And the first and most decisive reactions to this change in perception were precisely architectural – the arcades and the boulevards. The first created charming cloisters for the bourgeoisie to shop in without fear of being mugged or pushed in front of moving carriages, while the second were meant to prevent barricading by the working class, though in reality they actually assisted in the task of grid-locking the city.[45] Today, for much the same reasons, these same architectural strategies persist in the shape of the mall and the freeway and while they no longer protect an *ancien régime* as such, they still serve the entrenched interests of capital. At bottom, both no doubt reflect a fear of urban concentration, which, as Jameson has speculated, is itself 'a twentieth-century variant, a coded or "sedimented" persistence, of that older, ideologically far more transparent, nineteenth-century terror of the mob itself, the revolutionary crowd'.[46] What the mall must do, as the arcade did before it, is create an environment conducive to consumption (it must halt the flow of pedestrians so as to extract the associative flow of money). Now if it is true that the mall in the Bonaventure actually turns customers away then not merely is it a failure in commercial terms, it is also utterly illogical in capitalist terms, and this latter point threatens in its illogicality to unravel the whole postmodern tapestry.[47]

The problem, as I see it, is this: the Bonaventure does not appear to express the logic of capitalism in its function, although it manifestly does so in its form. What we must ask now is if the Bonaventure's mall is in fact an attempt to create a enclave, which should be seen as a device, then why create an enclave that seems to call for the construction of yet another enclave, this time a personal one like an individual force-field? The feeling that still another enclave is required is precisely what Jameson is referring

to when he says postmodern architecture has finally succeeded in trans-cending present human capacities to cognitively map their surrounds.[48] The feeling of dislocation induced by the seamlessness – and what I want to call the anti-modernity – of the Bonaventure mall that Jameson calls schizophrenia is, he says, analogous to the sense of incomprehension all of us feel today in face of globalisation.[49] This is without doubt Jameson's most important claim vis-à-vis the Bonaventure Hotel and postmodern space generally and, significantly, it relies on the very divergence of form and function I have highlighted above. The reason the individual cannot map the postmodern space he or she is thrust into upon entering the mall is that it no longer conforms to the accustomed spatial patterns of modernity, in which form and function are trium-phantly unified. It is, I might add, precisely for the fact that postmodern space seems to suppress function in favour of form that I want to call it anti-modern. If this form/function disparity were to be resolved then Jameson's important analogon would be invalidated.[50] And although, as I will show in a moment, this disparity can be shown to be amenable to that strong form of comprehension called empathy, I do not want to thereby destroy the analogon because I agree with Jameson in thinking it has a vital utopian function. In order to prevent that I want now to underscore something Jameson himself only fleetingly touches on and that is the fact that our incapacity to cope with postmodern space stems from our constitutional lack of preparedness for its characteristic fea-tures.[51]

   As I have said, the trouble we have with postmodern space is twofold: on the one hand, it suppresses function, giving itself over entirely to form, thus making it virtually impossible to determine what it is for and accordingly how one should approach it and or utilise it; on the other hand, and ultimately, the problem is our expectation of transparency, our spatial complacency in other words. We are beset by the fact that our spatial habits were formed in modernity, not the postmodernity in which we actually live, so we are not constitutionally equipped for own environment.[52] The word that I want to underscore here is habit. It is, by his own admission, Jameson's lack of postmodern habits that leaves him unable to map the space of the Bonaventure mall, and which, I presume, compels him to view postmodern space in a modernist way, that is, to search out what is new in it, what is telling about it, and emphasise these aspects over its more mundane features – the fact that it still has shops, elevators and so on.[53] His reaction, in other words, is the reaction of somebody watching a strikingly original film for the first time, not the reaction of someone who has seen the film so often they have practically

memorised it. My implication, of course, is that the requisite new habits have not been given sufficient time to form.[54] So while it is undoubtedly true that to be able to apprehend postmodern space in a single glance we would have to grow new perceptual organs, this emphasis on simultaneity can only be maintained if the perception of space is treated as analogous to the perception of film.[55] Such an idea can only hold if we assume that our current apparatus of perception was constructed by film.

Although Jameson does not explicitly state that he is treating as equivalent cinematic perception and what in contrast might be called ordinary perception, it is I believe implicit in the general claim that our perceptual apparatus was formed by modernity. One of the most distinctive features of modernity is assuredly the advent of cinema, not merely as a new aesthetic medium but also as a training ground for our collective perceptual habits. If, as Deleuze suggests, film improves on and, as it were, perfects perception, then one consequence of the pervasiveness of cinema must be a sense of perceptual inadequacy outside the darkened confines of theatre.[56] We cannot pull to a long shot or swoop in for a close-up with the apparent ease of film and are thus always trapped between a desire for detail and an urge for the big picture by our own weak bodies.[57] Even the elevator which rapidly lifts one up to the top of the building is not as fast as film and the lag between views spoils the montage; what in a film is a striking juxtaposition is in reality a tedious wait for a free elevator, a squeezed and stuffy ride and then a giddying stare at a shimmering city grid.[58] The more filmically literate we become the less able we are to perceive ordinarily, or at any rate, to feel satisfied that we are seeing all that we ought to see. So when we enter a space that enchants us, as Benjamin optimistically – and against the grain of his Frankfurt colleagues – argued the arcades are capable of doing, we are also struck by our inadequate means of apprehending it; we feel footsore and slow even as we feel delightfully bewildered.[59]

By the same token, cinema has also accustomed us to spectacle, so even as we are readily bewildered by fantastic new spaces we are equally easily bored and unimpressed by ordinary spaces. On the evidence of buildings already considered postmodern, the most boring aspect of what I am here loosely calling 'ordinary space' is its function, which is not to say that the non-functional or dysfunctional has in some strange way become desirable, but rather that it is no longer desirable for a building to look like what it is: office buildings should no longer look like office buildings, and art museums shouldn't look like art museums. (Better they look like binoculars, or crumpled aluminium foil if you're Frank Gehry.) What this aesthetic defies above all, including convention, and the need to be

functional, is material constraints, the sheer material fact of pipes, glass, steel, supporting columns, stressed concrete, and so on.[60] Its confrontation with these ultimately determining facts is, then, a figuration of that daily confrontation we all face, the need to eat, to sleep, to shower and to work, and the extent to which it is capable of aestheticising its own material needs is an expression of the depth to which our bodily needs are similarly aestheticised, which is to say commodified by late capitalism. It is this aspect of it that evinces our empathy and secretly enables us to map what initially appeared unmappable. Against the background of the efficiency of modernity and the structural need in late capitalism to plan everything, including obsolescence, whimsical has come to mean free, and the most visible way of achieving this effect is to defy the evident good sense of modernist design.[61]

In this respect, Deleuze is undoubtedly right to suggest that we have moved into a new age of invisible power – what he calls the society of control – because one rarely sees panopticons these days, they are too obvious. Mechanisms of control have deepened.[62] Postmodern space is delightfully bewildering because it responds to the boringly familiar with humour – the expected response to its designed inconveniences – but since this also entails disguising control mechanisms just who the joke is on is never clear. Boredom, as Jameson has argued, is the sign that personal habits have become fixed, invisible, and so deeply etched that it takes a profound shock to bring them into view.[63] Hence the desirability of an aesthetics of the boring, which would amount to a catalogue of the wilfully forgotten and the naturalised.[64] It is not difficult to see why the mini-city is in fact an excellent strategy. The mini-city is a satisfying containment of the vastness of the actual city, yet still large enough in itself not to disappoint jaded consumers. A delicate balance must be struck between overwhelming the visitor in a good sense and overwhelming them in a bad sense. And as Bachelard might have put it, since overwhelming is not an object as such, a phenomenology of it refers us directly to the imagining consciousness which, as Deleuze would surely remind us, we need to remember not to take for granted.

If a mini-city mall is not massive, then it would not have the conceptual appeal of an actual city, namely the allure of unlimited variety, the contemporary signifier of freedom. But, of course, if it is too monstrous, then unlimited variety suddenly becomes distressing and repelling. So the mini-city must be small enough to appeal to a longing for what Bachelard calls 'intimate immensity', for contained spaces, and it must be said, pedestrian spaces, where cars no longer rule and where the speed is human, and at the same time satisfy the desire for difference that

consumer capitalism has trained us to believe a corner-store simply cannot satisfy any longer, and that anything less than a cornucopia is an impingement on personal liberty.[65] To satisfy this latter demand, the size restrictions on the mini-city have to be raised beyond what can humanly be mapped, at which point the mini-city ceases to be a city *in* a city and becomes an*other* city, demanding to be cognitively mapped just as one would map any other city, a step at a time. The lack of convenience that Jameson cites is thus no accident or byproduct of postmodern space, but an integral feature of its appeal.[66] But the appeal of the mini-city is not only a matter of size, the design is important too, as Jameson stresses. However, what Jameson regards as confusing (and for that reason, either mistaken or misguided), the minimally signposted layout, I prefer to see as a cunning ploy.[67] In disguising the panoptic substratum with outrageously whimsical repositionings of long established coordinates like lobbies and check-ins, by hiding their modernity in other words, postmodern buildings call on us to map their new space in a very old way – by power of local knowledge, not global or strategic knowledge. What this does is create the opportunity for one to acquire the feeling of empowerment (which is not the same thing as power) that comes with local knowledge, the ineffable sense of security one feels in knowing one's way around. This, finally, is the greatest dupe of them all.

   This feeling of empowerment is achieved at the expense of ignorance of the interconnectedness of global capital and what it means to be imbricated in the world-system. The strategy here is to compel the consumer to accept the merely tactical as desirable. This is done rather easily, as it turns out, by playing on already sensitive ideological nerves and making everything planned appear undesirable, less richly textured than the more whimsical and contingent option. To this end, as Jameson has decisively shown, the communist world has been ruthlessly deployed as an analogon of the horror of conformity, distracting us from the structural homogeneity of our own far more conformist system that the infiltration of franchises (McDonald's, KFC, Burger King, but also Holiday Inn, Duty Free Shoppers and Ralph Lauren, not to mention the irrepressible Starbuck's, which, I note, has moved right into the heart of the Bonaventure too) into every corner of every city would seem astounding and incontrovertible evidence of, though it is frequently seen positively as the coming of modernity.[68] In this respect, indigenisation, despite the good press it has been getting lately, is in reality just another word for the penetration of the logic of late capitalism, for however positively you want to describe, say, the Indonesianisation of American franchises (notably Dunkin Donuts and McDonald's), the fact remains that it entails

an Americanisation of the Indonesian too.[69] But, I hasten to add, Americanisation does not mean homogenisation, as such, it is rather the insidious implantation and intensification of a desire for the same. (This occurs, I would suggest, as something akin to what Russian formalism called a motivation of the device: the uniformity of McDonald's is a guarantee of taste, hygiene, convenience and availability, all of which are motivating values before being features.) And even if it were true that indigenisation did express a new logic of multiplicity, then it would still conform to the logic of late capitalism since its chief characteristic is precisely its diversity.[70]

Nowhere does Jameson say the experience of postmodern space is anything like delightfully bewildering, but, logically, as I hope I have shown, this must be the case. What is more, his utilisation of the notion of the utopian impulse can be used here to transcode, literally to mediate, 'delightfully bewildering'. On the contrary, famously – and not a little controversially – Jameson describes it as schizophrenic, by which he means (borrowing his definition from Lacan and not, rather surprisingly, Deleuze and Guattari), 'a breakdown in the signifying chain, that is, the interlocking syntagmatic series of signifiers which constitutes an utterance or a meaning' and not, he is careful to point out, a clinical condition as such.[71] Basically this is another way of saying that postmodernism amounts to a loss of historicity, for what in effect schizophrenia is to Jameson is an absorption of the past into the present and, more damagingly, a disconnection of the present from the future as its hidden but uplifting potential.[72] The effect of this schizophrenising is twofold: first, it 'releases this present of time from all the activities and intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis'; and second, in consequence, the 'present suddenly engulfs the subject with undescribable vividness, a materiality of perception properly overwhelming'.[73] Politically, then, schizophrenia is paralysing: it makes impossible any effective connection of ideology with action, or to put it differently, it reduces the subject to being merely tactical. Worse still, the subject is so enthralled by the spectacle of postmodernity he or she no longer feels this desperate lack of political efficacy, except as bedazzlement.

