

**Rudolf Kjellén**

**Political Handbooks III  
The State as a Lifeform**

**A Translation Project**

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# Table of Contents

Preface.....	6
Introduction: On the Self-Reflection of the Political Science.....	8
I. The General Nature of the State.....	12
I.1. Experiential Analysis № 1 The Constitutional-Legal Concept of the State, or the Internal Concept.....	12
I.1.1. The State as a Judicial Subject.....	12
I.1.2. The State as Household and Society.....	13
I.1.3. The Constitutional-Legal Concept of the State in Contemporary Scholarship.....	14
I.2. Experiential Analysis № 2 The International-Legal Concept of the State, or the External Concept.....	16
I.2.1. The State as Realm and People.....	18
I.3. The Right of the Political Science to these Studies.....	20
I.3.1. Elements of the Political Science.....	22
I.4. The Organic Unity of the State.....	24
I.4.1. Biopolitical Method.....	25
I.5. Scope of the Political Science.....	26
I.5.1. System and Plan of Investigation.....	27
II. The State as Realm: Geopolitics.....	30
II.1. Integration of the Realm within the State.....	30
II.2. Different Realm Types: City and Country.....	31
II.3. The “Life Property” of the State Under the Realm.....	33
II.3.1. The Organic Interpretation: the Body of the State.....	34
II.3.2. International-Legal Consequences.....	35
II.3.3. Practical-Political Consequences.....	36
II.4. The Geographical Individuality.....	38
II.4.1. Natural Borders, Different Types.....	38
II.4.2. The Natural Territory and Its Types.....	40
II.4.3. Solution to the Problem of the Realm.....	42
II.4.4. Impact of the State upon the Realm.....	42
II.5. Perishability of the State and Immortality of the Realm.....	43
II.6. The Problem of Private Property.....	44
II.7. Special Geopolitics: Influences of Space, Shape, and Position.....	45
II.7.1. Space.....	45
II.7.2. Shape.....	47
II.7.3. Position.....	47
II.7.4. Transformations of Position.....	48
II.7.5. Historical Sides.....	50
II.8. Conclusion, Geopolitics.....	50
III. The State as People: Ethnopolitics.....	52
III.1. Connection of the People with the State.....	52
III.1.1. Connection of the People through the Time.....	53
III.1.2. Loyalty and Nationality.....	55
III.2. The Problem of the Nation.....	56
III.2.1. The Genealogical Solution.....	57
III.2.2. The Linguistic Solution.....	58
III.2.3. The Psychological Solution.....	59

III.3. The Biological Solution.....	60
III.3.1. An Ethnic Individual.....	60
III.3.2. On the Strength of the Nationality.....	61
III.3.3. On the Qualities of the Nation.....	61
III.3.4. Nations as Natural Essences.....	62
III.4. Emergence of Nations.....	63
III.5. Maturity of Nations.....	66
III.5.1. The Nationality Principle.....	67
III.5.2. Consequences of the Nationality Principle.....	68
III.5.3. Opponents of the Nationality Principle.....	69
III.5.4. Guarantors of the Nationality Principle.....	71
III.5.5. The Law of Ethnic Individuation.....	72
III.6. The Problem of Race.....	73
III.7. Special Problems.....	75
III.7.1. Of the Degree and Type of Nationality.....	75
III.7.2. Of the Physical Replacement Cycle.....	76
III.7.3. Of the Mathematical Relationship Between Realm and People.....	77
III.8. Conclusion, Ethnopolitics.....	78
IV. The State As Household, Society, and Regiment: Economic Politics—Sociopolitics—Regimental Politics.....	79
IV.1. Concepts of the <i>Household</i> and Various Types.....	79
IV.1.1. Concept and Practice of Autarky.....	81
IV.1.2. Self-Preservation of the State in Economic Area.....	84
IV.2. Concepts of Society and Successive Types.....	85
IV.2.1. Relationship to Economic Politics.....	86
IV.2.2. Types of Societies.....	87
IV.2.3. Natural Society and Sociality.....	89
IV.2.4. Purpose of the State in the Social Conflict.....	90
IV.3. Concepts of the Regiment.....	91
IV.3.1. Its Roots in the Soil.....	92
IV.3.2. The Personhood Demand: Universal Suffrage.....	93
IV.3.3. Natural Representation.....	94
IV.3.4. Loyalty and Thereto Related State-Purposes.....	96
IV.3.5. Spirit of the Time and National Spirit in the Regiment.....	97
V. The State Under the Law of Life.....	100
V.1. Perishability of the State.....	100
V.2. The Birth of the State.....	100
V.2.1. Primary and Secondary Process.....	100
V.2.2. Reception into the State Collective.....	102
V.3. The Death of the State.....	104
V.3.1. Psychological Dissolution of the Nationality (Poland).....	104
V.3.2. Physical Undermining of the Nation (Rome).....	106
V.3.3. Necessity of the Death.....	107
V.4. Necessity and Freedom within the State-Life.....	107
V.4.1. International Implications.....	108
V.4.2. On Individual Duty Toward the State.....	109
Conclusion: On the Purpose of the State.....	111
Appendix: Politics As Science.....	114

To

PONTUS FAHLBECK

The Predecessor

With Gratitude  
and Affection

## Preface

This book is, to date, my primary work, which ties together my separate pieces on various subjects in theoretical and practical politics. In its fundamental idea, the varied studies come together as creeks and tributaries into one main river and gain unity as a single, thorough view of the state. Therewith it denotes a significant step toward that aim which I, as a scientist, strive for: a system for the comprehension of politics.

The first, small, step on this way is contained in a news item on “Politics as Science,” published in the beginning of 1901; attached here in the appendix. Nearest followed, as a sort of practical experiment, the studies of the state’s greatest positive manifestations, which were summarized in my work on *The Great Powers*<sup>1</sup>, first edition completed in 1905; the preface thereto contains already *in nuce* the entirety of our new political doctrine. Thereon the theoretical problem was taken up for direct treatment through public popular-scientific lectures at the University of Gothenburg, autumn semester of 1908, and the title selected for this sequence was: “The State as a Lifeform: Contours for an Empirical Political Science.”

New stages of this theoretical and system-building project were contained in the *The Great Powers*’ second edition of 1911-1913 (in particular, the preface to part IV), later in *In Critique of the Great Powers*<sup>2</sup> (1913, in *Festschrift* to Hugo Geber), *Contemporary Great Powers*<sup>3</sup> (1914), and *Political Problems of the World War*<sup>4</sup> (1915), until its principles were finally formulated in the lecture on “The Object of the Political Science,”<sup>5</sup> with which I entered the Skyttean professorship<sup>6</sup> at the University of Uppsala in May 1916. This lecture (since then published in *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*) is now included as an introductory and first chapter of this book. But even this, much like the rest of the present work, rests in its root on lectures of 1908, which denote my definitive break from the juridical view of the state. Though all parts may have been revised and several times deepened, these lectures lay thus as foundation for the publication which now, while retaining the title, seeks greater generality.

This origin is presented here also to, in some manner, explain the occasionally cursive form in which the investigation is presented. I do not hide from myself the fact that it does not truly represent what one usually means by the expression of a handbook: rather, it meets the criteria for what we in school called a “reading book,” as opposed to a textbook or a handbook. If I have carelessly (in accordance with the publisher’s wishes) now let the presentation in its original, independent form be included in a series of *Political Handbooks*, then I seek the justification of this in the fundamental thought’s multifaceted and consequential execution, from the point of view that it is the core’s firmness more than the shell’s which constitutes the essence of a scientific textbook.

If this point of view may be seen as applicable here, then perhaps the freer form may be of service to another purpose, which no less than the scientific is intended by the present book, as with my

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1 *Stormakterna*

2 *Till kritiken af Stormakterna*

3 *Samtidens stormakter*

4 *Världskrigets politiska problem*

5 “Statskunskapens objekt”

6 Political-scientific professorial chair held by the Kjellén.

entire body of work. It is intended to be the introduction to a world which for too many of my compatriots is foreign: namely, the surrounding political reality. We have as a people the tendency to laugh at all types of "idealism," which at the root is hardly more than an over-cultivated or tired nation's inclination to dream itself away from a tiresome and unpretty reality. We have sacrificed at such altars for long enough. It is time to wake up. It is beginning to turn into a question of life and death to no longer wear fancy blindfolds before our eyes in a time that is hard for every man, but hardest for the blind. Therefore, it is a simple and necessary civic duty for each and everyone who has eyes and can see to bear witness of what he sees. But the witness's availability then does not need to be hindered by the abstract and schematic formal treatment that is considered necessary for a true scientific handbook.

In systematic respect, this book will therefore only do the rough work: to establish the introductory foundation and erect the frame. More careful construction of the system may come in continued works of experimental nature. May the system be tried on the concrete state-formations before it is definitely abstracted from them. As the work on the Great Powers came before this book, it is the intent that a work on the paternal state (*Political Handbooks IV*) is to come before a final summary of the system.

Uppsala, November 1916.  
Rudolf Kjellén.

# Introduction

## On the Self-Reflection of the Political Science

“There comes in the course of development of every science a moment where it stops, as if to catch its breath and come to its senses, where a self-trial emerges and a challenge must come to stand. In that moment, the method comes into question.”

With these words, a Finnish researcher has recently begun an investigation into the “problems of ethnology.”<sup>7</sup> These are no less valid for political science. Even this science needs, no doubt, a moment of self-reflection, as its afterthought seeks its way back to the problem statement itself, to the science’s source point and object. And a determined sense tells us that the time has now arrived, as the great public crisis manifests before the world a change of course for the state-thought with respect to the sphere of individual interests.

Practical-pedagogical viewpoints play here besides the purely theoretical ones. It is an often heard statement—not to mention a recognized truth—that political talent does not belong to the virtues with which a generous nature has equipped our Swedish people. We do not need to look further than the opposite shore of Öresund to feel our weakness in this area. It is, besides, related to the lack of interest in the merchant profession, which is often shown to us; behind both lies, namely, as a common root, an underdeveloped sense for psychological realities. Our history has always been richer in war heroes than statesmen; and even as the former’s race died out for lack of demand, the latter’s does not seem to have meaningfully multiplied.

Is it thus a coincidence that the study of politics also has a low-priority role within our education? Does this not stand in correspondence, as both result and cause, with the indicated national characteristics? In any event, this is a startling fact. Long has it looked as if specifically the civic knowledge has among us been considered to fall entirely outside the school’s field of purpose; even after the royal education reforms of 1906, it has no other place than the back pocket of the teaching of history. On university level, its emancipation has been achieved in organization, but hardly in rank: when the 1907 bylaw on philosophical exams for public office candidates institutes an upper class of so-called main subjects, we find history among six languages and six natural sciences, but no political science. Certainly this will one day be seen as a literally classic example of the human bondage to traditions, how even in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, our country—at the same time as we were preparing to, through universal suffrage, draw the entire people into immediate responsibility for its fate—considered knowledge of an extinct Greek language to be more important for Swedish education than knowledge of the political world which lives around us and of our own societal forms. It is as if national weaknesses are to be conserved, instead of overcome.

Now it is clear that our neglected place is also connected to a certain suspicion of theories regarding the state-life, natural for a democratic age. In no field is the time so uneager to recognize the great free-thinker’s word and experience; to think free is great, but to think right is greater! It is easy to be suspicious of a science’s claim to think correctly about a subject, when the time foremostly wants to think and act freely.

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7 Wikman in *Nya Argus*, 16/3, p. 53 (author)

But if the political science has ultimately not gained its full right either as a subject of general public education or as part in the sequence of academic examinations, then we add to that perhaps another reason outside of the psychological properties of nation and time. This reason I see in the official understanding of the science's own object and the thereto fitted organization of its teaching.

According to this understanding, the state<sup>8</sup> is primarily and in principle a subject of justice; what constitutes its meaning is its law and nothing more; the study of the state becomes, as a consequence, a pure and exclusive study of the law<sup>9</sup>. Now, though, this subject is already covered by the studies of state justice<sup>10</sup> within the juridical faculty. The humanistic study of the state has sought separation and desired to mark an independent nature by placing its perspective in the historical developments or the metaphysical expressions, but has therewith only wandered into other sciences' legal domains, those of history and (practical) philosophy. As a hybrid of these three, a pure in-between and transitional form, without any own central point and without any natural boundaries in either direction, political science has thus attempted a difficult presence in the scientific community. Should we then wonder, how it, in the educated opinion, has failed to win the attention which justly is reserved only to independent sciences with their own objects and own methods? Such a political science cannot attract the public and the students with the full power of the educational value that should be expected of its great object; it must, in contrast, through its abstract and formalistic inclination directly repel a people to whose character, according to the erudite G. Sundbärg, also belongs a justified opposition to all judicial confusions and lawyering.

It should therefore be established that the traditional understanding of the science's own object has not acted to give the political science what belongs to it in this country. Before, however, we place the blame on the science's own domestic maintainers as an independent fault, we should not forget that they in this case only represent the general understanding, even in the so-called great cultural countries. That the state is a fact of justice and the study of the state is therefore a judicial science, this has belonged to their impressions, occupied by the entire temporal consciousness, which one since long does not even discuss, because they appear obvious. We stand before a universal—not a national—prejudice.

So we see Jellinek, the time's tone-setting authority on the subject, in his *Allgemeine Staatslehre* of 1900 indicate as "currently reigning" the understanding that the state is primarily a subject of justice; and in his similarly named work of 1901 we find Richard Schmidt portray it as a gain that one has begun closer examining law enforcement and administration<sup>11</sup> in a science which earlier had too one-sidedly only occupied itself with legal justice<sup>12</sup>. The whole discussion subject of *Staat und Gesellschaft*<sup>13</sup>, over which such masses of German inc has flowed, rests on the premise of a contrast, where the state denotes the legal establishment *par préférence*, whose innermost character is reflected

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8 *statskunskap*, interpreted here as *political science*, properly means state-knowledge, making *state* and not *politics* its explicit object.

9 *författningskunskap*

10 *statsrätten*

11 *lagskipning och förvaltning*

12 *författningsrätt*

13 "State and society"



in the name and expression of the *legal state*<sup>14</sup>. Rudolf Gneists classical study of *Der Rechtsstaat* (1879) is the clearest exponent of such a view. As a practical application thereof we find not rarely “law and state studies” combined in one and the same university faculty, as is already done in Stockholm (compare our “accession register”) and Copenhagen, and particularly in the Austro-Hungarian academic organization.<sup>15</sup>

Behind this fundamental view we recognize again one of the most powerful traditions that has ever determined a science’s development, namely that of the natural law with its judicial “social contract” theory; and the core point itself, identification of state with law, can be traced through Machiavelli and Cicero<sup>16</sup> all the way to Aristotle, our science’s father. It is therefore here a question of a viewpoint with a more than a 2000-year-long background. But it is precisely within our days that it has made itself particularly relevant, which finds a very direct explanation in a situation beyond the scientific tradition, namely the state-life’s actual manifestation.

However much we may wish to imagine the science in an unmolested majesty above the flows of time, we cannot close our eyes for its actual dependence on them. The forces which govern there lie in all cases too widely and too deeply to, in a significant manner, let themselves be governed by the science. Not in condition to fulfill the role of director-general, the political science<sup>17</sup> resigns to the role of registrar. As the contemporary state is, such is the political science tempted to be: a defense of the transiently realized state-ideal, rather than a true mirror of the state-idea itself. But it is then all the more necessary for it to not lag behind the object in its development.

It is an impressive theater to see the state-idea wander through the times, at times spreading itself over the individual sphere of interest, at times withdrawing itself away from it, in a mighty rhythm whose beat corresponds to that of the general world history. We see it therefore expand in the powerful state-consciousness of the ancient Europe, only to thin itself out in the corporate being of the middle ages; again culminate in the age of the absolute monarchy, and once again be reduced in that of the liberal individualism, which put its mark on the 19<sup>th</sup> century. *The secret behind our official understanding of the political science is now this, that it always maintains the theoretical adaption to the latest manifestation of the state-idea.*

For the famous Manchester school—“the Minimisers,” with roots in Locke and Kant—really did not wish to see more than a “deliverer of judicial security” and a guarantor for the rule of law. This state’s task was exhausted at the declaration of the formal right; then it comes to the individual to be the bearer of positive development. Such a state does, in reality, become hardly more than a juridical-

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14 *rättsstat*, also *Rechtsstaat* in German

15 With a fleeting glance on the university calendar *Minerva*, I have found this categorization in no less than ten university colleges within the Habsburg monarchy, namely Vienna, Graz, Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Czernovitz, Krakau, Budapest, Agram and the two in Prague. The same is the case at the Universities of Freiburg, Münster, Würzburg, and Strassburg in Germany. Munich has a *staatswirthschaftliche* faculty (state-economic), and Tübingen has just in 1882 renamed one similarly called to *staatswissenschaftliche* (state-scientific). See Georg V. Mayr, *Geschichte und Gliederung der Staatswissenschaften*, 1906, pp. 58-59, 119, compare to his “Rektorats-Rede,” 6/12 1913 (“sozialwissenschaftliche”). (author)

16 The classical place in Machiavelli’s *Il principe* reads that “all states are republics or principalities,” with accent in this way placed on the form of their constitution. Similarly, Cicero’s *status rei publicae*, the terminological root of Machiavelli’s and the contemporary “state,” refers primarily to the legal condition. (author)

17 This is the first instance of the author referring to *den politiska vetenskapen*, the political science literally, rather than *statskunskapen*.

administrative fact, a “bitter and unpleasant man behind a hatch,” according to the definition of Anatole France (in *Bergeret in Paris*<sup>18</sup>).

Can one deny that this definition to some degree meets even our Swedish state of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century? A strong and fateful witness in this direction is given by the economic history of Norrland in this time, with its governmental respect for the property right even in its abuse; another tells of the judicial faculty’s long real monopoly on recruitment for our public offices. The connection is clear as a day: when the state’s overall activity is limited to ensuring that everything proceeds in good order according to given law, then education for the state’s service is a legal study and little more. To serve the state is to serve justice, and that ends there.

In this state-practice and its one-sided formal-judicial view of the state’s purposes, we see the foremost, or at least the one closest at hand, explanation for the political science’s limitation, as it in the organization of studies has been made into a legal study. Because our state has in reality had its field of activities so overwhelmingly concentrated within the law, that is why our state science<sup>19</sup> became a judicial science. We see an epistemological fruit on the same tree which on another branch carried the formation of latifundia in Norrland and on another the so often disliked formalism in our public offices.

Venturing, this state of affairs—which might not give in to the uncalled-for afterthought—will take to opening its eyes to the practical consequences of such a limited perspective. Consciousness thereon has also awakened in men of practical politics and taken expression in a general reaction against the Manchester ideal in the area of the state-life; and so, among us the state has, through new legislation in Norrland of 1906, seriously intruded on that one area which it previously was so adamant to defend, and in 1908 a reform in public servants’ education on a wider basis than only the juridical (a “state-scientific exam”) was officially brought to the agenda. It is but a moment in the same general movement of the time, if one is now to fix attention directly on the need for a reformed state science, no longer closed within the horizon of Manchester, no longer looking back to a time-turning of the past while the Western state’s evolution of government itself is in motion to manifest new, richer content.

If one has gotten these connections in sight once, then one cannot avoid the conclusion: our traditional state science must be *beaten away*, like a ring that has become too tight for the finger it embraces. It must be done for the science’s own sake, so as to not let it become too gray of a theory in front of the green tree whose shadow it sits in. It must even be done for the people’s sake, who to more than a normal degree, especially in this time, are in need of this element of education. The Sweden of universal suffrage cannot afford missing out on a contemporary political education.

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18 *Monsieur Bergeret à Paris* (1901)

19 *statsvetenskap*; Davidsen (pp. 33-34): “*The state sciences include political science, national or political economy, constitutional law, international law, administrative law, political history, constitutional history, statistics, sociology, political geography, ethnography, anthropology, forestry, cameral science, police science, and so on ... In present day Sweden, statsvetenskap is much closer to the English term ‘political science.’ Indeed, they are often considered virtually equal to each other. This was less so ... from the late 1890 to the early 1920s, when statsvetenskap and Staatswissenschaft were wider and taxonomically higher concepts than politisk vetenskap and statskunskap and their German cognates politische Wissenschaft and Staatenkunde.*” See Peter Davidsen, “The Emancipation of Political Science: Contextualizing the State Theory of Rudolf Kjellén, 1899-1922.” “Constitutional law” (*statsrätten*) ref. to as “state justice” elsewhere in this text.

# First Chapter

## The General Nature of the State

The self-reflection of the political science has led to a realization of the need to widen the circle of the science. The next question would be: in which directions? From the onset, the question foreshadows a direct and sharp observation regarding the object of the science.

The method of investigation offers itself here on its own. From the labyrinth of metaphysics one has partially saved oneself by the teaching which Bornhak (although himself still constrained by the legal perspective) expressed in his *Allgemeine Staatslehre* of 1896, that the state shall “not be constructed by reason, but grasped empirically.” It is the clarification of reality, and not any logical constructs, that the time demands of our science. For this end does not lie closer than the act of questioning our experience of the everyday life and what plays out around us in general. The state may itself, by its actions, bear witness of its nature.

### I.1. Experiential Analysis № 1

#### The Constitutional-Legal<sup>20</sup> Concept of the State, or the Internal Concept

##### I.1.1. The State as a Judicial Subject

What experience does, then, a citizen have of his state? The first impression would be purely negative. He has no experience at all. His everyday labors happen without the involvement of the state. He does not see it. And still the state’s presence is like the air: he breathes it in the judicial system<sup>21</sup> which ensures the peace of his labor. If he then wants to see the state, there is a certain way: namely, to transgress against the justice; then the state treads forth, as if from the background where it lays hidden, with determined organs and institutions at hand: police establishments, courts, prisons. And it does not help to fight against it, which only worsens his case; the state has means of power and enforcement, against which his resistance breaks like a reed straw.

This is then the first shape in which the state manifests to the individual: a compulsive power that limits his full freedom. On the other hand, this likewise means protection from other individuals’ intrusions. But, in both cases, the state watches over a determined legal order above the individuals’ transient preferences. Not directly for an individual’s sake, but for the sake of this legal system does it intervene with force or protection in the individual’s sphere of freedom. Objectively seen, this appears as a will and a power: a will that knows what it wills, and a power that can enact what it wills—a will to preservation of the rule of law, a power thereto through specially equipped organs. As such a great and silent and powerful will does the state exist behind the individual’s everyday activity, surrounding him with a solid wall of rules in the name of the social order and the common peace.

The first quality of the state, which we then in the empirical way learn to know, does tend to the strengthening of the understanding of itself as a judicial subject. Without doubt, it watches over the

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<sup>20</sup> *statsrättslig*

<sup>21</sup> *rättsordning*, translated variously depending on context.

state of justice and acts in the form of justice, with the means of justice. We establish this and continue examining the experiences of everyday life.

It will then shortly be observed that the state does not always hold itself passive with respect to the individual. There are situations (of more or less periodic nature) where the state itself, of its own volition and without challenge from his side, seeks him out with offers and demands. So, once a year it comes to the citizens with a masterly posture and demands a share of their well-earned property, in so-called crown taxes. Once in a lifetime (with certain recurrence), it comes to all well-grown males and interrupts their private affairs with calls to armed exercise. In purely extraordinary cases it, as a master of war, seizes the conscript's entire being, the life itself. We find here once again the purposeful will and power, now elevated to mastery over the citizens' property, labor hours, and life. We likewise experience that the state requires money and means of external defense. Herewith the frame is not yet broken around the judicial character, as these demands can be directly derived from the defense of the judicial circumstances from foreign and domestic disturbers of the peace—the policing apparatus and defense establishment have apparently a financial aspect as well. But we sharpen the observation further. And then our attention falls to one area where the individual may seek and find support by his state entirely outside of the sphere of justice.

### **I.1.2. The State as Household and Society**

In reality we are surrounded by cases, where the state assists the individual by advice and deed, including monetary aid by the construction of own homes, the draining of bogs, paving of roads, vocational education through travels, to here only take a few random examples out of the modern state's agenda. This must give the impression that the state is here interested in the individual's well-being without any apparent connection to formal justice or the rule of law. And this interest does not stop at the individual's well-being. By (completely or partially) taking control of public education at all levels, the state treads forth with a great spiritual interests in culture. The whole cultural life shows itself finally falling within its horizon, far beyond the domain of justice.

We have now arrived at the point where we can diagnose, within the state, an interest in the citizen's well-being and the national work in its entire width. Of course, even this interest can take burdening forms for the individual; the state may, for instance, close the way for him, so that he may not come past it with his plans without first having gained its consent in the form of a so-called concession. Hereagain it is relevant that the state does not act purely for the individual's sake and on his whim. It fulfills purposes above his; it supports him only to the extent that his activity aids these higher purposes.

But on its own plane it shows a determined interest in all sorts of developments. The closer we come to our own days, the more this quality of the state's behavior comes to sight. All the more do we see the state itself going to the forefront, with own initiatives in trading, other industrial, and overall in all cultural politics. All the more does it spread itself over the wide area that the Germans call *soziale Fürsorge*<sup>22</sup>: the relationship between an employer and an employee has long since ceased to be a private affair of the parties involved. All the more is it engaged equally on its own and directly in roles of economic leadership. Great entire areas of the national work have thus been laid into its ordinary

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22 "social welfare"

operations: it runs a more or less monopolized management of important fields of communication, such as postal and telegraphy services; it builds and maintains railroads, purchases waterfalls and develops them. In this time of generally increased trade affairs, the state has clad itself into the suit of a businessman.

It is to note here, that the state of old had trade affairs, to the extent that it by direct ownership possessed and made use of “domains” of various types. This legislation has in principle, though, always had a state-financial nature much like the right of taxation; it has served as a stable economic base for the principal state-purpose of maintaining the rule of law. But the modern state’s earth, forest, mountain, and water policies go far beyond such intentions; its point of view is the national-economic, its field of view is the entire society and the entire country. Finally we have now in the war been made witnesses to how the state has put under its regulation and control as good as all aspects of the social and the economic life; and one may be greatly mistaken if one believes that this rise of patriarchal legislation will pass with the war.

The image of the state which thus meets us in the surrounding reality is therefore very different than the older liberalism’s ideal of a state which only conserved the justice, while individuals handled the progress. Our modern state is itself a progressistic force, and of all the incomparably greatest one. The conclusion of our investigation gives itself away immediately and without partisanship: *political science must make space for the state’s social and economic power besides its judicial quality*. We can no longer stop at the dichotomy of *Staat* and *Gesellschaft*, as time and life itself has obsoleted it; we must for the sake of the political science seek a point of origin from which this *Gesellschaft* appears as content of the state, a new element of its nature—or two, if we distinguish the economical and the purely social components (on this later)—next to justice. This is the first general direction in which our science must expand.

It should immediately come to attention what a great step forward is herewith taken for the understanding of the political world. It is as if the state itself has grown and taken shape before our sight, and in the same sweep its judicial skeleton was filled with flesh and blood. It is materialized, becomes more concrete, and at the same time also more complicated: it shows itself no longer obeying the law-making powers alone; it equally stands under the influence of economic and social laws.

### **I.1.3. The Constitutional-Legal Concept of the State in Contemporary Scholarship**

This manner of seeing the state can nowadays, at least with respect on the purely social element’s part, be said to have gained standing in Germany herself, the beloved motherland of state-speculation, where the juridical point of view—well not without connection to the system of many states, which offers such rich material for legal distinctions—had its hearth. Certainly, the juridical fictions are still defended to the last by an authority such as Laband, but it has soon been half a century since this teaching received its first serious pushback from Gierke, when he placed the social order as *Genossenschaft* to be essential to the state next to the political suborder as *Herrschaft*. That victory leans in the other direction is clearly seen if we compare the tone-setting state-teaching of the 1870s, Bluntschli’s, with the 30 year younger Jellinek’s. To the former, the law is the state’s body against the state-will as soul and the public institutions as limbs, while the social aspects were viewed as the state’s

external circumstances or “basics of human nature.” To Jellinek, the state is not exclusively an institution of justice, but “mainly a historical-social formation”; the “social formation” and the “institution of justice” are two separate aspects of its nature, and thus the science of the state breaks into the “social state studies” and “juridical state studies.”<sup>23</sup> Jellineks influence appears to have been decisive for this dualistic state-teaching’s breakthrough; here we can only in addition refer to Georg V. Mayr’s distinction in 1906 and 1913 between the sociological perspective, which is occupied with the state’s “material developmental life,”<sup>24</sup> and the juridical, which is occupied with the state-life’s “secretions of formal justice”; further to Rehm’s demonstration in 1907 of the state as not merely “natürliche” and “geistig-sittliche,” but also “gesellschaftliche Erscheinung,”<sup>25</sup> and lately to Menzel’s clear conclusion in 1916, according to which the state’s structure rests on two factors: “genossenschaftliche und herrschaftliche Verbindung”<sup>26</sup>—solidarity with respect to authority<sup>27</sup>.

This view appears to be on its way to break through in this country too. Pontus Fahlbeck in Lund, with his rich social interests, is here a forerunner, albeit more through his productive activities than his methodological. As a clear expression of the change in perspective, the textbook author Nils Höjer’s words in 1907 are to note: “it seems to me given that time is now ripe to expand the old political science’s concept, that it may in itself contain also the economical life of society.” In reality it is a question of returning to the viewpoint which Hans Järta in the 1820s made so strongly relevant against the incoming liberalism; his motivation for the state’s intervention in the question of “public social service corporations” and that of public education<sup>28</sup> has gained new relevance in the age of *soziale Fürsorge*. Our demonstration so far only draws out the consequences of existing tendencies within the domestic science.

Here we may especially observe and strongly emphasize that the political science’s orientation in the social direction denotes the onset of emancipation from the pure law. Jellinek (p. 125) has hereon said some stunning words, which should not be excluded from our demonstration: “The social view of the state shows itself as a necessary corrective on the juridical. The judicial studies claim that the sovereign state is superior to all other organized power and subject to none. But the enormous powers of the social life, irreverently active in the form of a conscious will: to them, the ruler himself is a servant. May the lawyer then beware of confusing his world of norms intended to govern the social life with this life itself! All the formal-judicial ideas of state omnipotence, which in hypothetical form have their good ground, disappear as soon as one gazes away from the world of juridical possibilities and into the social reality. There, the historical forces govern which create and destroy this state’s body in themselves, which exist beyond all juridical constructs. To this nature applies what Hegel expressed

23 Under the latter, Jellinek later also treats the different legal systems, which by Bluntschli are not studied at all under *allgemeine Staatsrecht* (general state-justice), but under *allg. Staatslehre* (general state-teaching); see *Lehre vom modernen Staat*, I. 1875, book 6 and Jellinek’s *Staatslehre*, third ed. 1914, ch. 20 (author)

24 *materiella utvecklingslif*

25 Natural, spiritually-seated, and social phenomenon

26 “communal and hierarchical connection”

27 Menzel, “Zur Psychologie des Staates,” *Deutsche Revue*, April 1916. In expressions the influence of Gierke is clear. (author)

28 See Wahlgren, *Hans Järta som politisk teoretiker* (“Hans Järta as a Political Theoretician”), 1906, pp. 30-33, essay “om allmänna undsättningsanstalter” (“On Public Social Service Corporations”) may be found in Odalmanen 1823, committee reservation “om Sveriges läroverk” (“On Sweden’s Public Education”) in special print 1828, both currently in Forsell’s edition of *Valda skrifter* (“Selected Writings”). (author)

through his genius words: ‘for the state’s birth, life and death are given no other forum than the world history, which is the world’s trial. And its norms are certainly not the jurist’s.’”

So, the science’s nearer adaption to reality means in this way likewise a step in the development of its independence. At closer examination, though, we shall find that this victory on the one hand is immediately followed by new risks on the other. The social perspective saves political science from being swallowed by law; but what is now its stance with respect to the social life’s own science, *sociology*? Where does the the natural boundary that keeps the sciences from dissolving into one another go now? With the youthful boldness, sociology is already stretching out its paws to draw the concept of the state like a captured prey into itself. The state is, in its eyes, to speak with Gustaf Steffen in 1906, an “exclusive a sort of social life, and one among other manners by which we spiritually influence each other.”<sup>29</sup> We see also how Höjer presents his further perspective under the title of “social studies.”<sup>30</sup> The state in this thought-pattern becomes a subordinate concept under that of the society—a mere residency in society’s greater house.

With this tendency to exclusivity, which likes to follow new views, it is worth to be concerned here that the whole political science may thus throw itself from the legal science’s one-sidedness to the social science’s opposite extreme. That the danger truly exists, thereof witnesses Jellinek’s impression (the Preface) that only such works in political science which appear in the social politics’ or sociology’s fashion, can nowadays count on any larger degree of attention. It seems as if this expansion of the horizon only comes (so to speak) from ashes and into fire: it places a new vassal relation instead of a previous one, whereof our science is burdened in an epistemological sense. And when we later separate the economic life from the social, then national economics step in as a yet another dangerous pretender.

This result already shows that our understanding has not yet reached its aim. We cannot stop at the Gierkian-Jellinekian binary, well-grounded in observation as it may be. We must continue our ransacking of the actuality to see whether yet a richer and fuller experience can shape true unity.

## **I.2. Experiential Analysis № 2**

### **The International-Legal<sup>31</sup> Concept of the State, or the External Concept**

Our investigation has thus far stayed within country borders and observed the political life within. It remains to direct this attention to the political games outside, between countries. Here is an opportunity for new collation with reality; as witness of reality, we invoke the expression manners of the press: in them ought the time’s general conceptions be reflected through faithful picture.

Here shall then be worked a direct selection from the press’s discussion on a foreign political exchange: not for the actual news’ or the political opinions’ sake, but to learn to know the time’s

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29 Steffen, *Sociala studier*, III, 4. By not denying the state’s role as a guarantor of rule of law, the science makes its offers even more attractive. The state is in this conception a society, a territory, and an organization (see chapter on “the Being of the State”). Compare to Steffen, *Sociology*, IV, 1911, where state-science is clearly characterized as a special social science, esp. pages 546, 549, 552. See further Gumplowicz, *Allg. Staatsrecht*, 1897, and *Grundriss der Soziologie*, 1905, also Anton Menger, *Neue Staatslehre*, 1904 (a socialistic worker state); compare Stier-Somlo, *Politik*, 1907, pp. 21, 53, 59-60. (author)

30 *samhällslära*

31 *folkrättslig*; note that Kjellén later distinguishes between *folk* and *nation* in ch. III.

general interpretation of the participating parties' nature by the reflection in the words. That the discussion pertains to the past Balkan crisis of 1908 is not significant for the pedagogical purpose, as the common ideas should not have changed since then.

It starts with a thundering salvo in *Standard*: "Austria," it says, "stands now as the armed champion of despotism, as the professed enemy of the international law—that Turkey has been lured into an ambush, attacked and robbed on open highway by one of Europe's most civilized powers, that is an unforgivable scandal." From other directions, this is reinforced by the accusation that Austria has "fooled Bulgaria into running ahead with its dumb project"; that it has "pushed Bulgaria forward to gain a pretext itself," that it "does not hold back from irreverently violating conventions and threatening the peace"; wherefore it itself also "takes precautionary steps," and is "ready to give payback." One sees "Germany's hand in the turn of events"; Germany "stands behind"; it has "in revenge isolated England, it has won over Russia by the prospect of the Dardanelles and Italy with promises," etc. In other directions it said that Germany "looks angrily at Bulgaria, while simultaneously closing its eyes for and excusing Austro-Hungarian trespassing." For Serbia it is "a matter of life and death"; it "saw with worry Austria's advance toward the sea"; now it is "bitter and jealous," feels an "impotent rage"; it does not have "the sense to be satisfied with what it has." Even Italy is believed to want to "come forth with claims." England is "angered"; on the other hand, one seems to have "wanted to spare France's feelings," "deliver justice by mediation"; France too wants together with England and Russia to "put its influence over the scales of justice in favor of peace." England and France "want a congress," while Russia "does not consider congress necessary," though "the word came from Russia," and Germany is "preparing the agreement clauses" for the same. The main question is whether Turkey will "quietly and submissively join Bulgaria's act." It hardly seems so: is it "protesting," it "continues rearming," it "works with all its powers," it has "committed errors that shall be repaired." According to another version it is "disappointed, but not ready for war," and there it does not look well: "all that the Porte does bears the mark of tiredness, low mood, and illness: it is definitely the sick man." But under all this noise "sits Greece quiet and calm, and looks hopefully to Crete."

Needs the ransacking continue? Every reader recognizes the tone of contemporary newspaper's articles and has surely integrated the image into his own idea of the world. We see a number of concrete shapes, great factual realities with human emotions and all sorts of connections to each other. What are these entities? *Powers*, we call them usually, mainly in the context of "foreign powers,"—in other languages similarly *Mächte*, *powers*<sup>32</sup>, *puisances*, *potenza*—we also say countries, realms<sup>33</sup>, nations, peoples; but in all languages we also use the word state as a synonym. The domestic language use, which has stuck with a binary of *great powers* and *small states*<sup>34</sup> for different degrees of the same kind, is sufficient evidence.

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32 Author uses here the English word corresponding to Swedish *makter*.

33 "Realm"—*rike*, c.f. German *Reich*. Also commonly translated as *empire*, but this is only appropriate in certain contexts. Once existed in English. *Riks-* as a prefix is used similarly to *Federal* in the names of American institutions. Kjellén himself equated the Swedish word to German *Staatsgebiet* ("State-territory"), see Davidsen p. 281.

34 *stormakter* and *småstater*



Here we meet thus a new picture of the state besides the one that stood the nearest internal-political experience. A particular linguistic-historical investigation<sup>35</sup> has given me the result that this double meaning has followed the word from the beginning among us. The word does not exist in the documents concerning the establishment of the Skyttean professorship in year 1622 nor in the Chancellor's Order of 1626; with the meaning of a general nature it was to the best of our knowledge first used in Stjernhjelm's "Fägnesång"<sup>36</sup>, then mainly in the outward sense ("Lord, Thou who ... hat protected our country and state"); it is clearly found in the Chancellor's Order of 1661, now in both senses. The notion of the "state" itself thus belongs to the conquests of the Great Power period<sup>37</sup>. Since then it has gradually gained ground and become naturalized, but continues to present itself to our imagination as a Janus with two faces, one turned inwards and the other outwards.

### I.2.1. The State as Realm and People

Now we ask ourselves: under which science do we study this notion of state number two? The answer calls for a new analysis, and therewith shall without doubt a *geographical* aspect first come to sight. After all, we use the words "country" and "realm"<sup>38</sup> as appropriate synonyms. The names of Germany, France<sup>39</sup>, and so on indicate the same. The territorial point of view is reinforced through the figure of speech—especially in France—which permits placing the name of the capital, or even the address of its Foreign Ministry, as a substitute for the name of the whole: Berlin speaks to Paris, and London listens; Wilhelmstrasse spins intrigues against Quay d'Orsay and Downing Street! The first thing to come to our imagination at the thought of a foreign power is without doubt the image of a map.

It is therefore no wonder now to find that the modern *geography* forwards claims on this object of study as its inheritance and property. Its standard-bearing speaker is here Friedrich Ratzel, the creator of "anthropogeography" and the reformer of political geography during the latest turn of the century. Through investigations of the relations between the state and its soil he came to the conclusion that the relationship is very differently intimate than was previously believed. To him, thus, the states at all levels of development are to be viewed as natural organisms, albeit as such incomplete ones and on higher stages all the more tending to the spiritual-ritualistic. Primarily, they are political organization of the land itself, as well as the attached human mass. "The state is one part human and one part organized soil"—so does the final diagnosis read.<sup>40</sup>

As one sees, geography thus makes itself an advocate for yet another pretender to the subject, namely *ethnography*. For if the great historical shapes tread forth in territorial image, they appear alike as unions of men. This becomes the second and immediately following result of the analysis, whereof a number of state-names witness (either in combination with "land" as *Germany*, or on their own as

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35 At the moment under publication in *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift (Political-Scientific Journal)*, under the title of "The State in Swedish Language Usage, Terminological Notes" ("staten I svenskt språkbruk, terminologiska anteckningar") (author).

36 See: <http://runeberg.org/fagnesang/>

37 Height of Swedish extent and power in Europe, 17<sup>th</sup> century. This period includes Swedish participation in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) and the Great Northern War (1700-1721).

38 *country*—*land* in Swedish, may also be interpreted as *land* in English; *realm*—same as ft. 25. By *country*, we denote strictly a geographical entity, which should be distinguished from similar concepts, such as *nation*, *state*, and so on.

39 *Tyskland, Frankrike*

40 *Politische Geographie*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1908, p. 4, compare to p. 5 and Preface. (author)

*Turkey*<sup>41</sup> and the like). Country and people<sup>42</sup> are thus the new state-concept's elementary determinants. We meet also a thorough attempt to take the people as the point of origin for the solution to the whole epistemological problem in Kurt Riezler's "Prolegomena zu einer Theorie der Politik"<sup>43</sup>; but it stands completely isolated, and has stopped just at the schema, while the geographers started with practice from their beginning. So, we see now a whole school in Ratzel's footsteps occupied with investigations of the state-pictures provided by history; as a fresh and representative example may here be mentioned Alfred Hettner with his latest presentation in *Russland, eine Betrachtung von Volk, Staat und Kultur*<sup>44</sup>, 1916.

Now it is notable that Ratzel himself (in the Preface to his political geography) admits political science's right of way to this content: "sollte man nicht glauben die Staatswissenschaft müsse diese Aufgabe übernehmen?"<sup>45</sup> But since the political scientists are content with that their object "stands in the air," so may geography fill the vacancy, according to his understanding.

A continued analysis shall eventually clearly demonstrate to us the incompetence of geography and ethnography to embrace this entire object. One does not need to search long to find that the powers' nature is nowise exhausted by the determination of country and people. They are the nearest, but nowise the entirety of its contents. It is something much greater, much deeper, which is understood by the names of Germany, France, and so on. Without any doubt, we imagine therewith also social and judicial characteristics; or can one separate the so-called militarism from Germany's or the republican constitution from the contemporary France's face? Can one imagine England without the so-called parliamentarianism? Such characteristics are subject to change, as are all; but at any particular point in time, they are indissolubly contained within the given power's nature. Clearer than ever appears this connection now in the war: it is not merely with the country and people alone that the parties seek to overcome one another; we see them also in the struggle draw from forces of economic, social, judicial, and cultural kind. So "gathers all the historic life in the state," to use Paul Herre's pregnant expression<sup>46</sup>. The more we sharpen our view, the more indissolubly appears this connection. The state's riddle is footed in spiritual depth which the space perspective of geography does not reach. This has also lately been recognized by a geographical scientist of Penck's authority, at the same time as he admits the temptation for his own department to plow this unsown field<sup>47</sup>.

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41 *Germany*—that is, as mentioned prev., *Tyskland*, German-land; *Turkey*—*Turkiet*, referring to the Ottoman Empire.

42 *People*—*folk*. May also be understood as *nation*, although *people* (*folk*) and *nation* will receive more specific, distinct meanings in chapter III.

43 The supertitle of the same work reads *Der Erforderlichkeit des Unmöglichen* (*The Necessity of the Impossible*). Within the people four elements are distinguished, all in organic unity with one another, namely: space, race, state, and culture (language, art, ethic, and religion). — As one sees, this determinacy means a true attempt to cure the epistemological gap in the area (see further down), the only one known to me besides the modern geographers' and the old "statisticians" (see I.3.). Riezler is the same man who later under the pseudonym Ruedorffer published the noteworthy work on *Grundzüge der Elemente der Weltpolitik* (*Basics of the Elements of World Politics*), 1914. (author)

44 *Russia, an Observation of People, State, and Culture*

45 "Should one not think that the political science must take over this task?"

46 Herre, *Weltpolitik und Weltkatastrophe*, 1916 (in the series *Männer und Zeiten—People and Times*). Compare to Adam Müller already in 1809: "The state is the inner connection of a nation's collected physical and spiritual needs, physical and spiritual riches, inner and outer life, to a large, energetic, perpetually moving and lifelike whole"; cited by Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, 1908, p. 129 (author)

47 Penck, "Der Krieg und das Studium der Geographie," *Zeitschr. der Gessellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin*, 1916, nr. IV, p. 238 (author)

### 1.3. The Right of the Political Science to these Studies

We stand therefore before a pure gap in the organization of our knowledge. No reality can be more real or concrete than that of these powers, none either of greater practical meaning for individuals; for on their fate depends ultimately also the individuals'. If education at all means insight into the global circumstances which surround us, then it appears an educational necessity of highest degree to better learn to know these great facts in their unitary nature; but in the house of science we see no home for this study, as geography cannot house it and political science does not desire to.

There was a time when one considered placement in a third direction; namely, within *statistics*. It was in the younger days of this science; the derivation from *statista*, "statesman," was still clear, and one wanted now to gather in the new discipline as good as *omne scibile* of the existing states ("Staatsmerkwürdigkeiten"). Achenwall from mid-18<sup>th</sup> century and Schlözer from the end of the same are the best known representatives of this so-called Göttinger school, preceded by Conring<sup>48</sup> with his *notitia rerum publicarum* of 1660, followed by Stein in *Handbüch der Geographie und Statistik*, 1809 (continued by, among others, Wappäus). But it catches the eye that one has allowed unity within the nature of the power to get lost. These studies made loose conglomerates of what was really organisms. It is the same difference as that between a Baedeker<sup>49</sup> and a modern geography. It is an estate inventory, rather than a biography. The school is also since long dead; statistics have moved on to the social masses as such, and the powers stand homeless in this science.

We must now sharply place before us the question on how it comes that political science has not been willing to receive them. Why has it not here raised claim upon its recognized firstborn right? Of course it has never been able to purely look past the fact, clear as a day, that a country and a people are linked to every stately phenomenon, and the more farsighted have long kept their eyes open to the relationship between these accessories and the judicial life. But in the grand scheme one seems to have taken the connection as purely superficial. At least the territory has, despite numerous attempts, appeared to be only the frame around the state's image or a pedestal to his statue or simply a tray on which the true political science has been served in its juridical bowls.<sup>50</sup> Blomberg (1904) probably expresses the leading opinion among the faculty when he says that in the state there is "a question of a customary organization, not of a phenomenon of the organic life."<sup>51</sup>

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48 Hermann Conring (1606-1681)

49 Early German series of travel guides, named after publisher Karl Baedeker (1801-1859).

50 Seydel and Bornhak view the state straight up as a subject to its country and its people as objects. Other written thoughts represent Droysen, *Geschichte der Preuss. Politik*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 1868, who in country and people sees "der Stoff, aus dem sich der Staat aufbaut" ("the substance from which the state is made"); further Rehm, where he takes the state as from one point of view a natural essence, but country and people as natural foundations, and Richard Schmidt, who presents the state as an object for natural-scientific observations as well as judicial-scientific, see further in this chapter. Fricker, *Vom Staatsgebiet*, 1867 (compare to *Gebiet und Gebietshoheit*, 1901), is perhaps the first to clearly present the territory as an element of the essence of the state. On Jellinek's interpretation, see ch. 2. In Swedish literature note Reuterskiöld's determination of the territory as "the state's, so to speak, physical basis" or "the body through which state and people outwardly are individualized and act"; *Rätts- och samhällslära*, 1908, p. 21-22lll. (author)

51 Blomberg, *Svensk Statsrätt I*, 1904, p. 6. Note also Elof Tegnér determination of political science's field of work in *Lunds Universitets Festskrift* 1897: "the constituent state establishments in their development and organization, whereto could and should be attached a distinction between the states' external circumstances, their land, and people." (author)

One has stopped at this *either-or*. Now the powers of history must, in their irreverent struggle of interests, appear as organic entities. Accordingly one has denied them. The living will and power, which at home is occupied with protection of the rule of law and “*soziale Fürsorge*” does not admit to any relationship with these adulterous wills. This is the answer to the question of why political science has sought nothing to do with the powers: it has, despite the name, not recognized its object in their twisting journey.

But if we now, with lately gained experience, directly confront both concepts of state together, then it will no longer elude us that it is *the same state* that meets us in both cases, only from different directions. Germany, France, and all of the powers, shall they not from the *inside* appear exactly as Sweden in our first analysis? And ought not our own Sweden from the *outside* also appear as a “foreign power,” fumbling and erring in history as all the others, in the second analysis of reality?

It stands before the eye as a mountain. The powers in the struggle of interests stand each *in their own eyes* as the legal state, because they internally have their own judicial duty; therefore, they turn there their legal side, and so the natural aspect is obscured. It may well now happen that interest also in domestic questions becomes strong enough to explode justice—a typical example was given by Swedish governmental forces at the beginning of the World War, when they simply placed themselves above the Instrument of Government’s<sup>52</sup> §72, that the central bank shall on demand redeem its bills in gold—though this is not noticed easily by the citizen; he is accustomed to by his state have a duty before the court, and he shall also, when it comes to his own state, retain the judicial view long after it has vanished before the naked eye. But when he turns his eye *outside*, to other states, then this interest and this experience vanish, then he sees without colored glasses; and then it shall soon appear to sight that the judicial side is not the state’s one and only. For if ever it is true in the international life that necessity has no law. When the struggle for space and growth hardens, then we see the states with the natural aspect out, so that the judicial side occasionally seems entirely absent in turn.

Do we even need to strengthen the diagnosis with the experiences of the war? We do not judge, we only observe. No experience in history is clearer than this, that justice in the lands and seas means little when the powers feel their vital interests endangered. Justice may be dear to them, but life is dearer. But we understand now also that they are themselves barely aware of such conflicts. What they themselves do appears to them in the length just; it is only the enemy that appears to fight for the naked interest. When the English statesman exclaims his “right or wrong, my country,” then it is a paradoxical rewriting of his true meaning, which is that the fatherland cannot err; the same position, which at another opportunity is expressed in the official English maxim that an *Order in Council* must be presumed as right. We stand before a world-encompassing illusion, which in turn has epistemological meaning to our problem through its witnessing of the states’—or at least the peoples’—limited self-awareness. It is a clear reflection of the manifest relationship that in the state are contained *both* elements of justice *and* power, both custom and organic motion, as in all earthly personal life.

It would seem as as if we now are on trail to a practical basis for the juridical concept of state, and we see that the tracks lead to a pure illusion. It has without doubt been useful to the citizenry; but to science it denotes a prejudice and a handcuff, whom it is time to abolish if the science is to fulfill its duty to the truth. We may, though, not labor with two separate political sciences: one of the own state as

52 *regeringsformen*, one of (presently) four components of Sweden’s constitution.

an absolute legal state and a rational entity, and another of foreign states as petty beings of interest alone! In the name of science we must demand that unity in the understanding, which in turn follows with respect for actuality.

Herewith are by no means denied those special investigations, belonging to philosophy, which measure the state against the ideal and consequently celebrate therein a rational being; all the less denied is the real evolutionary tendency, which seeks to overcome the dualism of the state-life in direction of the supremacy of justice; all the least shall it be disputed, that this development is for the better. We can only establish *the fact that the states as we follow them in history and in reality have to move within are sensual-rational beings*, much like humans.

### **I.3.1. Elements of the Political Science**

It is now clear that we have reached the decisive point of our investigation, and it would do well to better fix the perspective.

The realities given by history, which we denote as states, appear different before our eyes depending on whether the perspective is that of the inside or the outside. In one case, the point of vantage is placed within the state's own civic sphere; the individual treads out of his connection with the whole and turns his gaze thereon—he sees then first a judicial phenomenon, therein a social and an economic, far away in the end an ethnic and a geographic; but the last do not seem to disturb in him the great impression of a dominating juridical appearance. This is a state-judicial concept: Boströms “public” state-society, with the private ones as necessary backdrop. It is that state whose concept is included in compound expressions such as “form of government,” “coup d'état,” “state interest,” “state calendar,” “state railroads”<sup>53</sup>; always seen from the inside and from below, in its contrast to private groups and interests. In the other case we see the same reality placed not before subjects but among equals, in objective shape as one among many in a great family; then it is as the other side of a hand, and the eye falls first on the geographic and the ethnic picture, further the economic and the social, and the system of justice hides now in the background. It is that international-legal concept, that state which enters into associations of states, which belongs to a system of states, which is listed in “The *Statesman's Yearbook*”; the individual no longer stands as an observer, he enters the greater context, and we see the ship-of-state<sup>54</sup> with all the citizens aboard steer its path through history.

On these different perspectives depends the shift of mindset between “states” and “powers.” But that it here in reality is a question of identity, that is not proved merely by the synonymy of state and power (see I.2.); we can strengthen the proof also from the other side by that habit of language which permits saying “power” in place of “state”—for instance in our Instrument of Government §86, where the state's censorship is denoted as obstacles placed “by the public power.” In the term “state,” the accent falls thus preferentially on the side of the legal system; in the term “power,” on the physical manifestation; but it is fundamentally the same being, which here appears “as if with two souls, one internal judicially bound and one external free,” to speak with Piloty<sup>55</sup>.

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53 *statsskick* (lit. “form of state”), *statsform*, *statskupp* eller *statsstreck*, *statsintresse*, *statskalender*, *statsjärnvägar*

54 *statsskepp*, notion present in Plato's *Republic*

55 Piloty, “Staaten als Mächte und Mächte als Staaten,” in *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht* 1914. The author naturally emphasizes that this dualism should be overcome in a growing magnitude of justice. (author)

To sharply fix the concept shift we must think of that *genus proximum* where our Sweden is contained as a species: the first analysis gives as result the constitutional form of state, the other the European state-system. They are, as one sees, quite distinct perspectives. But they are not mutually exclusive. Sweden belongs in fact to both genera and acts as a state in both. It is thus the same object in both cases, and the difference depends only on the variable emphasis.

We remark further, that both concepts are not equal in scope. The inner is contained within the outer. The law is one aspect of the state among several. The state as power is the wider concept, which embraces the state as justice—not *vice versa*.

The power of language over thought, here backed by a practical illusion, has thus far drawn boundaries for the political science, in the whole practiced one-sidedly to the advantage of the narrower, judicial state concept, while statistics and geography have extended their hands for the wider, factual concept. Time seems now in to seriously claim the political science's right to the latter too. We have by necessity a political science which synthetically rises above the old political science's thesis and geography's antithesis. We can no longer stop at an either-or in the factual state's rich nature; we require a both-and, both the customary organization and the natural organism. No longer the state's judicial side, at its height peppered with the household- and social aspects, but the entire state as it manifests in actual life.

We have already found our science placed in a sort of "correction leftward," in that the community in its social no less than economic shape are found to lie within its sphere of interest. The synthetic understanding entails a continuation of this orientation, all the way to people and country. This political science embraces not only the husband and the house picture<sup>56</sup> and the household, but also the house servants and the house. Only in this scope can our science fulfill its task to exhaust its object; and in the extent to which it therewith succeeds, the great gap in the organization of our knowledge (see I.2.) finally becomes filled as well.

It seems as if ground ought now be ready for this expansion of the political-scientific horizon. In Germany itself the opposition to the one-sided legal perspective has begun to make itself perceptible in this direction also. So proclaims Richard Schmidt in 1903, under criticism by Jellinek's "political history of literature," that the power moment of state has become all too underappreciated: political science may no longer stop at the moment of justice and leave the former to history<sup>57</sup>. And since Penck established the limitation of geography in this piece (see I.2.1.), he imagines in the future a reformed "Staatenkunde—welche den Staat nicht bloss als rechtliche Institution sondern als lebenden Organismus mit sehr verschiedenen Funktionen betrachtet"<sup>58</sup>; not a mere statistic of the old kind, but an "Erfassung des gesammten staatlichen Lebens."<sup>5960</sup> This is exactly the same program as is developed here.

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56 *Hustaflan, Haustafel* referring to a section of Martin Luther's *Small Catechism*, which describes the components of society and their purpose.

57 See *Allgem. Staatslehre*, II, 829-30. (author)

58 "Political science, in which the state is viewed not as a mere judicial institution, but as a living organism with various functions."

59 "Embrace of the entire stately life"

60 Op. cit. p. 237-9. This *Staatenkunde* receives its natural place between history and geography.—Penck's statement reached me only after the development of above-mentioned presentation. (author)

## I.4. The Organic Unity of the State

But how is it now going with the political science's need to assert its home among the sciences? This was the other side of that problem which lies before us to solve. If already the expansion into the social sphere, as we saw above, increased the competition in the area, should it not be purely overwhelming to let another pair of subjective spheres be drawn into the circle of our science? Perhaps it may seem that way initially. In the next instance we find that exactly this expansion of the frontier, and nothing less than it, is what gives our science the previously missing unity.

This unity is that of *life* and personality. The new political science is deeply haunted by the conviction for which Ranke in his own way appeared as an advocate in the great world<sup>61</sup>—that in its object the question is of superindividual lives, as real as the private individuals, only immeasurably greater and more powerful in their developmental progress. It is truly impossible to avoid this impression of the (see I.2.) latest deployed analysis of reality. These states speak and trade, sit together at congresses and fight on battlefields, envy and hate or sympathize with each other, tempt and flee from each other, help and hinder one another as other living beings in a community. Each and every one acts like an individual for itself, with its own character, its special interests, its manner of dealing, its world of feelings: “ein mächtiges Lebewesen mit selbständigen Zielen”<sup>62</sup>, superior to both the private and the social spheres, as Menzel says<sup>63</sup>. What an intensive personal impression they make, that can be seen best by the people's imaginations' willingness to individualize them to the point of having personal names and human shape: so do we all know “Mother Svea,” a woman much like “la Belle France”; and one does not need to browse the *Review of Reviews* long to see “John Bull” or “Uncle Sam,” always the same, like characters in a mask play<sup>64</sup>. Governments change, generations shift, but the powers seem to remain their own likes, changing only in secular rhythm at least. Against their long, wide, and deep traditions, the individuals may only exercise a limited influence. They are objective realities outside and above the individuals, at the same time within them, and stand in their own manner themselves under the power of life's fundamental laws.

So appear the states in the state-systems, and so do they appear even clearer in the past history, where former days' loud murmur has been laid to rest. Popular imaginations have now in themselves no scientific value, but they gain it when they attest and adjust the result of an objective investigation. All the while since Plato first saw the state in human shape, the question of the state's personal nature has not left the agenda of philosophers. All the while since Menenius Agrippa on the “sacred mountain” demonstrated the fable of the stomach and the limbs has the understanding of the state as an organism

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61 See Ranke, *Die grossen Mächte* (“The Great Powers”), 1883. On the connection (to Ranke see the latest Meinecke in *Die neue Rundschau*, June 1916, p. 721: “Wir Historiker aus der Rankeschen Schule begrüßen Freudig den Siegeszug dieser uns längst vertrauten Auffassungsweise auf dem Gebiete der Staatswissenschaften”) (“We, historians of the Rankian school, happily welcome the victory parade of our long familiar way of understanding of the domain of political science). Note here though Pohle's reservation in *Zeitschr. für Sozialwissenschaft* 1916, p. 677—Before Ranke comes Adam Müller 1809, see Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, I, ch. 7, and “L. v. Ranke und der Machtstaatsgedanke” by Max Fischer in *Das Grössere Deutschland* 20/5 1916. (author)

62 “A powerful living being with independent goals.”

63 Op. cit. p. 79, M. places this construction in deliberate opposition to those who in the state only see an institution of defense for citizen and a judge for their disputes—therefore in agreement with the viewpoints elaborated here. (author)

64 Uncle Sam may be a sketch based on a late head of state's (Lincoln) personal image; the rest are figures of imagination. As familiar, animal figures such as “the Russian bear” or heraldic charges such as the German eagle are employed.

not abandoned the practical statesmen. Discussion on these topics degrades easily into squabbles about words, at the same time as one presses the concept of personhood into one of pure reason or on the other hand lowers the concept of organism to that of the purely animal or even vegetable lifecycle<sup>65</sup>; but if the essential of an organism is this, that it in the struggle for existence may of own intrinsic power evolve, and if the essential of the concept of personhood is that this development proceeds in the direction of greater spiritual certainty—then the discussion pertaining to the character of states must be considered concluded.

To us, Swedes, this view of the state should be all the less foreign, as it has a powerful representative already in that man whose name is most closely associated with the origin of our still relevant constitution. No one has more clearly and with greater conviction than Hans Järta taught that the state “lives,” that it is an “organic individuum,” a “purpose in itself, an I,” that legal protection is merely one of its tasks, a means of achieving yet nobler purposes<sup>66</sup>. The modern understanding has therefore proud domestic forebears outside the social circle (see I.1.3.) too. But, certainly, behind both Järta and Ranke lie the deep furrows of the Historical School.

### 1.4.1. Biopolitical Method

“From a certain standpoint,” as I expressed in a 1905 work on *The Great Powers*, “one cannot avoid to, in the great powers themselves, also recognize biological facts. By own lifeforce and economic blessing, in constant competition against each other, that is, through a struggle for space and through natural selection, they have emerged on the surface of the earth. We see them be born and grow, we have also seen them wilt and die as other organisms. They are in this wise forms of organisms; among all lifeforms on this earth the most imposing. As such, one must be able to make them objects also for a, so to speak, biopolitical study, which seeks to explore laws of their development.” What is here expressed about great powers is, naturally, true concerning states in general. Here lies in a nutshell already that political teaching which I have now sought to scientifically motivate and better determine.

One has called this teaching “vergleichende Politik”<sup>67</sup>. In that case it seems to be on the right track; at least it was first through the comparative method that geography and linguistics entered their stage of a modern science. Here, thus, similar prospects for political science open up, namely, if it as the basis of comparison lays the concrete state-lives, aside from special disciplines which study legal organizations and abstract state-ideas. Only as a political science in an exact sense—a science of the “ships-of-state,” rather than the forms of state<sup>68</sup>, of the states and not just the state-powers, “Staatenkunde” instead of “Staatswissenschaft”—find we for the state study’s account an independent space among modern areas of study.

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65 For this reason we are not impressed by the remark that states lack reproductive organs, or what Jellinek otherwise has to propose against the organic theory, pp. 150-, likewise not by his denunciation of “those who interpret the state as a natural formation standing beside or above human beings,” p. 175; compare Stier-Somlo pp. 73- and Boethius *Om statslifvet*, 1916, pp. 22-26. (author)

66 See refs. at Wallengren, ob.cit. pp. 40-44, 53-54. Justice for the state is, according to Järta, as the bark on the tree necessary for protection, but it is not where the state’s life “blooms and gives fruit.” (author)

67 “Er hat ein ganz neues Gebiet der Wissenschaft genommen: die vergleichende Politik” (“He has taken on an entirely new field of science: comparative politics”), Ernst Posselt in *Hamb. Fremdenblatt* 31/12 1915, review of my work *Die Grossmächte der Gegenwart*. (author)

68 Pun. ship-of-state—*statsskepp*, form of state—*statsskick*.



Before this sight, the formal order of justice does in no wise lose its meaning, as little as it is the meaning to in a division of labor dispute the justification of those who handle one particular thing. Its development shall always make up a strong indicator of the strength or weakness of a particular state. But the guardian thereof shows himself now to be only one among several motives behind the actions of the state. Instead we shall learn to know a new primary motive, wherein this is contained as part. It is the political unity of purpose, use-value and need. Here the state has its moral principle. Here has the science of the state that unity in diversity which the old statistics (see I.3.) lacked, and subsequently also an own perspective, which it does not share with any other science—the last seal to its full independence and equality in the republic of science.

In particular, we notice the emancipation from history. If one says that this political science's scope has become unreasonably large, one needs only a reference to history, which extends to the same magnitude and more thereto, and this through all past times! But even political history has no direct interest in these great phenomena which we call states, other than when they are in motion. She is bound by the time perspective as an "active" science; while the political science has its space perspective and its primarily descriptive method. In historical events, besides, the state is only one form among many: the church, the corporation, the individual, all of which must interest history. To the political science in our sense, history therefore becomes an assistive science—and vice versa—and becomes necessary as such, but not more. We see a relationship by affinity, but no longer identity.

This change of perspective, through which the widespread international-legal concept of state—the state as power—is placed in the foreground as the object of political science instead of that of formal law—the state as a subject of justice—means therefore at once the filling of a great vacancy in our educational organization and the independence proclamation of political science itself. It ought therefore not escape anyone to which degree such a way of seeing is dedicated at once to refresh and to deepen that study which we denote "political science." In this sense, our science shall certainly be able to expect greater popular attention than when it only held law and history by the dress, and therefore be in a better position to fertilize the common idea with its great educational value, to be of greater immediate service also within the practical politics.

## 1.5. Scope of the Political Science

We summarize briefly our fundamental remarks. Political science among us has long, after particularly German patterns, limited its domain to that of law; thus, it has not been able to preserve for itself an independent place among the sciences, and has consequently ceased in its growth to the harm also of the people, which herewith has received insufficient nourishment from a knowledge source of imminent practical significance. The state itself has now invalidated this understanding as too narrow by obviously taking upon itself economically and socially productive purposes. An outwardly facing perspective on the factually existing states likewise draws to light that geographical and ethnographic elements determine their being with a previously perhaps underestimated intimacy. There exists already in our language use a wider state-concept, in which the accent falls exactly on this aspect of their being. When we speak of the state, therefore, we do not need to think of the state power as opposed to the individual sphere. There is a kind of state which in its form is not a mere aggregate of juridical letters in the framework of an external measure, as little as an institution of assurance for the judicial establishment. It is before anything else a *life*, with the risk of life and the power of life and the right of life. It is, as I have written in the preface to the first edition of the previously mentioned work on the Great Powers, a “striving and action, with shifting means and purposes at different periods of time for different states; to know these means and purposes is certainly no less important for a true political science than to know the framework of institutions and judicial rules and mathematical dimensions within which the acting persons have to move.” Here we meet first a task of purely quantitative kind, to expand the circles of the study; it is new countries to explore and integrate with the old, new elements to analyze in the factual state entity which one thus far has understood as a simple, juridical subject. Within this quantitative extension, though, let the need of qualitative deepening, through which connection and unity are preserved by the law of the political life, always stay in sight.

### 1.5.1. System and Plan of Investigation

The pictures of the state-life’s foremost representatives which I have given in my works on the Great Powers have in their entirety and with growing purposefulness<sup>69</sup> intended to constitute practical experiments and supports for the fundamental view which is here strengthened by the means of a theoretical and critical investigation. The thus internally facing investigation becomes mostly descriptive. Its general premise is the empirical observation of the factually existing states. It considers every state at times as realm, as household, as people, as society, as dominion<sup>70</sup> or subject of justice, without stopping at any particular of these determinants: with a glance into it they become manifestations of one and the same life—five elements with the same power, five fingers on the same hand, which work together in peace and which punch in war.

With this key in hand it also becomes easy to distinguish natural boundaries for our science with respect to other areas of knowledge. Its left wing is not geography, but *geopolitics*<sup>71</sup>; its object is not the land, but always and exclusively that of the political organization governing the land—that is to say, the

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69 See preface; note also *Political Problems of the World War*, 1915, where the dynamic point of view was brought forth in place of the static. (Otto Hintze in *Sokrates*, June 1916, p. 291) . (author)

70 *realm—rike; household—hushåll*, meaning economy; *people—folk; society—samhälle; dominion—herradöme*.

71 *geopolitik*

realm. It's right is not formal justice nor much less the history of law, but the politics of law and administration, or, in a single term (in connection to an expression revived by C. A. Reuterskiöld) *regimental politics*<sup>72,73</sup>; the boundary here is already drawn by Fahlbeck, most lately when he in *Finsk Tidskrift*, February 1916, places his “typological-political” manner of viewing a legal question against Hermansson’s purely juridical.<sup>74</sup> In the center itself sits the study of the politically organized human mass which upholds the actions of the state, or the people: not ethnography, but *ethnopolitics*<sup>75</sup>. Between this this discipline and that of the geopolitics we meet the study of the people in its productive life, or the state as household: not national economics, but *economic politics*<sup>76</sup>. Between ethnopolitics and the regimental politics lies ultimately the study of the people in its naturally and culturally educated components, that is to say, the state as society in specific sense: not sociology, but *sociopolitics*<sup>77</sup>. Theoretically, the initial trails are ready. That they in practice often may show themselves less easy to explore follows by the nature of the item, as the territories of sciences are never separated by sharp border walls or even fixed lines.

Thus the system gives itself away by inner necessity from the thesis. In the given five directions, the nature of every state is exhausted in an inescapable circulation, where the different elements mutually condition one another, so that each one acts in part for itself and in part for the others. As we now move to examine each on its own, so shall the demonstration therefore embrace not only the distinct qualities of each element of the state’s nature, but also the inner connections between them, in which the state’s internal unity manifests itself.

It seems to me as if the time has come to recognize and to seek to map the new lands which have been shown to lie in the possession of political science as preliminary work to the final system. In this presentation, attention will fall primarily on the realm and the people: the domains of geopolitics and ethnopolitics. In these, the biological character of the state also appears most immediate and necessary. They present themselves before others as objective categories by which the actions of the state are bound. They can therefore be denoted as the state’s especially *natural* aspect; against household, society, and regiment as its *cultural* aspect, where its will appears to be more creative and

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72 *law*—*författning*, used to mean both constitution and law in general; *administration*—*förvaltning*; *regimental politics*—*regimentspolitik*.

73 See “Regimentet I Sverige” (“The Regimen in Sweden”) *Statsvetensk. Tidskrift*, 1911, also *Föreläsningar i svensk stats- och förvaltningsrätt* (“Lectures In Swedish Constitutional Justice”), I, “Statsregementet,” 1914. (author)

74 See now Fahlbeck, *Engelsk parlamentarism contra svensk* (“English Parliamentarianism Contra Swedish”), 1916, p. 96. Compare already *Svensk författning och den moderna parlamentarismen* (“Law of Sweden and the Modern Parliamentarianism”), 2904, pp. 89-90, 92. (author)

75 *etnopolitik*; later the author correct this concept to *demopolitik*, “demopolitics.” See Davidsen, p. 304. In light of the author’s distinction between the concepts of “people” (that is, *demos*) and “nation” (*ethnos*), the former alone being an element of the state (see further section III.1.), *demopolitics* may be the more appropriate term for this category. In the original edition, the term “demopolitics” is briefly discussed in a footnote on the second page of chapter III; that footnote is reproduced in the same chapter of this translation.

76 *ekonomipolitik*. There is a tendency among translators of these concepts to, because the compound words of *geopolitik*, *etnopolitik*, and *sociopolitik* translate so naturally to single words in English, also attempt to render the other two categories by some form of single-word compound (rather than a combination of two words each, as was done here). We can justify the apparent inconsistency of not doing so by noticing that the former three compound words are formed by the Greek-style interfix -o-, the remaining two are not; therefore, the difference is already present in the Swedish terms.

77 *sociopolitik*

free. They form therefore the central point in a depiction of the state as a lifeform, while the other primarily show the state as a cultural form; wherewith one may apparently not stop in a schematic contrast, as the state-personality's connection concedes a record of the free will within the "natural" side, albeit not to the same degree as the pressure of need on the shifting forms of the "cultural" side.

Even the epistemological situation too mandates a greater part of the attention to the natural factors within the nature of the state. It is in this part where science has the greatest need for stimulation; not to speak of the vulgar interpretation, according to which the peoples and states—or purely just the individual statesmen for their part—shape their fates in full freedom given the impulse of the moment. Such harmful prejudices will not be overcome until the science itself has had its eyes sharpened for the *frame around the freedom of the state's will*, which rises from objective and relatively constant factors, primarily within realm and people.

It is therefore not a complete and uniform political teaching that will be developed here. The investigation of the state as a lifeform has for complement an investigation of the state as a cultural form. It is only the former task which is presented here for treatment. And the plan of investigation offers itself as a clear consequence of the preceding viewpoints: a sharper focus, in sequence, on the the specific natural elements of the state—realm and people—but on the part of the others only a highlighting of the inner connections through which the natural factors influence them too.