However, despite this rather bleak picture, Jameson's purpose in describing this feeling as schizophrenic is to reinject politics into a domain that seems wholly given over to capitalism. Given that the scene I have just described is almost perfect from a capitalist point of view, full of happily duped consumers as it is, this must seem hardly possible, and although it is indeed only a potentiality for a radical politics that can be adduced in the end, not an actual revolution, the situation is not utterly

hopeless. The stratagem at work in the mini-city would be perfect from a purely entrepreneurial point of view but for the fact that the awe these delightfully bewildered shoppers feel in the face of the mall's calculated grandeur is *estranging*. By defying established conventions of design, particularly those design elements that directly effect movement, such as the displacement of the lobby and check-in desk from the entry level of the hotel to a lower floor, the mall's idiosyncratic features bring into view the easily overlooked fact that a building constitutes a set of relations. And as Brecht says, breaking the environment into constitutive relationships 'corresponds to a new way of thinking, the historical way'.[74] In other words, if the design of a space is such that it casts what is usually taken for granted in an entirely fresh light, one that separates the various compositional elements from an unthought organic whole and presents them as objects with which we have relations, then its effect can be said to be estranging, which is to say historicising. It is historicising because it makes us aware that our spatial habits are tied to a conventional ordering of elements in space and that such an ordering is not naturally occurring, and, far from being immutable, is entirely contingent.[75]

So even as the apparent meaninglessness of postmodern space renders us schizophrenic, paralysing our ability to act, it nevertheless shocks us into seeing that space is available to ideological coding; it creates sufficient critical distance to allow us to place much needed inverted commas around words that roll too easily off the tongue (it is more 'efficient' to put the lobby on the entry level, more 'elegant' to have the check-in facing the door and so on). But, however hopeful this may be, even the most disconcerting design – as I have suggested above – is never entirely without the possibility of empathy; the trouble with that is empathy destroys estrangement by constraining it to sheer novelty. Attached to estrangement there is a permanent risk of recuperation, which brings me to a reconsideration of Jameson's use of schizophrenia. The problem that needs to be considered is what political potential can the concept and experience of schizophrenia (as process, not illness, to use Deleuze and Guattari's important distinction) have if the schizo it creates is politically awakened and paralysed in the same moment? A solution to this impasse obviously hinges on the nature of the relation between the two poles (what I will term, paralysis and conscience) attributed to schizophrenia by Deleuze and Guattari. My surprise above stems from the fact that Deleuze and Guattari's definition of schizophrenia as process does in fact accommodate this particular problem-position – indeed it is built around it – whereas Lacan's does not.[76]

You would think that this surprise would evaporate once it became

clear just how resolutely anti-Hegelian and anti-dialectical Deleuze and Guattari's deployment of schizophrenia actually is. Yet, as I will show in a moment, even though Deleuze and Guattari define schizophrenia in such a way as to prevent any dialectical – or even dialectical-like – movement, resulting in some kind of raising up, or transformation, it is still not antithetical to the Jamesonian enterprise. For while their version of becoming as it is articulated in the idea of schizophrenia as universal process strictly precludes a terminal moment at which one thing becomes another thing, preferring the Marxian becoming-concrete, so too does Jameson's, as can be seen in his idiosyncratic conceptualisation of utopian discourse as success by failure. The main difference, I want to say, is, finally, only terminological: Jameson permits himself to describe certain cultural processes as utopian, although they do not result in or from any transcendent raising-up as such, while Deleuze and Guattari, in reference to more or less the same processes, do not. In other words, bringing these two models of thought together via schizophrenia basically means finding an impulse within schizophrenia as a process analogous to what in Jameson's work is deemed utopian.[77]

Jameson's own reading of Deleuze and Guattari is not helpful in this matter.[78] For the most part, he uses their work to lend force to his correlation of period and style – famously, he equates decoding with nineteenth-century realism and recoding with twentieth-century modernism – which although it has resulted in some powerful literary critical insights is achieved at the cost of a slight distortion that needs to be corrected if Deleuze and Guattari's model is to be of any use to us.[79] By grasping it as a primordial flux which as humans progress is left behind rather than a universal one that eternally haunts us, Jameson eliminates the crucial dialectical 'mechanism' on which Deleuze and Guattari's entire account of schizophrenia hinges. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the different stages of human organisation, the move through savage, barbarian and civilised societies in other words, occur not so much as a progression whereby one might say schizophrenia is pushed further and further behind us (like our reptilian selves on the evolutionary model), as a succession of modes, different ways of dealing with the same thing – schizophrenia as the uncoded flow of desire. The bottom line in all Deleuze and Guattari's thinking is the axiom that desire in its raw state is inimical to civil society and must be coded to be properly managed, but no code can be sustained forever.

Capitalist society, they say, 'can endure many manifestations of interest, but not one manifestation of desire, which would be enough to make its fundamental structures explode, even at the kindergarten level'.[80]

Hence the fragility of the socius, whose prime function 'has always been to codify the flows of desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to see that no flow exists which is not properly dammed up, channelled, regulated'.[81] Sometimes, as is acutely the case in capitalism, the very process of regulation leads the socius into an invidious situation of having to unleash the very forces that will destroy it in order to stay afloat. Capitalism, as such, is not an administration of schizophrenia, but an investment in it. So, when Deleuze and Guattari say schizophrenia is the malady of our age, they do not mean it is modern life that drives people mad, but that the mode of production we call capitalism and the production of production called schizophrenia have been brought into a mad alignment that holds us constantly on the brink of dissolution and transformation – or what Deleuze and Guattari term 'breakdown' and 'breakthrough'.[82]

> What we are really trying to say is that capitalism, through its process of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless continues to act as capitalism's limit. For capitalism constantly counteracts, constantly inhibits this inherent tendency while at the same time allowing it free rein; it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit. Capitalism institutes or restores all sorts of residual and artificial, imaginary, or symbolic territorialities, thereby attempting, as best it can, to recode, to rechannel persons who have been defined in terms of abstract qualities.[83]

A well-known economic conundrum will allow the truth of this insight to be seen. If it is true that commodity capitalism mobilises desire in order to promote consumption and consumption is by that equation an amortisation of desire, then, accordingly, an increase in consumption is bound to extinguish desire at an increasing rate. So to maintain itself capitalism must promote an ambiguous form of satisfaction: one that results in, to coin a term, insatiety. A purchase must result in customer satisfaction, otherwise they will not return to that store, or continue to use that product, but it cannot at the same time result in the extinction of the urge to repeat the act of purchasing or else capitalism itself would falter. In other words, the very thing that is posited as the goal of consumer culture, namely satisfaction, is radically decoded in consumer culture, which is to say, made to function in the interests of capital, not the consumer. Through a sequence of profound acts of abstraction, credit being perhaps the most insidious of all, in that it automatically decodes all people as consumers and does not hesitate to give them a precisely determining numerical rating, capitalism has succeeded in penetrating

the process of self-realisation itself, enabling it to make it truly seem that you are what you buy, and correspondingly not what you lack.[84] This does not mean desire itself is intrinsically experienced as lack, however, only that desire must be transformed into lack if capitalism is to perpetuate itself.[85] What it shows above all is that the very notion of satisfaction is a capitalist-inspired concept, a fact perhaps reflected in Freud's frequent recourse to economic metaphors (especially in his discussions of the so-called perversions). It reduces all encounters to a simple transaction with afterglow; radical or subversive feelings are thus contained by a decoding of them as dissatisfaction, which implies a consumerist solution, that is, a satisfying conclusion, to whatever social problem is at issue by making all problems a matter of lack. Importantly, however, what this means is that the consumer is both permanently excluded from capitalist culture by their very means of participation, namely consumption, and protected from total absorption.

It is this 'included disjunction', to use Deleuze and Guattari's terminology, that – in the Jamesonian sense of succeeding by failure – I want to suggest can be read as utopian. The included disjunction belongs to the second component (mode) of Deleuze and Guattari's tripartite description of the schizophrenic process (desire) as it is invested by capitalism, the disjunctive synthesis or production of recording; in addition there is the connective synthesis or production of production and the conjunctive synthesis or production of consumption-consummation. None of these modes are even relatively independent, so everything can be seen as production; indeed, it is an axiom of Deleuze and Guattari's thought that everything *is* seen as production, especially the conscious: 'production is immediately consumption and a recording process, without any sort of mediation, and the recording process and consumption directly determine production, though they do so within the production process'.[86] A pop song, for instance, is already consumption in the instant of its production, however original it may be, precisely because it is a consumable sound, by which I mean a sound that has already found expression, elsewhere and by other means, and is now clamouring to be heard, forcing its way into production. This can be seen in the transition between different genres of pop, from say disco to new wave, where a new rhythm emerges in the vacuoles of the older rhythm, first of all supplementing it, then complementing it, then finally supplanting it. Instead of a theory of succession, what this implies is a genealogy of experimentation. Disco set in motion a certain form of a musical production of production, or what we might perhaps better call channelled creative energy. From a free impulse to express, it fashioned a new form of expression, a different musical

syntax to be explored. At disco's limits, new wave was formed as a detachment of energy, a freeing-up of a creativity beginning already to be stifled by the disco form. But new wave too soon produced its own syntax, and like disco before it, achieved its limit of becoming: consumption-consummation.

The schizo does not follow this path exactly. 'He is and remains in disjunction: he does not abolish disjunction by identifying the contradictory elements by means of elaboration; instead he affirms it through a continuous overflight spanning an indivisible distance. He is not simply bisexual, or between the two, or intersexual. He is transsexual.'[87] Schizophrenia, on this model, is pure, fully detached creative energy oscillating between a breakthrough to a new mode of existence and a breakdown into an already exhausted and spent mode. The model is anti-dialectical because any raising-up is also a tying-down: the breakthrough is the road to the breakdown. Yet, in that it proposes a dualism as a suppression of the dialectic it remains dialectical in spirit, as it were, albeit as a failed dialectic. Despite their suspicion of Utopia, and corresponding reticence to use it as a critical term, schizophrenia inasmuch as it oscillates between breakthrough and breakdown (where any form of breakthrough is a breakthrough to a new form of society, a new mode of living, and a breakdown a failed attempt to reach that new society) is precisely utopian. And, however reluctantly, they do finally acknowledge as much in the 'group fantasy' section of their discussion of the included disjunction, where they admit to its Fourieresque qualities, and insist on its revolutionary character.[88] The schizo, they say, 'produces himself as a free man, irresponsible, solitary, and joyous, finally able to say and do something simple in his own name, without asking permission'.[89] To be sure, schizophrenia as process lacks a specific mechanism of raising-up, something that would enable the becoming to become, but then as Jameson has shown this is in fact in its favour.