## Second Chapter

# The State as Realm<sup>78</sup>: Geopolitics

Geopolitics is the study of the state as a geographical organism, or a manifestation in the space: that is, the state as country, territory, property, or, most pregnantly, *realm*. As a political science, it has its constant focus on the state's unity and seeks to contribute to the understanding of the state's nature, while political geography studies the earth as residence for human communities in its relationship to the other properties of the earth.

### II.1. Integration of the Realm within the State

It has already been noted that the realm is that aspect which first catches the eye as we view the state from the outside. We have also seen a confirmation thereof in the nomenclature of certain states with geographical compounds. When we denote by the name of *England* the powerful hero of history who has covered a large fraction of the world map with its traditionally red color, we appear to place a geographical image to the forefront. Other famous examples are Russia, Finland, Greece, Germany, Holland, or more properly the Netherlands (Low Countries)<sup>79</sup>. While the word is certainly also used for provinces (Västergötland, Friesland, Jutland), our language reserves the word *realm* exclusively to full states, and that too is often included in names, such as France, Austria, the German Reich, and, veiled by evolution of language and pronunciation, our own Sweden<sup>80</sup>. A geographical nomenclature is also Denmark (Dane March); similarly, even more masked, Norway<sup>81</sup>. For the same reason we hail the state as fatherland<sup>82</sup>, motherland, although these concepts contain more than space. It is almost as when we name famous representatives to the *riksdag*<sup>83</sup> of the peasant estate after their residencies: Påboda, Stallerhult.<sup>84</sup>

Other peoples do not seem to be equally sensitive to the state's territorial property, to judge by a more reserved nomenclature of this kind. So do the Germans, analogously to us, say “Deutsches Reich” or “Deutschland” and “Frankreich,” but call our own state “Schweden,” which in Swedish would correspond to “Svenskien”; here thus the ethnic element takes the front. Englishmen and Frenchmen as well have similar ungeographic names for Germany-Allemagne and France. This difference in name-giving is here only of curiosity value; for it is obvious and does not need to be discussed that the country also in modern English and French eyes is an inescapable property of a state. We cannot think the country away from the state without losing the concept of the state itself.

The purposeful will, even with organized power, is therefore not sufficient for a state to be. Without country it is a social existence, but no more. The Hansa once had a real sphere of power which

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78 *rike*

79 *Ryssland, Finland, Grekland, Tyskland, Holland, Nederland (Nederländerna)*—all have *-land* in the Swedish name.

80 *Frankrike, Österrike, Tyska riket, Sverige* (from *Svea rike*).

81 *Danmark, Norge (Norwegen)*.

82 Original version uses the expression *fosterland*, from *att fostra*—“to raise” (a child).

83 *Riksdag* (compare German *Reichstag*) is the name of the Swedish parliament. Traditionally, it was a gathering of representatives for the four estates: clergy, nobility, burghers, and peasants.

84 Alfred Petersson i Påboda (1860-1920), Carl Persson i Stallerhult (1844-1926).

threatened, for example, the Swedish realm's economic independence, but a state it was not. Norddeutsche Lloyd has its business branched out across the world's seas, but all of its ships and offices make no state as such. The modern trade unions and associations may win large clienteles and expand themselves (as the Universal Postal Union) over almost the entire earth, but they own as such no land and gain therefore never the quality or rank of state. Just as little can even the greatest personal connection and the richest donations in union with the strictest organization make, for example, the Jesuit order a state; but the Teutonic Order became one in the 13<sup>th</sup> century by winning and organizing a country. Greatest of all societies, if we do not count the state, is the church, and the greatest of all churches is the Universal Catholic: she is perhaps to be counted as a great power even today, she has still in her "dead hand" immeasurable riches, she has an incomparably strong organization in monarchic form, and her monarch is the equal of sovereigns; but all of this is not sufficient to give her the form of the state, since the old and proper *Papal State* was drawn into the Kingdom of Italy in the year of 1870—left in the Pope's possession are only the three splinters of the Vatican with its garden, the Lateran church, and the pleasure palace by Lake Albano. Only the municipality shares with the state the necessary territorial character, but lacks on the other hand its full right of sovereignty.

From this fundamental viewpoint it follows that the people may be organized before the state. It is always so in the primary state formation. Our Germanic forebears already had a well-formed law before they halted their travels and seated themselves to form states. Settlement does not alone separate states from wild wandering hordes, but also from highly developed nomadic tribes; and when we back in time see people as strictly ordered as for example in the "Kobong system" of the Australian wilderness, but without any organized land, we denote this form of organization, without justice, as a kin state<sup>85</sup>; this is merely a kin society<sup>86</sup>.

Just as the ethnic element is thus genetically prior to the territorial, so has it also placed that other element in its shadow within the sphere of our science. The ancient, and still also those of the "Natural Law," political philosophers looked past it in their definitions of state; and hence the old Klüber in 1817 may be the first who in his speculations on the nature of the state considered the geographical component<sup>87</sup>. This first postulate already, that every state by necessity presupposes a country, denotes therefore to some degree a modern viewpoint.

## II.2. Different Realm Types: City and Country

This is connected to the eye-catching change of the character of the state's property. No one who has read the history of the ancient time can avoid observing that its states are typically named after *cities*; we follow Athens', Sparta's, Thebes' fates, we see the struggles between Rome and Carthage, we see Rome stretch itself across its entire cultural sphere and still be known as Rome. When we instead say Greece or Italy, this denotes a change of reality. Ancient states were cities, their territories a mere city area, even if a wide countryside was counted to it; state-life pulsed within the city walls alone, the country was only moderately a participant thereof. This territorial type is thus the city with annexes of country. The first step outside this type was taken in 88 B.C., when Italy beyond Rome attained

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85 *ättstat*

86 *ättsamhälle*

87 Jellinek, p. 395 (author)

citizenship in the state of Rome, and the second 300 years later, when the Empire in its great entirety was similarly naturalized; therewith the eternal city was in reality degraded from the rank of state to the rank of capital within a realm. The same territorial basis was possessed by that remnant of the ancient, which with a center in Byzantium vegetated another millennium and more in time. Although the enormous centralization of these empires gave the capitals an entirely different weight with respect to the countryside in comparison to modern states still.

The Western European middle age came as usual with a type which forms the polar opposite of the ancient's. Now the state concept vanishes completely into the country, *terra*; the conquering natural household, together with the poor condition of communications, invoked the image of traveling courts which lived on the domains without stronghold even in a capital—no modern traveling king or traveling emperor may compete against Charlemagne, who (according to Lamprecht's calculation) rode 12,000 miles<sup>88</sup> in his reign! With further development this type is also eventually supplanted by the late-Roman, as the absolute monarchy of the 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries overall has an inner friendship with the Byzantinism; we see therefore again strongly prominent capitals, and the French nobility's pull from the countryside to Versailles bears witness of that it was not merely the administration which was concentrated therein. From this type the distribution and equalizing of capital and other territories come to be which mark a modern European realm<sup>89</sup>.

Besides this general development, the city state has also seen a reincarnation. It occurred at the end of the medieval, in connecting to the blooming of the burghers' affairs, in three primary theaters: part in Northern Italy (Venice, Genoa, Florence), part in Flanders (Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp), part in Germany with its "Reichsstädte,"<sup>90</sup> which after the Peace of Westphalia had the same sovereignty under the shield of the Empire as the German countries, and by the time of the system's dissolution were 51, or almost as many as there are countries overall in the current time. A powerful representative of the newer city states of the old Roman sort was Venice all the way to the French revolution. Nowadays, most of the sovereign cities have been swallowed within the modern territorial type, and those which still stand—the "Freie Reichsstädte" of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, as well as the "semicanton" of Basel Stadt—are in reality only province cities with extended self-governance within the constraints of greater realms.

This form of state can today be seen as definitely expended. Even London's city complex of 7 million inhabitants can no longer be thought of as an own state;<sup>91</sup> this for reasons that will be shown (see II.4.3.).

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88 Possibly meaning the Swedish mile, 10 km, or the German *Reichsmeile*, 7.5 km.

89 In the most modern democracy, the capital has once again sunk in relative importance. In the system of the United States, one deliberately avoids placing the government into the largest cities, so that Albany is the capital instead of New York in the state of NY, Springfield instead of Chicago in IL, Harrisburg instead of Philadelphia in PA, and so on, see Bryck, *The Amer. Commonwealth*, ed. 1903, II, 796. Brazil and Australia have placed their federal capitals in sparsely populated areas at a legally determined distance from existing large cities, and South Africa has its government in Pretoria, but its parliament in Cape Town, while Johannesburg is the business center and the most populated city.  
(author)

90 "riksstäder"

91 Only as a self-governing "Reichsstadt" of the Hamburg type can London be imagined, that in the latest liberal government's "devolution plan" see *The Great Powers* III, 100. A similar solution has more than once in various connections been conceived for the problem of Constantinople, see Kjellén, *Politiska essayer* ("Political Essays"), I, 79-. (author)

### II.3. The “Life Property” of the State Under the Realm

We establish therefore as a first observation that the modern state presupposes a territory of both cities and country. All states are land owners. Next observation is a difference between the state and private land owners: a peasant may sell his farmstead, buy a new, and continue his existence there, but a state cannot. The state cannot move. He has a fixed residence and home, unlike loitering nomadic hordes, and this on a certain, once and for all determined, ground. He is fixed to his own soil, and dies if he loses this hold. He stands under a “life property” of the territory. If we imagine that all the citizenry of Sweden broke up with the king and the flag ahead and all of its movable property, and settled with them beneath a different airspace—we could not bring Sweden with us; behind us the Swedish state lies dead.

We fix here a property which the state has in common with vegetable communities, such as a forest; the state cannot follow along by the air—he is like the forest bound by a certain soil from which he draws nourishment, and under whose surface even his trees tie their roots together. Next, we see a similarity with animal communities, in that the state’s single individuals have freedom of movement and may serve his interest outside the territory as well. Sailing ships may bring valuables back home, armies in enemy land may defend the homeland—Sweden is with its ships under the flag on the East Asiatic line, just as Sweden once was with its sons by Breitenfeld and Poltava. In the same way ants gather by the anthill and fight occasionally to its defense outside of it. Within the vegetable and animal life there is a correspondence to the colonization through which a new state may emerge as an offshoot of an older. All sub-human analogies explode ultimately to the state’s ability of spiritual connections. Legations and consulates are its permanent sense-protrusion into other states, and all states may in extraordinary cases come together in congresses through authorized envoys; likewise do modern communication lines serve the states as force vessels through which the states may increase their power. But in all of this, none are able to move from their space. It is the power source for each and all. Every conflict between the threads is immediately reflected back. Each state gravitates at every moment from the political community to its own center, which lies where it lies. All international voyages show only ability of expansion, elasticity of the state, but no real ability to move. States may not commit themselves: they are in soul and heart alone—like the human.

Nor does the state move itself when he goes on trails of conquest or colonization. A forest may move from its space, but no state has in this way moved from its point of origin; at its height it has been able to relocate its capital (from Moscow to Petersburg, from Kyoto to Tokyo). This outward expansion is thus by its nature *growth* and not motion, whether it is satisfied with filling its natural space or continues beyond it. This is especially apparent from this, that states after the expansionary powers are exhausted withdraw to their own countries again. In this wise, Sweden’s state was gathered around the great lakes of Scandinavia, expanded across the opposite shores of the Baltic, exchanged the constitutional-legal tie to Finland for an international-legal bond with Norway, and resigned finally back to its place in Scandinavia, with the natural border in Scania as only real gain; similarly, Denmark has from its core in the islands (and Scania) grown over Holstein, over Skåneland, over Bohuslän and Norway with its crown territories in the Ocean, to later lose one after the other and be satisfied with the homeland; Spain with its American fates is a third example.



Every state has thus its once and for all fixed core country, from which it cannot separate itself or alive be separated from. Inasmuch do all ships-of-state stand grounded and cannot be brought to fleet! The state's lifeform is the tree's, which stands and falls on its place. This fact may occasionally be seen in the legislations themselves, as they in legal form establish the state area: so in Belgium's, Holland's, Prussia's, as well as the German and the Swiss Confederation's; the Swedish Instrument of Government claims jurisdiction over "*Svea rike* and thus underlying countries,"—other constitutions are silent, but their general presumptions are naturally the same.

This condition is connected to the state territory's *integrity*. It is written in our Instrument of Government §78: "no part of the realm may therefrom be separated,"<sup>92</sup> and §45 applies the axiom by forbidding royal duchies and life estates any more than in the name. This quality of the land belongs also to the consciousness of late-matured peoples, just as it presupposes a long-lasting link between country and state. We pity unjustly the gullible savages who sell great tracks of land for little pearls and fabrics, as they are not worth any more to them (Ratzel); yet still the land exchanges of the middle ages and the "Arrondierund"<sup>93</sup> principle bear witness of small concern for territory as the basis of a state. Our time has become all the more sensitive in this aspect. It is a question of whether the popular mind reacted sharper against the loss of *Grisbådarna* than that of the union<sup>94</sup>: the loss of Swedish power that rested in the union seemed easier for us to bear, as it did not affect the territory. Similarly it seems that the underwater skerries, which are only inhabited by lobsters, had been dearer to us than that half-million of Swedes which has emigrated forever, to judge from how we never took any action to constrain the emigration flows until the very latest times. Ratzel makes the same remark with respect to Germans: how different would they not have felt the loss of a few thousand square kilometers than of 100,000 emigrants! This can in part be explained by that humans may be replaced by other humans—the state, after all, sees every year a mass of its citizens vanish and others come to be through natural rotation; they, sooner than the solid ground, have the quality of loose property. But the fact remains. Nothing can more clearly show the modern state's consciously intimate connection to the soil than how he may bear loss of people easier than loss of land.

### **II.3.1. The Organic Interpretation: the Body of the State**

In this way, the state shows itself in stronger solidarity with the land than with the people. May we understand this better? Everything becomes clear with a single word: the realm is the *body* of the state. As all analogies, this is meant to shed light before the eyes, not shades around them. The realm is no property like the farmer's own land; it belongs to the state's personhood. It is the state itself, from a perspective. "Of earth you came," says the Christian ritual of the individual when his body is to be returned to the earth, and the modern anthropogeography seconds this by regarding the human as "a piece of highly evolved soil"; in its own sense, this diagnosis also fits the largest form of human community. Even a state is "made of earth"; even he is, seen from an aspect, a developed surface of the Earth.

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92 "ej må någon del af riket kunna därifrån söndras"

93 *arrondering*, land delimitation

94 Marine territory which was contested between Sweden and Norway at the time of the union's dissolution in 1909. International court ruled that the waters belong to Sweden.

It is Ratzel's view which we recognize here. It has already been noted (see I.3.) that this view has not yet become a common possession even within the science. A great step toward its breakthrough should be taken through Jellinek, who otherwise stands against the organic state-teaching. He labels as a misguided notion Seydel's formulation of the realm as the object of the state; he himself sees in the realm a moment which partakes in the state's subject, and considers it one of the political science's greatest conquests, that the state's relationship to its realm has the character of personal right, rather than *jus in re*, real right. An intrusion into the territory is therefore—J. cites here with agreement Preuss<sup>95</sup>—an intrusion against the state itself, not against any of its occupations; a transgression against a person, not against property. Of course, such formulations have no definitive evidence, and the whole understanding is at its root no more than a working hypothesis. But it will now demonstrate its truthfulness through that clarity which therefrom radiates over a multitude of the state-life's phenomena.

### II.3.2. International-Legal Consequences

First of all comes the positive international-legal corollary that all persons located within the country are beholden to the power of the state whether they are foreigners or subjects, for the state must rule over its own body. Therefore it was Japan's first call after the political renaissance to withdraw itself from the trade treaties of the 1850s, which exempted foreigners from its legal power, and the new Turkey has in the same spirit hurried to renounce the "capitulations." Further follows is the state's right to take all measures for its own safety in its own region, and its inconvenience when it must surrender any aspect of this right; thereof Russia's reaction (1908 in diplomacy, 1916 in action) against the obligation, conceded by treaty in 1856, which requires it not to fortify Åland, and similarly Montenegro's against the Berlin Treaty's article 29, which forbids the transformation of Antivaris into a military harbor.

At the same time it follows negatively from our thesis that no state may exercise a prolonged dominion over a foreign state's territory; for a body cannot serve two masters. Here too there are more apparent than true exceptions in the modern occupations, condominiums, and protectorates of various kinds and degrees, not to mention state-union's double dominion. Occupations slide regularly to sovereignty (Austria-Hungary over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, Japan over Korea in 1910, England over Egypt in 1914), condominiums end just as regularly in pure change of ownership or resolution of other sort (Prussia-Austria over Schleswig-Holstein in 1866, Germany-U.S.A. over Samoa 1889-1899, only the provision on the Hebrides lives on between France-England since 1887 still lives on<sup>96</sup>), and the federation's struggle with the member-state is fundamentally little worse than the state's with its municipalities. All these are transitory forms, whereon the political world, no less rich than other spheres of life, and the real detractions from the principle confirm their anomaly merely through the fact that such points always invoke concern: it is as if they form open wounds in the state-system concerned.

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95 Preuss, *Gemeinde. Staat, Reich als Gebietskörperschaften*, 1889, p. 394, compare Jellinek, pp. 398, 395, 404. That Jellinek has not gotten to the bottom of this view shows itself, for example, on p. 176, where the realm (*Reich*) is portrayed as "ein den Menschen anklebendes Element" ("an element which binds humans"). (author)

96 A proposal to this solution for the current Polish question proposed by Grabowsky (*Die Polnische Frage*, 1916), is on this basis to be view as already stillborn. (author)

Seen from the same point of view, the state's mission to develop its country's supportive sources and natural resources holds the same compulsive power as that which invites a human to care of her health. The old liberal view that the state ought to leave the land<sup>97</sup> to the unrestrained judgment of the individuals implies therefore that the state shall leave duties to its own personhood unfulfilled. Thereof follows in the length nothing good; our Norrland question is like America's trust formations not incidental—it is footed in a lack of understanding of the connection between state and country. But the correct understanding continues to make itself deeply relevant. It can be seen that this occurs when the state through external challenges loses parts of its country. This is, according to our view, not to be equated with the loss of property, but with a surgical incision; thus what is lost is not merely the surgically removed area, but also a degree of power. Where the surgery goes too deep, or where no real vital power is found, there no change is noted: we saw little in Persia following 1907. But where there is still health, there it shows in an instinctive feeling of the need to recover the lost through an intensive inner development.

It is this feeling which Tegnér has given the formula to “within Sweden's border reconquer Finland”<sup>98</sup>. The poet's intuition grasps here a deep, purely geopolitical truth; we may call it the *law of convalescence*<sup>99</sup>. It is this which drove the people of Holland after 1830 to at the bottoms of lakes and seas<sup>100</sup> reconquer Belgium, it drove the people of Denmark to after 1864 in sands of wastelands<sup>101</sup> reclaim Schleswig; and as we in current times see a growing drift toward development in our own country, a growing interest in our natural resources as well, with a certain boldness and enthusiasm in the communication politics, which greatly breaks against a long period of laziness, so is this too not a coincidence, but the law convalescence which invites us to within mountains and swamps and waterfalls and communication lines reconquer the union. Geopolitics give here a scientific example of the the tale of Anteus, the giant who regained power by touching mother earth.

### II.3.3. Practical-Political Consequences

But if territory shall possess this healing power, then it cannot be a piece of dead land. A body is an organism, and a mature realm is the same. This appears especially, as Ratzel has proposed, in the political value of different parts of a country. There are regions that may be lost without danger, and there are others whose loss the state may not survive. Even the state bodies have their Achille's heels and their hearts. Such *vital parts* are primarily the capitals and the great pulsing veins of communication. Sweden, which 300 years ago had to come out with “Älvsborg's ransom”<sup>102</sup> to retain its only harbor by the western sea, shall nowadays count to these parts the entirety of Bohuslän, it's only directly open window to the world seas; were a sea route opened to Vänern, Uddevalla would be of greater importance than Gothenburg.<sup>103</sup> What the Göta älv's mouth is and more, that is what

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97 See ft. 30: The author uses the same word for country and land.

98 “inom Sveriges gräns eröfra Finland åter”—from “Svea” (1811), poem by Esaias Tegnér (1782-1846).

99 *rekonvalescens lag*

100 Figure of speech, literal translation.

101 Likewise.

102 *Älvsborgs lösen*—ransoms paid by Sweden to Denmark to regain the Älvsborg fortification near Gothenburg in 1570 and 1613.

103 Gothenburg, the second largest city in Sweden, is positioned at the mouth of Göta älv, which connects Vänern, the largest lake in Sweden and in Europe outside Russia, to the sea. Uddevalla is positioned further north and closer to the

Schelde's mouth is to Belgium: Holland may choke Antwerp by closing this port, and has done so prior to the French revolution as well as after the loss of Belgium in 1830; it became a task for the new state to at least see the toll eliminated, as happened in 1863, followed by the great rise of Antwerp; but the Vliessing question of 1911 bore witness of a remaining sensitivity on this point. Belgrade was not only the capital of Serbia, but also its Danubian port, surrogate for sea access; thereof its indispensability—the Serbian state was in solidarity with Belgrade and was lost with it. When Chile in 1884 extended its border between Bolivia and the sea, this foe was paralyzed for the future, as the coast was its vital part.

The realms' organic nature is thus never more clear than in *war*. War is as an experimental field for the geopolitics, as for all politics, and the general staffs ought to be scientific academies no less in this branch of the political science<sup>104</sup>. It is to them that it comes to determine the campaign plans with respect to the enemy land's greater or lesser value within the enemy state's political organization; they must therefore study them exactly from this point of view. Modern war has as its goal to break the opponent's will; the most radical measure therewith is to take the entire realm, for that is the same as to deprive him control of his own body; thus France was itself captured in 1871, and could not escape Germany's arms before conceding its willpower; similarly Belgium in 1914, Serbia and Montenegro in 1915. This is a modern war all the way to the end; but one may exhaust and tire the enemy, so that he gives up before reaching that point, one may weaken him as people by killing or capturing the army, as household by tapping sources of wealth, as realm by occupying parts thereof. On these two latter areas, geopolitics serves the art of war by indicating the weak parts. It was a true geopolitical instinct, which drove Gustaf Adolf to seek the Emperor in the inherited countries and similarly Napoleon to seek the capital after these were developed into true centers during absolutism. Japan's plan to occupy the imperial canal of China in 1895 and thus disconnect the capitals of the realm, after Japan first paralyzed it by taking the outworks and fleet, bears witness of deep geopolitical instinct too; a plan which was halted by the conclusion of the war. A similar attack on the Göta Canal, though, would hardly affect Sweden, while a victorious strike against Stockholm by a sea-mastering Russia would take upper Norrland from our hands more certainly than an occupation in place.

So are state territories linked together in organic connection as bodies with hearts and lungs and less noble parts. If science and practical politics have been late to open their eyes for this, this depends also on the fact that reality has not been so clear before as now. The realms' organic property is developed more and more in joint life with the same people and the same state power. With every generation, which after finished work above the native soil is embedded into the same, the people's feeling of solidarity grows toward the country as its place of play, field of work, and graveyard at the same time as its nourishing field and its secure home. To the people's spontaneous work to develop and organize the country, that of the state-power is at a growing scale attached: by organized local administration, by "public works" of various kinds. The longer the cohabitation between them has lasted and the higher consequentially the culture has been driven, the more natural and necessary is the organic view on the territory which we here present. The people grows not *from* its country, it grows *into* it. How differently rooted are not the contemporary Englishmen than the Brittons who once

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lake.

104 Today, political science (*Statsvetenskap*) is one of two civilian undergraduate programs (along with military history) offered by the Swedish Defense Academy (*Försvvarshögskolan*).

trampled the grounds of the Midlands and Lancashire with no clue of their treasuries of stone coal and iron! Practical politics must therefore keep an eye open for the degree of this organ-development. Here is where Napoleon erred, when he thought to in Moscow hit Russia's heart; it was a false generalization of his basic idea of warfare, as Russia had yet no heart in the same sense as the Western realms.

## II.4. The Geographical Individuality

But there remains one thing to show in order to strengthen the analogy between a state's territory and a body, and that is to show the state-regions' independent distinction from one another. An organic entity is, after all, a thing complete in itself, separable from others. It is likely this presupposition which causes the most resistance against the organic interpretation in the general consensus. In reality it is here that it has its most glaring confirmation.

It gives us, namely, clarity over the one—so to say, the inner—aspect of the great leitmotif throughout history which has invoked the struggle for space. What we see there is namely at the foundation nothing other than the states' desire to become organic areas. They seek *geographical individuals* to connect with, in order to by this connection sublimate their territories to the natural.

To discover this connection, the science must first come to clarity in the question of the concept of a “geographical individual,” which occurred through Karl Ritter in 1817<sup>105</sup>. A steadily growing observation in this direction has found that this term is constituted by two determinants: outwardly by *natural borders*<sup>106</sup>, inwardly by harmonic connection in a *natural territory*<sup>107</sup>. In both directions, the law of *geographical individualization* been all the more powerfully active in the lives of states.

### II.4.1. Natural Borders, Different Types

Natural delimitation is a peripheral property of the realm, through which its separation from other states is marked more strongly or more weakly.<sup>108</sup> This is best accomplished by the *sea*, and the ideal realm is from this point of view *the island realm*. No states appear more clearly as individuals than the domains of England and Japan, while the purely continental realms (Switzerland, Serbia, the Boer republics in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Paraguay, Bolivia after 1884) stand furthest from the ideal. Therefore the “longing for the sea” is a political motive of the first order for all states of excessively continental nature, as in Serbia's and to an even greater degree Russia's history in latter times has fully indicated.

Where states share a common land border, there the principle demands that the type of border entails a difficulty of interaction, for better or worse, between the realms. Italy between the Alps and the sea, India with the Himalayas and Hindu Kush on the land side come in this aspect close to the insular realms; the Andes give Chile and Argentina an excellent border, and Romania appears naturally anchored by the Transylvanian mountains. In older times, one would for this purpose even erect

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105 Hölzel. “Das geograph. Individuum bei Karl Ritter und seine Bedeutung für den Begriff des Naturgebietes und der Naturgrenze” (“The Geographical Individual of Karl Ritter and its meaning for the concept of the natural territory and the natural borders”), 1896, pp. 380- [see <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27803055>]. Cf. Schöne, Polit. Geographie, 1911, p. 14-15. (author)

106 *naturliga gränser*

107 *naturgebit*

108 Hölzel's definition, op. Cit. p. 444, goes deepest: “eine Linie, an welche der lokale Charakter der in einem individualisierten Raume vereinigten Realiteten erlöscht, bez. von einem anderen abgelöst wird” (“A line along which the local character of an individualized space dissolves the united realities, or separates one from another”). (author)

artificial barriers, such as the Chinese wall against the Mongols of the desert, the roman *limes* in Southern Germany and Trajan's wall in Dobruja, Dannevirke in Schleswig. It must always be established, though, that we here deal only with relative circumstances. No one can say how tall a mountain must be to serve as a good border mountain. It depends to a significant degree on the convenience of its passageways. It depends no less on how tall<sup>109</sup> the people are who sit on either side: a greater people may observe heights which are completely closed to the lesser—which should be kept in mind when one asks why Kölen can remain a national border, but not the Apennines and not the Urals or Appalachians or even the Rocky Mountains<sup>110</sup>. On the other hand an internal mountain may become a hazard by the attraction that it presents to a neighbor, as the Carpathians for Austria-Hungary in the World War.<sup>111</sup> And besides, it may always be observed that the mountains' different inclinations give them different values as borders for both opposing entities; thus the Ore Mountain and Vosges Mountain borders are more beneficial to the neighbors than to Germany.

By the same fundamental principle—that the border ought to emphasize the realms' separation on either side and prevent them from entering one another—it follows that well-trafficked rivers hardly dedicate themselves to this political task. Therefore we find river borders, as a rule, only at lower stages of state-development, or remnants therefrom which mark fragile parts of the state system: so in northern Scandinavia and in by the lower Danube, so in South Africa, where politics have already broken them, and most of all in South America, which is also a beloved country of border frictions, a state-system that has not yet “settled.” The water border contrasts therefore between river and sea; while the absolute sea border, that is, the insular type, is the best, so is the *mesopotamic* type, where the realm is bounded on all sides by river arms, to be noted as particularly poor. We find it strongly expressed in Paraguay and the former Boer states, more moderately in Romania (which has the mountains for support on one side).

Here it should not be left unnoticed, though, that the World War has to some extent strengthened the merit of rivers as borders. Since the war has developed into a typical position war with trenches, one could have imagined the trenches as a lasting institution also in peace<sup>112</sup>: an artificial border as that of the old Roman Empire, but with a trench instead of a wall! Now the rivers are in a certain sense natural trenches. This significance for defense (as for customs protection) has not escaped scientists, but it has been brought to increased light by the experiences of the World War, particularly from the eastern front, where the war has had a determined habit of staggering by even smaller river lines (such as Bsura, Ravka, Styr, Strypa, Stochod). It is not impossible that this experience shall bear fruit in the coming peace to the rehabilitation of rivers as borders.<sup>113</sup>

Rivers always have a precedence in their sharply marked lines. This is the question in which we find lacking *deserts*, *wetlands*, and *forests*; which, though, by their relative sterility are well fit for the

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109 Exact meaning of this passage is unclear.

110 Cf. *Political Essays (Politiska essayer)*, III, p. 151. (author)

111 The Carpathians' character as a natural border is shown in that they were the cliff against which the movement of Russia's armies subsided, but also in that Russia's repeated campaigns have reached all the way until them. The current border grants Austria-Hungary Galicia for a “glacis” (Sieger), but this interest to one party cannot be recognized to have objective value. (author)

112 See Fr. Naumann, *Mitteleuropa*, 1915, p. 7. (author)

113 See “Skyttegrafven som institution” (“The Trench as Institution”) in *Nya Dagb. Allehanda* 4/3 1916. (author)

true purpose of the border. They lead the thought back to the most primitive form of border, the zone: long ago, in wild lands, swept clean by manhunts, as by the Matabele tribe and the Mahdins still in the 19<sup>th</sup> century—in the newest times revived among the cultured peoples in international-legal form, such as the 3-mile long “neutral zone” along the southernmost part of the realm border between Sweden and Norway after the divorce of 1905.

Before we leave this aspect of the subject, let a reservation be made in the other direction. The good border is an obstruction of travel, but it may not be absolute and exclusive. The snail shell is not an ideal for the house of the state. What it comes to is the right middle line between enclosure and communication; a wall, well tall enough to protect from harmful pressure, not so tall as to completely close all views and prevent a sound interaction between states.<sup>114</sup> The sea’s precedence as a natural border must be recognized as a disadvantage if it isolates to a certain degree, as in the case of New Zealand. The harmonic equilibrium stands here as the ideal, not the pure extreme.

## II.4.2. The Natural Territory and Its Types

We now turn the view from the periphery to the center—from the natural borders, which only constitute the frame, to the enframed territory. To the organic separation from the outside must come a similarly organic inner connection if one is to seriously speak of individuality. The pursuit of this connection happens on its own historical line, and has distinguished several different types before it at all was framed in connection with the necessity of natural delimitation.

The oldest form of a natural area is the *potamic*<sup>115</sup>, with its roots in ancient realm-formations by Tigris and Euphrates and by the Nile. There, the type was developed no further than the stage of a river-mouth realm, in which form it may still be found in places on the map (for example, Cochinchina, Nigeria, Portugl, Netherlands). As a more complete form it is found in the “Danubian monarchy” and “Congo state,” which to a significant extent embrace the entire area of a dominant river (lesser examples in the Manam-realm of Siam, Orinoco-realm in Venezuela, Essequibo-realm in Brit. Guyana). In this form we can therefore not fail to recognize vital power. In actuality there is a great degree of solidarity—particularly in communication and construction—within a region drained in a common system, even if one does not with Agardh (1853) see in these “primary valleys” and “primary hillsides” the map’s only and purely natural provinces.<sup>116</sup> Fully realized, this type satisfies also the peripheral requirement, as the water-separator between different river zones as a rule is a qualified border type. In reality, the system often lacks completeness, particularly in the Danubian monarchy, whose decisive weakness is precisely that it lacks all of the sources of the river. But this incompleteness invokes also regularly a political pressure in the direction of the missing parts, that is, from the mouth

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114 Lyde, “Types of Polit. Frontiers in Europe” (*Geogr. Journal*, febr. 1915) recasts the perspective completely and motivates the Rhine border precisely for the reason that communication there gravitates in both directions: an interpretation that evoked opposition at the actual meeting, see pp. 128, 135-36, 144.—For a special case, namely at the meeting point of natural and cultured peoples, Junghans has already (“Der Fluss in seiner Bedeutung als Grenze”) with reason argued for the superiority of the river border over all other border types. (author)

115 The expression is Kapp’s. (*Vergleichende Erdkunde*, 1868), although with a somewhat different color, see Sieger, “Staatsgrenzen und Stromgebiete,” Sonderabdruck aus der *D. Rundschau der Geographie*, 1913-14, p. 3 n. 1. One could also have said the “fluvio-central,” as opposed to the “fluvioperipheral,” or “circumfluvial” against “circummarine.” (author)

116 See Kjellen, Introduction to *Sweden’s Geography (Sveriges geografi)*, 1900, p. 21. (author)

to the source and *vice versa*, all according to the balance of power. It was this pressure to which Bosnia fell victim in 1908 (1878) and Serbia in 1915: they were spread limbs in the Danubian basin, which then entered the Danubian realm.

An even larger role than the potamic or the circumfluvial realm type has been played by the *circummarine* type. Here, unity is sought not in a common drainage area, but in open water with its intimate connection routes; that is, a pure-bred exemplification of the communication perspective. It catches the eye that this type is more one-sided and superficial than the former. Nonetheless, some of history's proudest pages are written in its sign, those of the Roman Mediterranean dominion, of Sweden's Baltic dominion, and—proudest of them all—of England's dominion in the Indian Ocean. Since England itself earned its insular type (by the union with Scotland 300 years ago), it has for the most part of its reign sought this more primitive form. As a realm type it is all the more impressive, built entirely from foreign building stones as it is, far from the owner's own house. One may denote it as an incredible attempt by a state to move out of its own space, an attempt that in the length must overstrain its forces; as it now stands, it has already in its cornerstone of Egypt created an Achille's heel, or a "vital point" (see II.3.3.), of the first order.

In principle, this state type does not concern itself with the natural borders: it lives exclusively by the centripetal force that is supposed to flow from its marine medium. But even if the border problem may in all directions be happily solved—and also without overextension in England's case—this type hardly seems to belong to the future, as the land in terms of communications has begun to catch on to the sea's advantage (Svensén); this development tends to restore to the sea that original and natural purpose of a border. The modern states should also in the length not prefer such gaps in their population as the type induces. It is only in simpler state-systems with weak concentric pressure where such realm-forms may develop and survive.

Although the formed-out circummarine realm type does not appear to fit into a modern state system, there will always remain a political tendency in which it can be said to have its root: the demand for an *anti-country*<sup>117</sup>, fundamentally defensive, to counteract the threat of a greater power on the other shore, that is, the desire for a "political bridgehead" (Arltdt) or a pre-stage before the natural stage<sup>118</sup>. We see fresh workings of the law now in Italy's aspirations for Tripoli in 1911 and Albania in 1915, just as in Japan's reservation for Fokien *vis-a-vis* Formosa. Japan's newest expansion may as a whole seem as an attempt to revive the circummarine type around the Sea of Japan; but this is only a temporary appearance—the true direction of expansion lies more to the south.

For now, the circummarine tendency rests also on a real principle, that the *closed* realm-form is stronger than the splintered one by its facilitation of communication and defense. Our days' great politics has to depth and quantity been directed by this motive, to create interconnected colonial complexes in place of the separate colonies. One has denoted this contrast as Russian and English. But England too nowadays strives consciously to build bridges between the bridgestones of its dominions; this within the frame of the thought of the Indian Ocean. From this thought, therefore, a political

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117 *motland*

118 Arltdt, "Naturliche Grenzen und staatliche 'Brückenköpfe'" in *Zeitschr. für Politik*, 1916, pp. 543-. The author generalizes this drift to a world-historical motif and counts to it not only staging beyond the sea, but also "glacis" beyond a natural border in land context, such as Congress Poland for Russia's end in the Rokitno wetlands, p. 551. (author)



pressure was exerted toward intermediate, not yet politically acquired countries, such as Mesopotamia and Arabia, and because Germany's Levantine program (just as its equatorial) meant an opposite pressure on the same points, so did the World War gain one of its most powerful stimulations in this geopolitical conflict. The circummarine realm type can also be derived from a process in which the law of the anti-country is the first and the law of the closed possession the second moment; there is no reason to expect a decline in the power of these motives each on their own; even if they together would find it more difficult to in interaction construct dominions with the sea for a central point.

### **II.4.3. Solution to the Problem of the Realm**

With the conduction of these history's own experiments we may now establish two general results as a solution to the problem of the realm itself. One the one hand, a correspondence is required between the natural boundary's outer and the natural area's inner advantages, which are historically formed along separate lines; only when one has accomplished the one without losing the other does one reach the goal. One the other hand, these factors may not be found lacking too much, so that every natural border is perceived to be natural and every geographical interrelation is perceived as a natural territory. In both cases more inner and deeper qualities are required. We have fixed them as far as borders are concerned; there remains a similar remark to be made on the territory.

It catches the eyes then, that it is not the simplex which gives the natural territory its content, but the harmonic; not the formal connection by the river or sea, or even a single desert, or even a fertile plain, but a harmonic completion and measured proportion of productive natural types: field, meadow, forest, mountain, and water. Here too moderation is the ideal, not the extreme. Homogeneity is a weakness, for it results in a uniform production with thereof following foreign dependence and increased risk<sup>119</sup>. It is therefore the production perspective which is dominant here. One expects of a natural territory that it shall satisfy the people's consumption needs in separate directions. A realm must, for the sake of its economic sovereignty (which in its own order is a prerequisite for political sovereignty), just as a person to a certain degree ought to, "be sufficient for himself."

Herein lies the doom of the city-state type (as London, see II.2.). It is the great law of autarky that we are concerned with here: the realm must be a natural territory which prepares for reasonable autarky. It is the real determinant of the geographical individuality within. Here lies also the direct bridge between geopolitics, which treats the general circumstances of the realms, and economic politics, which treats autarky's factual development and methods within the realm households.

### **II.4.4. Impact of the State upon the Realm**

The multitude of political aspirations which follow from the law of autarky belong thus to the chapter on the economic politics (see IV.1.1.). Here already, though, may the remark find place that the state itself may contribute to its autarky. That is not simply gifted to it by the realm; it has in its power the ability to, by a certain degree, reshape the realm, so that it better suits this demand. Autarky lies only latently in the soil and must be extracted by labor; powerful and systematic work on the soil, aimed at not only developing its advantage, but also to complete for what it lacks, means a powerful contribution

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119 C.f. the concept of import-substitution industrialization.

to the realm's individuality. The state is thus able to make its realm more natural than it fundamentally is.

Also the borders' weakness may by people and state be to some part overcome, and this even without artificial means such as Chinese walls or modern trenches. Nature does not at all have good border types in such variety that they may always be available at hand for political shifts. The gaps are filled by the bonds of historical cohabitation, which let the borders grow in the popular consciousness, so to speak as spiritual pathways. Weak borders may also be strengthened by well-suited communication politics with respect to those living along the border; thereof the idea to make the Swedish inland line in the southern part of the country into a distance rail along the border and therefore block the natural draw to the neighboring country. Overall the communication problem in the "cycle of intercourses" is of central significance to the question of the realms' inner and outer interconnections.

The question of the border is, besides, always to some degree a question of the purely political power relation between the sides. A strong state such as Germany bears without difficulty bad borders, which for a weak state such as Turkey became fatal. The border is thus stabilized not only by its own natural qualities, but foremostly by the entire state's power development, and therebehind by the balance of the entire state-system. That strong states do not stop at the natural border, but seek themselves "bridgeheads" and "glacis" there beyond, Arldt has with justice shown<sup>120</sup>. But if power wanes within a member of the system, then this indicates a weakened counterweight at this point, which means an increased pressure on it from the other side; first then must the border show its suitability as a natural one against the growing stress—and the bad border seems now an open, or half-open, door to a collapsing house.

## II.5. Perishability of the State and Immortality of the Realm

It is an intrinsic connection in constant flux between realm, people, and state power which thus meets our afterthought. This guaranteed mutuality between the separate elements of the state shall also aid us in overcoming a theoretical difficulty, which at first may seem concerning. If the territory is a body—will anyone object—have we not then also accepted a scheme in which the body is less transient than the soul? Or does not the country stay even as the state vanishes? And may it not in its time serve as a body to new states? The Mediterranean countries have seen such examples. It is clear here that we stand at the limit of our analogy. It is extended to the outermost extreme. But we will see that it is not entirely lacking here either. The difference between states and other organisms at this point is not even as great as it may seem, namely, if we take the guarantee of mutuality in account. A glance at the given playing field, the Mediterranean region, will enlighten us thereon.

It is in reality not the same country that lies now in the valley of Guadalquivir, or around Tigris-Euphrates, or even the fever coasts of Italy as were in the times when Moors, Babylonians, and old Romans so successfully fought the natural drought there. The new peoples and states have loosened in their struggle, allowed the irrigation structures to decline and thereof left the country defenseless

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<sup>120</sup> Op. cit. p. 516. It is, though, a gross exaggeration to, as Arldt, on this basis declare the natural border to be an empty buzzword.—The "glacis" buzzword is used in particular by Curzon, on England's sphere's of interest beyond the natural borders of India; cf. Also p. 55 n. 2. (author)

against the elements. The result has been new countries on the same part of soil. So does the country partake, more or less, in the fate of the state. Nature, fundamentally, offers only the frame and the raw resource; it is up to the people to fill and form—or, in one word, organize—it. Without organization collapses also the realm, following the state. I can therefore not subscribe to Jellinek's thesis that the realm is at once both the state's dead and immortal element; I rather see there a living and mortal entity. What is dead and immortal is, so to speak, the raw soil.<sup>121</sup> Worked by a people under the protection of a state, it gains something of the people's and the state's perishability; at the same time, it returns to the state an element of its initial imperishability in and through the continuity of its nature and the psychological effect thereof on the the people.

## II.6. The Problem of Private Property

We have now followed the organic understanding of the realm from different aspects and have found its nature to grow all the clearer with the passage of time and growth of culture, until the realm finally stands as a part of the state's personality, its body, coloring the state with certain qualities and on the other hand receiving influence from the state. A remark on this general chapter stands out once again to us concerning one of the most significant political problems, which by this understanding receives its clear solution. It is the problem of the individuals' right to parts of the state's territory, that is, the problem of the individual landowner. We know already (see I.1.2.) that the state in its domains and forests, and so on, has immediate interests in the realm; in what relationship does the rest of the realm's soil stand hereto?

According to Heinrich Schurtz (1900), the “dead are the first and undisputed and entirely personal landowners,” to the extent that no one even dared to approach the burial grounds<sup>122</sup>. Nowadays the dead in our cemeteries cannot even prevent the gravekeeper from harvesting the grass atop of their own graves. It is the living's work on the soil, primarily the generations' sequential labor to increase its value, which constitutes the moral foundation of the ownership right.. Thus, speaks Ratzel, “the landowner shares the ground with the state, and is therewith closer bound to the state than is the merchant.”<sup>123</sup> The question is now whether he herewith has rights against the state as an equally privileged part. Feudalism believed so, and we see the same view return in the historical liberalism. There is a pure and clear echo still in the debate in our parliament's Second Chamber on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of May, 1907, concerning Norrland's ore fields, where the leading politician of liberalism, Karl Staaff, equated the relationship between the Kiruna company and the Swedish state to the relationship between two neighbors<sup>124</sup>. This interpretation was opposed to the sharpest from as much the socialist direction as by the right. From our organic perspective, the case is absolutely clear. If the land is the state's body and and the state a unity, then it may not tolerate claims toward dissolution from the inside any more than incisions from the outside. The property right is therefore only to be seen as delegated on behalf of the state with a quiet reservation that this does not contribute to the state's destruction; if so occurs, then

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121 “Von menschlichen Subjekten ganz losgelöst gibt es kein Gebiet, sondern nur Teile der Erdoberfläche” (“Separate from human subjects, there is no territory, but only parts of the Earth's surface”), says Jellinek himself, p. 176; cf. p.78.  
(author)

122 Quoted by Ratzel, p. 50., cf. His entire ch. III, “Besitz und Herrschaft.” (author)

123 Ambiguous—may also be read as “closer to the state than to the merchant.”

124 A. K's protocol, pp. 39, 46-47, 51. (author)

the state's right to "reduction" is made clear by history. Our latest Norrland- and forest legislations bear witness that this understanding is returning to our practical politics, likewise our modern concept of "neglect"<sup>125</sup> (the law of "review"<sup>126</sup> of certain farms in 1909) points back to the times of Gustaf Vasa. We cannot admit any "states within states" with privileges against the state to its certain harm.

The standpoint of liberalism depends here on a purely mechanistic, by science defeated perspective. It was not two neighbors who were exchanging Kiruna wares between themselves: one of the parties was Sweden itself. Theoretically, that problem is solved. But if the science, therefore, in principle, vindicates socialism in this aspect, it has not given a judgment in the question of practical politics on the degree to which the state ought to interfere with its right of superownership<sup>127</sup>. This question cannot at all be solved by scientific methods. It is clear that one may theoretically celebrate the thesis that all right of ownership is fundamentally a right of occupancy, without therefore in practice desiring to rub a sand grain of the private soil, which, from the position of the state, is managed with no remark to be made from the perspective of realm—where no misuse is present, there the state has practically lost its right, there private property is part of the state's guaranteed rule of law.

## II.7. Special Geopolitics: Influences of Space, Shape, and Position

I consider it herewith demonstrated that the organic interpretation of the realm, and this interpretation alone, gives a satisfying solution to all hereto associated problems. This interpretation alone is therefore reconcilable with the modern way of thought which seeks connection within the moving diversity of phenomena.

We see therefore the realm with its different attributes not as a transient auxiliary or loose and fungible attachment to the person of the state, but as a content within its own essence, in much and to a great extent decisive of its actions and entire development. Already on this general and orienting part we have found such influences beyond just and unjust<sup>128</sup> from the state's natural side, so that great parts of history lay clear in this light. New contributions to this political necessity shall meet us in the special geopolitics, with their observations on separate parts of the realm—in particular space, shape, and position<sup>129</sup>.

### II.7.1. Space

As the earth is organized, the wide space must assert itself in the form of large states, and as large states expand, the course sinks for the small. This is certainly a law with many aberrations. The map of Europe itself still has in our short century seen new small states emerge, while giant dominions such as Canada and Brazil barely weigh on the political scales; and Holland was in the 17<sup>th</sup> century a Great Power with 700 (German) square miles' space, while Poland with 10,000 was not. Fundamentally,

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125 *vanhäfvd*. Refers specifically to land.

126 *uppsikt*. Literally, *watch*.

127 *överäganderätt*

128 *bortom rätt och orätt*. Davidsen (p. 243) interprets this recurring phrase (III., V.2.1.) as a translation of "jenseits von Gut und Böse" ("beyond good and evil"), reference to Friedrich Nietzsche. The author uses the German words twice (III.3.3., IV.3.2.).

129 *rum, gestalt och läge*

these facts prove nothing more than the natural relationship that great spaces are organized slower than small. It is a difference in level of development. Under otherwise similar circumstances it is therefore merely a question of time before the great realms will have grown into their space, and the indicated tendency is then valid without reservation.

That history in fact places all the greater significance on space, that is shown most clearly in the succession of banner-carrying trade powers: Venice, a city, Holland, a delta country, England, an island realm—and thereafter (already suggested by Treitschke 40 years ago and Gladstone 30 years ago) U.S.A., a continent. Hereof follows now a clear consequence. Lively, able states within a limited space stand under the categorical imperative to expand their space, by colonization, unification, or conquest of various types. This was England's situation and is presently Japan's and Germany's: as one sees, no pure pull for conquest, but natural and necessary growth for the sake of self-preservation. As different times use different measures, so does this law act to different degrees. The classic example is close: if the *Prussia* of Frederic the Great was sufficient for the balance of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, so was Bismarck's *Germany* necessary for the 19<sup>th</sup>, and now, as the standard has bloated itself to the enormous dominions of England, Russia, and the U.S.A., the balance seems to call for a *Mitteleuropa*<sup>130</sup> either in the smaller format of Germany-Austria-Hungary (Naumann), or more preferably the greater, with the Levant thereto (Jäckh). Here meets us the picture of a state complex, or a *state bloc*, to satisfy the demands of space, and similar bloc-building appears to be shaping a *Pan-america*, although the leitmotif is less clear. But in this entire development toward greater realm formations we trace inescapably a political necessity, and the statesmen's freedom is limited in the whole to finding ways for its realization.

It is now clear that this growing scale means a concerning moment for the sovereignty of the smaller states. The great realm exercises a sort of gravity on the lesser ones already as a physical mass; Deckert has noted this for the American state system, with the U.S. for a political sun, and the same phenomenon is very eye-catching on Russia's account *contra* Asia and even against certain smaller Slavic peoples in Europe; against the other western states, Russia's physical attraction is neutralized by spiritual repulsion, due to its lower level of culture. On the other hand, the great and uniform space is itself a stimulus for political expansion: over Russia's steppes, America's prairies, and England's seas wanders the eye out into the endless, igniting the conqueror's longing outward—while the small peoples in their narrow conditions easily fall into a vegetable state as the petite-bourgeois before his mirror in the small town. Here we see the large space's tendency to politically expand itself, just as the great capital.

On the other hand, one may not overlook the factors which stand in the way of unconstrained widening. To a certain degree, the great space appears to carry great difficulties for cohesion even in the beloved age of communications. The growing circumfugal tendency grows with an increasing vulnerability outward as friction increases with the stretching of the borders. To these hazards of the space itself come also moral shortcomings as the expansions exceeds real survival essentials. The more relevant development hereof belongs to ethnopolitics and economic politics, which shall teach us what lies at the bottom of the endless expansion. It shall then be shown that the future is not so dark for the smaller states, even if the present times appear to threaten their full sovereignty with great dangers.

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130 *Mellaneuropa*, "Middle Europe"

Also in the political forest, that law applies which prevents the trees from growing into the heavens and choking out the bushes.

### II.7.2. Shape

Just as we now have seen the space as a factor of great significance in the states' policies, so shall we not rarely be able to establish the same for the territorial shape, or the realm figure<sup>131</sup>. The ideal here is a concentric figure, because it is most fit for cohesion around a central point. The French and the Spanish motherland comes close to this ideal. An extreme opposite to this was Prussia at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, which was not even connected, but consisted of three disjoint primary parts; here, the state's policy must move toward the joining of the parts into a unity. But also the present Austria's figure with long extended arms (Galicia, Dalmatia) is by itself impossible; there, the union with Hungary, which fills the gap, has a purely outwardly motivation; also Bosnia and Serbia fit well within this extended embrace. In the same way, Romania's longing for Siebenbürgen<sup>132</sup> is already shown in its shape of a pincer around this country. An all too great disproportion between length and width is also of evil, as it makes difficult communication and the task of defense, in particular when it gives the realm a quality of uniformity. This is the case of Chile, a hundred-mile shoreline and mountainside that has all too much a need of widening, thereof the conflicts with the neighbors to the north beyond the desert of Atacama as well as to the east beyond the Andes; Norway too suffers from similar weaknesses in shape and position—a motive for the union with Sweden, which certainly is covered by opposite motives and different perspectives.

Details of the realm's outer form may also occasionally permit interesting political conclusions. The "Caprivi finger" in German South-West Africa and the "duck bill" in Cameroon may well have had local considerations (participation in the rivers of Zambezi and Chari), but the latter's successor of 1911, the two "lobster claws," grapple indubitably after the Congo State itself. In the same way one may in the "panhandle" of the United States, Alaska's hanging wedge between Canada and the Ocean, read political aspirations for (western) Canada. Our own map contributes a shining example to the north, where a long, thin wedge of the Russian-Finnish dominion is extended in the direction of the Malangen fjord; when one now recalls that Russia before the establishment of this border had claims all the way to the fjord in question, one cannot avoid seeing in this map figure an index finger toward the Atlantic, much like in the bulge nearby a closed fist for the Varangians.<sup>133</sup>

### II.7.3. Position

It is clear that the position in similar cases plays into the influence which the territory's shape exercises. Among all geographical influences on the states' actions ought those proceeding from the position be the most numerous and strongest. We do not speak then of the significance of a position under the equator or by the edge of the ecumene or the physical situation at all, although that too may impact politics decisively—such a connection shall be noted on the account of the small states below. Here, we

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131 *riksfiguren*

132 German name for Transylvania.

133 See Kjellén, *Studies of Sweden's Political Borders (Studier öfver Sveriges politiska gränser)* Ymer 1899, p. 329, Arldt, op. cit. p. 550, notes also that Scandinavia's northern border is "labile," not "stabile." (author)

will keep to the purely political position, the states' placement next to one another, and the cultural position with respect to global communications.

England with no immediate neighbors and Germany with 8 such, of which three are Great Powers, show us two extreme types. It is *a priori* clear that their freedom of action will be much different: Germany cannot choose allies and political pathways as freely as England; its elasticity is limited by the large number of neighbors with their concentric pressure. Worse than this, though, is under certain circumstances the one-sided neighborhood position, with the pressure of a *greater power in the back*. Such is the case with Portugal after 1640 and Norway after 1905: no such sincerely meant guarantees, no "neutral zones" or other international-legal rules may entirely lift this pressure which by the necessity of natural law exceeds from the greater power toward the lesser; therefore this positions determines the entire political journey of states concerned, so that they appear to sense a need of seeking counter-pressure from the sea. It is thus this situation which drove Portugal into the arms of England and Norway into integrity- and neutrality treaties with foreign powers, among which Sweden did not find a place. Such a position is evidently a property of the respective states which they may not come away from and which determine their policy by the necessity which the free will of a state-friend cannot abstain from.

A similar situation has on the part of Holland and Romania been neutralized by the fortunate circumstance that they have *two* rival great powers in the back. But the situation is darkened thereof, that they sit on the mouths of one neighbor's primary rivers—along the border of Germany and Holland does Rhine and by the border of Austria-Hungary does Danube carry an immense traffic—while the rivers of Spain become navigable only by the border to Portugal and the Norwegian-Swedish border rivers have no significance for the movement of persons. This makes the Netherlands' position decisively worse; that is ignoring that they trample Belgium on its most sensitive toe, the mouth of Schelde. It is a dangerous thing for a tiny state to have its seat placed right on the foot of a great power. What mildens the situation of the Netherlands is another property of its interesting position, namely the neighborhood of England, in reality the third great neighbor (as France through Belgium seems like a second one): England must regard it as question of life to keep Germany from the mouths of the Rhine.

#### II.7.4. Transformations of Position

Now it is to note that the difficult position of the Netherlands has only emerged in recent times. When the state was formed, it was one of many on this side of the continent; the current position has emerged in the most recent age by German concentration in the German Realm<sup>134</sup>'s great power and by its industry's grand concentration in Rhine-Westphalia. Here we see how positions move, relocate themselves, while the states lie still. One very interesting case of such a *transformation of position*<sup>135</sup> is offered by our own country in the current century. The inner ring of small states (Finland, Norway, Denmark), which has long felt to us as a sort of buffer against the outer girdle of great powers (Russia, England, Germany), has become broken by Russia's policy toward Finland after 1899, the union's dissolution under English auspices in 1905, and the institution of direct connections to Germany after 1906; so, we may henceforward count on the immediate neighborhood of the great powers. We have

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134 That is, the German Reich (*rike*).

135 *lägeförvandling*

also lately on a few occasions felt the cold breath of one in our face, namely in the Åland question of 1908 and 1916; whose question's sensitivity again depends on on the archipelago's position by our own house corner (a threat to the capital and a lock for the sea link to Norrland). That the great powers have become our real neighbors, thereof delivers the World War evidence daily.

Here we meet a realm type which is determined by the position exclusively: the *buffer state*. It plays a great role in the political world, particularly in our time. The lot of such a state is not pleasant, as it in principle lives on the static balance between two (or more) pressures. Korea has run the risk to the end; Siam, Afghanistan, and Persia have been pushed hard by this pressure. Buffer politics have played no smaller role in Europe, in particular on the Balkan peninsula. This is the secret in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin's map: Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia have for their independent presence to thank the other great powers' desire to lay buffers between Russia and Constantinople, conveniently corresponding to Russia's own desire to win obedient realms<sup>136</sup> and allies along the same route. When we later observe that the other row of small states in Mitteleuropa—Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland—correlate with the historical friction zone between Roman and Germanic Europe, we see a sudden light, that *buffer politics contain a life insurance for small states* in the age of great powers. Portugal, Greece, and Norway demonstrate another chance for existence—namely, in the periphery; but the World War has borne witness of that this chance is of lesser value, so long as the sea namely obeys only one single master. No third possibility appears to exist anymore. The small states seem to face the same fate in the world of politics as the natural peoples have in that of culture, to be pushed into the peripheries or be conserved in border districts—or to vanish.

But great powers too may in the name of balance serve buffer purposes. The entire history of Austria has been marked thereof that the wide folk-road of the Danube and the plains of Hungary draw foreign peoples; thus it was in the beginning Europe's defense against the Avars, thereafter the Magyars, thereafter the Turks, and lastly it has served as such against the Russians. If we suspend our view to a planetary perspective, it seems that the same role is cut out for the Russian world-realm; just as the Hungarians once were the threat to Europe, but were domesticated and later themselves took part in the border guard against the Turks, thus the situation does not seem so distant for when Russia also will serve the cause of Europe as the world-spanning buffer between the white and the yellow—a definitive defeat in the World War would immediately point to this direction.

This middle position, which is the precondition of the buffer character and which for small states easily may become fatal, is, on the other hand, from an economic point of view an exclusive advantage. There, Italy has its natural stance as as link between Europe and the Levant, whereto also its realm shape as a pier also indicates. There lie the conditions for a powerful trade development for Holland and Belgium, Switzerland and Denmark; the latter partially retains Scania as a commercial upland after losing it politically. From the same point of view, Russia's slow development is explained: it is the backside of two continents, located outside the trade routes of all the world's seas. The Russian longing for the seas shows itself as a natural instinct to escape this shadow into the economic sunside.

But here too we may observe position transformation of particularly notable sort. Countries have, much like urban real estate, their "undeserved appreciations in value." England's entire contemporary development is an effect of America's discovery, which suddenly moved it from the

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136 *lydriken*



periphery of Europe to the center of the world. In the same manner, Japan's sun could not have been taken seriously before the Great Ocean was drawn into the real global communication network. Which immense gain in property value did not Egypt gain by the Suez canal? As a direct political reflex came England's occupation of the country. At the same time and for the same reason, the course sank for the Cape colony, the old transit station on the way to India—and it would come to ruin entirely if not for Kimberley's diamonds and Johannesburg's gold giving it a local production value in place of the commercial transit position.

### **II.7.5. Historical Sides**

Lastly, may a remark find place in this chapter concerning the transformation of the state's entire perspective as consequence of the general development. Their life pulsates richer at times by the one, at times by the other border, moving between them with the course of history. Ratzel speaks of this phenomenon as the wandering of the "historical side"<sup>137</sup>; as an example he takes Germany, which over the course of time has moved this side from the south (Italy) to the west (France), north (Sweden) and east. Closer and more dramatic is the example of Russia, as it until the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century worked overwhelmingly on an Atlantic front, until 1878 on a Mediterranean, until 1905 on an Asiatic, and thereafter anew on a Mediterranean: a movement north—south—east—south. But its capital lies still on the Neva, as an anachronism from that time when it saw its greatest adversary in Sweden. Straight across, on the other side of the Baltic, lies the capital of Sweden with its eastward perspective, fit for the Baltic idea, founded in a time when Finland belonged to the dominion and more natural for that time; but Sweden's historical pendulum swings between the east and the west (south), the Baltic and the Scandinavian idea; and, should the latter be definitively victorious, then the position indicates Gothenburg to be a more natural center. Another example, and the heaviest of all, of a similar displacement of the center of gravity can be anticipated for the United States. Thus far, for historical and economic reasons, oriented as good as exclusively toward the east, the side of Europe, where it has its origin and where also the capital is located, the great union has in latter time gained more and more interest in the south, where its pan-American great idea shall be realized, and in the west, where the great future market of China attracts. The debut in this direction in 1897-98 (Hawaii, Philippines) has already given its pacific coast an increased significance, and the time may come when victories and risks (Japan) transform the Pacific into its "historical side."

## **II.8. Conclusion, Geopolitics**

These are the perspectives which are best suited for a recognition of the wild and partially still virgin area of geopolitics, where Ratzel is the great plowman and forerunner. I have sought to present the relationship between state and realm not as an external one, owner and property, but as an internal, best compared to the relationship between a person and his physical body. I believe myself to have strengthened this understanding with sufficient content, serving to teach how the free will of the state is in multiple aspects linked by strong bonds with fastenings to the realm's properties; at the same time, I have desired to demonstrate the manner in which the relationship between them has under constant flux

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137 "historiska sidan"

with growing culture become all the more innerly and living. And only a pure world-absent asceticism will in this connection find anything unhealthy or degrading.

With insowise widened experience, we continue by moving the observation to the other fundamental element of the state—the people.

## Third Chapter

# The State as People: Ethnopolitics

From the study of geopolitics we take home the most important lessons, that the state in its realm has a natural aspect which is the source of countless interests and necessities beyond just and unjust, and also that this natural aspect according to the “principle of geographical individuality”<sup>138</sup> tends to correlate with a natural territory on the surface of the earth, harmonically interconnected on the inside, sufficiently separated from the neighbor on the outside. At the same time, we observed in the state itself a certain ability to make its realm natural; they stand in an intimate interaction as a person with his body.

### III.1. Connection of the People with the State

The next step of our study leads to observation of the human material within the essence of the state. Seen externally, the state appears not as a piece of country, but also as a mass of people in the frame of the country. The study of the state in this respect becomes therefore the study of an ethnic organism, and can reasonably be called *ethnopolitics*<sup>139</sup>. It links itself, as one sees, to the object of ethnography, but is not concerned thereof from any perspective other than as content of the state.

From one aspect, this ethnic character of the state catches the eye even before the geographical. When the state is imagined at rest, then the realm becomes the primary; when it is thought in action, the people are imagined in the first place. In the political science of the Negroes, the land also means little or nothing against the people, as Ratzel demonstrates. Even further back, we see people without country, whether they have broken up their house beams, as the Germanics in Mitteleuropa in the centuries after the birth of Christ and Bantus and Boers in South Africa in the 1700s and 1800s, or whether they have not yet settled themselves. It has already been noted (see II.1.) that we cannot ascribe them the character of a state. The people may be older than the state, and are always that at the time of the primary formation of the state, but become state first by marrying a country and organizing a society.

The old Greeks placed the state’s center of gravity in the people to such an extent that they use the plural demonym and nothing else to denote the state: they said “Lacedaemonians,” “Persians” where we would rather say “Sparta” and “Persia.” But we could also naturally say as they did. We say also “the English people” or “nation” as a synonym for “England.” Our names for country or realm join the demonym—only *Netherlands* and *Austria*<sup>140</sup> are purely geographical—and other realm names are formed purely on an ethnic basis: Belgium, Hungary, Turkey, and all of the Danubian states<sup>141</sup>.

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138 “geografiska individualitetens princip”

139 Woltman (1903) says “Politische Anthropologie.” From a certain perspective, the name *demopolitics* also offers itself.

Though, I find the expression more suitable for that sub-discipline of the ethnopolitics which treats the people’s mass as such (the population) in connection to the already naturalized expression *demographics*. (author)

140 *Nederland, Österrike*

141 *Belgien, Ungarn, Turkiet. Danubian states*—possibly Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Bohemia (*Bulgarien, Rumänien, Ungern, Böhmen*).

We can thus imagine the state without people even less than without land. The states are husbands<sup>142</sup> as much as they are landowners; they may like the old Russian nobles count their dominions in “souls.”<sup>143</sup> But they are slave-owners as little as they are mere landowners. Much like they cannot transpose themselves from their countries, so can they neither exchange peoples with one another. If Sweden were emptied of Swedes, and Russians moved therein, the Swedish state would be as dead as if it had left its territory; the state is thus bound to *its* people, and the soil alone does not create the people. Farmhands may leave a farmer, renters a landlord, even children a father, and the property, house, home are still there; but a people that leaves its country kills its state. Thus the state is insolubly united also with the people as such.

For individual citizens, the case is different. If the state may in times of need lose a little of its country, it may also lose parts of its people. This, as we have already noted, is even easier. It follows thereof that the people is his mobile element which characterizes the elasticity of the state; even if citizens emigrate in great numbers and never return, the state may survive this, so long as he retains a core at home.

Thus the state can also receive citizens from other states and by naturalization turn them into its own. Here we see an exchange between the states which geopolitics does not know (other than in the periphery, in colonial land exchanges such as between France and England in 1904). Solidarity between state and people shows itself in another way; the state protects its own in foreign countries, so long as they themselves have not by naturalization there broken the bond.

The mobility of the people is likewise an easy perishability. If the state can ambivalently see individual citizens leaving the country, then this is explained also thereof that the state is accustomed to parting with individuals: every year it sees 15, 20, or 30 thousands of its own, depending on mortality, vanish forever. But it sees at the same time, if all is as it ought to be, just as many come to be by the way of natural birth rates. It is a constant exchange, which in itself does not concern the state; only if the factors therewith are removed from the normal—by a great mortality or low nativity—does its attention wake up, as will be shown more precisely below.

### III.1.1. Connection of the People through the Time

In this direction we meet another important observation. If the state is *one* with its people, then it is not merely with the individuals which at a given moment fill its space and perform its work. Its carrying foundation of human substance flows constantly away. The state is one with all generations, the living as well as the unborn and the dead, just as the tree with its leaves in all years. This is the first corollary of an organic interpretation on this point.

The current population of Sweden therefore do not form the people; they form only the last generation of the Swedish people. The people stretches itself through all times, just as a river which remains the same though the particles of water change. Aristotle already sensed this and made use of this picture, although he was hardly able to utilize it in his political science. The idea was muddled in various ways, and in Rousseau we see the world-historical representation of the opposite, mechanical

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142 That is, head of household.

143 Russian nobility counted numbers of owned peasants by souls. See, for example, the novel *Dead Souls* by Nikolai Gogol.

view with all of its political and legal consequences. It belonged together with that mechanical understanding of state whose practical mirror were the cabinet politics and whose most radical fruit was the partition of Poland, a partition also of the people: if the people are a mechanical and transient union of people, the reservations against dissolving it are diminished.

Against a teaching with such consequences, it was clear that a reaction was to come. We shall not halt ourselves here for criticism; it is sufficient to note that, already one hundred years ago, Adam Müller fixed the organic perspective in the following definition: a people are “the elevated community of a long line of past, currently living, and coming generations, who are all connected in a great inner union of life and death.” From the same perspective, the state becomes an “alliance of the past and the coming generations.”<sup>144</sup> The Historical School of Jurisprudence contributed to this point of view, though not without particular consequence either. Already in 1899, in a concept analysis of the fatherland<sup>145</sup> idea, I have sought to fix it;<sup>146</sup> its foremost advocate in the domestic literature is perhaps Boethius, who in his political writings time after time returns thereto.<sup>147</sup>

What lies in the plate of this political view in our contemporary everyday opinion is obviously the political consequences such as have already been indicated. It cuts against the simple solution of democracy for the problem of the popular will as current citizens’ will at the moment, paired with its identification of this popular will as the state’s will itself. Our organic understanding motivates institutions for the defense of minorities and coming kin, to which the advanced democratism is not only indifferent, but also disdainful. But if one can only hold the thought free from such practical concerns, then the fact must stand clear that the state’s human basis is constantly shifting, while the state constantly remains. The state existed then, when the the current generation trod into its law, and it shall remain when the same generation leaves life behind, like the string play which sounds long before and long after a single part of a piece. This thought is of decisive significance with respect to the state’s ethnic nature. It adds to it another characteristic of continuity to the side of the territorial; it is the difference here that the external exchange, due to the greater malleability of the people, is much faster; this is not a difference in quality but only in degree, and we shall soon observe the factors which make even the difference in degree lesser than it initially appears.

Already this naked fact that generation after generation lives its life in joy and despair under the wing of the same state cannot avoid giving its human element a certain cohesion, regardless of whether it at the outset contained greater or lesser homogeneity. It is, to speak with Hans Larsson, “the feeling of honor and solidarity which comes to comrades on the same boat to share a fate.”<sup>148</sup> When one

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144 Müller, *Elemente der Staatskunst* (“Elements of the State Art”), 1809, cited by Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, pp. 130, 129, and Boethius in *Statsvet. Tidskrift*, 1908, p. 140. (author)

145 *fosterland*

146 “Sweden’s current population does not form the Swedish people, but only its last generation: a wave in the current, a moment in a lifecycle. The fatherland embraces not only the now living millions, but also the dead and the unborn millions, by which the living generation is insolubly bound by memory and hope. In this way, Sweden’s whole is something more than its visible parts. Were it different, then our society would not have been of a higher kind than the ants’ hill or the bees’ hive.” See nowadays *Nationell samling* (1906), p. 166-67; cf. “Nationalitetens idé” (“The Idea of Nationality”), 1898, *ibid.* p. 138 (author)

147 “Rösträttsproblemet” (“The Problem of Suffrage”), 1904. “Richerts politiska ideer” (“Richert’s Political Ideas”), *Histor. Tidskrift*, 1905; “Olika upfattningar av orden folk, nation etc.” (“Different Interpretations of the Words ‘People,’ ‘Nation,’ and so on”), *Statsvet. Tidskrift*, 1908; last, “Om statslifvet” (“On the State-Life”), 1916. (author)

148 Hans Larsson. “Nation och Stat,” in *Idéer och makter*, 1908, p. 113. (author)

interacts daily on the same deck, under the same command and the same risk, this becomes a natural and necessary thing. Foremost it is two of the state's areas of activity that act to bind and to brother its human limbs: justice and the judicial process in peace and the solidaric responsibility in war. Even without particularly working thereon, the state must herewith create a certain inner unity within that people whose external alliance it in specific sense is. By binding citizens within itself, it binds them by a common "general feeling"<sup>149</sup> (Kirchoff).

### III.1.2. Loyalty and Nationality

I denote this solidarity as *loyalty* in technical sense. By this word I thus understand the bond of community in right and duty which unite all citizens of a state by one and the same sense of responsibility, with no regard for all that otherwise binds or divides, and as well looking past what particular form of state the question holds: monarchy or republic. Loyalty is without doubt one of the primary forces of history. By its nature it is dynamic, that is to say that it can change to an unending degree, and this only within one state through time. Here the state power itself has a task to observe. By certain legislation and a wise political overhead it has in its power to preserve, create, or restore a normal measure on this barometer. This entire subject appears to fall into the fields of social and regimental politics, just as loyalty itself is a concept of regimental politics. That we have already touched on it here has its motive in that loyalty right in the domain of ethnopolitics meets an opponent whose reaction thereagainst belongs to the modern state-life's most characteristic and most deeply intrusive presences.

We see the conflict already in Germany, where Danes, Poles, and Frenchmen each in their corners react against the state and are under attack by the state. We see the same picture at a greater scale in Russia, in all the borderland-peoples' opposition against the russification that flows from the state-thought. In Finland on its own we meet two ethnic factors, Swedes and Finns, in a domestic dispute of similar kind which has long concealed the peoples' feeling for the common russification. Belgium displays the same theater, in the duel between the Flemish and the Walloons, where the latter's traditional advantage has gradually been giving in. Austria, finally, gives use the picture of an occasionally almost anarchic struggle between different ethnic groups, so that one has many times asked oneself whether there at all is any place for loyalty; while Hungary has only by a magyarization *à la russe* been able to uphold a shadow of ethnic unity.