For Jameson, insofar as Utopia is concerned, success is in fact to be found in failure; indeed, what is most striking about Jameson's writings on Utopia is his marked interest in its failings and failures rather than its strengths and successes. Yet he is not a pessimist. His paradoxical catchcry – utopian thought succeeds by failure – is, I would argue, optimistic.[90] Instead of prophesying a bright future on the basis of a rosy present, Jameson uses the various futures art has so far been able to imagine to diagnose and indict (in precisely the clinical/critical sense that Deleuze gives these terms) what it is tempting to call the existential health of the present.[91] My implication is that for Jameson Utopia is not a place, a mythical island in an unknown sea, but a *process*. It is in this respect

that it is analogous to schizophrenia, also a process. And, bearing in mind Jameson's salutary caution that dualisms are the strong form of ideology, and that it all too frequently appears that we are called on to side with the schizo, it is important that it be emphasised that it is not the schizo as such that is posited as revolutionary by Deleuze and Guattari, though they do allow that from time to time he or she makes certain escapes, but the process, the potential of its flux.[92] However welcome and fantastic (or even unappealing, as is sometimes the case too) specific Utopias may appear to Jameson, it is still the act of fantasising (the attempt to breakthrough, we might now say, together with the attendant risk of breakdown) itself that he prioritises not the actual fantasy.[93] As in the case of classic Hollywood films like *The Godfather* and *Jaws*, what impresses Jameson is the way they conceal a utopian impulse ('that dimension of even the most degraded type of mass culture which remains implicitly, and no matter how faintly, negative and critical of the social order from which, as a product and a commodity, it springs').[94]

Jameson's method consists in discovering the best in the worst, Utopia in other words, and then asking why it is that it must be so deeply buried, and moreover, why it is that no-one else seems prepared to look for it? In this way, cultural analysis has been, through recourse to such ahistorical notions as pleasure, desire and gratification, thoroughly depoliticised.[95] Utopia is the critical means of reversing this trend. If it is accepted that Utopia (in the sense Jameson deploys it) is in fact analogous to Deleuze and Guattari's schizophrenia, then a very interesting reversal occurs, one which puts postmodernism through a change of paradigm. By exchanging Jameson's Lacanian definition of schizophrenia for a Deleuzian one, what was initially described as the experience one feels in the face of a loss of historicity is turned around 180 degrees and transformed into an intensification of historicity, or as (I have suggested above) what Brecht calls estrangement. Precedent for this move can be found in Jameson's own work, in his proposal for a schizophrenic historicism, but nowhere does he explicitly connect Utopia and schizophrenia as I have done here. The reason for that is fairly obvious: it is Jameson's practice to bracket schizophrenia as a critical and/or aesthetic term, whereas Deleuze and Guattari posit it as an unmediated ground, so to bring the two together involves a substantial epistemological shift. Utopia would have to be supposed an immanent concept for it to be properly equivalent to Deleuze and Guattari's schizophrenia, and this is exactly what I take it to be.

This move no doubt comes as something of a surprise because Jameson frequently defines Utopia in such a way as to make it appear transcendental: by placing it structurally beyond the capacity of writers and

thinkers alike to imagine fully, Jameson makes Utopia seem transcendental in the classic Kantian sense, that is, something which must be posited because it is a necessary frame for thought but cannot be presented. Yet, crucially, it is not as a frame for thought that he actually uses it.[96] In his accounts of science fiction, Jameson follows Suvin in suggesting Utopia – or, more generally, the future – might serve the same function as Brecht's 'estrangement'.[97] In the case of Brian Aldiss's *Starship*, the futuristic substitution of culture (the starship itself) for nature (the real world, as it were), results in a twofold estrangement: 'on the one hand, it causes us obscurely to doubt whether our own institutions are quite as natural as we supposed, and whether our "real" open-air environment may not itself be as confining and constricting as the closed world of the ship; on the other hand, it casts uncertainty on the principle of the "natural" itself, which as a conceptual category no longer seems quite so self-justifying and common-sensical'.[98] Here it is the inability of the author, in spite of his evident imaginativeness, to create a truly alternative universe that for Jameson evokes a utopian dimension, a dimension he ascribes to all science fiction. By force of its failure we are returned all the more intensively to the real.[99] This is what it means to succeed by failure; but what is important for our purposes, however, is the fact that it is an immanent dimension – immanent because it is a failure, because it never rises above the realm in which it is and can be thought.

Whereas for Lacan schizophrenia is the eradication of the relation, already arbitrary to begin with, between the signifier and the signified, and the consequent loss of semiotic cognition, for Deleuze and Guattari it is a heightened sense of semiotic relatedness that obtains, a feeling that there are no natural relations, that new ones can constantly form. It is semiotics without a bar. Instead of being lost in the funhouse, the postmodern schizo is for the first time in history aware that his or her environment is in fact a funhouse, a dead zone of images, false trails, bad deceptions. If they are happy there it is because they have finally learned to laugh at the madness that surrounds them on all sides, not because they have lost contact with reality.[100] 'Far from having lost who knows what contact with life, the schizophrenic is closest to the beating heart of reality, to an intense point identical with the production of the real.'[101] No doubt, then, Deleuze and Guattari are correct in believing that no one 'has ever been as deeply involved in history as the schizo, or dealt with it in this way. He consumes all of universal history in one fell swoop.'[102] Instead of being a malaise, schizophrenia turns out to be the sign we are in fact coping with postmodernism, adapting to its twists and turns, precisely as Jameson

envisaged that we must. This is the moment then for me to return to the issue of the body, for what Jameson seems to be calling for in his account of postmodernism is precisely a hastened evolution of the human body.

Despite the obvious, though pernicious truism that the body is usually only positioned as a third term so it can be repressed (so that sticky questions of libinality and so on can be buried with it, something Jameson can hardly be accused of), it nevertheless remains tempting to see the omission of an extended meditation on the body anywhere in Jameson's output as a deliberate avoidance because the body does actually seem to stand between all the opposing terms in the various critical binaries Jameson utilises without ever being fully figured for itself. Nowhere is this more obviously true than in the account of postmodern space where the body plays no part beyond that of faulty apparatus. It is perception that is the primary term. This is even true of his use of the notion of bodily perception, which although it appears to foreground the body still positions it as, finally, in-between: it is in-between what is perceived and the perceiving apparatus itself, namely the eyes, and is figured only as the more diffuse registration of affect. Here then, as in Merleau-Ponty's work, the body really only serves as a means of deconstructing phenomenology, forcing it to reckon with the apparatus of perception as well as the phenomena of perception.[103] Bodily perception turns out only to mean that what we see we feel, and that our response is visceral because it cannot be purely visual (our eyes cannot 'reply' as it were).[104] Yet all of this assumes that a body as such can at some stage be placed in evidence; that it has a known and knowable form, a precise reference point and an obvious sense; none of which his dialectical method could permit him to hold true. As Jameson has shown in relation to such apparently 'natural' sensations as pleasure, even affect, long held to be utterly spontaneous and instinctive, must be bracketed because far from being purely physiological it is thoroughly ideologically coded.[105]

I want to suggest therefore that Jameson's proposed moratorium on the 'body' is a considered response to a problem of description.[106] As I believe he must see it: the problem lies in the algorithm itself (perception + body + space) – or rather, in the insistence that an algorithm can apply in such a situation. It assumes that the body is a thing, that perception is an activity, and that affect is a second order response to perception that runs through the body like electricity. It also assumes that the body is distinct from the space it inhabits, both in a general sense of discrete solids, and in a genealogical sense. The next question then is whether or not the body is thinkable at all? Again, it would not be some ready to hand referent that was at issue, but a concept. And in this respect I think it is probably true to

say for all its present attention that the body has become unthinkable, for Jameson at least, in postmodern theory. It is unthinkable because no new totalisation has been constructed to replace the now rejected idea of the natural body, except perhaps the cyborg but that is too additively conceived a concept (body + machine) to really serve as an adequate replacement. It is also unthinkable because capitalism separates the body from its attributes and abilities, turning it into a source of labour, a surface to be ornamented and displayed, and even more insidiously a problem to be solved (bad breath, obesity, fitness, health and so on). In trying to articulate this problematic cultural studies has simply turned the body itself into a way of totalising certain forms of consumer culture, from punk to crossdressing, thereby pushing it into even further abstraction. It has become an empty signifier sadly capable of absorbing both the demands of consumer capitalism and the inquiries of critical theory.

The truly perverse outcome of the now legendary unmappability of the Bonaventure Hotel is not, I want to argue, finally, that it turns customers away; but that in attempting to lure them in, by disguising or else hiding its implicit connections to global capitalism in such a spectacular fashion, it actually brings to mind the enormity of capital, the very thing it hides so well. In this respect, schizophrenia is, though Jameson does not say as much, a utopian concept; still another example of what Jameson refers to as succeeding by failure. My point in suggesting that postmodern space is delightfully bewildering is that its primary effect seems to be the suppression of inquiry, which is not to say false consciousness so much as the diminution of that political awareness we call conscience.[107] The distracted window-shopper is anything but politically conscious and certainly very far from being subversive, no matter how much unauthorised pleasure they gain from the marvellous displays, and the not incidental opportunity to display themselves malls afford. The mall, if it is to be seen in its proper light as a technology for the creation of surplus value, has to be seen as recuperating in advance any and all uses of its space, whether these result in direct sales or not, because it has by the fact of the presence of mall-users succeeded in its singular aim of attracting potential customers.

And although he makes the same observation himself, Jameson does not ask the one question that would seem to follow from this observation and that is, from the point of view of obtaining surplus profits, how does the mall in the Bonaventure Hotel actually work? Obviously enough, he does not ask this question because in a sense he has answered it already by saying the mall in fact does not work as it is supposed to. Yet, in the same breath, as it were, he also points out – contradictorily – that the general

pattern it follows of being a city within a city is in fact a world-wide trend, so one must assume it is not generally speaking a bad strategy. In other words, far from depriving the subject of agency, in saying that customers are turned away by postmodern space, Jameson is probably endowing them with too much. By the same token, the very experience Jameson saw as resulting from a loss of historicity turns out to be the most intensely historicising experience available.

Notes

1. Gregory 1994: 139. Cf. Pile 1996: 247 n. 6.
2. Thus I extend Kellner's claim made in 1989. Cf. Kellner 1989: 2. Interestingly, the strongest competition for this title of most written about is probably Foucault's work on the prison, which obviously enough is also an inquiry into the coalescence of architecture and culture.
3. Homer 1998: 134.
4. For instance, Pile 1996: 247 n. 6; Bertens 1995: 183 n. 5.
5. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 15.
6. Jameson's errors of memory and map-reading, which were duly amended in subsequent versions of the essay, are recorded for posterity by Soja 1997: 198.
7. Jameson 1991: 44.
8. See, for instance, two very interesting collections of papers, *Sexuality and Space* (Colomina 1992) and *The Sex of Architecture* (Agrest et al. 1996).
9. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 316.
10. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 324.
11. In this respect, it obeys an important principle of schizoanalysis: 'the rule of the right to non-sense as well as the absence of a link' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 314).
12. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 326.
13. As we've seen, attraction and repulsion are in fact the twin actions of the body without organs. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 9–11.
14. Davis 1985: 112. Homer (1998: 176) reaffirms this point, as does Ruddick (1990: 194). The history of the Bunker Hill site is explored by Soja 1997: 211–15.
15. Jameson 1991: 41–2. For an interesting use of the Bonaventure's reflective exterior, which picks up on precisely it class-distinguishing function, see *Most Wanted*, which uses the mirrored surface of the hotel as a contrasting backdrop in a scene where the fugitive hero hides out in a homeless man's humpy.
16. 'At least 100 000 apparel homeworkers toil within a few miles radius of the Bonaventure and child labour is again a shocking problem' (Davis 1985: 110). This is by no means a problem peculiar to the Bonaventure, it is in many ways an implicit feature of the concept of the mall. As Anne Friedberg has put it, 'The mall is a contemporary phantasmagoria, enforcing a blindness to a range of urban blights – the homeless, beggars, crime, traffic, even weather' (Friedberg 1993: 113).
17. Jameson 1991: 421 n. 19; Mandel 1978: 23.
18. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 412.
19. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 409.
20. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 10.
21. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 410.