The presentation is in no wise complete. Who is then this opponent to loyalty that has achieved and achieves so much noise, so much internal discord, so much paralyzing worry? We call him by another, a well-known term: *nationality*<sup>150</sup>. It is the struggle between nationality and loyalty which passes through great parts of the state-world with varied results; in Germany and Russia and Hungary with apparent advantage on the side of loyalty, in Austria and Finland on that of nationality. But there are also scenes where the struggle seems to have been blown away, even though its preconditions are present. So do Frenchmen, Germans, and Italians sit in Switzerland side by side, but they keep—this was at least the case before the World War—still and peaceful with respect to each other; nationality

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149 "allmännkänsla"

150 The word is no older than the time of the French revolution. Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, p. 141, has not found it earlier than 1798 (in Novalis), and the Dictionary of the French Academy has not included it until the edition of 1835, see Ruysen, *Le Problème des Nationalités*, 1916, p. 14-15. (author)

has capitulated, loyalty rules undisputed. Neither is there in the disorderly ethnography of the United States any notable concern from the various nationalities which gather around the Anglo-Saxon core; it is an picture of harmony which sharply deviates from the eternal struggle between certain of these ethnicities at home in Europe.

We now concentrate our attention on this new elementary force which acts both peacefully or with hostility against loyalty. It is not difficult to recognize nationality and see the difference. It is a very noticeable phenomenon of co-belonging between humans, much like its rival, but acts in an entirely different manner: not indirectly by the state-power, but directly citizens in-between; not from above as a common barometric pressure, but from within and from the side as a common thermometric degree. It shall also soon become clear to us that one belongs to nature as much as the other to culture. In the lifeform of the state, the nationality is the other fundamental imprint beside the natural territory.

The human mass which is held together by loyalty alone within a state, we call *people*<sup>151</sup> in technical sense. The mass which is held together by nationality we denote, just as pregnantly, *nation*. The relationship between them is the general ethnopolitics' great problem, dominant within this discipline much like the relationship between state and realm within geopolitics.

We have seen that the nationality is a determinant of essence<sup>152</sup> and the nation the essence which is so determined.<sup>153</sup> What is a nation? Which factor or factors stand here as constituents? We cannot carelessly skim over this question, much as is still lacking in the scientific clarity on this point.<sup>154</sup> Thus it demands a special investigation, which may perhaps for a period appear to lead away from our political-scientific grounds, but will eventually lead us into the center thereof itself.

### III.2. The Problem of the Nation

When one in the middle of the previous century in Italy gained political interest in the study of the nature of nationality, one presented the following six indices: community of country, of descent and race, of language, of customs and habits, of history, and of legal order outside religion. Two of these have played a larger role than the others in the discussion: blood relation and community of language. We begin our examination with the first of these, which lies closer to the word's own terminology: the *genealogical* solution.

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151 *folk*

152 *väsenbestämndhet*

153 In a specific sense, one also uses the expression "nationality" for politically non-independent parts of a people, such as Romanians, Slovaks, and so on in Hungary: one therefore calls the entire Austrian monarchy a "nationality-state," in contrast to unmixed "nation-states." This is the only meaning that Ratzel attaches to the word, *Die Erde und das Leben*, p. 674, while for example Kirchoff, *Nation und Nationalitet*, 1905, pp. 59-, and Ruysen, p. 15, also consider the abstract sense in the text here, (author)

154 From the real literature on this subject we may note: Bagehot, *Der Ursprung der Nationen*, tr. 1874, Rénan, *Qu'est ce qu'une nation*, 1882, Neuman, *Volk und Nation*, 1888, Kirchoff, *Zur Verständigung über die Begriffe Nation und Nationalität*, 1905, Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, 1908, pp. 1-19, also *Die deutsche Erhebung*, 1914, pp. 74-99, Boethius, "Olika upfatningar av orden folk, nation m. m.," 1908 (*Statsvet. Tidskrift*, pp. 129-, 229-), Hans Larsson, 1908, op. cit., pp. 104-114, Jellinek, pp. 116-121, Hornborg, "Ras, språk och nation," 1914 (*Finsk Tidskrift* I, 231-250, c.f. following critique *ibid.* by Wikman), Ruedorffer, *Grundzüge der Weltpolitik*, 1914, pp. 5-31, *Revue* 15/4-1/6 1915 (an *enquête* of "Principe des Nationalités"), Ruysen, op. cit. 1916, I myself has contributed by studies on "The Nationality Idea" ("Nationalitetsidén"), 1898 (now part of *Nationell samling*, pp. 130-161), also "The Perishability of States and Nations" ("Staters och nationers förgänglighet"), 1908 (now *Politiska essayer* I, 3-11), wherof one or another broken-off part returns in the following demonstration. (author)

### III.2.1. The Genealogical Solution

It has long been an accepted axiom that the unity of nations stems from a shared descent. One understood them as large families or kinship trees, with separate branches closer to or further from the stem. Around this image, a category of myth-making was established which operated with an ur-father (such as the “urman” of the Germanics and Odin of the Swedes in particular), or an ur-mother, or a couple of ur-parents (as in Japan). It is a typical picture: all powerful peoples imagine themselves “autochthons,”<sup>155</sup> to use Tacitus’ remark about the Germanics. Even after such tales have begun losing ground in peoples’ faith, the popular perception remains that it is blood ties which bind the nation. It is a more or less conscious understanding which draws political obligations on the “brotherhood” of the Scandinavian peoples, or “the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race” or England’s “motherhood” to the American daughter-nation. Unfortunately, such debt letters are in history sooner or later protested and rarely paid. This shows that kinship, at least to the nations themselves, does not stand as a particularly obligating factor. If therefore the separate branches of the Roman race have indeed joined together against the Central Powers in the World War (see III.6.) then this has little to do with sibling sensibilities; to the extent that feelings have played a role here at all, it is the Roman cultural community which has been the ferment here and not some natural voice of the blood. In the life of nations, blood is hardly thicker than water according to the testimony of history.

This has in turn an explanation therein that the blood community, even if it initially exists, is not easily preserved through the times. It cannot be disputed that Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes once were one and the same nation—although it is futile here to seek a younger or older brother; it is also historical fact that the Icelanders are a branch of the Norwegian stem, Americans of the English, Canadians of the French, Dutch of the German, and Boers of the Dutch. But how have these relations not been thinned over the course of times! We do not speak now of the influences of the foreign air, but of the influences of blood-mixing with foreign nations. The strongest example may be the North American, where the Anglic core is receding, while the nation is filled with other blood. The science has long been clear on this case. It was in 1881 that Bluntschli proposed that “in the nations no blood-bond can be demonstrated,” and the year after that Rénan in a much noted lecture expressed: “the truth is that no pure race is given—to build politics on ethnographic analysis, that is to build a chimera.”<sup>156</sup>

A quick survey among the nations of Europe shall overwhelmingly demonstrate this. Most of them in Europe have emerged before the eyes of history, so that we are able to distinguish the separate elements. Thus Mommsen shows us a very fractured map of *Spain* in other, pre-Christian centuries: Iberians and Celts, Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans, in lively blending and on all stages of culture; thereto came later by the migration from Europe Visigoths, Vandals, Suebi, while the migration from Africa drove over the pillars of Hercules a wave of Moors and such peoples, and out of this entire mass the Spanish people was gradually formed. The proud “blue” blood can thus hardly be particularly indigenous. In *England* we have the exact same picture on a foundation of Celtic, Roman, and Germanic races: there are Picts and Scots, Brits and Gauls of various kinds, there Romans and French nomads have gathered, there arrived Danes directly from Southern Scandinavia and Angles and Saxons

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<sup>155</sup> indigenous

<sup>156</sup> Bluntschli, *Die nationale Staatenbildung und die deutsche Staat*, 1881, Ernest R Rénan, op. cit. C.f. Kirchoff on this subject, op. cit. p. 21, and Neumann p. 56. (author)



from North-Western Germany; and yet no one ought to dispute that the English nation now stands before us in the clearest and most solid shape. The *French* nation is also made of Celtic, Roman, and Germanic races (Iberians and Ligurians, Greeks and Romans, Franks and Burgundians); in the *German* blood a large percentage of Slavism is present, whose remnants still hide in Lusatia and by the Spree; on the *Italian* peninsula, Celts, Ligurians, Etruscans, and Greeks created an initial blood mixing, whereto came another in the medieval age by additions of Langobards, Normans, and Saracens; in the same manner the *Greek* tribe has in ancient times a mass of different roots, while the Neo-Greek nation is formed from this old blood plus Slavic plus Albanian. How many Finnish and Tatar tribes have not gone up into the *Russian* blood, along with Scandinavians and Germans over the time; and who can measure and weigh all the elements of the contemporary *Chinese* type! Incomparably firmer and clearer is the *Japanese* nation, and history knows no larger influxes there save Koreans in the early medieval time; but the Archaeologist and the Linguist find Arctic and Malay characteristics, and possibly also Polynesian beside the Mongolian.

The purest blood in Europe is likely found in Scandinavia; yet Danes and Jutes have over the course of times become strongly Germanized; in the anthropology of Norwegians one has noted a distinctly darker and short-headed element (with its core in Jäderen<sup>157</sup>); Icelanders have received Celtic influences. One time it appeared as if the Swedish nation would take home the trophy in the question of racial purity, and even though the hypothesis of the Swedes' and Geats' identity does not appear to be established, we may well defend the poets diagnosis "of Aryan blood, the purest and oldest"; but it cannot be left unnoticed that the tribe has received strong admixtures of Danish and German in the Medieval as well as weaker admixtures of Finnish and Walloon in the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

Thus, wherever we see, and the deeper we see, the more the eye is lost in a whirlpool of ethnicities, mixed with one another to greater or lesser intensities, so that incalculable variants and transitions appear instead of the pure colors, which the genealogical hypothesis appears to presuppose. We are not concerned with measuring the percentage of these admixtures; we only establish as a scientific and nowadays generally accepted result that the genealogical viewpoint is not sufficient to solve the riddle of the nation.<sup>158</sup>

### III.2.2. The Linguistic Solution

We transition to the other characteristic signifier, language: the *linguistic* solution. Here one has attempted to find the certain sign of nationality, so that the linguistic community is understood as blood community, and one has even attempted to trace the family trees to the root by this cipher. How many theories of ur-peoples and brotherly peoples are not backed by this research method! It is the glaring results of comparative linguistics that has led to this overconfidence, much like all new methods and discoveries. Here as before not much observation is required to find the limitation of this solution.

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157 Arbo, "Carte de l'indice céphalique de Norvège" ("Map of the Cephalic Index of Norway"), in *Revue d'anthropologie* 1887, and other works; see also *Norway; offic. Publication for the Paris exhibition 1900*, p. 81, and Reusch, *Norges Geografi*, I, 1915, pp. 101-. (author)

158 "A people is not merely one by birth surplus naturally grown human herd, but an end-result of many connections, wanderings, sunderings, and new connections," Steintal, *Dialekt, Sprache, Volk, Staat, Rasse*, 1896, see Kirchoff, pp. 26-27. (author)

The problem already lies in that nations may change languages, while not as easily as one changes clothes, but still fundamentally and completely. Entire nations may do it, as the Bulgarians; they are a Finnish people, but accepted a Slavic language since migrating from Volga to the Danube. Parts of nations do so in foreign countries even easier: Danes became in Normandy, linguistically speaking, Romance, transferred to England, changed a second time, and became Germanic again. Following linguistics, Spanish and Romanians are closely related; but the former's oldest known ancestors spoke Iberian while the latter's Thracian, before the Roman dominion by its long roads left its linguistic stamp on them. Such a language exchange may occur voluntarily, as when the Wends by Spree all the more ceased to speak "Serbski" and found German more practical, or in the same way the Romance tongues in the Graubünden by the way of communications go into "Schwizer Dötsch"; it is the same history as with our Finns in centermost Sweden's Finnish forests, and we see it to the greatest scale in U.S.A., where English gradually drowns out the immigrants' various tongues. It may also happen by force, as we shall find later; but in both cases it demonstrates the hazard of tying back language to tribe.

How little the language community demonstrates nationality is best seen on maps of the English language. English is spoken by, besides the island's own children, North Americans and Irishmen; and even if one determined to extend the nationality to these, it would be impossible to count the Negroes in America as Englishmen, although their speech may be English! Likewise the Spanish-Mexicans and Portuguese-Brazilians each speak the same language.

It is therefore shown that the language may stand in an external connection to the nationality. Language is a sharp witness of a full and complete natiogenesis<sup>159</sup>; though, it is not a cause but an effect thereof. It is the mirror of nationality where its temper and genius lies clear, and similarly its most intensive tool, wherewith it holds itself together and preserves itself; therefore the nation clings to the language, regards it as a bulwark with whose preservation it senses its own cohesion; but this depends more on the content of the language, its spiritual wealth of thoughts, wills, and moods than on its form. It is likely that this content in the length also determines the form—thus the American English is already strongly distinct from the domestic, and will likely with time become its own language—but as a diagnosis of nationality, or the solution to its riddle, the language at a given point is not sufficient. Nationality lies behind the language.<sup>160</sup>

### III.2.3. The Psychological Solution

Both the linguistic and the genealogical solution must therefore be said to have been made bankrupt; and the pettier alternatives in the enumeration above are even less good. Disillusioning as fixing a nation's entity by one element or even a complex of objective elements therefore is, one has lately wished to place the entity of nationality into the purely subjective domain. A nation, says Rénan, is a great unitary group which bases itself on "the consciousness of shared sacrifice for the coexistence and the decision to live together in the future as well"; thus the existence of the nation becomes "a day by day continuing plebiscite," and the nation itself a "soul" ("une âme, un principe spirituel"). It becomes

<sup>159</sup> *Nationbildung*, "nation-formation." One may be tempted to render this concept by the more common cognate expression of *nation-building*, though this does not quite fit, as this expression suggests deliberate effort by state actors; among more common expressions, *ethnogenesis* would be the more fitting term.

<sup>160</sup> See also *The Great Powers*, 1905 ed., II, pp. 94-95. (author)

therefore a *psychological* solution: soul community. This manner of viewing has won the support of geographers such as Kirchoff, sociologists such as Gumplovicz, historians such as Meinecke, and lawmen such as Jellinek, among whom the last does not in nationality see anything other than a subjective concept. According to this stance on the question, nationality's riddle would be solved by Schiller's formula (in Wilhelm Tell) from the oath by Rütli—the same that one reads on the inside by the main entrance of the German Reichstag's palace—"wir *wollen* sein ein einig Volk von Brüdern!"<sup>161</sup>

It does not fall to anyone to deny the significance of this moment; it shall also be shown in our coming investigation. But as one has placed the entire solution here, one has once again committed the common mistake of treating a very complicated problem as an equation with a single unknown. It seems to not require more than a simple observation of a concrete nation, for example, the English, to learn that there are also objective elements included. We cannot accept a position that places the entire nature of the nation into the realm of suggestion. We do not believe in any substanceless folk-souls<sup>162</sup>, which fly homeless around to temporarily settle in a group of people and thereby turn it into a nation. We believe that the nation exists beforehand with its elements, and that particular circumstances are only required to release its will and consciousness.<sup>163</sup>

The difficulty of fixing the concept of the nation lies naturally in this complicated quality which follows partially thereof that the nations are found in the middle of the constant stream of history, and partially thereof that they flow into one another without fixed borders. Ethnopolitics here has the same difficulty as petrography, the inorganic nature's system, though even more staggered by the mobility of the human element. But just as little as this difficulty has prevented the petrographer from distinguishing certain determinate minerals, so little ought they prevent the ethnographer and ethnopolitics from distinguishing types of humans and fix their concepts.

### III.3. The Biological Solution

#### III.3.1. An Ethnic Individual

We distinguish as such human types, placed between the individual and humanity, the factual formations participating in history which we call nations. The understanding lies close to Schule-Gävernitz' definition: "one unique in kind individual, standing in-between humans and humanity, to whom the human in moral conviction voluntarily submits, and who in the great cultural context of humanity has a determined purpose to fill."<sup>164</sup> The nation is thus an *ethnic individual*<sup>165</sup>, just as the realm a geographical: a person of greater embrace and lesser content than the separate individual—a "makroanthropos," a "potenziertes Individuum" which "faithfully replicates the human's entire sensual-rational being," to speak with Meinecke.

Already 18 years ago, in a study of the idea of nationality, I denoted the nation in relationship to its members as that person who possesses all of their and only their common qualities.<sup>166</sup> I am yet to

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161 "We *want* to be one united people of brothers! "

162 *folksjälär*

163 May also be understood as "only particular circumstances are required ..."

164 *Britischer Imperialismus und Englischer Freihandel*, 1906, p. 400. (author)

165 *etnisk individ*

166 See *Nationell Samling*, p. 134. (author)

find any better, although I am not blind to the schematic within this diagnosis. It sees the solution to the national problem behind the simple solutions: the *biological* perspective. It portrays the nation as a living type, around which the individuals vary and to which they gravitate.

### III.3.2. On the Strength of the Nationality

The degree of this variation and gravity determines the strength of the nation, which is the same as the vital power of the nation. Where individuals isolate themselves by their own qualities and interests, so that the sense of community is unable to counterbalance private egotism, there we see a weak nationality. Where the individuals once again feel their co-belonging as a living power, there the nation gains a life guarantee of immeasurable significance. So the nation-sense<sup>167</sup> is a fluidum which may rise to a complete frenzy, but also shrink to a latent condition or entirely wither away. This variability explains why the peoples react so differently to the same types of actions: politics which would be impossible in one state are tolerated without difficulty by the public opinion in another, so that the manner of reacting in politics to the attentive observer permits conclusions with respect to degree of nationality. Thus it is as much true for nationality as loyalty that it is a dynamic idea<sup>168</sup> with nearly unlimited degree of fluctuation.

We note further that every nation by itself appears to be subject to this malleability. The same nation, which one time may appear apathetic with respect to its national interests, may at another time spring up as an irritated lion to its defense, When one follows the history of a nation, one finds there nationality like a geyser with intermittent flows. But it is also obvious that the degree of nationality varies by people. The Englishman or the Chinese, who in all spaces and circumstances resemble themselves enough, contrast without doubt strongly—in this respect already—against the German and the Japanese, who are more sensitive to the pressure of the surroundings, more inclined to do “as the Romans when in Rome”; therefore the former do not as easily dissolve into the surroundings as the German or the Swede in America, just as once the Visigoth in Spain or the Dane in Normandy. It truly wills to appear that in the various nations there is from the onset a greater or lesser national determination.

### III.3.3. On the Qualities of the Nation

Thus we meet here already an objective element in the national life. But with this reality of the degree of nationality there is an even clearer one in its quality. The nations are without doubt personally colored entities, with definite physical and psychical characteristics; certainly subject to change, much like the individual’s character, but at an immeasurably slower pace, whereof they appear relatively stable. Here anthropology and popular psychology<sup>169</sup> enter as the assistive sciences of politics, though they both would entirely be hovering in the air if there were no national reality to be found. The latter discipline in particular has much to teach us, for the practical politics rest to an eminent degree on a precise estimation of the nations’ true characters and resonances. The transient attitudes play a lesser role than the true characteristics; it is the latter which act as objective factors—whether it concerns skill

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167 *nationkänslan*

168 Cf. Jellinek, p. 120, who in his terminology applies this definition to the nature of the nation (instead of nationality).

169 *folkpsykologien*

in general such as the white peoples' advantage or talent for political dominion such as the Romans and Great Russians against aesthetically inclined Greeks and "Lesser Russians,"<sup>170</sup> or talent for business such as the Chinese and Danes against Japanese and Swedes, or for the diplomatic games such as the Englishmen against the Germans, or for technical organization such as the the Germans against the Englishmen.

Now it is of course simpler to fix this national character in a foreigner than in a countryman, according to the common experience that it is difficult to recognize the forest for the trees and most difficult for one who is a tree in the forest. We who stand in the middle of our nation see in one another firstly the constantly fluctuating individual, and do not easily glance the unified. In a foreign country we see once again the typical, that is to say, the national. Every traveler has made this experience abroad. It ought thereof already be clear that nationality on an objective basis unites us domestically, even if we do not appear to always see it.

In fact, this is expressed in the spiritual area much clearer by the *public opinion*<sup>171</sup>, let be that the spirit of the time adds there to the spirit of the nation as a second factor. How immovable this public opinion is, that is first shown when one attempts to change or defy it. Many a reformer has beat his forehead bloody against this wall. For nationality cannot permit more than a certain amount of light to shine through at a given moment. It is grounded too deep below the soil to easily give in. And so are nations firstly and lastly to be seen as *facts*, with their degree and their kind, stooped in a very slow evolution.<sup>172</sup> This truth—difficult to grasp for one who himself stands entirely within the national prejudices, clearly stands out to each and every one who has not been carved this fortune—has defined the much criticized but deeply real concept of the *folk-soul*<sup>173</sup>, as an expression for this factually given, difficult-to-move, purely biological personal characteristic "jenseits von Gut und Böse"<sup>174</sup> which paints the concept of nationality.

### III.3.4. Nations as Natural Essences

Thus even the national feeling is in itself neither good nor evil, but mighty with both of the strongest and richest personal development as well as the blindest injustice and prejudice. The explanation lies therein that it fundamentally is a purely natural instinct, and remains such even at high stages of culture. This nature-boundness shows itself in very typical form in the nations' judgments of each other and lacking perspective on themselves. The Englishman condemns with the deepest tone of conviction the "German Mickel," against whose backwardness and brutality his own purity shines so clear. From the other side sounds the answer in public outrage about the "perfidious Albion," which stands in the way of the German righteousness shining over the earth. The American looks down on them both with

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170 That is, Ukrainians, "Great Russians" meaning what is known simply as "Russians" today.

171 *allmäna mening*

172 See most recently Paul Meinhold, "Staat, Kultur, und Erziehung" in *Socrates*, 1916, p. 325: "Es ist ganz wunderbar, wie der Kern der Nationen trotz verschiedener Blutmischung, trotz geschichtlicher Wandlungen, im letzten Grunde die Jahrhunderte hindurch sich gleich bleibt" ("It is quite wonderful, how the core of the nations, despite various blood mixings, despite historical transformations, ultimately remains unchanged through the centuries."). The most common example is the contemporary French people and the Gauls in Caesar's description as well as the Germanics now and in Tacitus' time. On the other hand, refer to "Hvad vi behöva" ("What We Need") in *Natinell Samling*, pp. 72-73. (author)

173 *folksjälen*

174 "Beyond good and evil"

disdain and finds the world in general fairly bad, with one exception: the American. The Russian presses and oppresses with the cleanest conscience any people within reach, but does not have enough hate and fury when the Turk permits himself any such thing. And so everywhere. It is not worth to speak of any consequence or any reason in this world of blind condemnations and prejudices. And similarly the talk of phariseism and hypocrisy does not fit, for there is no act here: it is entirely unconscious and in good faith. Nations are so made that they are not able to measure others as they measure themselves. Why not? Because when it comes to themselves, interest comes into play; and therewith the case becomes a different one to them!<sup>175</sup>

This is the low level of development among the peoples which is reflected in the previously (see I.3.) noted weaknesses of the powers' self-awareness. When one observes the theater of history one realizes that the nations cannot be seen as personalities in the high sense that their style of behaving is entirely or even to the greater part determined by reason. They are to be viewed as organisms in biological sense. The only fixed parts within them are their interests, prejudices, and instincts: the instinct for self-preservation and growth, the will to life and the will to power. In no wise shall be denied the presence of altruistic tendencies by the side, and they may occasionally seize the power entirely; but they make themselves regularly present only where they do not clearly contradict the egotistic. Self-assertion<sup>176</sup> is the first of a sound nation's concepts. Nations as such are fundamentally pure natural essences, which in history do not seek objective truth and justice, but *themselves* and *theirs*.

This diagnosis shall now be further illuminated and confirmed, when we conduct the study genetically and trace the origin of nations. Thereon we do not need to stop by Bagehot's great question mark for the races and simple indication of the imitation instinct<sup>177</sup> (with respect to predecessors) of the tribe. We turn ourselves directly to history, for this process has taken place before its eyes.

### III.4. Emergence of Nations

In reality we see it in one direction contemporarily and that at the greatest scale. Already in *The Great Powers* of 1905 I indicated the United States as the stage of a new nation's birth to the world. The theater has not gone further than the act in which all of the elements are each on their own readily apparent, thrown there by the Earth's greatest migration onto a pre-existing Anglo-Saxon bottom; we see the new elements grow and multiply and fill the soil out there, while the original core (in the states of New England) stagnates by reduced nativity; we see them at the same time slowly dissolve into the culture-form in place, though not without contributing to a transformation thereof; thus they gradually sink into the mass which therewith gains a new color, which by the completion of times—when immigration has taken normal dimensions, so that the elements gain more fixed relations—must stand out as a new folk-substance or nation. Much like the minerals in a rock type they have molten together into a unit, and this unit is unique, similar to no other.

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175 This section was written before the World War and published in *Political Essays II*, p. 130. What we experienced in the same direction during the war surpasses all imagination and tempts occasionally to surrender all hope for nations' sense of truth and justice. Cf. Steffen, *Krig och kultur (War and Culture)*, I, 1914, pp. 107-. (author)

176 *själfhäfdelsen*

177 *efterhärminingsdriften*

It is a clear natural process of *assimilation* by direct blood-mixing. When we now think back to the genealogies of nations (see III.2.1.), it strikes us that this is a common feature. Armed by the magnifying glass of history, we see thus at an earlier time in Europe the same picture as in America. Thus there was no Englishman one thousand (or more) years ago; on the island of Albion, Celtic tribes crowded together with German and Scandinavians, as well as remnants of the Roman invasion, soon also new continental elements from Normandy; all of these—perhaps each on their own substantially mixed already—folk-substances have over the course of time been welded into the fixed and strong type which we now see on the island, and only the linguist and the researcher of customs may with strained eyes recognize the elements. Here the end has therefore long come to that process which in the United States has recently begun. And so everywhere: these clear nationalities around us are dissolved by genetic investigations into a mosaic of smaller ethnic elements which once had relative freedom, which perhaps in places still preserve this freedom, but which in this country have been cooked into a single fully organic entity.

But the theater on America's soil has still a great interest therein that it concerns an already complete nation's transformation into one new. It is the second time in a few centuries that this continent sees a new nation being born: first it was the emigrated Englishmen that there transformed into Anglo-Americans by the transplantation itself within the new soil, under the power of a new nature and new cultural purposes.

We learn here to know another, simpler method for the birth of nations, which naturally is active in the previous but may also work alone. It is the *acclimatization process* or the for all life valid law of adaption: rectification according to the environment. Already on a surface-level consideration, this law makes itself relevant also to the people. The modern "anthropogeography" has put particular effort into publicizing these influences of the nature itself. They are observed also from other directions: to use two eminent world-historical examples, we recall Oldenberg's connection of the Hindu's pantheism and the Nirvana teaching with the hot climate of the Ganges valley, where all fixed contours move away into formlessness, and likewise of Auler Paschas<sup>178</sup> testimony that he has never understood Judea's predisposition for the highest form of religiosity better than when he one quiet night saw the stars in its area in wonderful greatness, as if approaching the earth.<sup>179</sup> When such influences with striking truth have been shown for the innermost human soul-life, then we may also understand how a geographer such as Kirchoff could present the natural territory essentially as a sort of casting mold, where different human elements are cast to homogeneous masses,<sup>180</sup> naturally under strong dependence of the natural form.

Now, it is not Kirchoff's meaning that this influence is only external and direct. He has an open eye and places great weight on the indirect influence by the nature's pointers to economic life and exchange. Thus he finds this circulating production and consumption along natural trade routes be a decisive factor to the connection and cohesion of citizens in Switzerland and Belgium.<sup>181</sup> Without doubt this is a significant remark, and it ought to be widened to apply to the entire historical coexistence, the

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178 General Carl Lorenz Auler (1854-1930).

179 Oldenberg, *Buddha*, ed. 1914, pp. 12-13. Auler Pascha, *Die Hedschesbahni*, "Petermanns Mitteilungen," 1906, Ergänzungsheft n:o 154, p. 6. (author)

180 Kirchoff, *Mensch und Erde*, 1901, p. 93, *Nation und Nationalität*, p. 11. One almost gets into a superstitious mood when one hears that the American has begun taking the Indian's facial features! (author)

school of nations where their beginnings are educated by upbringing. The cultural environment—interaction with neighbors not the least—turns here to the natural environment; this not only for the material sector, but up to its customs and literature and the spiritual exchange of thoughts in all of its forms. That this coexistence ultimately is the strongest element in the weaving of nations ought not be doubted; but when Jellinek considers them on this basis to be only historical-social formations and not natural, he overlooks the foundation and roots and presents as a contrast that which is a supplement, to a certain level even a causal relationship.

Only in one case can Jellinek's diagnosis be considered a hit, and that is where natiogenesis occurs without exchange of soil. Such is the case in the recently mentioned Belgium and Switzerland, where, though, no new language bears witness of the new nation's full maturity. Thus the case is more typical in Portugal and Netherlands. Nature alone could not by seashore and river mouths turn these Spanish and Low German branches into their own national tribes if the states had not closed the doors around them (2/3 and 1/3 of a millennium ago, respectively) and designated for them their own historical purposes, separate from those of the main tribes; in this context, their dialects became elevated to realm languages and thus bearers of their own literatures. The result became so fundamental that no state-boundary in Europe is as old as Portugal's, and that the wanderer 2 miles west of the German Kleve finds himself in an entirely new world, in the Dutch Nijmegen.<sup>182</sup> Here we see a unique case of the state's ability to create a nation, a "political acclimatization"; loyalty here has in essence delimited nationality by external separation no less than the previously (see III.1.1.-III.1.2.) remarked internal unification; but, evidently, neither has it here occurred without cooperation with nature, which separates the coastal territory from the uplands.

The direct acclimatization on a foreign ground consists of adaption to a new natural environment with therein lying new labor purposes, and is negatively reinforced by the simultaneous liberation from the adaption to the old country. Thus the Anglo-Saxon race was developed in separate environments on both sides of the Atlantic during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, and it can therefore be said that it was already a new nation which in 1770s dissolved also the political ties to the mother tribe. It was immigration which after the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century interrupted this nation's naturally slow development and called upon the natiogenetic process anew in order to from Anglo-Americans create Yankeemen, now in the form of assimilation. The same double transformation has on Italy's soil produced first the old Romans and later the modern Italians, both times primarily through assimilation. But acclimatization works now relatively alone in Australia, where a new Anglophone nation is being formed, and in the same simple way have the multitude of the old tribes' fragments emerged as described earlier in this chapter. One is tempted to think of grafting within the realm of plants and the reproduction by budding in lower animal life when one observes such phenomena in the world of nations.

As long as we are able to trace the process, nations thus emerge by the amalgamation's and adaption's purely biological processes. Even therein their behavior is similar to the speciation within

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181 See here Kirchoff, *Mensch und Erde*, p. 81, *Nation und Nationalität*, pp. 17-18, 27-28, 37, 41, Neuman, p. 68, Ratzel, *Die Erde und das Leben II*, 675. (author)

182 See Kirchoff, *N. u. N.*, pp. 18-20, 22, also *M. u. E.*, pp. 78, 82; Treitschke, *Politik* (1897), p. 277; Karl Menne, *Die Entwicklung der Niederländer zur Nation*, 1903. On the part of the state in the shaping of the nation, see Neuman, pp. 99, 102, 130.



the lower organic world, in that it does not appear to be a permanent, continuing event, but with a preference for certain breaking times. Most current European nations trace themselves to such an event in the older middle ages. They have emerged sporadically to then stand fast, certainly under a steady assimilation and acclimatization and with an increasing gravity of the higher cultural influences, just as humans themselves slowly transform over the course of their lives after they first take a personality.

### III.5. Maturity of Nations

Now the most significant question remains: when can a natiogenetic process be considered complete, so that the nation has been born to personhood? The answer may be sought in both an objective and a subjective direction.

The first one reads: when the ethnicity in question has developed a common and own language. Here the connection between nationality and language appears in a new light, as cause and effect. When therefore the acclimatization had reached that point when the Low German tongue could be presented as Dutch and the Castilian as Portuguese, then we possess a certain sign that the new nations have broken away. Likewise so when assimilation on the British peninsula around year 700 created a common Old English tongue, in order to through a reawakening of the process by the end of the Middle Ages transition to a more Modern English. It is equally the sharpest and quickest instrument given to an all the more internal closure in that the door is opened for a written language above the dialects, with the entire spiritual traffic of literature as consequence.

The emergence of the language does not always keep an even step with the approach of national maturity; the American English has not yet differentiated itself as more than a dialect, and the Swiss nation stands clear as a day with no apparent need for an independent language. But if this diagnostic therefore occasionally betrays—and is always chronologically floating, difficult to fix to an exact point in time—then the other, subjective, stands fixed. So sounds the answer to our question: when the nation becomes *conscious of its own individuality*, its co-belonging internally and distinction externally. And hereby we have reached the central point of this investigation.

We must, namely, observe that the nations just as human children are for long unconscious of their existence. The individual members dwell still in their kin-, or village-, or estate circles, and do not feel themselves co-belonging against other nations to the degree that this feeling becomes a particular source of power. But ultimately it happens that solidarity becomes such a force in their souls; and this experience can come momentarily, like when an electric tension collected over a long time discharges itself or a spark breaks out in blazes.

Typically this happens as consequence of a hard external pressure; it is in need that a nation learns to know itself. The people of Sweden, thereto separated into provincial groups, learned this in Engelbrekt's<sup>183</sup> time under Danish oppression. France's broken and despairing ranks felt the same experience at the same time, when the maiden from Orléans raised her banner against the Englishmen. History then recorded the thus unleashed force as its strongest, dearest, and most mysterious. Before its court it and it alone is evidence of a true birth among the peoples.

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183 Engelbrekt Engelbrektsson, early 15<sup>th</sup> century Swedish rebel against the Kalmar Union.

When this consciousness to as limbs enter a higher or greater personhood first grasps a nation, than this nation truly has “become a man.”<sup>184</sup> *On this point the process becomes political.* For the nation which feels itself in the age of majority will also be recognized as such. It desires to explode the established state-system if it has no space therein. It desires to, as sovereign, be in equal standing with the system’s preceding members. It demands its confirmation in the shape of a *state*. The form of this demand, again, is typically a declaration of independence. It was this development which led the Dutch to 23 January 1579, Americans to 4 July 1776, Norwegians to 17 May 1814 and 7 June 1905, Bulgarians to 5 October 1908.

### III.5.1. The Nationality Principle

The form of being as state constitutes therefore the terminal point of the nation’s longing for life. First then does it also in the exterior become distinct from the others. Now it may feed its loyalty from the source of loyalty and the work of the entire state power. But there is something even deeper that is gained here. *By the state the nation gains higher spiritual content which it lacks in itself.* Its blind instincts attain by the state a bridle in the rational ideas of justice. Its natural power has entered the higher state of consciousness which accompanies the rational form. Under the enticing light of freedom it has bound itself to a historical responsibility.

This is the content of the *nationality principle*<sup>185</sup>, one of the greatest ideas that has ever dominated a time-turning. It is not old in history; it has not played any role in the formation of states prior to the middle of the 19th century. For if the nations themselves are old, their conscious claims on political individuality are young. The ancient time knew nothing of it; it dealt in Greece with political microcosms which never were able to realize a national unity, and in Rome with a dominating macrocosm over allies and subjects of various nationalities. The medieval—thereto counted the age of the absolute monarchy—took just as little note of the reality of nations; it made no difference within its dominions whether they were mixed from several ethnic groups or not. Nor had the science noticed this case; Montesquieu still knew nothing of the nationality’s state-forming power and right. For the natural law no intermediate forms or degrees existed between the individuals and their sum of humanity; it built its states of abstract human types, average proportions of French-German-Englishman, and so on, and these individuals inflated it then to the true moving force of evolution—it saw no one else as the protagonist of history.