22. Jameson 1998a: 154, 187.
23. Davis 1985: 107; Even more puzzling is Gregory's endorsement, 1994: 281.
24. Jameson 1993: 30.
25. For an interesting representation of this side of the Bonaventure, see the John Badham film, *Nick of Time*.
26. Some of these issues are addressed in Morris 1988.
27. Dreiser 1994 [1900]: 332.
28. Jameson 1991: 332.
29. Clifford 1997: 32.
30. Jameson 1994: xv.
31. As Jameson insists, there is a right way and wrong way of reading Hegel; his own preference is not to condemn Hegel for his idealism, which is easily done, though not all that interesting or useful, but rather to look at those things he was capable of doing thanks to his idealism. Jameson 1998b: 75.
32. Jameson 1991: xxii.
33. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 40–2.
34. Jameson 1991: xxi.
35. Dialectics teaches 'us that we cannot speak of an underlying "essence of things", of a fundamental class structure inherent in a system in which one group of people produces value for another group, unless we allow for the dialectical possibility that even this fundamental 'reality', may be 'realer' at some historical junctures than at others, and that the underlying object of our thoughts and representations – history and class structure – is itself as profoundly historical as our own capacity to grasp it' (Jameson 1992: 37).
36. It is Gasché who shows most clearly that differance is an intellectual construct enabling a certain form of philosophy.
37. For instance, on the issue of the death of the subject, Jameson states that it is unproductive to take side, 'except to observe that the kinds of criticism and interpretation generated on either side of this divide will be very different from each other' (Jameson 1992: 117).
38. Jameson 1988b: viii.
39. Cf. Jameson 1988b: 103–13. This desire for an 'other' space is much more explicit in colonial and postcolonial situations. For example, the Hotel Indonesia in Christopher Koch's *Year of Living Dangerously* is defined as a world complete unto itself, and sealed off from the world around it by prohibitive cost. Not surprisingly, it is the chosen haven of the white, ex-patriot journalists. One can find a similar treatment of the hotel in Arundhati Roy's *The God of Small Things*.
40. Jameson 1991: 40. To this list may be added, according to Harvey at least, the renovated Gare d'Orsay in Paris and the new Lloyds Building in London. Harvey 1990: 83.
41. Cf. Friedberg 1993: 111–15.
42. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 303.
43. 'When you recall that Portman is a businessman as well as an architect and a millionaire developer, an artist who is at one and the same time a capitalist in his own right, one cannot but feel that here too something of a "return of the repressed" is involved' (Jameson 1991: 44, 49). On this point, I agree with Harvey that some element of the spectacle of postmodern space must be a carefully calculated attempt at social control, which is how increased consumption should be understood in late capitalism. Harvey 1990: 88.
44. Jameson 1994: 29; 1988b: 89. De Certeau 1986: 121.
45. Benjamin 1997: 174.
46. Jameson 1988b: 89.

47. Jameson 1991: 44.
48. Jameson 1991: 44.
49. 'It may now be suggested that this alarming disjunction point between the body and its built environment – which is to the initial bewilderment of the older modernism as the velocities of spacecraft to those of the automobile – can itself stand as the symbol and analogon of that even sharper dilemma which is the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the great global multi-national and decentered communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects' (Jameson 1991: 44).
50. The concept of the analogon is taken from Sartre's *Psychology of Imagination*. Jameson defines it as 'that structural nexus in our reading or viewing experience, in our operations of decoding or aesthetic reception, which can then do double duty and stand as the substitute and representative within the aesthetic object of a phenomenon on the outside which cannot in the very nature of things be "rendered" directly' (Jameson 1992: 53).
51. In a later work, Jameson gives grounds for a different kind of speculation. Insofar as America recognises itself as being somehow at the centre of globalised, late capitalism, it also has to admit to a certain amount of blindness. As such, the figurative disorientation that Jameson's argument hinges on can now be reread as a kind of allegorical blindness that a theorisation of globalisation may help to correct. Cf. Jameson 1998b: 59. Such blindness should not however be construed as weakness, or taken to mean that capitalism's effects are not felt at the ground level, as an early commentator, John Fiske, mistakenly reads Jameson. Cf. Fiske 1988: 297.
52. Jameson 1991: 44.
53. While I have little sympathy with Goldstein's paper as a whole, on this point I do agree: 'If were we to see only the strangeness of the Bonaventure Hotel and not its ordinariness, we would be missing something important about the everyday cultural logic of late capitalism' (Goldstein 1993: 159).
54. This is what I take to be the deeper implication of the otherwise facile observation Goldstein makes in saying Jameson responds to the Bonaventure mall as a theorist and not a consumer. Goldstein 1993: 160. It also explains why Steve Pile found its space to be disappointingly uncomplicated: his mode of perception was different to Jameson's, postmodern where the latter was still modern. Pile 1996: 247 n. 6.
55. So while I agree with Friedberg in thinking that the mall and the cinema are two different means of mobilising the gaze, I do not share her view that the gaze itself is a homogeneous function. For the same reason, I cannot agree with Baudrillard's claim that in order to properly examine the American landscape one should begin in the cinema and then work outwards (Baudrillard 1988: 56). My position is that each perceptual situation demands its own mode of perception. For a different comparison between Baudrillard and Jameson, see Lehan 1998: 276–80.
56. Deleuze 1986: 2.
57. Conveniently, thanks to *In the Line of Fire* it is now possible to make a precise comparison between the actual experience of the lifts at the Bonaventure and the cinematic experience of them.
58. Jameson 1991: 42–3.
59. Buck-Morss 1989: 253–60.
60. Jameson 1994: 58.
61. Mandel 1978: 232.
62. 'We're definitely moving toward "control" societies that are no longer exactly disciplinary. Foucault's often taken as the theorist of disciplinary societies and

of their principal technology, *confinement* (not just in hospitals and prisons, but in schools, factories, and barracks). But he was actually one of the first to say that we're moving away from disciplinary societies, we've actually left them behind. We're moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication' (Deleuze 1995: 174).

63. Jameson 1988b: 117–20.
64. Jameson 1961: 19; 1988a: 68; 1991: 70, 303.
65. Bachelard 1964: 184.
66. Jameson 1991: 39–44. For an even more exacting description of this feature of the Bonaventure mall see Soja 1989: 234–5. Baudrillard too has occasion to describe the Bonaventure Hotel, but his account is little more than a pastiche of Jameson's, making the same remarks about the exterior being like reflector sunglasses and the interior being confusing. The only difference is that Baudrillard is not able to decide whether this is a postmodern space or not. Baudrillard 1988: 59.
67. Jameson actually says there are no signposts, which may have been true when he visited, but is no longer the case. Interestingly enough, in one of the pictures of the interior of the Bonaventure that Jameson includes in his book directional signs can actually be seen.
68. Jameson 1994: 30.
69. For an example of this particular form of privileging of the indigenous see Appardurai 1996: 32.
70. 'The postmodern effect, on the contrary, ratifies the specializations and differentiations on which it is based: it presupposes them and thereby prolongs and perpetuates them . . . ' (Jameson 1991: 371).
71. Jameson 1991: 26–7.
72. 'With the breakdown of the signifying chain, therefore, the schizophrenic is reduced to an experience of pure material signifiers, or, in other words, a series of pure and unrelated presents in time' (Jameson 1991: 27).
73. Jameson 1991: 27.
74. Brecht 1964: 97.
75. Jameson 1988b: 141.
76. It is worth pointing out here, I think, that in his account of the same conceptual frame, Harvey elides the crucial methodological and epistemological differences between Deleuze and Guattari's definition of schizophrenia and Lacan's because he interpolates a modernism/postmodernism period distinction not found in their work, nor in Lacan's either I shouldn't wonder, effectively making the former paranoid and the latter schizoid, which is a profound misrepresentation. Harvey 1990: 53–4.
77. For an alternative, much more rigorously dialectical (in the Hegelian sense) attempt at a rapprochement of Deleuze and Jameson, see Miklitsch 1998: 49–59.
78. Cf. Jameson 1988b: 123–32.
79. Oddly, Jameson later dismisses this very apparatus altogether, condemning it as 'merely' existential, without any reference to his earlier instrumental use of it. In the same breath he then introduces yet another distortion into the picture by disenchaining codes from territoriality, when Deleuze and Guattari say that it is precisely the codes inbuilt in flows that makes territorialisation possible. Cf. Jameson 1998a: 150–2; Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 285.
80. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 379.
81. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 33.
82. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 34, 278.

83. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 34.
84. 'In a sense, it is the bank that controls the whole system and the investment of desire. [. . .] That is why it is unfortunate that Marxist economists too often dwell on considerations concerning the mode of production, and on the theory of money as the general equivalent as found in the first section of *Capital*, without attaching enough importance to banking practice, to financial operations, and to the specific circulation of credit money – which would be the meaning of a return to Marx, to the Marxist theory of money' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 230). For an example of just such analysis, one that emphasises credit over mode of production, see Arrighi 1994 and also Jameson's commentary on it, Jameson 1998a: 136–61.
85. 'We know very well where lack – and its subjective correlative – come from. Lack is created, planned, and organized in and through social production. [. . .] The deliberate creation of lack as a function of market economy is the art of the dominant class. This involves deliberately organizing wants and needs amid an abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one's needs satisfied; and making the object dependent upon a real production that is supposedly exterior to desire (the demands of rationality), while at the same time the production of desire is categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 28).
86. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 4.
87. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 76–7.
88. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 63, 292.
89. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 131.
90. Jameson 1982: 153; 1975: 239; 1973: 59.
91. Postmodernism, for instance, can conjure fantastic digital paradises in which everything a person could want would be available instantly in virtual form (as well as a host of apocalyptic scenarios, to be sure, from total environmental collapse to thermonuclear armageddon), but appears unable to conceive of a world-system other than capitalism. Cf. Jameson 1994: xii.
92. Jameson 1999: 412; Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 341.
93. Jameson 1988b: 80.
94. Jameson 1992: 29.
95. In *The Seeds of Time* Utopia is given precisely a repoliticising, therapeutic task: 'There is', Jameson says, 'a collective therapy to be performed on the victims of depoliticization themselves, a rigorous look at everything we fantasize as mutilating, as privative, as oppressive, as mournful and depressing, about all the available visions of a radical transformation in the social order' (Jameson 1994: 61).
96. The suggestion that Utopia is an immanent rather than transcendental notion is Marin's. See Jameson 1988b: 88.
97. Jameson 1973: 58.
98. Jameson 1973: 58.
99. Jameson 1973: 59.
100. On this point, it should be noted that laughter and euphoria are not the same thing, and I agree with Jameson that the euphoria customarily associated with postmodernism is in fact merely a compensation formation. Jameson 1991: 330.
101. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 87.
102. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 21.
103. Jameson 1991: 124.
104. Jameson 1992: 1.

105. Jameson 1988b: 62–3.
106. Jameson 1993: 44.
107. This is how I interpret Jameson's claim that postmodernism may be characterised by a certain 'waning of affect'. Jameson 1991: 10–15.