This theory has been weighed on history’s own scales and found too simple. It took a human shape in the fatherlandless Corsican Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon denotes the individual’s giant attempt to embrace the world in his own name, with no idea behind himself: with no nation around himself, and likewise no God above himself. This transgression was necessary, this overextension of the individual, for the nationalities in general to awaken. It was by them and only by them—on Spain’s, Germany’s, and Russia’s downtrodden and again restored national consciousness—that the giant fell. And then a political discovery was made greater than any since Christianity’s discovery of the individual: there is another personhood in history, and this person is the nation. It was as when the other actor entered the wagon of Thespis: the theater could begin with a deepened meaning. But the nation is

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184 “Vorden en man”

185 *nationalitetsprincipen*

again the greater out of the two. The individual is not the master, but the tool. The nation, not the individual, is the true hero of history.<sup>186</sup>

This understanding lies as seed already in Fichte's speech "an die deutsche Nation," held 1807 in Berlin with company of the drumbeats of the French occupation outside the hall.<sup>187</sup> It was exaggerated to one-sidedness by the Historical School. It was then infringed against by the diplomats at the Congress of Vienna, who did not consider it necessary to give regard thereto on their new political map (Holland-Belgium united, Italy and Germany kept in fragments). It was condemned in 1849 still in a pastoral letter from the Synod of Vienna as "a remnant of heathendom."<sup>188</sup> It was the legitimacy and the *ancien régime* who stood as judge here. As late as 1863, this denunciation was seconded from the other direction, with the motive of the French Revolution's individualism, by Jolv.<sup>189</sup> But then the nationality principle was already proclaimed (1851) as Mancini's "sacred and divine cause" (*santa e divina cosa*), on which he in his famous lectures "Della nazionalità come fondamento del diritto delle genti" wished to build the entire international law. It was the new Italy's spiritual call to service. Under French step-parenthood (Napoleon III), the idea had now emerged as a world-historical motive in rising action, and would since then not exit the stage.

### III.5.2. Consequences of the Nationality Principle

It is clear that the nationality principle will in practice act in two ways: as a centrifugal force, where several nations under one state have longed for freedom, but also as centripetal, where different states of the same nation have longed for unity. It is thus one and the same force behind on the one hand the Balkan peoples' liberation and on the other hand the unifications of Italy and Germany. We see it also to a lesser degree in Holstein's (and Elsass's) return home to Germany and Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria. In reality it lies behind as good as all border changes that have occurred on the map of Europe in the last half-century. It is not to wonder that an idea, which has fulfilled such great works, becomes regarded as a warden tree in politics between peoples. Thus, now that the entente has gathered itself behind a program for the peace after the World War, the nationality idea is its declared primary motive: the new Europe shall now be founded entirely on the principle of peoples' right to unity and peace.<sup>190</sup>

There are namely significant gaps before the full implementation of the idea. If we look closer, we find on the map of Europe three types of sins thereagainst: (A) unity without liberty, as the Czechs in Austria and Irish in England; (B) liberty without unity, as in Italy with its outlying countrymen in Austria and Switzerland, among others, Romania with its in Hungary and Russia, Serbia with its in

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186 Cf. Rudolph Sohm's stellar lecture on "Die Gegensätze unserer Zeit," 1883. (author)

187 Kirchoff, *Nation*, pp. 9-10. Hans Larsson, op. cit., pp. 106-. (author)

188 The differentiation of languages was at the same time denoted as "a consequence of sin and fall from God"; see Neuman, p. 96. (author)

189 Jolv, *Du Principe des Nationalités*. See in particular p. 36: "Ce n'est pas parce qu'ils sont de telle ou telle race que des hommes ne peuvent être forcés d'obéir qu'aux lois qu'ils se sont volontairement données, c'est tout simplement parce qu'ils sont hommes et conséquemment libres." C.f. pp. 33-34, where the idea of nationality is presented as a confusion between the people's idea, which includes rights, and that of the race, which cannot have any, because it is not a juridical person. Note also Quatre-Fages' categorical verdict "Toute repartition politique, fondée sur ethnologie, est absurde," quoted by Kirchoff, *Mensch und Erde*, p. 94. (author)

190 See *Political Problems of the World War (Världskrigets politiska problem)*, pp. 60-61. Note further Asquith's speech 6/8 1914, "we fight to defend the principle that the small nations shall not be crushed," and Lloyd George's words, "this is a war of nationalities." (author)

Austria-Hungary; (C) neither liberty nor unity, such as the 33 million Ukrainians in Russia and Austria-Hungary and the 20 million Poles in Russia, Austria, and Germany.<sup>191</sup> But practical politics have also on all of these points had to count with more-or-less mean conflicts. It is the correlation between the Italian “irredentism’s” grasping after Trento and Trieste, the Serbian’s after Bosnia and other territories, the Romanian’s after Siebenbürgen, the Bulgarian’s after Macedonia, and so on; the same secret lies behind the Irish and Czech stamping against their states’ unities as behind Polish and Ukrainian dreams of liberty. The crimes against the nationality principle no less than the crimes against nature appear therefore in everyday experience as open wounds within the state-system (see II.3.2.). He does not allow himself to be suppressed or silenced. As an imperative, more categorical and less accessible to rational critique than any other, he stands for the statesmen in countries with “irridenta,” and similarly for the heroes of liberty from nations which live under other nations’ rule and care.

The power of this requirement becomes clear by a single word. The nationality principle is no less than the *personality principle*<sup>192</sup> in its application to the national personalities, with its eternal truth and eternal limitation. In a sudden clarifying light we see already here that it is a child of the same spirit as the universal suffrage within the nations. The great force stems from the same source. It is the “national value” which wants to claim its right also politically and socially on the greater stage, just as the human value of the individual on the lesser.

### III.5.3. Opponents of the Nationality Principle

We may now understand that the nationality principle ran and still in certain directions runs much resistance. In purposeful action, this reaction shows itself in such phenomena of the regimental politics such as russification, magyarization, and germanization, all aimed against foreign minorities in the name of a ruling majority and therefore of loyalty, all aiming to by violent method make the national unit complete at the cost of the nationality idea on the domestic elements’ the account. We find thus on this hostile path also Germany, ever since it in the name of the great idea solved its own problem of unity; and we find at the spearhead of the most extensive reaction (against Poles in the east) the same great statesman who was the man of the nation during its work of unity.<sup>193</sup> That Austria too must be part of the reaction, let be by different means, is a clear work of this state’s own self-preservation instinct: where loyalty is not carried by any nation, there the nationality idea automatically means dissolution.

One cannot avoid seeing a connection between these practical politics and the new state-teachings which positively react against the nationality principle. This is no longer the muted voices of *ancien régime* and revolution, this is the greatest contemporary authorities, and now foremostly in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thus Treitschke labels our principle as one of the natural law’s most broken abstractions; Ratzel sees therein a return to un-territorial politics (“Rückschritt ins

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191 See the full exploration in *Political Problems of the World War*, pp. 71-95. The different types of irridenta are systematized in the German edition of the same work, *Die polit. Probleme des Weltkriegs*, pp. 55-56. (author)

192 *personlighetsprincipen*

193 It is therefore not difficult to find the Ariadne thread in the “gymnastics by which a righteous German defender of nationality invents Polish and Slesvigan exception rules” (Hans Larsson, p. 109); it is simply loyalty which seizes power on the basis of a satisfied, dominant nationality. Objectively seen, germanization and similar phenomena may be understood as another expression of the nationality principle itself, when one namely understands the principle as signifying identity of state and nation, regardless of the means by which this is attained. Germanization has the same aims—a nationally united and purified realm—as, for example, the Polish national movement. (author)

Unterritoriale”); Kirchoff denotes “sound states” as “real interest-communities,” and not “ethnological nation-states”; Meinecke demands that “Staatsverband muss über Volkverband gehen”<sup>194</sup>; and Sieger gives the “nationality-state” forged from several nations preference before the nation-state as a “guide to a better future.” It has gone all the way to the point where one welcomes the World War as a liberating action which shall entirely put an end to the national and racial idea as a state-forming power (Potthoff).<sup>195</sup> In general one can see in the right-wing parties, with their strong focus on the state power, a special resonance with this standpoint, while the modern left stands more determined on the idea as a whole.

In my work on the political problems of the World War, I have sought to make justice between these two opposed perspectives and take them over in a synthesis. It is conceded to the deniers of the nationality principle that the principle cannot make itself valid alone and absolutely. On the one hand it has its limitation in the demands of the state-system, where the new member is to have its place; here must without doubt certain guarantees be placed, such as the citizen’s participation in the active state-community, guarantees of both negative (no pressures) as well as positive (contribution to the cultural work) sort, as will be shown below in a separate connection (below, ch. 5); here respect must be paid to certain other political necessities, such as the geopolitical. On the other hand, the nationality principle does not prevent a political connection within a higher circle, such as the Magyars’ in the Habsburg monarchy or the Germans’ in a Mitteleuropa, so long as the nations’ unity and autonomous liberty within the circle is preserved<sup>196</sup>. The nation state is not thought of as the final word of history. Though this does not exclude that the word in its right place is solid and worthy of reception.

A deeper and possibly more common attack against the nationality principle comes from those who like Hans Larsson regard them as a transient attitude, comparable to the religious fanaticism of the 16th and 17th centuries and determined to in time move to a plane other than the political<sup>197</sup>. There is much of this interpretation also in Vitalis Norström, when he places the “cultural state”<sup>198</sup> against the

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194 “State community must come before national community.”

195 Treitschke, pp. 270, 280; Ratzel, *Pol. Geographie*, p. 35; Kirchoff, *Mensch und Erde*, p. 94; Meinecke, *Die deutsche Erhebung*, p. 80; Sieger, “Der öst. Staatsgedanke und das deutsche Volk” in *Zeitschr. für Politik*, 1916, p. 19; Potthoff, *Volk und Staat*, 1915, p. 8. C.f. Hasse’s distinction of “Völkerstaat” (popular state) and “Nationalstaat” (nation-state) as two sound formations, *Das Deutsche Reich als Nationalstaat*, 1905, p. 14. (author)

196 See the restrictions by the proclamation of the principle in *The Problems of the World War*, pp. 62-70. In his critique (“Probleme des Weltkriegs,” *Die neue Rundschau*, 1916) Meinecke follows to the point where I regard that “das apriorische Recht der Nation reicht bis zur Einheit, aber nicht bis zur Souveränität” (“The *a priori* right of the nation is sufficient for unity, but not sovereignty”; German ed. p. 54); here our understandings diverge in that Meinecke believes that the *a priori* right ends even earlier, by “Bürgerschaft der Existenz—das Recht auf freie geistige Bewegung und Entfaltung ihrer geistigen Kraft und Eigenart” (“Citizenship of existence—the right of free spiritual movement and development of their spiritual power and distinct qualities”; p. 727); as an example he gives the Germans in Austria-Hungary. I understand this standpoint within the circumstances of peace; but how does it stand in war, in the aforementioned example between Germany and Austria-Hungary? Shall it then not show itself unstable by placing Germans on either side against each other? Thus the Meineckian understanding requires necessarily a supplement, that *the possibility of war is decoupled from the circumstances*, that is to say that at least an international-legal connection is erected. Under these absolute circumstance, I have nothing opposed to Meinecke’s arguments, and recognize that my standpoint must be expanded. (author)

197 *Ideer och makter (Ideas and Powers)*, pp. 112-13. (author)

198 *kulturstaten*

“national just state”<sup>199200</sup>. The popular belief likely corresponds with this understanding that the contemporary intimate communications are on the route to slay the nationalities in favor of cosmopolitan gatherings.

### III.5.4. Guarantors of the Nationality Principle

Hereon it may be noted that the view appears to bear witness of a pure illusion. One overlooks that the modern means of communication connect not only nations with one another, but also individuals within one nation, and that the latter circulation is significantly more meaningful than the former. It is as the relationship between foreign and domestic trade; the former is easier to see, catches the eye, but not even England’s circulation of over 20 billion with other countries gets even close to the circulation at home on the island. One further overlooks the spiritual circulation right in our time through the national press, built on the general literacy which is guaranteed by the national school. If we add the modern state’s regular attributes of general conscription duty and universal suffrage, then it is even clearer that forces are now in motion which more than in all previous times make possible a grasping of the nationality; and one shall easier understand the historical fact that out of the nations’ struggle for presence, by natural selection, lines all the more firm and pure have emerged, surrounding the distinct nations.

Shall we need to strengthen the last judgment by a comparison between, for example, the cultural nations of Europe and the natural peoples<sup>201</sup> of Africa? It is evident, that the nations of our time precisely strive to consolidate themselves into their own idiosyncrasies, tighten themselves around their own types, at the same time as they each make their contributions to the common work of the cultural circle. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly clear that the understanding is breaking through, according to which nationality is in reality a creation of our time. “First the contemporary extended schooling, the expanded public education in general, and the possibility of an extensive thought exchange induced by the great development of communications and the press, even among the wider strata, have prepared ground for this assimilated mass which we call nation,” says Neumann (p. 95).

There is no doubt that a Swedish nation has existed since heathen times, and that it in the old times had the same task of unity as Italy and Germany do now, until it almost 600 years ago was gathered together under an own, shared law; but a closer observation shall without doubt give that its real national consciousness has not been a living power even in its greatest time. It was *loyalty* which led the people of Sweden during its world-historical purpose: a strong sense of state, better fixed as faith in king supported by the strong bonds of the state church on the other side; thereto came in the higher classes without doubt a great national ambition, but in the common man there surely was more of a sense of home and native village than internal solidarity. Only sporadically, such as during the Engelbrekt uprising, does the real national sense appear to have broken forth; otherwise it lied latently within the objective circumstances of the nation, and it was only our time—of the public school, the newspapers, the the railroads and the conscription—that is first capable of definitively extracting it<sup>202</sup>.

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199 *nationell rättsstat* [*Rechtsstaat*].

200 *Radikalismen är en gång* (*Radicalism is once*), pp. 62-. (author)

201 *kulturnationer, naturfolk*

202 Cf. “The Perishability of States and Nations” (“Staters och nationers förgänglighet”), 1908, collected in *Polit. Essays I*, p. 6: “It was in the name of loyalty, state-sense more than that of nationality that it [the Swedish people] made its

But the nationality principle has its true and lasting guarantee not of its own power, but thereof that it meets and marries another force of no lesser value or weight. This counter-current is *the state's longing for a living sensual content*. As much as there is a current from the nation to the state—we have now sufficiently observed this—there is also a current from the state to the nation. In the former case, the initiative belongs to the nation which seeks to idealize its nationality as loyalty. In the latter, the state is the primary and leader to make loyalty materialize as nationality. The former is a movement upwards from below, the latter downwards from above. But both carry the same aim: *the nation-state*, where people and nation coincide in one space, enclosed within one state.

So we see here the loyalty principle as a road on the right side collide with and feed into the nationality principle. We find ultimately no difference between “state-nations” and “culture-nations”<sup>203204</sup>; they fall together in the end. Shall one now perhaps understand the width and depth of the necessity which in our time has let nations and states find each other, who thus far in history have wandered separate roads, as if seeking each other? It is not only the nation which strives for a spirit. It is also the state that seeks a *soul*. At the same time the nation gains of the state a rational rein, at the same time it grants the state back the pulsating sensual life and its living unity, which no earthly form of presence can be without if it seeks to achieve personhood.

### III.5.5. The Law of Ethnic Individuation

The idea of the modern state lies deepest in this connection between the nation's natural essence and the states' desire for reason. There, its inner character of a lifeform is reflected most clearly. There, the character of this lifeform is also reflected: not pure instinct, nor abstract justice either, but a synthesis of both. The pure light of justice will break in a national temper much like light breaks in an atmosphere, and arrives to its place in history only by the way of this refraction.

Geopolitics have taught us that the modern state obeys the law of geographical individuation, the ideal of which is a natural country for a body. What we have now seen in the nationality principle is the law of ethnic individuation, whose aim is a natural people and its soul. They are innermost one and the same desire for nature and organic life. Thus, much like the natural country or realm has natural territory and natural borders, the natural people or the nation also has its cohesion and its separation from others. And thus, much like the state itself can participate in its territory's independent development, it may contribute to that of the nationality by reinforcing it with loyalty; but in either case, it cannot avoid the need for a basic form of objective circumstances. In this connection it is clearer than ever that the personhood idea of the nation no less than that of the individual is a definitive conquest of and for the humanity.

There is, as already noted and as is evident in and of itself, no question of absolute demand. Nature does not have borders in sufficient proportion (see II.4.4.), nor do the nations lie as fragmented and fixed as “the different glass cases in a museum collection” (Treitschke); they are to a certain degree

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greatest deed.” See a further development in “Commemorative Speech for Carl X Gustaf” (“Minnestal öfver Carl X Gustaf”), *Göteb. Aftonblad* 16/2 1910, as well as in speech on “The Heart of Sweden” (“Sveriges hjärta”), held in Skansen 1/5 1910 and published in *Vår Lösen* 1914, I rediscover this point of view very clearly in Gustav Sundbärg in *Folklynnnet och utvandringen (The Mindset of the People and Emigration)*, 1911, pp. 25-26. (author)

203 *statnationer, kulturnationer*

204 See thereon Treitschke, p. 271, Kirchoff, pp. 52-, Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum*, pp. 2-3. Boëthius, p. 135. (author)

elastic bodies; they may occasionally (Macedonia) not even be completed; they may also voluntarily or by “evacuation” of the state change location, so that a bad border may be purified (the Turks’ outflow from the lost areas of the Balkan peninsula<sup>205</sup>). Nor is it an entirely unmixed benefit to possess such absolutely pure borders. But that evolution moves in the direction of such relative fixedness in country and people, this is already seen in that Western Europe, which has the most mature states, also has the purest nations. Only there—if we thereto also count Scandinavia—do we have clear nation-states of greater than 90% unity. Even if politics have produced polyglottic states there in Belgium and Switzerland (and Elsass-Lothringen), in the friction zones between the races, the maturity is then shown therein that the national borders within these states are fixed: the desire for growth with the consequent struggle for space has diminished. Particularly enlightening evidence is here borne by the Jews, who in Eastern Europe are “unfalsified Orientals” and therefore also counted as their own nation, while they in the West stand out as fully naturalized, as if baked into the nationality in place (for example, Lord Beaconsfield<sup>206</sup>).

The state’s and culture’s participation in the purely national concentration stands out strongly in this increased capability for assimilation. It is as an old and happy marriage; nation and state have as husband and wife grown together into a whole personhood—but the presumption is therefore their original and eternal distinction in nature.

### III.6. The Problem of Race

Before we leave this primary problem of ethnopolitics—concerning the relationship between people and nation—we ask ourselves whether not also the race stands as a state-forming factor of greater scope. The question can only be answered by empirical observation, the result of which is with reason negative.

Geopolitics have arguably shown us a political block formation in the European as well as the American state-system; but neither Mitteleuropa nor Panamerica have any at all connection to ethnic elements; the former seeks to unite separate races, such as Germanics, Slavs, Finns, and Turks, and the latter seeks to bridge the continent’s<sup>207</sup> decisive racial antithesis and unite Germanics (along with other components of the Yankee blood) with Romans. Here, geography has a complete advantage over ethnography. If one later observes Japan’s freedom from Mongolic prejudices in their policy toward China, and adds the shipwreck of pan-Slavism in the World War, one becomes somewhat disinclined to highly appraise the influence of race.

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205 See hereon *Political Problems of the World War*, pp. 67-69 and literature cited therein, also Meinecke’s critique, op. cit., p. 726; c.f. Treitschke, p. 271. (author)

206 So already in 1884 by Brachelli in *Statistik der Staaten Europas*; see Neuman, p. 89, and Treitschke, p. 276. Of Beaconsfield as a national representative, see Oscar Schmitz outstanding work on *Die Kunst der Politik*, 1914.—One has also presented the Jewish tribe within ethnopolitics also in a different case, namely as evidence that history places a higher value on a certain mixture of races than on racial purity—Jews are at the same time the purest and the least natiogenetic among nations. Treitschke, p. 279, Ratzel, *Erde und Leben*, p. 675. (author)

207 *världsdel*. In Swedish, as in certain other European languages, there are two distinct concepts which are both typically interpreted as *continent* in English: *kontinent* and *världsdel* (“part of the world,” Ger.: *Erdteil*). The former concept typically counts Eurasia as a single continent, while Europe and Asia are always distinct “world parts”; North and South America are usually distinct continents (*kontinenter*), but may be the same “world part.”



Nonetheless, it would be all too hurried to entirely strike the problem from this chapter on this basis. While race thus far has not made itself politically relevant, there has been no lack of attempts thereto, of greater or smaller degree and kind.

Thus, the Pan-America program has without doubt a spiritual obstacle to overcome precisely in the racial and cultural antithesis, and this obstacle has taken a political form in the so-called A-B-C alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, which entered great politics with its mediation between U.S.A. and Mexico. Here lies at the bottom a Romance unit, and from here the perspective moves to the *Latin America* as a unit on the basis of race *contra* the Germanic north thereabout. The perspective intersects others, foremostly the *pan-Iberian*, which has even held congresses (in Madrid 1900, 1904; a reflective effect of U.S.A.'s war with Spain of 1898); here enters the historic moment, the bond between "motherland" and daughter nations across the world seas; Spain is thus a participant, and the program has been presented as a "Greater Spain"<sup>208</sup>. On our side of the Atlantic, we find hence the race thought active on the Pyrenean peninsula in the form of the *Iberian Federation* to which the entire Latin America connects itself as an ethnic and historical annex. But it does not even stop there, but widens itself to finally to the program of the *Latin Union*—the dream of Frenchman Victor Hugo, Italian Mazzini, Spanish Castelar—where the Romance race-thought is finally realized in a state bloc of over 100 million in Europe alone! Thus far it has not taken practical contours more than in a discussion of a Latin toll union (as counterweight to the German) a few man-ages ago; Portugal is not a part within its only real fruit, the Latin Monetary Union of 1865. Nor did Spain take the side of its racial brethren in the World War, and Portugal's participation clearly depends less on racial community than on the political pressure of England. This aside, one cannot avoid noting in favor of the racial thought the fact that Italy in 1915 and Romania in 1916 were driven out of their treaties' bonds with the Central Powers into the camp of the Entente.

*Pan-Slavism* too has in the conclusions of the World War shown itself to not be entirely without fruits, even if it as a unifying racial thought has been bankrupted with the defection of Bulgaria, the emancipation of Poland, and the Austrian peoples' loyalty in general. It has, though, not been without effect on the Czechs in Bohemia nor the Ruthenians in Galicia; and its impression on the people of the Serbs did in reality set the avalanche of the war in motion. The significance of pan-Slavism lies in these effects on the smaller peoples, not in the Russian initiative; it is they who made it into a world-political factor more than any other instance of the racial thought—even though one ought not be blind to catalytic moments from other directions<sup>209</sup>.

The smallest practical effect of the racial thought has been found where the race itself held the highest place. Pan-Germanism certainly put a fruit full of vital force in the "Pan-German League"

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208 Marvaud, "La plus grande Espagne," *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, Dec. 1904. Mella, *El ideal de España*, 1915, also counts to "dogmas nacionales" a reunification with "America's united Spanish states"; where another national dogma concerns the federation with Portugal, Brazil is also imagined within the bloc. See *Das Grössere Deutschland* 18/12, 1915. C.f. *The Great Powers*, I, 46, 51, IV, 89. (author) More precisely, Mella sought "Estados Unidos Españoles de América del Sur, para contrapesar los Estados Unidos sajones del Norte" ("Spanish United States of South America to counter-balance the Saxon United States of the North"). See: [https://es.wikisource.org/wiki/El\\_ideal\\_de\\_Espa%C3%B1a. Los\\_tres\\_dogmas\\_nacionales](https://es.wikisource.org/wiki/El_ideal_de_Espa%C3%B1a. Los_tres_dogmas_nacionales)

209 In this way the Austro-Hungarian peoples' draw to Russia is shown to widely and in much as a mere side effect of their hatred of the Germans and Magyars, see the *Political Problems of the World War*, p. 119. See therein also the whole of chapter IV, "Racial Problems." (author)

(*Alldeutscher Verband*) since 1891 (1894), a mass of more or less fantastical projects of a “pangermanisches Deutschland” (Reimer 1905) or a “Grossdeutschland” (anonymous, 1895) have seen the light of day in its trails<sup>210</sup>, and one or another voice has also been raised for that outside Germany (such as Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson<sup>211</sup>). But while Sweden in the great press of the World War tends to sympathize with the main German people, Norway’s and Denmark’s sympathies lean therefrom away, and no Germanic power has openly placed itself on its side in the struggle—its extension in Mitteleuropa goes, as has already been noted, not in the sign of the race.

In Switzerland, one has a special opportunity to observe the workings of the race thought, as Romans and Germanics meet there within the same frame. The temptations of the World War have put to test the cohesion across the racial gap therein, and it cannot be said that it has fully passed the test; the different attractive forces have made themselves perceptible—in particular within the French Swiss—to such a degree that serious patriotic concerns for the future have come to order.<sup>212</sup> Also the growing tension between the Romance Walloons and the Germanic Flemish within the frame of the Belgian state pointed toward the same direction before the war.

Before such events, one cannot deny the racial thought’s every practical significance within contemporary history. One cannot even deny the possibility that it will have a word in the expansion of the realm types themselves, and thus come to play a real political role. One must merely establish that this time has not yet come. Our time stands under the sign of the nation-state. What in the area of ethnic kinships stands above that, that is still at the stage of the pure dream or, at its height, the formless stage of the nebula.

### III.7. Special Problems

When we now finally cast a glance at the special ethnopolitics, a few conclusions shall offer themselves as immediate corollaries to principles already fixed. The state shall in many ways be shown to be defined by its people, as an integral component of its nature, and out of this connection emerge by greater or smaller necessity certain tasks for its work.

#### III.7.1. Of the Degree and Type of Nationality

Such tasks follow first from the *dynamic degree of the national feeling*. It is clear from our entire demonstration that the ideal here lies not in the extreme, but in the temperate zone; subsequently it

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210 See hereon Hasse, *Deutsche Grenzpolitik*, 1906, ch. VII, and *The Great Powers* II, 157-58 (the question of a “Central European” program in its earlier period).—Deckert, *Panlatinismus, Panslavismus, und Panteutonismus in Ihrer Bedeutung für die polit. Weltlage*, 1914, sees in “pan-Teutonism” a superconcept within which both pan-Germanism and “pan-Anglism” fit, pp. 25-. If we interpret the latter as a race thought in itself, for which there ought to be reasons, then it is likely to be thought of as the most vitally forceful of them all, in its inner and its outer line, “imperial connection” and “reunited states,” see (also for the full investigation) “The Political Race Problem” (“Det politiska rasproblemet”) in *Nya Dagbl. Allehanda* 24, 26, 27, and 28th Sept. 1916. According to Deckert, pan-Latinism represents 115 millions, pan-Germanism roughly as many, pan-Slavism 135, and this pan-Anglism 150 (Anglophone) millions. Other calculations in *Friedenswarte*, 1916, p. 291, where it is argued for “systematic racial politics.” Within the war, besides, both the Germanic (v. Bieberstein’s call out of the trench “an die Völker germanischen Blutes” in *Friedenswarte*, 1914, pp. 362-) and the Latin union thought (*Messagern*, Oct. 1916) has come in renewed expressions. (author)

211 Bjørnstjerne Martinius Bjørnson (1832-1910), first Norwegian Nobel laureate in Literature.

212 See here H. Meier, *Die deutschfeindliche Bewegung in der französischen Schweiz*, 1915, and August Schmidt, *Ueber die angebliche Germanisierung der Schweiz*, 1915, also Arnold von Salis, *Die Neutralität der Schweiz*, 1915. (author)

becomes a matter of great importance for the state to restore the balance whenever it is for any reason disturbed. We see in our time an excess, a “too much,” to the fever temperature of “nationalism,” for example in Serbia already before the war; in such cases it is the state’s duty to silence and hold back, so that the feeling does not breach all constraints of reason. But there may also be too little, an undernourishment of the national life, which G. Sundbärg has attempted to demonstrate on account of the contemporary Swedes.<sup>213</sup> This is an even greater threat. If the temperature sinks below a certain threshold, as in the old Poland (see V.3.1), then there is simply no hope. The connection is clear from the previous investigation; if the living sense of co-belonging within a nation is what motivates its existence as state before everything else, then the condition for its existence falls away with the extinction of that sense. When a nation thus loses its sense of nationality—when it is punctuated by individual selfishnesses, as in the condition before the establishment of the original state—then there is no longer a life, but an empty shell which hangs together without a core. The national indifference may therefore develop into a “pernicious anemia” of the state. We see here if ever an inviting necessity to seek ways of increasing the national temperature to the normal degree within such a state.

That the *type of nationality*<sup>214</sup> suggests a multitude of political motives is clear without doubt so long as one recognizes for the state any task in the cultivation of the people. May only one such motive be brought forth in particular: if the nationality is not yet complete, it is the task of the state to watch over this process, so that it as far as possible is kept clear from harmful elements. This is the case of U.S.A.; the nation’s inability to absorb the negro element and unwillingness to do so, likewise to assimilate too much less valuable blood from Eastern Europe has there as is known given cause for very significant and current questions (immigration law, among others). Without doubt this concern for the quality of the nation is one of the state’s categorical duties.

### III.7.2. Of the Physical Replacement Cycle

The aforementioned America’s problem is connected to its abnormal immigration, and leads our thoughts from the national questions to *the people’s own purely physical replacement cycle*. Here various possible disturbances may be imagined, which to the highest degree call for the state’s attention; primarily by a too great emigration, as in Sweden, Ireland, parts of Italy, or a too weak nativity as in France and certain Anglo-Saxon countries and also, though to a lesser degree, in other places of Europe. It is also well-known that these circumstances stand in the foreground within the respective states’ politics and particularly of those in France. The seriousness of this danger shall be emphasized in a later chapter; here we observe the way and the means: the “two-child system,” sterilization of the marriage, the voluntary restriction of the number of children. This system denotes a revolt against the elementary duty of every generation to maintain the existence tribe. Thus on the other hand there is a question of the state’s self-preservation here. When it takes up the struggle for the system in question, it is struggling for its own life.

Which means of defense does it possess? Against the second threat to the population number, excessive losses by emigration, cures can be suggested by economic politics, as the threat is footed

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213 See section “Bristen på nationell instinkt” (lack of national instinct) in *Folklynnnet och utvandringen (National Character and the Emigration)*, pp. 25-57. (author)

214 *nationalitetens art*

primarily in economic causes which ought to be possible to mitigate. But the decrease in growth is more difficult to treat, because its root is in the area of psychology. Thus one goes no further than to palliatives which already in the time of emperor Augustus were shown to be futile: taxation of bachelors and tax deductions for family supporters, premiation of child-rich families and the like.<sup>215</sup> The system is a mirror of an over-reflected culture, in deep connection with the entire worldview. It is no coincidence that it has put its roots deepest into that culture which was the predecessor people of Europe and that state which likely could be considered the oldest of the state-system. Whether the World War will be able effect a change in the obscure depths of the soul where these roots are seated is perhaps the most important question which slumbers behind the curtains of the nearest future (c.f. V.3.2.).

### III.7.3. Of the Mathematical Relationship Between Realm and People

It is obvious that the purely statistical population count has a decisive influence on the direction of a state's entire politics, inwards and outwards. The situation of France, with a stagnating population that receives plenty enough space within the realm may be seen as the ideal, and has indeed been interpreted as such in a certain socialist direction; there one makes thus direct propaganda against fertility and in principle does not want to know of any "natural surplus" or population growth. This direction neglects two perspectives. The first is that a people never stands alone in the world, but is in constant competition against others; so long as all peoples do not begin to regulate their growth at the same pace, it follows that the people which voluntarily ceases in growth shall condemn itself to increasingly greater irrelevance with respect to the others. The second is this, that such a stagnating condition in itself is harmful to the people; the peoples need as water a sound turnaround to stay healthy—a standing river is a dead river. It is as Witz said in 1862: "Rising population count is not an unconditional advantage, nor a sign of power, but a sinking population count signifies illness always."<sup>216</sup> The French type, driven to its edge and celebrated as a program is a renunciation of evolution itself, a farewell from history.

It must therefore, seen purely objectively, be regarded as an unorganic desire of such a state to conduct an expansionary policy of such a great degree as the French Third Republic has done. That is instead the cause of a rapidly growing people. Since all peoples under normal conditions first fill and then overflow their spaces, the time ultimately arrives when there in the realm is more people than can conveniently be held therein. The great state must then direct its politics toward the primitive task of finding "bread in the desert" for their overflowing crowds of people. Herein lies really a part of the contemporary imperialistic desires, since modern technics have made possible a growth of people in the homelands to a greater degree than the country itself was able to develop. When a perhaps awake and insightful observer of the great politics such as Carlgren in his "World-Political Explorations" of 1907 does not find words strong enough to condemn the "robber politics" of the great powers, some attention ought to have been dedicated to this simple fact that they do not possess a free choice; they stand strictly beneath the law of necessity, which invites them to care for the support of their own

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215 See *The Great Powers* II, 71-72, c.f. the rich literature on the subject, in particular Bertillon, *La dépopulation de la France*, 1911, and Julius Wolf, *Der Geburtenrückgang*, 1912. (author)

216 Waitz, *Grundzüge der Politik*, p. 22. (author)

outside of their borders. This was the cause of England; this is still the cause of Germany, Japan, Italy. But this motive is significantly lacking on the count of France. There are no national needs behind its enormous colonial empire: no surplus population, little overflowing capital (c.f. IV.1.). We partially make the same remark on that American policy which laid hand on the Philippines and that Russian policy which grasps for Europe. Here is a question of peoples that have not yet filled out their own spaces, and for them a concentration in peaceful inner development is the natural policy. When they carelessly go out into expansion, the moral of history corresponds to the private and labels their desires as an overstep, which sooner or later ought to be followed by punishments.<sup>217</sup>

In this way, the general political direction of a state—its greater or lesser restraint in foreign policy—is already pre-drawn by the mathematical relationship between its realm and its people (with respect to household). We fix here the extremes of *overpopulation* and *underpopulation* according to whether the realm is lesser or greater than the people based on the normal count within the state-system, and find an expansionary policy just as natural in the former as that of concentration in the latter case. It appears that the rules herewith apply also to the smaller states, for the little and utterly strongly populated Belgium sought colonies (Congo) very organically and naturally. For Sweden, such a policy would have been purely despicable before it has been able to organize and fill with people its own realm, which is larger than three great powers' motherlands (England, Japan, Italy). Here, the political imperative inwards is all the clearer, as it concerns a space all the way up to and beyond the threshold of the polar world, a space that thus poses a great resistance against cultural organization. That, in addition, our situation—where the realm is greater than the people—is safer and holds a more promising future of the two, does not need to be further demonstrated here.

### III.8. Conclusion, Ethnopolitics

Thus the state's free will is in many ways anchored to necessity also in its ethnic aspect. May it be established once again that such observations do not describe the entire truth. Much like the natural essence of the folk-soul is not limited to spiritual and customary influences, the actions of the state is not contained within these laws which our grammatical investigation finds slumbering in objective circumstances. A political teaching which obscures the irrational factors ("imponderabilia") of people's lives denies itself as empirical. This reservation appears to be particularly in its place here as we now transition to a brief overview of the aspects of state in which the cultural element begins to dominate.

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217 It was this point of view that Ito made relevant against China in the Korean question of 1885, when he presented China's claims as those of a purely "historical," while the Japanese were of an "economic" nature. *Japan skildradt af japaner (Japan depicted by the Japanese)*, 1904, p. 233. C.f. *The Great Powers*, 1905, pp. 107-8, and essay on "Private morals and State Morals" ("Privatmoral och statmoral") in *Political Essays II*. (author)

# Fourth Chapter

## The State As Household, Society, and Regiment

### Economic Politics—Sociopolitics—Regimental Politics

#### IV.1. Concepts of the *Household* and Various Types

The realm is the people's home and yard, within which foremostly it must gather for itself the outward life's basic necessities. For this purpose the realm must be organized. It may also happen that it has become too small to cover the needs of the people; then the state must by other means, outside of itself, care for the people's maintenance. In this property of it, in its care for the people's material life-needs and economic life grounded in the realm, the state stands as an economic organism, or a household. The study of the state as household we call *economic politics*.