Chapter 7

Deleuze and Popular Music[1]

> It seems clear to me that philosophy is truly an unvoiced song, with the same feel for movement music has.
>
> (Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*)

Rightly or wrongly, Deleuze has been labelled a snob for his high-brow taste in music, art and literature.[2] Whether that is just or not I cannot say, but it is quite clear that popular cultural texts do not figure very largely in his thought. Indeed, for the most part, Deleuze depicts the popular as the undesirable other, or, worse, an enormous homogenising machine depriving art of its place and value in contemporary society.[3] In this respect, at least, Deleuze is very much like Adorno, utterly modernist. The question is, though, can Deleuze's work, despite his personal taste, actually account for the peculiar events and phenomena of popular culture? I believe it can, but only if we disentangle popular cultural texts and practices from the amorphous matrix of capitalism Deleuze identifies them with, and treat them with the same respect and affection he accords Kafka's writing, for instance. This would amount to the discovery and articulation of a form of creativity unique to mass culture. Rather than contrast art and popular culture, and rehearse a procedure Deleuze is known to have loathed, what needs to be found is a way of avoiding such distinctions altogether, something Deleuze himself made his life's work. His way out of Hegelian forms of dialectics was abstraction, or the discovery of the artistry of any text. This is particularly necessary in the case of popular music, my concern here, because to many it is nothing but a giant exercise in money-making, and thereby completely devoid of aesthetic value.[4] In other words, it stands in need of abstraction, or what I termed 'conceptualisation'. Deleuze, however, was apt to make both too much and too little of the commercial imperative of capitalism, and never himself took this approach to popular culture.

In the first place, while it may be true that Kafka never intended

publishing his work, and can rightly be said to have written for himself not profit, it is nevertheless also true that he wrote from within a capitalist milieu. This does not therefore mean that Kafka's writing is a straightforward reflection – or reification even – of capitalism, or that if it is not an expression of capitalism it must necessarily contain a critique of capitalism. But it does mean Kafka could not avoid thinking about it, no matter how much he might have tried, and that this fact must somewhere and somehow be registered in what he wrote. This is why the most important claim in the whole of the Kafka book is the one which states Kafka was intrinsically anti-capitalist in his mode of writing.[5] What it does, which I cannot but find curious, is subordinate Kafka's writing to his gesture, namely his refusal to publish. It is curious because it deforms the complexity of Kafka's response to his environment in a way that it is against the grain of Deleuze's thought: to begin with, it makes the artist all but impervious to the vagaries of everyday life in a socio-historical sense, as though to say, not only did Kafka write for himself, but he also worked from within himself; this, in turn, allows Deleuze and Guattari to pursue the psycho-dynamic indices in Kafka's writing with the same relish and hermeneutic flexibility Freud enjoyed (and which they chide him for). In the end, this excision puts too much emphasis on the significance of capitalism and not enough on the relation between the writer and his world.[6]

In contrast, one must say Deleuze does not emphasise enough the centrality of capitalism in film. One can safely say that all the Hollywood films Deleuze mentions in his two books on cinema, no matter how art-house in conception or execution, were made with the aim of making money for someone, even if it was not the director, and while this does not mean film is inherently and irretrievably an expression of capital, it does mean that some facets of the commercial infrastructure of film-making need to be taken into consideration. Besides the obvious constraint of budget, which can be crudely but instructively assessed in terms of dollars per screened minute, there is also distribution, marketing, and format to be considered. Is the film 70mm? How many cinemas can it be seen in? How much push is the studio putting behind it? Where cinema is concerned, all these questions are, I would argue, integral to the more general Deleuzian question of 'how does it work?' This is not to deny that a screen text can be read with the same emphasis on the aesthetic as any other medium, but it is to assert that it is more complexly bound to its milieu than other modes of art perhaps are. Deleuze was surely not unaware of this; yet he does not shy away from affirming the aesthetic importance of film. In other words, he was content to talk about popular

cultural texts, but not in popular cultural terms. I imagine that this is pretty much what de Certeau would have said against Deleuze, adding perhaps that to not examine how cultural texts are actually used is to fail to understand both them and culture.[7]

My problem here is twofold. First of all, I do not think Deleuze would allow that Kafka's means of escape from the constrictions of capitalism is available to just anybody, much less to teeny-bopper fans of pop, and this makes capitalism into a monster of godly proportions and capabilities. This becomes obvious when his esteem for the peculiar creativity of 'minor' cultural producers like Beckett, Messiaen and Klee, who are valuable because of the lines of flight, or escape, they each have conjured, is compared with the mindless conformity Deleuze attributes to producers of mass, or 'major' cultural, objects such as pop videos, whose chief failing is precisely that they take us nowhere despite their promise.[8] Majority for Deleuze is any model you have to conform to, thus it is everybody and nobody, and it is this blanching effect that art must resist.[9] Pop culture, insofar as it does induce, command or otherwise result in conformity, clearly cannot fulfil the essential promise of art and deliver us from the homogenising manipulations of the market. In other words, it can never result in the new, in the modernist sense. It may be, though, that conformity itself has been misunderstood, whited over by a still modernist zeal for originality. My second problem, accordingly, is that Deleuze does not accord all popular cultural texts the same aesthetic value he allows film, despite the fact that film really has no special claim to textual specificity, that is, artistic separation from the capitalist machine, and thereby prevents an adequate engagement with the popular.

His low regard for the popular notwithstanding, Deleuze does however provide several useful critical tools for its analysis and it is these that I am going to try to bring into the light via a discussion of nostalgia in popular music. What I am looking for here is a Deleuzian way of doing cultural studies, and a Deleuzian explanation of the role played by nostalgia in the presentation and appreciation of contemporary pop. I am prompted to follow this particular line of inquiry by the fact, intriguing to me, that in my home town, Perth (Western Australia), the radio station with the lion's share of the lucrative 18–35 year-old market (92.9 PMFM) plays lots of 1980s music, and, perhaps more interestingly still, makes a big deal about it too.[10] Indeed, the fact that it plays 1980s music is the centrepiece of its current station-identity ('Yeah, I have flashbacks'). If ratings are anything to go by – and in commercial radio what else is there? – its 1980s playlist, which includes songs going on twenty years old, is extremely popular.[11] In fact, given that it often devotes an hour at a stretch to

playing 1980s tracks, PMFM's 1980s playlist must be working very well for them indeed. What I wonder is whether or not it is possible to answer a simple but obvious question, like why is 1980s music so popular today? If the obvious answer, namely nostalgia, is the correct one, then I would like to be able to determine what exactly it is about 1980s music that today's listeners are nostalgic for?

This presents us with a number of perplexities, which, as I hope to show, Deleuze's work is able to resolve. The first of these arises from the fact that if we were to say it is the music itself that is longed for today, then before we could ask who is nostalgic we would need to determine what is so special about *that* music, not only in contrast to other musical styles, but in absolute terms too. From today's perspective, the only thing that really stands out about music from the 1980s is its clumsiness (by which I mean the purely subjective judgement that today we do it better), but the same could be said for the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. In other words, given that the actual variation between the popular music of the 1950s and 1980s is so slender, could a detailed musicological account or description of the shifts in modes of syncopation (it being understood that melody falls increasingly into irrelevance as pop progresses) that characterise this decade be of any use in ascertaining what we might choose to call nostalgic potential? If we map the 1980s as the era when disco became new wave, then new romantic, and then went on to become techno, via a strange deviation through rap (which too was born, or at least became prominent, in the 1980s), are we brought any nearer to seeing how it is that the J. Geils Band's one hit, 'Centrefold', is popular all over again? Not really, but this should not be surprising. Music history, of which musicology is but one of its more sensitive implements, is never going to be able to provide a satisfactory account of popular music because it is too irrevocably tied to the idea of the clean break, or distinctive shift.

From a musicological perspective, the musical shifts evident in popular music are so minute as to rarely rise above the merely innovative, and, what is more, are generally confined to changes in instrumentation or recording processes. Historians, so long as they cling to the idea of the clean break, the appearance of the new in other words, are thus compelled to emphasise context over content. The effect of this, however, is not merely the volatisation of the idea and reality of the original in popular culture, as Jameson puts it, but the eradication of content too, something Jameson in fact tries to save. Even so, his sympathetic account of what a critical analysis of pop music must now aim at evacuates pop music of its content just as surely as those which *in principle* deride the popular for being empty. 'The passionate attachment one can form to this or that pop

single, the rich personal investment of all kinds of private associations and existential symbolism which is the feature of such attachment, are fully as much a function of our familiarity as of the work itself.' What this means, as Jameson goes on to explain, is that a pop song, by way of its incessant repetition, 'insensibly becomes part of the existential fabric of our own lives, so that we listen to ourselves, our own previous auditions'.[12] The only thing left to study, therefore, is ourselves as listeners. A more general way of putting this would be to say artistic criteria only apply to art, which is defined by its ability to get us outside of the sphere of ourselves, and non-art, which fails to do that much, needs to be judged by different means. But, since such means cannot be formulated around a primary object, as art theory is, because in the realm of the popular immediacy gives way to mediation, the problem of the popular cultural object is dropped in favour of an inquiry into reception and once again theory turns towards the subjective.

   The trouble is this inquiry into reception is prejudiced by modernist values. Although the new is described in terms of its effect on listeners, it continues to be defined by its manifest textual difference, its rare and superior 'difficulty' in other words. Pop, then, because it not only strives for simplicity, but is in fact defined by it, cannot hope to compete or compare, despite the fact that it too has had the same or similar 'striking effects' on people modernism attributes to the best art has to offer. Although manifest in performance, where art theory seems determined not to look, complexity in pop is never to be found at the level of the text, where modernism seeks it. Indeed, at the performance level, pop has increased in complexity with every technological advance to such an extent that it must now be described as cybernetic. Of course, the technical difficulty involved in producing a new Michael Jackson song cannot be compared to the conceptual difficulty of a new score by Boulez, but does that mean the two are completely incommensurable? What has been left out of the equation altogether is effect. Yet, I would argue, in market capitalism effect is the only distinction that survives; all others, including context, are obliterated by its relentless, rationalising mechanisms. My implication is that when, as is the case today, sales of Beethoven CDs rival sales of Beatles CDs, and any claim to aesthetic superiority Beethoven's music might have is used as promotional material, the aesthetic distinction itself is instrumentalised and with it the very source of the distinction, namely unique musicality, leaving us with nothing but effect.

   The effect of music, or any piece of art, is what it sets in motion for a particular listener. It is what it does, in other words, and though it may be

attributable to composition, it is not a function of it because effect is a relation, not a property. Already we have seen that for Deleuze the effect of pop is conformity, while for non-pop it is escape. I do not intend to challenge Deleuze on either of these points, especially not the charge that pop induces conformity, what I do want to challenge, however, is the negative value conformity is coded with. The privilege accorded to originality is undoubtedly the most persistent and in many ways perni-cious (from the point of view of popular culture, at least) legacy of modernism and is at the heart of what it has to say about the social effect of art. The privilege bestowed on the original is at once ideological and methodological and although they are mutually supporting the two strands of this particular web can be separated. In the twentieth century alone, the new or different has been prized by modernists and Marxists alike for the fact that it makes plain that the shape of present society is due to historical shifts, not natural or inevitable forces, and can always be changed further, perhaps for the better. Both schools hold that the new is under constant threat of absorption by the capitalist system, a fear readily appreciated when one considers the centrality of rarity in the exchange system, but neither is able to see that such absorption may in fact be positive rather than deleterious. Yet such absorption is not only inevi-table, but also desirable insofar as it implies collective change. Drawing on Deleuze's concept of the refrain, I will argue that the conformity inherent to pop is an effect of its newness, and that such newness has an affirmative side to it that is the equivalent of a line of flight.

So, looking back at the 1980s, was any of the bubble-gum pop of that era, which then as now seemed as much driven by changes in hair fashion as musical innovation, really new? Yes, I would say, at the level of effect, much of it was very new. Now of course it sounds inept and raw, which is to say both technologically and culturally backward, but then it sounded of the moment. Indeed, the music of the times produced the moment *as* a moment by giving it a particular sound, and with it a mood, a way of dressing and something to buy (film is a constant reminder of this fact; indeed, pop music has come to be the surest marker of historical period, it being enough to put the Easybeats on the soundtrack to signal that the setting is 1960s Australia). The modernist question would be to ask whether or not this shift in taste is the product of the emergence of a genuinely new mode of music, or the effect of cultural programming?[13] But, given that both outcomes can be seen to be reactions to the homogenising effects of commodity capitalism, one to its etiolation of critical thought, the other to its retardation of sales, the question is essentially moot. Its principal failing is that it does not produce a

distinction between a mode of the new which is against the impulse of capitalism and one which is the very lifeblood of capitalism that is not reliant on the position adopted by the critic. More generally, I would argue that Kant's much prized definition of art, the basis of much of what modernism has to say, is built around a spurious division: purposive purposelessness is to the loathed purposefulness of the commodity, as communism is to market capitalism, a hysterical repression of its grounding idea, intent.[14] Crudely, to contrast art that is purposefully made, whether to sell or to make a point and art that is unintentionally put together and only sold incidentally is meaningless at the level of the text, which is no doubt why art theorists stress effect so much. The trouble is, though, as I have already suggested, the effect of high art has never been well enough distinguished to prevent the same thing being said of pop. The reason for this, I want to argue, is that the difference is one of degree only.

It is time now to ask, not only 'what is the new?' but also 'is there a different new for popular culture and high culture?' By definition, the new has precedence over everything, which means, as Lyotard's polemical appraisals of postmodern aesthetics has shown, that the postmodern does not come after the modern, but before it.[15] Otherwise it would not shock us, it would not be new or different enough to truly make us reel if it were simply an exaggeration, or an ironisation even, of what already exists. The new excites us because it overwhelms our senses, by which we mean to say it catches us without the appropriate faculty to apprehend it.[16] This is of course Kant's argument, that the new is sublime, but this is still an *a posteriori* argument relying on effect. Assuming the new has such an effect, some account needs to be given of it in order to determine why art theory has singled it out for attention. Kant's definition of art does not in itself explain the pleasure of the giddiness, or the thrill of the incomprehension, that sublimity provides; nor does it explain the longing we feel once it has passed. What is it about the new that captures our attention even as we throw up our hands in despair of ever making sense of it? Most obviously, it is its difference, but that does not explain its appeal and appeal, I am suggesting, underpins the recognition of difference. A better question then would be: what is the appeal of the new? It is this question, and not what constitutes the new, or modern, that should be the concern of cultural studies, as it erodes the distinction between high and popular. For it is all very well to assess the relative postmodernity of an artwork, or film, but such a determination does not in itself tell us why that information is important. As Nietzsche has said of truth, we do not know where the urge for the new comes from.

What needs to be determined therefore is the basis of western culture's continuing obsession with issues of modernity. Why do we want to know whether or not a work of art is modern or postmodern, if it is not because culturally we are predisposed to regard the new in a particular way? The appeal of the new, I imagine, must be that it does something the old cannot achieve, and not simply that it is different. So what we must discover is what this 'something' is, and how it operates. But more importantly we need to discover why it is that our culture requires this 'something'. As anthropology has shown, this requirement is not universal, or not, at least, universally articulated.[17] The difference imperative is not, I would argue, reducible to a simple quest for what Bourdieu has called distinction. Distinction describes only the character of the goal, not its motivation. As such, Bourdieu's analyses are somewhat wide of the mark of what cultural studies should really be about. There is no sense in describing what the goals of a culture are, if the significance of these goals cannot first be explained. One way of apprehending the difference imperative in its specificity, and thus determining what it is exactly that distinction does, is to try to clarify the appeal of difference.

This presumes that difference is knowingly sought, and its peculiar benefits obvious to those who seek it.[18] This move, which is manifestly counter-Bourdieu, risks returning cultural studies to precisely the position that Bourdieu wisely extricated it from in the first place, and thus might be seen as revisionist, or worse regressive. I will reply by saying that Bourdieu's critique of personalist or intentionalist modes of cultural analyses are well founded, but that in attempting to solve the problem set by the need for a non-person-centred methodology that was not at the same time transcendental he ended up throwing out the baby with the bath-water. In eradicating intentions from cultural practice, and thereby eliminating the obfuscation of ends-oriented actions, Bourdieu expunged the will. My point in saying that difference is knowingly sought is precisely to retrieve the will: an action can be deliberate if it is willed, even if its specific outcome as end is not intended or ever fully known. So, in addition to Bourdieu's inquiry, I would ask: what does distinction do? My suggestion would be it sets becoming[19] – or what Guattari was to later call autopoiesis[20] – in motion. As the achievement of a sustained and conspicuous difference, it is not what one strives for in order to have what another does not, which is difference construed negatively; it is, rather, what one does in order to be who one is, which is difference conceived as affirmation.[21] Distinction is, in this sense, the formulation of a new self, which, because our society is undergirded by commodity capitalism, takes place in relation to consumer goods.

The new then, is not merely the different, but that which makes difference possible, and it is this power which can only be realised in a relationship between the object and a subject that is the basis of its appeal. That this interpretation might be correct can be adduced from the fact that not just any newly pressed CD qualifies as new, though it is always different (even if a duplicate), and no amount of programming can guarantee a favourable reception. The power of the new stems from the fact that it is able to institute difference in a field that seems stable, homogeneous. As I have already suggested, it is able to do this because it sets becoming in motion, which is to say the new is not 'acquired' via some straightforward mode of consumption, but is rather 'activated'. The new is not the 'merely different', but the *differenciating*.[22] It is what makes the difference characterised as diversity possible. In other words, it is not a phenomenon, but rather the 'noumenon closest to the phenomenon'.[23] What is especially significant about this concept for my purposes is the importance it places on repetition, for popular music – and its associated nostalgia – is constituted by repetition. 'In every case', Deleuze argues, 'repetition is the power of difference and differenciation: because it condenses the singularities, or because it accelerates or decelerates time, or because it alters space'.[24] Bearing in mind Deleuze's quite strict understanding of repetition, the question that needs to be addressed is of course whether the repetition one encounters in popular music is authentic or not?

What I want to show now, though, in advance of an answer to this question, is that popular music is a refrain. Like the tick, the refrain is composed of three functions. It comforts us by providing a 'rough sketch of a calming and stabilising, calm and stable, centre in the heart of chaos'.[25] It is the song the lost child, scared of the dark, sings to find his or her way home. The tune also creates the very home we return to when our foray into the world grows wearisome. Home is the product of a very particular gesture: one must 'draw a circle around that uncertain and fragile centre'[26] one is accustomed to calling home in order to delimit it as what de Certeau called place.[27] A housewife might sing to herself as she washes the dishes, or else have the radio playing in the background, and by so doing build a wall of sound around her to shelter a precious interiority, her self-created reserve of inner strength. A song also enables us to launch forth from the home it helped us to build. 'One ventures from home on the thread of a tune.'[28] With a song in our hearts we are able to extend indefinitely the secure interiority of the home; it is as though we take home with us wherever we go. The song is our future, a future of our own dreaming. To put it differently, we need not venture into the dark,

chaotic world of the unhomely again so long as we have a song. The refrain is these three things at once, not in succession: it is a block of sound that is at once a way home, the very source of home, and the home in our hearts. But, Deleuze and Guattari insist, the refrain is not music, it is rather 'the block of content proper to music'.[29]

Deleuze and Guattari reject Attali's apparently sensible distinction between sound and noise as the basis for analysing music and propose instead – drawing on Hjelmslev – to distinguish between music as form of expression and the refrain as form of content.[30] The refrain is not the origin of music, they caution, lest we return to a philosophy of essences, but 'rather a means of preventing music, warding it off, or forgoing it'. It is a speech-act of a particular type, a becoming in other words, not a peculiar sound-pattern. Music too is a speech-act: it is defined by the way it uses the refrain, not for any innate quality. Music picks the refrain up and by deploying it as a form of content in its own form of expression takes it elsewhere, makes it function otherwise. 'Music is a creative, active operation that consists in deterritorializing the refrain.' The refrain by contrast is 'essentially territorial, territorializing, or reterritorializing', and it quickly reclaims music for itself should it ever become self-indulgent, which is to say repetitive merely for the sake of hearing an enchanting little phrase over again.[31] To the ear, this distinction is actually quite sharp: music decodes, which means it tends towards the eradication of all codes (a code being the naturalisation of any connection between a sound and a concept), and the refrain recodes, or overcodes, which does not mean it restores order, as though music were chaos, but rather means it attempts to constrain variation by regulating it. A tune that sticks in your head and can be easily whistled or hummed is a refrain; a tune that requires more than one set of lips to whistle or hum is, by virtue of this inherent polyvocality, becoming-musical.

Where does this leave popular music? If popular music is indeed a refrain, then it is no longer music, which prompts the further question: how does this aid the cause of popular music in the death-struggle for recognition it is locked into with its sneering cousin, Music? At first glance it must seem like the final insult, that gob of spit in the eye of the popular which forces it to give up the fight altogether and retreat into a corner to lick its wounds and dream about the old times. And if the distinction between music and refrain was applied only to popular music, as though Music was intrinsically free of the taint of the refrain, as it were, this would indeed be the case. But that is not how it works. In fact, the very first casualty of this particular revolution is the value-driven (as well as value-laden) distinction between popular music and Music, an eradi-

cation no amount of comparative work (the pointless task of saying the popular is at least as good) can ever hope to achieve. It does this by shifting the ground of the discussion from aesthetic achievement to actual use. Music has its part to play, as does the refrain. But this does not mean we have solved the problem of the popular completely, for there is still the issue of instrumentalisation to consider. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms this would refer to the capture of either music or the refrain by the war machine of capitalism. The question would be whether or not popular music, as refrain, is actually capable of instituting meaningful difference given that it is always already a component of market capitalism.

In order to see how the refrain survives its capture we have to return to its three basic functions: the way home, the creation of a home, the home in our hearts. It is the second function which is the dominant one in market capitalism, I believe. Every new type of music that manages to carve a market niche for itself in fact creates a niche in the public sphere for its listeners: its function and appeal is first of all territorial. That is, it forces a fiercely protected domain to open its doors and admit one more. When punk smashed its way on to public radio in the late 1970s it changed the very meaning and sound of popular music.[32] So did the Beatles when they rose to superstardom in the mid-1960s. And before them there is a long line of innovators that can be traced right back to the halcyon days of Tin Pan Alley. The effect of this is precisely the third function of the refrain: the enfranchisement of faithful listeners. This usually means giving a voice to teenagers who, in most senses of the word do not otherwise have one. What they actually do with this voice is the crucial factor in this analysis. I would say, what they do corresponds to the first function of the refrain, in that listeners to popular music use the voice it gives them to enunciate themselves differently and in so doing make habitable the objective conditions of their existence; in other words, what popular music does is set in motion a becoming-minor – or, what amounts to the same thing, a becoming-public of the otherwise 'private' individual – which, as Deleuze and Guattari have said, is the initiation of a line of flight that is an escape.[33]

Contra Adorno, then, the simplicity of popular music is not a sign of the deformation of culture, nor the symptom of a deterioration of cultural ear, but evidence that its function is not thinkable in purely aesthetic terms.[34] The suggestion that music's function may be thought in etho-logical terms constitutes, I take it, a partial rejection, at least, of aes-thetics.[35] At any rate, it is fairly clear that aesthetics in the strictest sense leaves Deleuze and Guattari cold, which is precisely the problem. Sound, they say, 'invades us, impels, drags us, transpierces us' and does so to such

an extraordinary extent that occasionally it makes us want to die.[36] It ignites something in us and cannot be isolated from that passion without privation. It is as a modality of this productive relation between people and their sounds (which the refrain conceptualises) that I want to think nostalgia. Before coming to that, it is worth noting that cultural studies has already shown, in its own way to be sure, that popular music is a refrain, deeply connected with the rhythms and possibilities of everyday life and not some infantilising drone as Adorno seemed to think. It has also shown that it is territorial: its variegated strains serve at once as the rallying cry of individual subcultures, and the trigger that leads to their formation.