Economic politics concerns itself with the national economy, even to the extent that it certainly does not limit itself to the "state-financial" legislation concerning the state's direct properties within the realm (forests, crown lands, waterfalls, among others). But, as a political discipline, it is not interested in the economic laws for their own sake, but only in their reflection on the health condition of the states concerned<sup>218</sup>. It studies the states each on their own in all the parts which constitute its economic dependencies, knowing well that this property in the the world of states, no less than that of private people, is deeply significant for the entirety of its existence.

We meet occasionally here too a suggestion of this significance already in the names of the states; such is the case of *Argentina*, the land of silver, and *Brazil*, the country with brazilwood. It is apparent that the role of the household in the nature of the state has increased with the contemporary increase in population and the overall materialization of life. On the other hand, household politics have also greatly promoted this growth by the promotion of the economic life and primarily by the population-tightening industry. Here, the politics of population and household connect most intimately. It is, though, easy to distinguish their boundaries in principle in the expansion, according to whether it is the popular mass itself which overflows, or the production and the by that manner accumulated capital.

In reality it is one of the economic politics' main interests to follow the wanderings of production and capital between the states. The state which has something to sell must do so by export, whether it is a question of raw material, or fabricated goods, or pure capital. Here emerges the wide-grasping distinction between the *debtor-* and the *creditor-state*<sup>219</sup>. U.S.A.'s relationship to Britain in the area of raw goods, France's to Russia in that of capital give world-historical examples. One sees by them already how household needs tie political bonds.

The consequences are vast, vast to the extent that they ultimately could decide the entirety of a nation's politics. The country which has the surplus must place it in order to by the revenue satisfy its overnumerous mouths. This is the case of England, with three times the population that its home-island

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218 To compare, for example, Bernhard Harms, "Krieg und Weltwirtschaft" in *Weltw. Archiv*, April 1916, pp. 228-29, (the distinction between *Volkswirtschaft* ("folk-economics") and *Staat* (state)). (author)

219 *borgenär-* och *gäldenärstat*

could reasonably feed by its own resources. We do not need to go deeper into this well-known situation, but turn our attention to certain political consequence which follow thereof. England must therefore be involved with free trade, in part on its own side, so that its raw materials don't grow expensive at the ports of the realm, in part on that of others, so that England's fabricated goods find their way to other markets; the latter point of view found in the 1890s its buzzword in the "open door," with particular view on exotic households. England must also have a free way to these exotic households, that is to say, supremacy on the sea, and for that sake suppress every competitor. That it likewise itself has the greatest reason to secure for itself foreign reserves by colonization lies clear as a day. The entire political problem of England is as such a household problem.

Similar is the case of other Western states, though to a lesser degree, just as they have not yet reached as far by the way of industrialization. France, with its surplus of capital, and the U.S.A., with its overflowing production, receive from these vantage points some right to the expansive politics which in no way are justified on the grounds of population politics (see III.7.3.). The distinction of over- and underpopulation do not always in practice correspond to over- and underproduction with respect to capitalization; but each state has at every distinct time a decisive impression upon its nature by its stance within the one or the other category.

The English type carries with it an impressive emphasis on trade, which regulates the outgoing and incoming life-needs much like a blood circulation with arteries and veins; so, namely, that fabricated goods dominate the export and raw materials the import. But this exchange of goods creates similarly a strong *under-balance*<sup>220</sup>: far more is bought there than is sold there. The possibility hereto is prepared by the already earned capital placed abroad, in addition to the sea traffic deployed and also the incomes of a World War, such that the negative trade balance goes into a positive *payment balance*<sup>221</sup>. This type too is found in all countries of high, industrial cultural standing. In the same way that the "invisible export" of the purely capitalistic sources of income develops on top of the direct output of goods, the household presents as an *investor-state*<sup>222</sup>. Herein lies also not only the outer character of a creditor, but thereto the inner of a man who has begun withdrawing from the productive work. England and France have advanced the most in this direction, although certainly not until the endpoint. Here the contrast steps in against states such as Germany and the U.S.A., who still stand under the strong stimulus of labor and therefore place the household gains into new corporations more than into loans.

On the opposite end against the English household stands, represented primarily by Russia, a household type with a center of mass in the primary productive needs. That is to say that it is purely agrarian in the question of production. Much like the industry, trade stands in a rear position, and this trade balance is positive, with a high export, primarily that of raw materials, while industrial products are imported. That does not exclude the possibility that the payment balance in its entirety may be negative, by the state's need for credit for its financial expenses, whereon the household regularly slides into the debtor category.

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220 *underbalans*

221 *betalningsbalans*

222 *rentierstat*

If the investor-state fittingly may be called an *over-cultural type*, the Russian system denotes a *colonial type*<sup>223</sup>, just as Russia before the war held itself in relation to France and Germany as colonies do to the motherland from a household point of view. The schema is violated by a few variants, such as Sweden's trade, formally a cultural type of preponderant import, displays a real colonial type: overwhelmingly raw materials and half-fabrications (wood, iron ore). Its collected characteristics belong only to primitive realm households and constitute distinguishing characteristics for these households.

#### IV.1.1. Concept and Practice of Autarky

When we now in earlier periods of higher cultural states' histories find similar primitive circumstances in economic respect, the contrast between the extremes appears as different stages of one and the same development. Experience has also very clearly shown us industrialization as a general process, advancing at varying pace over all countries of the European culture, and from those also slowly reproducing to the East. But experience and reflection give also to hand that this development ultimately leads to dependence on the country abroad, which at the basis is barely more satisfying than the colony's immature and retarded condition. At the height of power and glory and joy, England has its hands bound like hardly any other great power. It is for example not able at all to wage war against U.S.A.: this would be a literal suicide, as this would mean—as the case is now—the same as by its own hand cut its industry off from its foremost market of raw materials and by its own hand deprive its people of their primary food supplies! Here if ever one can speak of vital questions och vital necessities, which must in many ways hamper independent politics.

And therefore we arrive here at the same result as on all of the previous main points within this investigation. The ideal is no longer the furthest end of the wing, but in a balanced position between the wings. The solution to the general household problem is called *autarky*<sup>224</sup>, the median between the high cultural and colonial type: economic self-sufficiency, so that the people's essential needs may be covered by the realm's own incomes. A relatively separated, closed within itself region of production and of consumption, which if necessary exists for itself behind closed doors. No all-consuming industry and trade with thus following dependence on the abroad, but also not an all too dominant agriculture at the expense of higher cultural demands; but a harmonic rotation and domestic supplementation within the domestic economic life, so that a highly developed people's various vital needs may be covered within own borders.

Here we are struck by the complete agreement with the solution to the realms's and the people's puzzles. Autarky is no more than the state's economic individuality, much like the natural territory is the geographical and nationality the ethnic individuality. The decision on the economic politics corresponds here to that of the geopolitical immediately, as we have already seen (see II.4.3.-II.4.4.); but ethnopolitics too bears a parallel witness with its demand for a homogeneous population closed within itself. The autarkic household is the nationally and geographically differentiated one. So is the state's personality reflected in its various aspects, according to the law of organic life.

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223 *öfverkulturtyp, kolonityp*

224 *autarki*



The first which now catches the eyes at the application of this general law to this area here in question is the reaction against the industrial type of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It was in its essence cosmopolitan; in the name of free trade, it left the national households out to the competition in a common world market, where the strong as always has opportunity to devour the weaker. The first reaction came already through the *protectionist*<sup>225</sup> system of the latter part of the century. Here, the state steps forth to the defense of the household, countering foreign conquerors with toll-walls, within which a national economic life may flourish as a forest plantation shielded from the storms of the sea<sup>226</sup>. It is also noticeable that it is here able to act with greater liberty than with respect to previous, more purely natural aspects of its essence; though, it is likewise clear that it ultimately cannot move outside a boundary determined by the qualities of the realm and the people.

But the autarchic principle is not satisfied with closing the national households behind toll gates. It expands itself to a clear system, the closed “spheres of interest” (Dix) in place of that of the open door. Nothing shows better the vindicating superiority of the system than that England itself here steps out as its bearer: its latest deals (beginning with the French of 1904) point unmistakably in this direction—they have reserved markets for themselves instead of competition on the free market. The entire great Chamberlainian<sup>227</sup> program, “the commercial union” with the self-governing colonies—which after great difficulties at the port exit now appear to have gotten a good traction by the experiences of the World War—is none other than the closure of an economic sphere of interest on the account of the British nation. That free trade must be sacrificed for this goal shows only more clearly the power of the idea.

Germany’s problem is in reality the same as England’s, to acquire for itself a secure market for the purchase of raw materials and for the sale of fabricated goods, and the solution is thus even here sought in a special sphere of interest. Only the paths are different: England already owns the sphere of interest in its great Empire, and its task is therefore limited to closing it, while Germany must, on the other hand, acquire the sphere itself. If England’s way to the goal is that of concentration, Germany’s consequently becomes that of expansion. Here we meet therefore the programs of *Berlin—Baghdad* and *Mitteleuropa* on the basis of free interconnection between the state-links: that is a closed sphere of interest, where the primary productive life of the Levant is thought of as a supplement to Germany’s industry. The entire problem of *Mitteleuropa* in its various phases appears now primarily as a household problem. The World War, which for the nearest future has isolated the central powers from the outside world market, has actualized the program, much like it once and for all has imprinted the law of autarky: they would already have been brought to their knees long ago, had they not in the time of need thought to transform themselves into the “geschlossene Handelsstaat”<sup>228</sup>, whereof Fichte already foretold in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and which is only a different name for the closed autarchic sphere of interest.

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225 *protektionistiska*

226 A special form of the economic hazard is the great households’ “Jumping” system; backed by their great domestic markets, perhaps with strengthened power by concentration in *cartels* and *trusts*, they are able to expend surplus stores at minuscule prices on the small markets if these are not protected by tolls. (author) Kjellén uses here the English word for “Jumping.”

227 Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914)

228 “Closed trade-state”

We have hereto seen the problem only from one aspect, that of the industrialized state. From that of the agrarian state the need is reversed: to create a self-sufficient industry, so that circulation of goods beyond the doors is drawn within them. This is the secret of the “Witte<sup>229</sup> system” on the count of Russia at the turn of the century, much like especially the opposition against the current German trade treaties, which were seen as standing in the way of Russia’s economic liberation. The aim here is thus the same as in the previous case: equality between primary and secondary household necessities<sup>230</sup>. The means are also similar: the toll system, twice as necessary when it comes to constructing an industry from the beginning. But if Germany’s way, in its narrow conditions, must be that of expansion, so must Russia’s be that of concentration—in an interesting similarity to that of England, according to the law of the similarity of extremes; the autarchic desire stimulates only on one point in Russia too the desire for expansion, namely toward the Dardanelles’ natural exit point for their production.

The agrarian household’s longing to overcome its limitations is in reality a political factor no smaller than the industrial household’s need to milden its risk. Occasionally, the principles can cut against one another in the same area. From such a conflict comes the first hinder to the realization of Mitteleuropa, namely the Hungarian policy which in the *Ausgleich* of 1907 led to the dissolution of the toll union with Austria for a period of 10 years. The same conflict may sooner or later be fatal also to the British Empire, which fundamentally rests on the colonies’ recognized economic inferiority.

We find therefore the autarchic principle by different ways at work in the surrounding world of states, much like we found it theoretically correct.<sup>231</sup> But if a warning against exclusivity was necessary already in the previous chapter, it is even more at place here. The autarchic principle too must not become a fetish whose worship closes the eyes to the significance and need of economic interaction between the peoples. East Asia has here in history conducted warning examples by their strictly closed and behind the locked doors stagnating states (China, Korea, Japan) right up to the threshold of our time. Such a system stops development and thus receives its doom. The economic self-sufficiency must not be bought at the cost of the folk-soul’s growth itself, which is conditioned by a normal interaction with other states and peoples.

An exchange of goods will thus of course take place between the peoples in the state-systems of the future too, and the difference in level of development will of course always preserve a part of the “international division of labor” of the contemporary systems (the flattening of the primarily industrial and the primarily agrarian states). By the same path that households gain their autarchic independence, the differences between the strong variants in over-cultural- and colonial type evened, in favor of a system that trades raw material for raw material and industrial good for other industrial good. Pohle established this law for a natural exchange of products already in 1902, and Harms demonstrated it

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229 Sergei Witte, Russian Minister of Finance 1892-1903.

230 See *Political Problems of the World War*, p. 143. When a critic, Peter Rassow in *Preuss. Jahrbücher* of Aug. 1916 regards the concept of autarky in this application to Russia “strongly expanded, essentially changed”—in this place it is spoken of “eine Beugung des Begriffs, die ihm fast wertlos macht” (“a bending of the concept which nearly makes it worthless,” p. 301)—he does not appear to have had his eyes opened to the true inner meaning of the word. That autarky can work in opposite forms is no more strange than that the nationality principle can work for sundering (Turkey) as much as unity (Germany); c.f. above, III.5.2. (author)

231 The weaknesses, as remarked above in ch. II are noted for Norway and Chile in the realm shape itself are deepened here by their all too one-sided natural origins. On Norway’s part, see “The New Scandinavia” in *Political Essays* III, pp. 150-51. (author)

most recently in 1916 as a tendency already present in “Volkswirtschaft.”<sup>232</sup> That the primacy of the domestic trade over foreign trade will be strengthened to a high degree is a natural consequence of the autarchic development.

#### IV.1.2. Self-Preservation of the State in Economic Area

From this principle, light falls also on the important chapter within economic politics which treats the households’ international orientation or the trade’s “territorial differentiation”<sup>233</sup> (Harms). In its dry number one may verify all degrees of sovereignty and dependence. It is known that Portugal’s vassal relationship with England began through a trade treaty in 1703: this is still reflected in England taking 40% of their exports. That is also in itself a weak dependence in comparison to Mexico’s on U.S.A.: 55% of imports, 76% of exports. The threat to England’s occupation of Canada is similarly expressed in the colony’s trade balance with U.S.A.: 60% of imports. Germany’s economic advantage over Russia has emerged from similar counts: a full half of its import account, nearly a third part on the export account. On the other side we see a solid ground beneath the tighter Mitteleuropa in the trade lists which already before the war granted Germany a share of 40% of Austria-Hungary’s collected circulation; at the same time as the insignificant cross-realm trade between Sweden and Norway eased the break-up of the union. Here the state has powerful keys to bind and loose<sup>234</sup> in its trade legislation; so was the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian “mellanrikslagen”<sup>235</sup> in 1897 a factual forbidding of the union, while the English colonies’ implementation of *preferential tolls* has tied the bond to the motherland tighter. In this latter system (“differential tariff”), the modern state has gained a powerful tool for purely political ends; it has already been applied to the traffic between independent states, such as U.S.A. with Brazil (for the one’s grain and the other’s coffee), and ought in future bloc-formation play an increasing role.<sup>236</sup>

It is obvious that the concern for the own independence offers a small state caution before it by its trade circulation binds itself too closely to a great one; thereof the opposition in Sweden against the German trade treaties of 1906 and 1911. A more even distribution within the circle of customers is here advantageous. Our principle concerning production leads to the same result. The concept of autarky forbids the one-sided tendency toward a single direction, which is denoted as *monoculture*<sup>237</sup>; the example of Greece, with its dominant Corinth growing and thereof following crises, up to the state’s half-bankruptcy, is here a warning.<sup>238</sup>

Instead it must be the statesman’s concern to develop the potentials of the state in all the changing directions which its nature together with sound economic principles overhead provide. Every

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232 Pohle, *Deutschland am Scheidewege*, 1902, p. 240, Harms, op. cit., p. 245. (author)

233 “territoriella differentiering”

234 Reference to Matt 16:19.

235 “inter-realm law”

236 At the entente powers’ economic conference in Paris of June 1916, the thought may have been entertained of a differential system after the war according to the approximate schema: 30% toll for the enemy camp, 20% for the neutral, 10% for the allies. (author)

237 *monokultur*

238 Schilder, “Die Monokultur in der Weltwirtschaft” in *Zeitschr. für Socialwissenschaft*, Oct. 1907, and *Entwicklungstendensen der Weltwirtschaft*, II, 1915, ch. 3. C.f. latest on Greece, Rich. Marek in *Geogr. Zeitschrift*, 1916, p. 514. (author)

such victory signifies not merely a reduced risk for economic recessions, it is also a gain for the national household, which herewith saves on one expense-posting of its account with the abroad. When Sweden thus half a century ago began filling its need for sugar from its own beet fields, the import was freed from the great post of sugar cane; and when we—which we hope happens soon—are fully in condition to by own waterfalls and peat bogs replace the power need which hereto has been filled by English black coal, this denotes not only a national economic saving of (typically) 100 million per year, but also a political emancipation from the pressure of England. The World War has placed this point of view to the highest relief (Italy, Greece); and the German inventions, which down there have naturalized nitric acid and rubber in the realm household, demonstrate clearly how the details of economic politics may have immediate significance for the life of the state itself, as direct supports for its defense.

An insightful economic policy is therefore an element of the state's struggle for self-preservation, and has never been the stronger than in our time with its preference for the purely material interests. From this imperative follows at every moment a diverse magnitude of special problems, which the statesman has before him to solve; different for every country, according to its special structure, but themselves gatherable to a common solution within the great postulate of autarky. It was—to begin with only one example—this greater context which made the question of the Norrland ore fields into a foreground question of Swedish politics in the first years of the new century (until the resolution of 1907); behind the question of the state's and the owning corporation's income shares hid the greater question concerning how Sweden were to preserve its chances to by domestic refinement of the ore overcome its harmful character of a colonial trade type (see IV.1. introd.) and so add an ell to its independent economic length.<sup>239</sup> To the same extent that autarky is felt and recognized as a law for the self-preservation of the state, to that extent clarity is spread over the right path in similar cases, and the wisdom of statesmen much like their folly shows itself here too closed within boundaries dictated by life's own demands.

It should finally not be left out of sight that an autarchic development means the greatest guarantee for the formation of real *economic solidarity* within a state's productive life, in parity with loyalty and nationality. Great and power-draining conflicts may emerge where this solidarity is no longer preserved beneath the surface of the competition between producers and consumers. The World War with its deflationary problems leaves thereon a few telling examples. But we stand therewith at the threshold to the sociopolitical chapter.

## IV.2. Concepts of Society and Successive Types

The fourth element of the state we denote as the *society*<sup>240</sup> in specific sense, and the study thereon may suitably be called *sociopolitics*, in analogy to sociology, which studies the social laws without particular regard for their relation to the existing states.

From Aristotle (*koinonia* against *polis*) and Cicero (*societas*—*civitas*) to our contemporary sociologists, the entire school of natural law included, one has used a concept of a society in a superior relationship to the that of the state: the state has been one species among several in the family of the

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239 See for example the motion in A.K. nr. 228 of year 1907. (author)

240 *samhället*

society. Rousseau's *volonté de tous* in contrast to *volonté générale*<sup>241</sup> constitutes an attempt thereover, Schlözer's *Gemeinde*<sup>242</sup> similarly, Hegel and the first socialists have from the other direction contributed to the distillation of the concept as an opposite to the state, but first by the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century a similar contrast was established in the concept of *Gesellschaft*<sup>243</sup> as it appears in Lorenz Stein's and Robert von Mohl's ground-laying investigations.<sup>244</sup> The modern concept of the society is therefore even younger than the concept of nationality: two generations against three. It stands like the people in conceptual contrast against, but likewise in empirical congruence with the state: each state is a society, and every society a state. It is thus the state itself seen from a certain point of view.

How does the state behave as *societas*? According to Mohl's thought (further elaborated by Gneist in 1879, see above, Introduction), we see in *Gesellschaft* the summary of all natural spheres of interest, which according to the demands of culture and the law of labor distribution bind citizens into smaller groups within one and same frame of the state: local and stranger, educated and uneducated, worker and employer, different types of workers, and so on. The society is therefore a real multitude of internally competing interests, while the national people are a natural unit of similar individuals. The society is a working limb in the cultural world, while the nation is a physical species of the humanity. The society is the last generation itself in its living world of shifting interests and ideas, when the nation is a continuous connection between the generations. That this living generation too never can free itself entirely of the elementary powers of nature and of the folk-soul is certainly not denied here.

#### IV.2.1. Relationship to Economic Politics

In contemporary understanding, the household too is an element of society, to the extent that it denotes the summary and entirety of the economic interest groups. For this reason, I have hereto also included economic politics inside the frame of the sociopolitics.<sup>245</sup> Continuing reflection has led to a change, so that I now limit the concept of society to the area of the purely social powers, or the culturally characterized organic fragments of the popular mass, while the economic organization of the realm is reserved for the new sub-discipline. But it is hereof already clear that that economic politics and sociopolitics share particularly intimate connections. Economic interests separate competing groups

241 "will of all," "general will"

242 "community"

243 "society"

244 See Stein, "Das Begriff der Gesellschaft," 1850; von Mohl in *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Staatswissenschaft* 1851, H. 1, also in *Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften* I, 1855, pp. 88-101. (author)

245 So still in *The Political Problems of the World War*, see p. 129. Peter Kassow, op. cit., appears to believe that these disciplines overall do not rank with geo- and ethnopolitics, as their problems are of a "of mendable nature"—"af medelbar natur" and "too a good part lay as deeper layers of motives beneath the geopolitical and ethnopolitical contradictions"—"till god del ligga som djupare motivskikt under de geopolitiska och etnopolitiska motsatserna" (p. 299, "delmotiver inom de geopolitiska" ["componential motives within the geopolitical ones"], p. 302). Herewith a new critic, Pohle, agrees in principle in *Zeitschr. für Sozialwissenschaft*, 1916, p. 681. Certainly it is possible to so extend the frame of geopolitics that even the entirety of economic politics fit therein, and similarly the ethnopolitics on the account of sociopolitics. Aside from that the gap between sociopolitics and economic politics becomes thereby deepened, such a contraction of the system would exactly increase the fusion of natural and cultural sciences which I especially have worked to soften. I do not overlook that geo- and ethnopolitics—even within my delimitation—also contain cultural moments: but the present demonstration ought in its entirety bear witness of the dominant natural character over their objects, in comparison to the similarly dominant cultural character of the competing disciplines. It is this division which carries the fundamental thought of my system. One who reads ch. I above shall understand that I assert the count of five over that of three, and why I do so. (author)

within the states, and acquire therewith a social character. The struggles between producers and consumers, between agrarians and industrialists, between protectionists and free-traders, between the export interests and advocates of domestic refinement are such social reflexes of economic contradictions. The great struggle between capital and labor belongs here to a certain degree. If we then imagine the contrast between great and small possession—the latifundium institution’s meaning for England and Italy, the trust institution’s for U.S.A., the corporate power’s in Norrland for Sweden, on the other hand the even land distribution for France in a more fortunate direction—then this chapter becomes full of subjects which may seem to just as well belong to the household politics.

On the other hand, sociopolitics do have their very characteristic and independent area, namely that which concerns the so-called social classes themselves. Within household politics, the state lives only on bread; in sociopolitics we learn to know other and higher needs, up to the spiritual culture’s most refined consumption demands. Thereto both disciplines have each its own characteristic perspective also on the same object; in one case production, in the other the living group. It is the same difference which has separated national economics and sociology into separate sciences, since they long ago were taken as one.

The contemporary socialist doctrine does by principle not want to know of any needs other than the economic as the foundation of human interconnections. A glance at the different developmental stages of society and successively replaced types shall thoroughly disperse this prejudice.

## IV.2.2. Types of Societies

It is now immediately shown—much like in the question of the nation (see III.5.1., III.5.4.)—that if society in our modern sense is a late conquest of science, then the item itself is old, older in fact than the state itself. Furthest back in time we find the *kin society*, the original type, the society of the bonds of *blood* as the nearest and the only bonds before the emergence of the distribution of labor; humans are still found on wandering foot and all share the same interests, food for the day and security against the attacks of enemies. In this social body, the kin constitutes the cell itself as a natural unit; as such it is also responsible for its members. The type is found in all cultural peoples’ childhoods<sup>246</sup> and similarly in the contemporary nomadizing cultural peoples.

With growing development, the kins settle down on determined soil, which is taken for plantation; over long processes, which we can only follow in darkness, the brother-bonds are loosened, kins dissolved, and the community of the blood is replaced by that of the neighborhood. One feels more naturally bound to one’s *neighbor* in the village who shares the everyday activities than to one’s relative in another village. Thus the neighborhood becomes the cell of a new, second type, the *village society*<sup>247</sup>, which relieves the kin of the care and responsibility for its own. The territorial perspective is here dominant after the genealogical has been consumed.

The great law of labor division now begins working within the settled farming population. Different classes differentiate themselves from a “mature” mass: for the defense and the real state-purposes, for culture and education, for trade and other industries besides farming. Thus begins a new

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246 Newer research has found it even in Japan, where one has long denied it, see Kjellén, “Japan’s ‘ancien régime,’” in *Statsvet. Tidskrift* 1906, p. 254. (author)

247 *bysamhället*

process of transformation where the social occupation gradually takes the privileges of the shared residency. When these occupations with the aid of the state have crystallized privileged corporations, then a third societal type is distinguished from them, that of the *estate society*<sup>248</sup>, where the community with *likes* (“peers”) is felt to be more living and binding than with neighbors in the village, not to speak of relatives within another estate in the kin.

This estate society developed over time into a house with different etages above each other, while at the cellar level the unfree mass of the people was kept. New great interest groups formed themselves likewise, for whom there was no place among the floors. Thus the type solidified in privileged bodies and gradations among the citizens. Reaction was not lacking; it came in the form of the French revolution, in the combined name of liberty, equality, and fraternity, where equality had the most immediate social intentions. The result was the contemporary “civic society,”<sup>249</sup> where the individual stands before the state as liberated of all lesser bonds, carried by the naked fact that he exists.

Sweden’s oldest legal source, the older Westrogothic law<sup>250</sup> of the early 13<sup>th</sup> century, reflects clearly the second type, the village society, while the first kin type glimpses in the background and the third estate type looms above the foreground.<sup>251</sup> In the present time we see the latter type in the background; it is over the half-millennial course of history consumed as the others before it, hiding its last remnants among us in the Council of Nobles (in a certain way also in the Church Council)<sup>252</sup>. But if we now turn our sight forward, would we see a successor? The official “civic society” which surrounds ourselves cannot claim the heritage. It is namely distinct from all of the previous ones thereby that it does not enclose one in solidaric circles; in accordance with the natural law’s and liberalism’s atomic understanding, it bases the state directly on the individuals. But therewith it actually negates society’s own principle as it was established by Mohl.<sup>253</sup> Its nature is from a social perspective dissolving, suppressive, equalizing. It throws gravel over the lot where the estate society stood, but it builds nothing new or positive. At once it stands clear to us that we live in a transitory stage, such as must always be present in-between the types. We stand in the trough of a wave after an evened social high flood, and have for us to expect a new escalation whose culmination will give us a new social form around a new principle.

And we do not need to strain our eyes to see this new element emerge over the graveled lot. All around us it simmers and seethes of young life which wants to break forth. Organically and freely, as plants in nature’s spring, social formations shoot up for whom the ideal of liberalism fits the least. It is the union and the association. It points clearly toward a new societal type, directly emerged from that

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248 *ståndsamhället*

249 *medborgarsamhälle*, “citizen society”

250 *Västgötalagen*

251 It was in my studies of this law when I first believed that I saw the law-bound succession of societal types, see “State and Society in the Old Westrogothic Law” (“Stat och samhälle I det gamla Vestergötalagen”), II in *Tidskr. For Retsvidenskap*, 1898, p. 230; c.f. later “A Collective Program in the Question of Suffrage” (“Ett samlingsprogram i rösträttsfrågan”), 1902, pp. 9-15. (author)

252 *adelsmötet, kyrkmötet*

253 This is why this word, *Gesellschaft*, when it first was pronounced, acted as a petrifying Medusa head to the educateds’ “*Freiheitsgewohnheiten*” (“habits of liberty”), according to Mohl’s own expression in *Geschichte und Literatur der Statwiss.*, I, p. 71. (author)

principle of labor division which has never been more inviting than in our days, but on basis of equality and the national gathering, as an acquisition from the liberal transitory period. It is the consciousness of the modern classes, which here within the states corresponds to the nations' awakening within the state-system. The former have in the first partial awakening had the liberty to break the frame of the latter (the workers' international); here the World War has without doubt solved the problem of showing them the way back home. We see it all the clearer how the connection between *comrades* rises to a leading social principle ever since the bond between the similar, the the neighbors, the relatives has loosened. The result which is thus hovering in the foreground of our age is therefore a quaternary societal type, the association- or the union society, emerging from the blue collar workers' unification with the employers' and the literate occupations' of all types and sorts and striving for one goal, where the society's natural interest groups have all attained organization and appropriate place in the cultural work.

### IV.2.3. Natural Society and Sociality

For every given standpoint of the long evolution which we have sketched out here, the state has possessed a determined characteristic of the societal form. When we now see all of the cultural countries as if fingering for a sound and natural worker- and employment organization within their nations, we witness so once again such a phenomenon as we have previously fixed within the geographical, ethnic, and cultural spheres. The state seeks for its foundation a natural society, as complement to the natural territory, nation, and the autarchic household.

In reality it is an entirely direct connection. If a harmonic complement of natural contrasts which in mutual circulation seek to even themselves is the correct geographical and economic foundation, so follows hereof as a corollary the harmonic social foundation in that the interest groups by themselves are separated into the distinct natural types and household interests. But one single dominant class interest is just as unnatural as a uniform country or a monoculture. The evolution of technics over time forbids also in the cultural countries such petrifying one-sidedness for society as for household and realm. The differentiation of classes is a corollary to the distribution of labor itself, a necessary product of the cultural development, and cannot be extinguished other than in connection with the entire culture. But through the idea of citizenship, the classes have been coordinated with each other instead of the estate society's subordination and at the same time embraced the entire people instead of the estate society's privileged body. So is the path paved for the complete social organization in which the working class has been only a forerunner, and of which we at the completion of times—when the period of transition with its birthing pains has passed—expect a harmonic balance between all justified cultural interests, according to their own value for the commons.

The sense of this harmony is what I call *sociality*<sup>254</sup>. One sees immediately the analogy with nationality, which means solidarity within the people, just as loyalty, which is solidarity beneath the law. The organic society has its unity much like the nation's in a diversity much like the realm's and the household's. In its interaction with the state, it offers as dowry the fixed, concrete reality of living interests, and receives as such of the state as wedding gift the reins upon egotism whereof the classes

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254 *socialitet*



are in need of no less than the nation itself in times of necessity if they are to be fit for service to the tranquil development.

It follows from the aforementioned that sociality offers a reliable barometer on which one may read the strength or the weakness of the state. Where the classes are unable to find a *modus vivendi*, but lie in constant internal feud, there the state's own ability to act is paralyzed; so much more when the classes eagerly present demands against the state and hold it accountable for their needs' supposed neglect, so that loyalty vanishes with sociality. The classical example are the plebeians of Rome by the Sacred Mount, in open renunciation of faith and obedience to the state. This is the dangerous situation which returned in England at the industrialization's entry, and which by Disraeli was in 1845 characterized by the famous word of the "Two Nations": the upper- and lower class, which lived together, yet still were in mindset and interests just as fractured as if a world sea was between them. That time the English state succeeded in by wise policy overcoming the gap and restoring sociality, much like Rome in its time. But forwards to our days the danger has returned to England, much like other Western countries, by socialism's emergence with an open anti-state program. In actuality, the weak sociality belongs with the signature of our time; entirely natural in times of change, when the new society has not yet attained its organic form. Where no nation state has been possible to realize, as in Austria-Hungary and Russia, there the "nationalities" emerge as classes and fuel the fragmentation with a new element; and the same may be the case where there are different religions beneath one state, as in Germany, Russia, and the realms of the Levant.

#### **IV.2.4. Purpose of the State in the Social Conflict**

The threat of the contemporary societies' fragmentation has its crown therein that the classes increasingly consciously have designated the state itself as the victor's prize in the struggle, in order to by its power advance their own one-sided interests. Thus, socialism is not in principle hostile to the state—as is known, it resonates in quite the opposite way with state power to an exaggeration—but the condition for its faith in the state has hereto been that it itself, as the defender of the working class, has the state power in its own hands. In U.S.A., where the demand for labor is greater than the supply and the air is otherwise not good for the growth of socialist dissatisfaction, the capital itself and the labor companies ("trusts") step out as rivals to the state, by more or less secret path seeking to secure it for themselves as an ally or otherwise neutralize as an opponent.

So must the modern state wage a struggle on two fronts in order to under the name of the "commons,"<sup>255</sup> which is harmed by the supremacy of these class interests, assert its unitary and superior interest. This too is a task of self-preservation, but directed against internal rivalries rather than outer. Here tasks are met saturated with political necessity, not to abort the class conflict—which is impossible and, if possible, would be harmful—but to soften, even it out, reconcile it when tensions have exceeded the normal, push it back when its waves threaten wash away the regiment itself.

The unmistakable moral condition for a happy solution to this great state-purpose is now this, that the state does not in advance allow itself solidarity with any of the competing class interests in any form other than what is necessary for its objective (national) aims. The paths are entirely naturally twofold: preventive and curative. Bismark showed the way of the prophylactic method in the 1880s:

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255 *allmänheten*

*soziale Fürsorge*<sup>256</sup> by work insurances of all kinds (primarily the elder insurance), but further by oversight<sup>257</sup> over the industry, limitations on labor hazardous to health, and overall by the changing work which is summarized under the name of social legislation—we shall meet important components thereof also in the domain of pure legislation (see IV.3.4.). The therapeutic methods are more fragile and insecure. Here too we meet various kinds of social legislation, going back to the Licinian in Rome. A natural method is further for example the work of conciliators in the direct gains of labor (“*förlkningsmän*”).

Naturally, all involvement of the state must occur with strong protection of the legal order. Where it is openly threatened—such as in the organized anarchy of “syndicalism” in France, with the strike as normal warfare to the guerilla warfare of “sabotage” and the “general strike’s” decisive punch against the state—there the state has one duty alone, the same as in the case of foreign enemies at the border: to show that authority does not carry its sword in vain. When sociality and loyalty have dwindled in large parts of the population, there the state has an old recipe at its disposal: to draw attention from the fragmented domestic interests to that side which concerns all and therefore must unite, namely the foreign policy. These are the politics of “distraction,” and they may under certain circumstances even lead all the way to war; thus it is not difficult to interpret Bismarck’s wars of the 1860s under burning parliamentary conflict, likewise Russia’s war against Japan at the threshold of revolution in 1904, and it is not difficult to recognize such threads here and there in the motive-twining of the World War itself.<sup>258</sup> Though, it must always be asserted that the sword of authority drawn in such calculation is double-edged, as Russia found out in 1905.

We finish the chapter with the observation that the state’s own activity has distinguished two social classes—that is, a direct component of society, corresponding to the crown domains of the realm and the *fiscus* of the household—namely the army and the corps of public officials, which thus stand at its immediate disposal as tools in the service of social reconciliation and development.

### IV.3. Concepts of the Regiment

The state’s fifth and innermost element is the *regiment*<sup>259</sup>: the state power in pregnant sense, the dominion, authority, the judicial organization for gubernatorial purposes. One sees from the outset that *regimental politics*<sup>260</sup> is a different science than state justice, although they touch each other in the same area. The latter’s object is the judicial subject of the state, the former’s is the judicially organized state power. The latter therefore studies its object at rest and in constituent acts; regimental politics in turn

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256 “social care”

257 *övervakning*—surveillance or guardianship

258 In addition to remarks hereon in *The Political Problems of the World War*, pp. 130-135, a testimony of Bishop Gore in Oxford may added regarding how the World War on England’s part has prevented an immediately threatening class war domestically, see *The Struggle Behind the Fronts (Kampen bakom fronterna)*, published by Kristl. Studentförbundet, 195, pp. 125, 127, 130. (author)

259 *regementet*

260 I am not quite satisfied with the expression (*regementspolitiken*), but find no better; *legal-* and *administrative politics* (*författnings- och förvaltningspolitik*) are but parts of the whole, and *regimental politics* too seems to have a more limited embrace. *Gubernatorial politics* (*Guvernementspolitik*) appears adequate, though is formally heavy. If it did not appear tautological, one may have, in connection to the more narrow notion of the state, employed the expression of *state politics* (*statspolitik*). In German, *Herrschaftspolitik* offers itself naturally.

see in the state an active will, and investigates the manner whereby it is in reality constituted (law), as well as the forms in which it factually works (administration), and the boundaries which the state itself places for its sovereign occupations, though its primary interest lies in area of legislation.<sup>261</sup> Thus the juridical and the political sciences intersect within this field, each with its own perspective, its dominant interest, and its methods.