For instance, it has been claimed that Yothu Yindi have, in Australia at least, by virtue of the enormous popularity of their product, created a market for Black Australian commodities, generally. By making Black Australian marketable, they have in fact created, or re-created a Black Australia.[37] Tellingly, it is the 'surprising success' of the band, not their music, that has received the most critical attention. It is generally con-cluded that as the first authentically Aboriginal and broadly popular band, Yothu Yindi have, in the best sense of the word, *blackened* Australian radio.[38] By breaching the long-standing hegemony of White Australian music on Australian radio (in conjunction with overseas music of course), Yothu Yindi created a space in which other Aboriginal voices might emerge.[39] A similar case has been made for the gay community's adoption of disco,[40] and the incorporation of dance music into the everyday life of teenage girls.[41] All these analyses focus on use, not content, and it is this focus that enables them to conclude that new music, or, equally, a new use of old music, is foremost the birth of a new generation, its advent.

What is nostalgia, and how does it operate in market capitalism? If popular music really is a refrain, then there is a strong case to be made that nostalgia, in practice, is an instrumentalisation of the refrain. The sometimes grating irony of nostalgia is that even as it is a fondness for things past, it is really an act of terrorism on the future. For so long as we play old music like it is new, the authentically new is prevented from emerging. This is the line taken by most bands calling themselves original, when faced with the apparently too easy success of their cover counter-parts. While the aim of covering old tracks is unlikely to be anything so malign as the destruction of originality in music, that is certainly one of its effects. A more likely explanation is fear of failure: new music is costly to promote, if not to produce, and though capable of reaping huge profits, it can also fail just as easily. Nostalgia, meanwhile, is much cheaper to

market – it has already been promoted at least once – and though not a certain bet by any means, it is a gamble for which odds can at least be calculated. If one old disco tune has been revived successfully, then why not a second and a third? The irony of the popular success of nostalgic tracks, such as the revived and revamped 'I Love the Nightlife' by Alicia Bridges (from the soundtrack of *Priscilla*), is that when you set out to discover who (in the demographic sense) actually and *actively* is nostalgic it turns out to be people too young to remember the tune's debut![42] In that its operation does not rely on individual memory, the commercial exploitation of nostalgia (which may turn out not to be a function of memory at all) is indeed a form of instrumentalisation, but to explain how this song came to be popular all over again it must posit some kind of programming device. It cannot answer the question on the basis of the music alone.

Even so, it should still be possible to state how it is possible that popular music can be the subject of nostalgia. Nostalgia, I want to suggest, is inbuilt in the refrain itself. The very structure of popular music, its inherent repetitiveness in other words, makes it an especially potent nostalgia-inducing agent. My implication is that nostalgia does not only concern the distant past, nor indeed is it only a matter of memory (and as we have already seen, sometimes memory does not come into it all). It is manifest in the present as repetition, and its function is not simply mnemic. The increasingly narrow definitions applied to popular music by its practi-tioners and aficionados alike, which are as much assertions of cultural identity as musical distinction, suggest that internal variation is diminish-ing in desirability, not only possibility, which means the very success of groups like Blackbox and Technotronics is due to the fact they made an artform out of what Bourdieu has called 'diversity within homogeneity'.[43] While it is true that sounding different while sounding the same is from a commercial point of view the nearest one gets to a safe bet (it could be said that by not daring to change a manifestly successful formula, both Blackbox and Technotronics simply minimised their risks and capitalised on their successes), it is also true that neither group would have been successful if they had not been formulaic in their approach. Evidence for this is to be found throughout popular music. It is not just the techno outfits, renowned anyway for sampling and other forms of aural-plagiar-ism, who play the 'diversity within homogeneity' trick. Think of Status Quo, Racey, and other 1970s twelve-bar specialists, and the embedded-ness and importance of repetition to popular music becomes abundantly clear. When you look at the really early rock music, like Chuck Berry's, it can be seen that it was the mastery of repetition that lead to its invention.

The technological advances made in the course of the development of popular music are practically all to do with problems of repetition, beginning from the most basic idea of recording. As Benjamin said of film, 'mass reproduction is inherent in the very technique' of popular music production.[44] The repetitiveness of popular music is a reflection of this. Mass reproduction demands mass reproducibility. Popular music emphasises chorus and theme, for just this reason, it is that aspect of music which is produced by repetition. Hence its anthemic quality. What this suggests is that popular music is not really about 'being heard', but rather about 'being heard again'; and 'being heard again and again and again' is what *really* popular music is *really* about. The crucial question still to be answered is how is it able to command this repetition? What induces people to listen to popular songs over and over again? In art, this question is answered in the very definition of the artistic text: according to Deleuze, art itself, when it is new, produces a 'violent effect' that forces us to seek its meaning through experiencing it again.[45] One implication of this is that the new is never heard for the first time, but is always already involved in its own repetition. So how is this different to the effect of popular music, which similarly involves repetition? Deleuze's answer, as I have already noted, is that there are two kinds of repetition, or rather one mode of repetition that is genuine and another which is not. The difference between repetition and mere duplication (non-genuine repetition) is this: in practice, the latter induces conformity, while the former institutes difference.

It might appear that popular music cannot truly aspire to the status of genuine repetition because from a production point of view at least duplication is inherent in the very idea of the popular. But this fails to take consumption into account, which is a quite separate issue from the production of the music. As is clear in the opposition Deleuze constructs between repetition and moral law in his account of genuine repetition, conformity refers not to duplicated sound patterns, but to ways of behaving; in this case, conformity means aligning oneself with an existing institution and living as it dictates one ought to live. But as Deleuze notes, there are two ways of opposing a moral law: one can either challenge the law by attacking its grounding principles, as Sade does in his tract on republicanism for instance, or else become an enthusiastic advocate of the law, a false friend who turns the law to personal ends as Masoch did.[46] Capitalism, which is as much a code of behaviour as an economic system, is as open to both these kinds of subversion as any other institution. So even if it is true that pop music is defined by conformity, it must also be true that its defining conformity is under pressure from all sides.

Thus, one may reject a product outright. This happened to the glam-rock outfit Twisted Sister when they proposed to tour Australia in the early 1980s on the strength of one quasi-cult hit, 'We're not going to take it'. They advertised dates, booked venues and did all the right promotional things, but were forced to cancel due to a dismal lack of ticket sales. It also happened to Blondie on their 'Island of Lost Souls' tour and doubtless there are plenty of other examples. By the same token, one may be a false friend of rock, as camp is, and treat it with humour, as is the case with ABBA and practically every disco track recorded nowadays. Rap obeys the same principle even though its mode is utterly different from camp. Where popular music is concerned consumption is not a one-off digestion of a simple commodity. If we were to retain the food metaphor, and there is no reason why we should not, then we would have to say pop is like a gobstopper that continues to change flavour the longer one sucks on it. Like a gobstopper, it has no predetermined appeal or specified durability; one may like it or leave, chew it quickly or suck it slowly. Nostalgia, in this case, would not be the lingering taste one has after the gobstopper has finally dissolved, but rather the shift in flavours between layers of sherbet, which is to say, nostalgia is one component among many of a pop song. To my mind, it is its very amenability to nostalgic (re)appreciation which corroborates the claim that pop music is a refrain, for one of the defining features of the refrain is its inexpressiveness. It is pure content that awaits expression.[47] Pop is like that; it too awaits expression.

Notes

1. This chapter previously appeared in *Social Semiotics*, 7 (2): 175–88.
2. Rée 1995: 111.
3. 'What happened with pop videos is pathetic: they could have become a really interesting new field of cinematic activity, but were immediately taken over by organised mindlessness' (Deleuze 1995: 60).
4. Attali 1985: 102.
5. Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 40.
6. For a fine example of how Deleuze's thought can in fact be made to accommodate the tension between an artist and his or her world see Holland 1993. I take the term 'registration' from this source.
7. de Certeau 1984: 20–1.
8. Deleuze 1995: 149.
9. Deleuze 1995: 173–4.
10. This chapter was written in the summer of 1996/7.
11. According to AGB McNair's survey, PMFM rated between 26 per cent and 29 per cent, of the market, while its nearest rival, in terms of target audience, 96 FM rated only 4.6 per cent–5.1 per cent (its non-commercial rival, Triple J rated 9.2 per cent–9.8 per cent) during the survey period of 24 March to 27 April. And, in

the next survey period, interestingly, 96FM managed to boost their market share to 6.4 per cent by going back to their old playlist. Ironically, in the same period their station-identity campaign launched them as the 'New 96 FM'. It would appear that they stole some listeners back from PMFM by this strategy, as in the same period their ratings dropped by 1.7 per cent. (National Radio Ratings, published in *The Australian* 8 May 1996: 16; 19 June 1996: 16).

12. Jameson 1992: 20.
13. Attali 1985: 39.
14. I take the idea that communism is a suppression of market capitalism, not a radical alternative to it, from Jameson 1994: 76.
15. Cf. Lyotard 1992: 22.
16. This, as we've seen, is the key problem with postmodern architecture according to Jameson (1991: 44).
17. As Marshall Sahlins as pointed out, not all primitive peoples are utterly backward. In many cases the technology thought necessary for western-style progress actually exists, but the desire to utilise it in that way does not. The difference between the primitive and advanced societies therefore seems to western anthropologists to be that primitive societies were somehow inhibited. Thus the task of anthropology (according to Sahlins) is to discover what precluded the attempt to progress (Sahlins 1974: 31).
18. This is methodologically different from Bourdieu. Cf. de Certeau 1984: 56–60.
19. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 232–309.
20. Guattari 1995: 40.
21. Deleuze 1983: 9.
22. I take this term from Deleuze 1994. For an explanation of its etymology see the translator's preface: xii.
23. Deleuze 1994: 222.
24. Deleuze 1994: 220.
25. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 311.
26. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 311.
27. de Certeau 1984: 35.
28. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 311.
29. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 299.
30. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 302.
31. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 300.
32. As has been well documented. Cf. Hebdige 1988: 62–70; Chambers 1985: 176–80.
33. Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 26.
34. The simplest account of Adorno's thoughts on popular music is Jameson 1971: 3–59.
35. Any doubt on this score is laid to rest in the following proclamation: 'To us, Art is a false concept, a solely nominal concept . . .' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 300–1).
36. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 348.
37. There is a downside to this, however. Cf. Mitchell 1992: 11–14.
38. This is a clear instance of the operation Deleuze and Guattari call becoming-minor, which is always the transformation of the major. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 16–27.
39. For an extended discussion of Yothu Yindi's significance to the Australian music scene, see the collection of papers in *Perfect Beat*, 1:2.
40. Dyer 1990.
41. McRobbie 1990; Bradby 1990.
42. Going by the dance scene, which tends to anticipate radio, it is the 15–18-year-

old, and not as might be expected the 35-year-old, who demands to dance to (which is not necessarily the same as listen to, though when radio picks up on the scene it is) what are generally described as nostalgic tracks. A 15-year-old of today had still not been born when disco was at its fever pitch in the mid- to late 1970s, yet it is precisely disco that he or she is most inclined to dance to, albeit in a re-mixed form.

43. Bourdieu 1990: 60.
44. Benjamin 1968: 244 n. 7.
45. Deleuze 1972: 22.
46. Deleuze 1994: 5.
47. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 317.

Conclusion:

A Dialectical Deleuze?

> No theory today escapes the marketplace. Each one is offered as possibility among competing opinions; all are put up for a choice; all are swallowed. There are no blinders for thought to don against this, and the self-righteous conviction that my own theory is spared that fate will surely deteriorate into self-advertising. But neither need dialectics be muted by such rebuke, or by the concomitant charge of its superfluity, of being a method slapped on outwardly, at random. The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy.
>
> (Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*)

Adorno's message, stated above, is that no concept, by itself or in a cluster, is capable of standing in the place of a state of affairs – of supplementing it, to speak like Derrida – something will always be left in remainder. A concept will always have an outside, in other words, and this outside, according to Adorno, is joined to the concept in a dialectical relation. What the concept is unable to conceptualise is the limit philosophy must ceaselessly confront if it is not to become a tool of the state of affairs it inhabits. Thus he urges that dialectics be not embarrassed. While it is true Deleuze does not have any truck with dialectics in general, he did allow that this negative form of dialectics Adorno practised, or at any rate sought to deliver, is both necessary and, what is more, intelligible within a transcendental empiricist frame.[1] My point is that Deleuze's concepts too bespeak of this problem of the remainder, but they reorient it so as to restore it to immanence.[2] For Deleuze this residue is not outside of thought, but the outside of thought. Its function is no longer limit or lack, but inspiration, literally the very life-breath of thought. Still, insofar as this outside contradicts the traditional norm of adequacy of what we habitually call the inside of thought, it may be useful to read Deleuze as a dialectician.

Why not choose another name? A couple of answers spring to mind, but none so compelling as the fact Deleuze's twofold thought in itself implies a dialectic, even if he does not practise it. It is true Deleuze's definitive question is 'how does it work?', but we miss something so crucial it prevents us from attaining anything like a full apprehension of his work if we take it as our starting point. Before we can tackle the implications of 'how does it work?' we need to ask how Deleuze got to the point of being able to ask it? What are the conditions of its asking? It is Deleuze himself who points us to this line of inquiry when he says that before he could write *Difference and Repetition*, his first book of real philosophy (by his own admission), he needed to construct his tool-kit, to prepare the concrete conditions for asking a new kind of question. Much attention has been given to the genealogy of these tools, working out what they are and where they were taken from, but little thought has been given to the far more important issue of why Deleuze should need these particular tools in the first place. It is not sufficient an answer to say Deleuze wanted to create a philosophy of immanence because it assumes, against the very grain of Deleuze's own thought, such a philosophy is an end in itself.

If it is granted that radical immanence has some higher purpose than its own evolution, then however immanent its conception may be we are already on the brink of a dialectic because the minute function enters the picture we create a distinction between a body of work and the work it either does itself or otherwise enables. This is not dialectal in the sense Deleuze understands the term, it does not refer to or propose a theory of synthesis. It is rather a theory of the necessarily self-conscious relationship between models and their application, which is the sense Jameson has given dialectics. Not every instance of the application of philosophical models attains the requisite level of self-consciousness, of course, to be called dialectical, but those that do not enjoy a certain fate. For it is axiomatic, in Jameson's view, 'that a philosophy which does not include within itself a theory of its own particular situation, which does not make a place for some essential self-consciousness along with the consciousness of the object with which it is concerned, which does not provide for some basic explanation of its own knowledge at the same time that it goes on knowing what it is supposed to know, is bound to end up drawing its own eye without realising it'.[3] From this perspective, it is hardly an insult to Deleuze to say he is a dialectician since what that really means is he is a philosopher who is clear enough about the function and aim of his philosophy not to confuse it with his own eye.

Now, my aim here is not to suggest Deleuze is secretly a latter-day critical theorist or incognito adherent of the Frankfurt School, there are far too many differences between their respective approaches to warrant any such assertion, not the least of which is his categorical rejection of communication as the benchmark by which to understand human behaviour, including speech.[4] I do however want to point to a certain sympathy between their respective endeavours because it seems to me that they hold theory in much the same regard. It is a weapon of great power but it only attains its true strength when it breaks free of the various images it has of itself, which in every instance forever subordinate it to an 'ought to do'. So treating Deleuze as a dialectician is not so much a matter of reading him against the grain as wondering how his work may be conceptualised in practical terms. Asking whether or not his work can be understood as dialectical is really only another way of asking what larger frame can we construct that is able to accommodate the force and originality of his thought? Standard practice, it seems, is to reduce Deleuze to a handful of concepts and tie them together in a loose bundle called transcendental empiricism. My approach, on the contrary, has been to treat Deleuze's oeuvre as a project with wide-reaching effects. To do this I needed to conceive Deleuze's work as a whole and posit an outside, then read one in relation to the other, which is precisely a dialectical procedure. This, I have argued, is exactly what Deleuze himself does.

The presupposition that Deleuze's oeuvre be received as a 'project' can be interpreted in a number of ways, all with quite different though interlocking implications. I think, however, there are two main ways in which this can be understood. First of all, a project is something one sets out to accomplish; it is a finite goal like completing a book, running a race, building a house. The task of elaborating, that is to say, deriving, determining and defining a philosophy of immanence falls into this category. Early in his career, Deleuze perceived a problem with philosophy and saw what he thought was necessary to remedy it and set about doing just that with great precision and rigour. By the time he came to write *Difference and Repetition* he felt able to say all his tools were in place, by which he meant the project of establishing a philosophy of immanence was near completion, and, in fact, as it turns out, this book was its culmination. So, in effect, although not yet even half way through his career, Deleuze's major philosophical project is already completed, leaving us to wonder why he did not retire, or if the later books are not merely variations on an already established theme. The later books can all be seen to have been built on the platform put in place by the work

leading up to *Difference and Repetition*, but they also surpass it in many ways too.

   This points to a second way of understanding 'project' and that is as something ongoing and essentially incomplete, something which can never be done with. My argument, though, is that the former conditions the latter. Whereas 'project' in its first flush is a labour of Hercules, in its second it is a labour of Dionysos. Slain, and cut into tiny pieces by the Titans, then miraculously reconstituted and revivified, Dionysos is the divine figure of the paradoxical conjunction of the one and the multiple, the creative and the destructive.[5] Created from the ashes of the Titans, who, as a race, were annihilated by Zeus's thunderbolt, humankind carries the burden and the guilt for this crime against Dionysos. This ancestral guilt can be purged, according to Greek thought, by observing 'the Orphic rites and way of life'. In doing so, 'men can return themselves through Dionysos to the lost unity and find once more the golden age'.[6] It is precisely this redemptive quality of Dionysos's character that appealed to Nietzsche in his earlier work. And although he would come to mistrust its tragic tone, he never lost faith in its creative power. 'Not only does the bond between man and man come to be forged once more by the magic of the Dionysiac rite, but nature itself, long alienated or subjugated, rises again to celebrate the reconciliation with her prodigal son, man.'[7] By dancing and not walking, by singing and not speaking, by doing things *differently*, Dionysians exceed and thus modify the established 'Apollonian' order.[8]

   The sense that philosophy has a job to do is prominent throughout Deleuze's work, yet it seems no-one (among Anglophones at least) has seen fit to regard him as a public intellectual in the way, before him, Adorno was, and, in his own time, Foucault was. A major reason for this, no doubt, is the fact Deleuze was reclusive in his habits; he did not travel as far and wide as Foucault (indeed, he preached nontravel as a higher form of movement), he did not take up adjunct chairs in American universities as many of his colleagues did, nor did he grant interviews to practically anyone who asked (in fact, in the comparatively few he did grant he often took the opportunity to denigrate the very idea of interviews), and though he did participate in Foucault's notorious G.I.P in the early days, and other such micropolitical projects, he soon pulled out when it become overly demonstrative.[9] Yet he was neither silent nor inactive; his books are relentless in their critique, and remorseless in their mode; perhaps a little too relentless and remorseless for the soft at heart who would at least like to find *some* of their cherished views endorsed, the necessity of retaining a concept of gender for instance. There is much to be

said about the fact Deleuze admired only those writers who wrote for a people yet to come, who nourished deep within themselves a new race of beings and did not hesitate to condemn humans as they are. What better reason is there for writing, Deleuze asks, than a confrontation with the shame of being a man?[10]

If posterity has seen fit to beatify Foucault it is because he articulated an ethics, something we can use to justify the practices and beliefs we live by. He separated behaviour from necessity by situating it within history and by so doing illustrated the ignominy of legislation directed against the practices of everyday life. This was the point of the series of books he wrote and proposed to write on the history of sexuality. He did not himself intend to fashion a new ethics of sex or the body in these books, but rather to illustrate the fact that throughout history people, in the west at least, have done so in considerably different ways. What Foucault shows is that sexuality has always been problematic, but different cultures problematise it in startlingly different ways. In the time of the ancient Greeks pederasty, for instance, was more a metaphysical problem than a moral problem, but today that dimension is almost completely lost from view. The question was could a boy make love to a man and not lose something of his manliness in taking the supposedly passive role? Queer theory, feminism, and other critics of western morality have found Foucault to be a powerful ally because he gives them a historical argument they can use to estrange a moral one. In contrast, Deleuze appears not to have articulated an ethics, which is to say, left us something to justify ourselves with and therefore remember him by (or if he did, it is a hard, cruel ethics that does not endear itself). This observation is both true and not true. It is not true that Deleuze did not elaborate an ethics, but it is true he left us nothing with which to justify ourselves. In fact, that is the very last thing he gave us. All that Deleuze has to say on the subject of ethics stems from a conviction that man is shameful, and he constantly enjoins us to become something finer.

> Human rights say nothing about the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights. Nor is it only in the extreme situations described by Primo Levi that we experience the shame of being human. We also experience it in insignificant conditions, before the meanness and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies, before the propagation of these modes of existence and of thought-for-the-market, and before the values, ideals, and opinions of our time. [. . .] This feeling of shame is one of philosophy's most powerful motifs.[11]

What could be more utopian than this? This book posed two questions. How should we read Deleuze? How should we read with Deleuze? In

answer to the first, I proposed that Deleuze be read as a utopian thinker. In answer to the second, I suggested Deleuze's work gives rise to its own form of dialectics. By valorising experimentation and rhizomatic structures, Deleuze's work apparently lends itself to all manner of wild appropriations, by any sector of any discipline. Certainly it has been used to license an enormously varied range of inquiries and interpretations, from philosophical interrogations of the body to geographical meditations on space. But to determine whether any of these readings are justified or not is impossible unless an actual programme for reading Deleuze can be devised, and intuitively such a programme seems an anathema to the radical mode of thought known as Deleuzian. Yet, if Deleuze's work actually licenses these readings of him, then however eccentric they may be, they are somehow affiliated to it, which means responsible before it. Again, to police this would seem an anathema, but to ignore it seems equally problematic since it strips the Deleuzian of its specific, or better, singular force, as a politically charged mode of creativity, leaving it only the weak generality of anything goes. For this reason, the central problem in reading Deleuze and reading with Deleuze is: what can be done with Deleuze? The answer, I have argued, is to produce Deleuzism.

Notes

1. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 99.
2. Deleuze 1993: 125.
3. Jameson 1972: 207.
4. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 6.
5. The destructiveness of Dionysos, insofar as it is creative too, can be compared with Derrida's notion of deconstruction, which, as Derrida points out, should not be associated with either Heidegger's or Benjamin's use of the term *destruktion*. Cf. Derrida 1992: 63.
6. Detienne and Vernant 1978: 136.
7. Nietzsche 1956a: 23.
8. As Mason explains, for Vernant Dionysos is the very image of alterity. 'As the incarnation of the Other, Dionysos reveals the possibility of a joyous alterity as another dimension of the human condition. Yet Dionysos does not represent a separate form of existence, according to Vernant. His function is precisely to confuse the boundary line between human and divine, between human and animal, between here and beyond. Dionysos thus also reveals the multiple forms of the Other, the ultimate failure of any attempt to pin the Other down to some simple form of self/other binary opposition' (Mason 1990:1).
9. Marks 1998: 1–18.
10. Deleuze 1997: 1.
11. Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 108.

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