It happens occasionally that this aspect of the state-life too comes up in the nomenclature, although not directly: so in *United States of America, die Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, The British Empire*, former Orange Free State<sup>262</sup>. More pregnantly, the form of state itself may be used to denote a state in everyday speech, such as the French Republic, the Habsburg Monarchy; and we find Germany more often nowadays denoted in the enemy press by “Kaiser.”

The real principle of the state, even as dominion inwardly, is the political purposefulness<sup>263</sup> and not the justice<sup>264</sup>. In the practical state-life there is as a rule no difference here. The state realizes justice because it has seen its purposefulness. Justice so understood becomes the spiritual crown of the state’s entire personality. By the idea of justice it seeks to realize itself as a rational personhood. The judicially soaked regiment may be understood as the latest expression of the *spirit* of the state.<sup>265</sup>

It is therefore not only for practical reasons that the state seeks to place under itself also areas of the cultural life, such as the relationship between employer and employees. It is in agreement with its nature to place the entire cultural life beneath law. It acts therewith as the grower who puts to use a piece of wild land by the field: not merely because weeds therefrom easily transfer to his old growths, but also because he feels responsible for the garden as an entrusted good.

The character of the state power herewith appears quite clear in comparison to the other elements of the state. The nation has senses, the society (and household) interests; the regiment entails duties. Against the nation’s sensual nature, the state places in the regiment its rational desire, against the class struggle and unfreedom its durable institutions and its legally protected liberty. The regiment is therefore the core of the state’s cultural aspect in which it seeks to overcome nature’s and desire’s authority by self-conscious and free actions.

Here shall only in a fleeting review be demonstrated a few characteristics of the context which binds the state by the lower aspects of its personhood and therewith prevent it from asserting its rational, free will’s absolute presence.

### IV.3.1. Its Roots in the Soil

A sound state legislation, thus, stretches its roots all the way down into the earth. The country colors the temperament of the nation, and this is realized in the form of government: “Tropical India cannot be

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261 “The occupation of the state is, by its true nature, law” (“Statsverksamhet är den till sin egentliga natur förvaltning”), Reuterskjöld in *Statsvet. Tidskrift* 1911, p. 297. (author)

262 *Oranjepristaten*

263 *ändamålsenligheten*

264 *rätten*—right, justice

265 The state is the person, the I, the life, whereof the regiment is a manifestation—much like the society and other phenomena here explored. It is in this sense that the state by our investigation is portrayed in conceptual contrast against every element in itself, working therein and affected thereby.—With the gaze directed primarily against the organization of power, Ruehoffer understands the state primarily as a body to the soul of the nation, see op. cit. p. 16. This viewpoint coincides clearly with Riezler’s general schema, see I.2.1. (author)

governed as freely as cool Canada” (John Morley). The country indicates further the productive life, and this marks in its turn the law: an industrialized people is not so satisfied with small measures of freedom as a people of peasants is. The space itself occasionally plays a powerful role in the form of government: enormous spaces have thus shown themselves to be difficult to rule constitutionally (Brazil 1824-1889, Russia after 1905); they strive for a Caesarian (Rome, Russia before 1905, India) or federalistic form (U.S.A., Canada, Brazil after 1889, Australia)—where to also narrow Alpine parts are predisposed (Switzerland). It is in itself obvious that the cohesion of a great dominion requires a strong hand: imperialism presupposes an emperor.

But most of all it is its own historical experience and achieved cultural level which naturally impacts the people’s constitutional demands, which in no wise are the same as the neighbor’s. Every people is a historical *unicum*, and this makes itself not the least bit relevant when it comes to writing or accepting its legal form as a state. It shall now not be denied that the written law itself is able to exercise a certain effect on the development; in this way, Norway’s *Grundelov* has without doubt blown into the people’s republican tendencies. But it always falls short in serious conflicts with the real life. This is noticeable in particular where different legal ideas have been linked together in the same regiment, as in the Romance and German state ideal in Prussia’s constitution of 1850 or the monarchic administration and democratic law of the French form of government of 1875; the opposites cannot then lie peacefully still at each other’s side as mixed styles of a constructed wall, but rise to battle against one another, and the battle shall continue until one of them succeeds in leaving its mark on the entire form of government.<sup>266</sup>

Thus life asserts its primacy before even the most deeply venerated constitution. It is also shown in the emergence of customary justice in which verdict precedes written law. Sweden’s constitution of 1809, once grown on national soil with minimal possible foreign cultivation, stands in this day as an aged tree in certain parts overgrown by a blooming primeval forest of “praxis”; it is the people that was changed by the power of new times’ ideas, and this change has even with no alteration of constitution been reflected in the living form of government.

### **IV.3.2. The Personhood Demand: Universal Suffrage**

How life claims its right even by universal recipes of state-justice shows itself likewise in that point of the law through which this has allowed itself to be implemented most universally, namely through the representative system. Modern democratism has presented the *universal suffrage* in the name of the individual, as a civic birthright, and as such it has made its victory parade through the West; where it has not yet arrived, there it presses constantly against the door (Prussia, Hungary). In reality it is the people which by this way makes itself matter in the political life. For this universal suffrage allows in principle everything which finds itself at the bottom of the people come to the surface. Here is no longer a question of selecting the specific rational elements from the popular mass; here it is asked of the people as such, as a fact, with both advantages and errors. The apostles of the principle naturally imagine that it will of its own by some obscure way select out the undesirable and let the good within

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266 It is Fahlbeck who first fixed attention to this phenomenon in his genius lecture on “constitutional types and constitutional conflicts” at the Nordic academic conference in Gothenburg of 1899, unfortunately only extant as a summary in the report of the conference, published in 1900, p. 92-97. (author)

the people seize the high seat. Reality has already all too clearly refuted this blind and prejudiced belief. What comes out of the voting booths during the general elections is the people's own mass "jenseits von Gut und Böse." When now this mass similarly, in the name of democracy, is granted the decision of the state's leadership, the result is what it must be: politics which plays more and more on the temperament of the people and society's fancy of the day. As these vary between states, so too does the outcome vary. The same method yields clerical politics in Belgium and radical politics in France, war in Romania and neutrality in Sweden. The spirit is one, but the gifts are various, and similarity in law does not prevent an endless variation within the real political life.

In the unopposable march of the universal suffrage through the state-system we recognize thus the modern state's power of personhood; but, at the same time, we establish how far it leads from the abstractly just and rational if it is made fact with no counterweight. From a purely practical standpoint, the method has awakened great considerations just through its numerical method, which gives the numerical plurality the right without respect for quality; when now the working classes possess the plurality in an industrialized society, this electoral method threatens to grant them all of the power into their own hands—and the one-sidedness, which has shown itself condemnable in all previous chapters where it is a question of the state's lower attributes, would enlarge itself to the greatest extent.

It is therefore not to wonder that a general reaction is now in motion around our continent<sup>267</sup> against this electoral system with its disdain for all greatnesses but the bare unqualified majority. Primarily, this reaction has taken aim against the electoral method itself and the by *proportional representation* sought a technical guarantee against the danger of a single class's dominance; this solution, in its contemporary form, descends practically from Belgium of 1899, and has since conquered the Nordic countries and stands on the agenda in France itself, the general elections' motherland. In a different form, the reaction is concentrated on the division of electoral districts, and seeks to correct it according to social contrasts (attempts in Prussia, 1906, and Austria, 1907, and the so called "Mossebo Program"<sup>268</sup> in Sweden). But behind all of these technical solutions, one and the same great thought shines through: not to abolish the universal suffrage, but to *organize* it, so that it reflects not only the unity of the nation, but also the diversity of society. The universal suffrage creates a national representation alone; what we strive for is a social or *societal representation*.

### IV.3.3. Natural Representation

Here the connection between regiment and society threads forth in a sudden explanatory light. No political forms which are not direct expressions of the social realities may receive a guarantee of durability. The rule validates itself through all times. In the time of the village society, representation too stood on territorial basis. When evolution continued toward the estate society, the estate representation emerged on the social basis of its time, in order to ultimately disappear with all attributes of popular freedom into the autocratic system. The French revolution has now cleared the table; the nation itself mobilized against the old society, and universal suffrage with public elections became its dual battering rams, one directed against the throne and the other against its privileged supporters, and "national representation" was the result of the two. It required this concentration of the popular will,

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267 *världsdel*

268 *Mossebo programmet*

with the suppression of all qualifications, in order to dissolve the unified excesses of state power and estate particularism of the time. It was a program of struggle which had its time and which has done its service.

Shall one now understand? As the overextended by the idea of absolutism state-will again sunk into its dimensions in the form of a constitutional regiment, then so must the popular will, overextended by the idea of national representation, similarly be moderated within the form of an organic societal representation, with the nation's internal qualifications once again freed and living. It is not the universal suffrage which is at fault; it is necessary in order to grant the nation immediate co-responsibility within its state. The fault is in the general elections<sup>269</sup>. They belong to the interregnum of the civic society. Now, the modern body of trade unions around us is laboring to create the new, natural society on the basis of the association; and it is on this society that the correct representation must be founded, a *representation of interests*<sup>270</sup>, in which the modern society's great factual spheres of work tread out before the state, each with their men of trust and speakers, and with that weight alone which corresponds to their respective value to the commons—this is the solution to the great problem of representation.<sup>271</sup>

One sees that this solution is a synthesis of the preceding two, the estate thought's thesis and the civic thought's antithesis. The future representation rest all the more on the latter, which is merely a euphemism for nationality. The modern classes shall not break it down all the way to the bottom, as the former estates did, but neither shall it dissolve and vanish into it, as the disorganized suffrage will: they shall rise up out of it as mountain peaks from a common base. First by this shall the class contrast's real necessity be possible to definitely reconcile with the ideal postulate of nationality.

We have previously seen the modern group society in organic connection with the autarchic household and the harmonic natural territory. As we now see the group society aspiring for political expression in the representation of interests on a national basis, we recognize one and the same law working in all elements and within all aspects of the state-life. Everything hangs together in the same great evolution. It should not be necessary to further demonstrate how the result grows in clarity and confidence just by this correspondence. Seen each on their own, the representation of interests, autarky, and so on may be subject to doubt—seen together, as an expression of a common, all-encompassing thought; they support each other and provide evidence of one another's truth, which is not easily wiped.

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269 *samfällda valen*

270 *intresserepresentation*

271 The exposition in the text connects, partially verbatim, to my fundamental investigation on "The Representation Problem" ("Representationsproblemet") in *Det nya Sverige*, 1907, pp. 448-61; c.f. Boëthius in *Statsvet. Tidskrift*, 1908, pp. 229-247, and foremostly Wallengren, *Problems of Suffrage (Valrättsproblem)*, 1905, pp. 100-182, where all arguments against representation of interests are summarized. W. admits himself in another work that the "thought is in fashion," and cites an expression in the Danish Parliament that it is "a leading thought among all political philosophers, who in these moments are occupied by these subjects around the world"; *The Two-Chamber System (Tvåkamarsystemet)*, p. 18. According to Haseach, *Die Moderne Demokratie*, 1912, p. 468, it ought to soon become a "burning question." According to Zwieg, *La reforme electorale en Autriche*, 1907, (cited by Wallengren, *Problems of Suffrage*, p. 117), there is a "generally growing inclination" thereto. The thought is embrace especially by the right in various countries (Austria, France, Germany, Denmark) on the basis of their connection to the renaissance of monarchy. A prominent representative in Spain is Mella, see *Das grössere Deutschland*, 18/02, 1915, p. 1700. A dedicated supporter is also Oscar Schmitz, see *Die Kunst der Politik*, 1914, p. 434, and *Das wirkliche Deutschland*, pp. 375-. (author)

But if the representation of interests is the future's necessary expression of the people's will, then neither shall the political democracy be the last word of history. In reality, it hangs together with the form of the national representation and shall fall back with it. If the state-life in all previous areas has shown itself as seeking a balance, then it ought not in the length deny this tendency in the area of the regiment. Under the power of the revolutionary ideas, the 19<sup>th</sup> century has been striving for a state-form just as monistic as that of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, but in the opposite direction: the throne, which it found before itself in autocracy, it has broken (republic) or at least degenerated (parliamentary monarchy). When the forces which now work within the state have reached their aim, then we must in the area of the legal life expect a new synthesis overall, a strengthening of the specific state-power on democracy's own basis, a satisfaction thus of order and freedom alike by a Monarchist renaissance (constitutional monarchy), or a Caesarian concentration (principate).

It is obvious that this harmony is the ideal. The regiment suffers as much as the household of a monoculture. Whether the path thereto shall be straight and direct—so that the reaction against the excesses of liberty ends at the correct intermediate point—is certainly another question. Experience does not speak in favor of this quick solution; it speaks instead of excesses' tendency to invoke opposite excesses, according to the law of the pendulum's swinging. By this experience I have chalked out a natural system for the state-forms, where the declining line from absolutism, by constitutionalism, to democracy (parliamentarianism) is conceived to be replaced by an ascending line through principate to a new absolutism (Caesarism).<sup>272</sup> The last century has witnessed the former series in its irresistible advance across Europe, and it is entirely natural that one has generalized this developing line to a constant, much like sailing in the trade wind which never ceases and never turns; it is the politics which believe that "one can always afford a step to the left." Experiences of other cycles of time, going back to those of old Rome beginning with Caesar, and also to some degree to those of the contemporary America, let us predict that Europe once shall see the course of democracy run out, and then there will remain a return along the second line, like the summer monsoon's replacement by the winter monsoon in regular intervals. It may be a threat that humanity, once it has come all the way to the brink of the abyss of anarchy, does not stop this course before it has reached far past this too. That an endlessness of variants and aberration shall cloud the view of the passage for the near-sighted ought not confuse us about this development's direction and necessity.

#### **IV.3.4. Loyalty and Thereto Related State-Purposes**

Thus: this world, which close at hand appears to us unbounded and accessible to free, rational creation, shows itself once again caught in the shackles of long and great processes beneath the law of life itself. Only to the degree that the statesman subordinates his will to its objective tendencies is he able to contribute to the creation of the subjective legal harmony, the inner bond between people and regiment, which is called *loyalty*. We have already studied this phenomenon in its relationship to nationality and sociality; we have also indicated violent ways of achieving agreement between them (see III.5.3.). All is not the statesman's fault if loyalty stands low within a people; the fault may also lie in circumstances

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<sup>272</sup> *Festschrift to Pontus Fahlbeck (Festskrift till Pontus Fahlbeck)*, 1905, pp. 121-149, and *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 1915, pp. 427-451. The expression of *principate* is here taken, after "emperor" Augustus's famous form of government and Machiavelli's nomenclature, as an indication of the balanced form of the rising line. (author)

above his ability, within the people itself or in the society; but if the people instinctively always places the guilt on government, then there is here a justification for the time being which falls primarily on the government's responsibility to carefully adapt the form of government according to the great law of the time-turning.

Therefore find we also changes to the legal regime among the tools by which social crises may be overcome. The classic example is the "Law of the Twelve Tablets" against the successive legislations by which the plebeians were received into Rome's regiment in the 400-300s B.C. In modern history we see a parallel in the English legal and administrative policy of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (the suffrage rights' reforms of 1832, 1867, 1884, administrative reforms of 1888 and 1894). Austria's parliamentary reform of 1907 was motivated directly as a cure against the disease of the conflict of nationalities. It similarly strengthened Austria against Hungary in the union conflict, much like Norway's democratic resolution of 1898 gave it a determined advantage against Sweden, which suffered of inner dissatisfaction against the restricted voting right. Sweden's reform of 1909 stands therefore as another case of the curative method by the way of law. If the government takes too long to enact such initiatives, it may happen that the people itself grabs it by the way of revolution: so in Russia, 1905, in Turkey, 1908, apparently also in China, 1911.

All these cases stand as one sees in the declining line of the legislative curve: they constitute stages of the still continuing adaption according to the civic society's and democracy's spirit of the time. The ascending line, against concentrated state-power, has a lesser tendency to complete itself by legal way, of which the Napoleonids' history in France in their time and the North American now does not lack examples.

It is not difficult to in such politics under certain circumstances recognize up in the legal life itself an effect of the *law of convalescence* which we have already observed in geopolitics. The connection is clear in the Russian revolution of 1905 after the catastrophe in Asia and the Swedish suffrage reform of 1909 following the dissolution of the union; also the Young-Turkish constitution of 1908 was meant as a treatment for the "sick man's" distress. So stands the legal aspect of the state too up in the middle of the river of life, in steady contact with other aspects, affected by them while itself also affecting them.

#### **IV.3.5. Spirit of the Time and National Spirit in the Regiment**

This connection shows itself finally also therein that the legal treatment does not always succeed. The reform of 1907 in Austria showed itself as oil to the ferocious waves of the national conflict with its universal suffrage, entirely in error; and sociality has for long times not stood so low in Sweden as now, following and despite the reconciliatory legislation of 1909. Here the universal suffrage appears not as protected ground but as an expanded polling station. In a very blatant way it is clear here how little the state corresponds to its law. The entire political organization is ultimately only a form: what it arrives on is the living content. This is what liberalism does not realize when it places all of its trust in



regimental couriers: in simpler cases, changes of regiment, in more difficult, changes of constitution.<sup>273</sup> The latter history of France is the strongest evidence by the system as well as by its weakness.

Among the factors which play a role here in obscuring the prescription, one is greater and more generally significant than all of the others. It is the *national spirit*<sup>274</sup>: the personal characteristic itself of the people. She is the one guide of the regiment, where the spirit of the time is the other. From the other side, she too places limits to the statesman's freely creative will. She is an atmosphere, through which the idea of time is to refract before the people may claim it (c.f. III.5.5.). A sound regiment can never deny its deep bond with the nation.

That is why we do not believe in the "ideal law," which the Enlightenment philosophy of the 18<sup>th</sup> century sought for in the state-life as if it were the philosopher's stone. The effects of this schematization at the expense of the life of the personality—that of the individuality—have stretched themselves wide. Most western constitutions have emerged as variations of one and the same theme, the Montesquieuan separation of powers, or as more or less poor copies of a common model, in particular the English law. A great part of the domestic political dissatisfaction comes from the friction of these abstract or foreign influences against the national personality. It is not difficult to understand that all states fit in the same form of constitution as little as all feet fit in the same machine-made shoe number. Even if the fashion in the all is the same, the leather must be cut according to each and every one's individual type. If one had learned from England instead of blindly imitating it, one would have found the correct way right there: a people which on its own lives itself into its law, so that it sits as "the skin on a body" (Carl Peters). But the same constitution sits on all imitators more or less poorly, as they naturally do not possess England's individual circumstances of realm, people, household, and society.

At the same time as the legislative politics pays appropriate respect to general ideas of the time, it also gives a warning against all too slavish respect for them. By all appearances, the warning is invoked with respect to the fact that the contemporary states stand at very different stages of development. Ideas for a certain stage cannot without risk be transplanted to another. The remark is particularly in its place with respect to the eastern imitation of western ideas of state, which began in Turkey in 1876 and Japan in 1889 and continued in various countries in the new century. In particular the liberal recidivism in Turkey of 1908 much like the "democratic breakthrough" in China after 1911 has awakened serious concerns among experienced observers. For an eastern society of their sort is an old handwriting on decomposing paper: it collapses entirely if carelessly exposed to the fresh air. It does not tolerate the oxygen of freedom. Freedom too, namely, has its own, by tradition and nationality determined, districts, and does harm outside of them.<sup>275</sup>

In such cases, the form of the law becomes an experiment which may invoke more evil than it cures. If the bodily constitution overall is good, as that of Japan, then it neutralizes the risks and follows its own laws, even if the foreign form of government is permitted to stay on paper as a

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273 "The work of the state, which by its real nature is administration, has in our days been concentrated in legislation, and thus the misunderstanding has gained root and stronghold in the public consciousness, that legislation can prescribe cures for everything, and all evils may be cured by legislation"; Reuterskjöld in *Statsvet. Tidskrift*, 1911, pp. 297-298. (author)

274 *nationalandan*

275 "The Answers of the Balkan Wars" ("Balkankrigens facit"), in *Polit. Essays*, I, 214. (author)

beautiful and untrue advertisement. In another case there may be a danger that the foreign ideas accelerate the misfortune of the realm.

Once again we see therefore life's own primacy before all exterior forms. It is good for a people to have a time-appropriate and overall well-ordered regiment, but even better is a sound and strong soul. Gustaf Adolf's time period in the history of Sweden, with its weak legislation, is an example for all times that *the state is greater than its law*.

## Fifth Chapter

# The State Under the Law of Life

Our special reconnaissances of the state's elements, or attributes, have concluded. The state stands now before us not as an incidental or artificial form of human co-habitation tangled in juridical concepts, but as a deeply rooted in historical and factual realities, organically emerged phenomenon of the same fundamental type as the individual human—in other words, a biological entity or a lifeform.

### V.1. Perishability of the State

Another answer is still required to strengthen this result. If the state is a type of life, ought he not also be subject to the fundamental laws of life, among which destruction is the greatest?

It is now not difficult to find experiential evidence in this direction. That states are born demands no further evidence than that they exist. That they are mortal, that shows even a cursory review of history. Where is now the world-dominating Rome? Deeply beneath the ground of the modern city's Forum, its memories are unburied by a people which through many blood-mixings has become another in heart and kidneys. Where is its last most feared enemy, the vandals with their states? Vanished without a trace other than one name: "Andalucia." Where is the "Holy Roman Empire" with its claims on the position of the universal state, where are the highly cultivated states of Montezuma and the Inca people, where is the Moors' culturally shining realm surrounding the royal fortress of Alhambra? Their tombs stand in the vast graveyard of history, revealing how states too depart by the same path which lies before the individual.

That states may die is therefore not in question. But the question has its right gravity when expressed as such: *must* they die? Are they mortal by nature, much like humans? Do they have a certain predetermined lifespan, upon whose completion they must again be ripped from this earth?

It is with fear that one touches the thought that the dominion of annihilation would extend so far. While the problem on the account of other states attracts us with the power of the unknown, we shy instinctively away when it is applied to our own state. The mere thought that our own fatherland<sup>276</sup> may cease to exist repels us innerly. In front of these prospects, it is natural if one in general dismisses the question by the Buddhist formula of the unknowable: "the Holy One has not revealed it."

Our research would at the same time betray at the decisive point if we were to avoid giving ourselves an answer. We will not easily pass the question on the path which we have charted out for ourselves. An investigation must be attempted—even if we sense that we have reached the limits of the knowable, where one cannot expect a decisive conclusion from science.

### V.2. The Birth of the State

#### V.2.1. Primary and Secondary Process

To place the problem in the right light from the beginning, we first ask ourselves: how are states *born*?

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<sup>276</sup> *fosterland*

Herewith one must (with Jellinek) distinguish between primary state-formation within a legal wildland and secondary within a completed state-system. The former offers us nowadays no difficulty to interpret; it is entirely a question of settlement and social organization, a purely practical phenomenon with no judicial or rational taint. We take therewith a definitive distance away from the old natural law, which already on this point saw a purely legal question, and found its “delivering” word in the social contract. It was a scientifically meaningful fiction to the extent that it broke with the medieval state “of God” and turned state-formation into a human phenomenon; but as history has no knowledge of constituent contracts by which individuals bind themselves as co-owners within a political corporation,<sup>277</sup> neither do we need such an artificial explanation for a natural case. Jellinek too admits without hesitation that the state’s “act of creation lies outside the domain of justice,” so that the state’s “own will is its legal basis.”

The problem begins first with the secondary process: the state’s entrance into an already complete political map and a *jus-gentium*-established state-system. How does a newcomer gain space within an area in which all places are already occupied to the brim, and living law backs the distribution?

The case would certainly be impossible if the constraints of this law held a secure position—other than in the unlikely condition that the *beati posidentis* themselves leave space of their own goodwill. This has happened; though, it has also happened that new states came to be without this goodwill of the preceding states in spite of existing law. This is where the problem sits. In reality we are witnessing one “happy event” of this kind after the other. The present state-system of Europe is the most fixed that the world has ever seen, and yet it can in the past century show a birth count of no smaller number than 11, if we include Albania in 1913; Luxemburg 1815, Belgium and Greece around year 1830; Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro definitively in 1878, Norway also in 1905 and Bulgaria 1908,<sup>278</sup> thereto the modern Italy 1859-71 and the German realm 1866-71. The question of the emergence of states has therefore full contemporary relevance.

It follows immediately from our premise that a state within a completed state-system does not come to the world innocent as a child: it is through its own birth burdened by the guilt of having violated the international law. The extant system with its carefully calibrated and finely balanced legal relations must be broken through in order to give space for the newcomer; and at the point where this occurs, a special injustice is done to the one or the several “nearest” ones, namely the states whose legal area or area of power<sup>279</sup> is immediately weakened by the newcomer’s appearance. From the viewpoint of international justice and morals, every new state’s birth is apparently a scandal, and the newborn is to be recorded as illegitimate in the church archives.

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277 It would then be the apocryphal oath-swearing at Rütli (*Rütlichschwur*), or perhaps the puritans’ “Mayflower Compact,” see Story, *Commentaries on the Constitution of the U.S.*, 1891, I, 30-31. C.f. otherwise Jellinek, especially pp. 274-275. (author)

278 Only in passing do we note here the technical property that the birthing process occurs as a rule in two stages: first “half,” then full sovereignty. So, typically, Norway 1815-1905 and the Balkan states, most recently Bulgaria 1878-1908. See *Polit. Essays*, I, 42-43, and Dannemann, *Die polit. Und rechtliche Entwicklung der halbsouveränen Staaten Europas*, 1915. (author)

279 *rätts- och maktområde*

But history in its great march pays hardly much regard to such notational concerns and condemnables. Even behind the mask of the international law she is fundamentally her old self, as when she before any international law created the states through the primary process. The origin generally reduces itself to the pure life of power and will. The difference is primarily that the demand for power and will is now so much higher, which stands as a great obstacle to overtake in this case. But herewith it is certainly not said that the international law lacks all significance on these occasions. On the contrary, it shall now be shown that it has already had a decisive role *after* the completion of the natural act. The world has advanced so far into an international order that the state-system decides on the reception of the new state into the community or not. But they cannot prevent its birth not its death; thereof history decides beyond just and unjust.

Now, there are also cases in which godfathers of great politics supervise the entire process from beginning to end, with more or less respect for natural circumstances, as in the case of Albania in 1913. In such cases something artificial is asserted, which does not bode well for the future of the child. We observe now the typical process, and shall find that it is in no wise arbitrary, even if it cannot be impressed into predetermined juridical categories.

The demonstration here ties itself directly to the point where we left the investigation of the nation's development toward a state (see III.5.), that is at the declaration of independence; most lately that of Bulgaria in 1908. This is the obligatory precondition of the modern state-formation: a nationality which has matured to consciousness. Even sworn opponents ought hardly reject the validity of the principle at this point. Though real state-entities may have survived on another basis than that of nationality, no new state ought in the future come to be without this living personality. The state can henceforward have no other source or basis since the discovery of the nature of the nation.

## V.2.2. Reception into the State Collective

The declaration of independence, though, is only the first act of the process. Life creates the demand and presumption for its acceptance, but no more. For no nation can by its own mere whim oblige others, to decrease others' areas of power and alter the existing balance. Bulgaria was for example unable to force its envoys onto the other states of Europe in 1908, and a state cannot be considered sovereign without the possibility for diplomatic representation; no less could it condemn Turkey to that loss of power which its secession was considered to signify. This must depend on yet another trial. The nation attains sovereignty only by *international-legal recognition*<sup>280</sup> and acceptance into the state-system.

The connection is entirely the same as that between citizenship and suffrage: right did not come until the state conceded it. Here it is the collective of the old states—nowadays in practice represented by the great powers—which constitutes the tribunal. It is tried, thus, whether the national claim is to be transformed into a right or not. And first when this is done, the state as such is born into the world. Much like the sanction according to the Labandian theory is the the true birthing act of a law, so is the international-legal recognition that of a state. It may well happen that it may exist there outside, as a naked fact, and gradually by assertion grow into the state-system; but the preconditions for such a development are nowadays very weak and would appear to become even weaker in the future.

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280 *folkrättsligt erkännande*

Thus we arrive in any case ultimately at a sort of agreement as a form for the birth of the state—or perhaps more precisely its baptism—though not internal, but external, with other states. The form of the law, which the state-teaching of the natural law has placed at the spearhead of the primary state-formation, shows itself in actuality to be the crown and completion of the secondary; it does not come first in the process, but absolutely last, emanating from a sort of right of the state-system to complete itself.

Naturally, those members of the old state-system who are directly harmed by the claims of the new pretender have the first word at this judgment of the powers. If he stands by his right and asserts it, as Sweden against Norway in 1814, then the process is already lost from the start for the newcomer. If he does not protect his right, as Sweden against Norway in 1905 and Turkey against Bulgaria in 1908, then the procedure is simplified, though the other states naturally still do not have their own votes engraved.

Are we able to distinguish certain circumstances within the goal which on equal ground with nationality may serve as surrogates for the legal right of self-ownership? One is that the newcomer must be organized as a state, with a government which is able to maintain order and speak for it; herein already lied the damnation of the “Republic of Formosa” of 1895 and the “Latvian Republic” of 1905, nearly also that of Albania in 1913. Another ought to be that the territory in itself is approximately a natural whole, without significant intrusion upon those of others. But beyond these external conditions of regimental- and geopolitical sort, much emphasis must also be placed on the perspective of whether the nation in question has shown itself possessing the ability of independent contribution toward the common culture of the state-family. This criterion plunges Albania’s stocks deeply beneath their nominal value, but it is permitted to suppose that this is what weighed the most in the favor of Norway in 1905: it has for its sovereignty to thank more than any external qualities the poetry of Ibsen, the music of Grieg, the achievements of Nansen, and the science of Bugge—these high cultural achievements have impressed the world, and surely have contributed toward holding back the arm of Sweden. But what history firstly and lastly demands of a nation that is to be considered worthy of its highest rank, that of the sovereign state, that is will and power and determination to by deed and at any cost assert its “personal right.” This is the most decisive factor before the tribunal, simply because power is necessary to attain it. That is why this rank has been recognized for a nation of 2¼ million such as Norway, while still denied a nation of 35 million such as Ukraine. In this way, the vital force makes itself the relevant factor herein too, under the forms of justice.

We have spoken here only of the emergence of such states for whose sake the state-system must be cut-through and another’s right infringed upon. In events such as the unifications of Italy and Germany to new great states, the problem is to a certain extent different and more simple. The state-system may certainly be deeply interested here too, for the sake of the balance, but no right is infringed upon within this process, as the unification does not move the borders of neighbors. No outsider may find reason to protest in the name of justice, as little as in the event of an entrance into an alliance or an “entente.” The vital force works here directly and until the end on the basis of the national solidarity and with no need for international confirmation. We see here so far a type of primary state-formation again, though naturally in inwardly judicial forms.

### V.3. The Death of the State

The complaint which can be imagined comes instead from within. For at every such unification, states must die; the former small states within the greater nation must surrender their existence as states simultaneously as the new federal state becomes organized as a real state. History shows that the emergence of the modern Italy costed the lives of 7 states (Sardinia, Two Sicilies, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, Lucca, the Papal State) and the new Germany those of 4 (Hanover, Kur-Hessen, Nassau, Frankfurt a. M.). This becomes on its own a European death-list of 11 since the last time-turning; and then we have still not counted the entirely artificial and therefore ephemeral state-formations such as the Napoleonic kingdoms of Westphalia and Italy, or the Vienna Congress's creations of Krakow (1815-1846) and the Ionian Islands (1815-1864). Thus old right vanishes here; and when this does not happen by voluntary resolution, old loyalty may long react against the new victory in the name of nationality, as in Hanover. To us it stands clear that such a death is the necessary sacrifice for admission to the full blessing of personhood. When for example Sardinia voluntarily surrendered its existence as a state in order to rise as Italy, we see here a natural evolution forward and upward. History too gives here its confirmation when she labels such particularism as pure atavism, gradually defeated as the new nation-state grows into its call. Satisfaction, and no tears, is appropriate next to such graves. To dissolve into a higher life—that is for states as for the individual the thought which breaks the edge of death and denies the kingdom of death its victory.

Do we not in reality stand by the answer to the question of the mortality of the states? There is nothing which keeps one from interpreting the described historical event as exemplary and of universal significance. Certainly, we may not yet have been able to establish a determined tendency toward a racial-political unification with absorption of the nation-states (see III.6.); though this corresponds with our innermost imaginations that humanity once shall realize its unity also in political form. The lives of states must flow into this “universal state”<sup>281</sup> like rivers into a sea; let be that their separate furrows may still be distinguished (in the sign of federalism). Here we are permitted to find the biological analogy confirmed until the end, and this without surrendering our hope of immortality. In light of facts such as Prussia's dissolution into the great Germany, the thought of the mortality of states no longer repels us.

#### V.3.1. Psychological Dissolution of the Nationality (Poland)

But the death list of Europe in more recent times has yet another case in which the annihilation has claimed its right with no shadow of consolation falling over the grave. *Poland* did not dissolve into any greater organic unity, nor give up its existence in favor of nationality, nor die a natural death: it has by the hands of others been erased from history, in which it was a powerful realm for centuries—it's voice in the world was silenced by violence, and its homeless nation lives now in three foreign residencies.

If we look closer to our own days and beyond the borders of Europe, we may note at least three such cases of similar violent type: *Transvaal* and the *Orange Free State* in South Africa of 1902 and Korea in East Asia of 1910. In these cases, the murderer was a single superior power. In other areas we see several powers uniting against an intended prey, as in the case of Poland, and begin the execution by its partition into “spheres of interest”: so is Siam threatened by France and England since 1896 and

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281 “universalstat”

Persia by Russia and England since 1907, and the same sword of Damocles has long hung over China and Turkey—in order to ultimately, it appears, move onward to the head of the Austro-Hungarian great power itself.

In these processes too we find justice and reality in a strange mixture. Poland was divided according treaties, Siam and Persia likewise, the Boer states conceded their independence by formal agreements. Such legal procedures shall not confuse us about the essence within a fate such as that of Poland. It was prepared from within, before the chop fell. The downfall of the Polish state is a textbook case of the “pernicious anemia” within the state-life, as we have already examined in greater detail in the chapter on ethnopolitics (see III.7.1.). None of the foreign powers’ partition treaties of 1772, 1793, and 1795 is therefore the cause of death; they are only moments of the execution; the death sat in the heart of the state, where *nationality had vanished*. The result laid before the contemporary eyes: “where there are two Poles, there are three different opinions.” Deprived of the carrying and supporting element of willingness to sacrifice for the common good, the Polish people dissolved into the unhinged self-violence of the individuals; and so, the state became a hearth of anarchy, infectious to the surroundings (which thereof had a reason to step in), and fell later as an easy prey. The decline of nationality drew at once the danger upon the state and weakened its power to resist the danger. Our natural compassion to the great suffering must not mislead us into looking past the organic within this fate. The act is not tragic, only “negatively pathetic,” to borrow the aesthetic terminology. It was a regular execution upon an expired people which made its own fate.<sup>282</sup>

The state of affairs in our days was no different in the case of Korea and to a certain extent in that of Persia. They have long enough shown themselves to be immersed in a thinned-out vital air. They led a vegetative existence in elderly weakness. They had nothing to contribute to the common foundations of humanity. This impotence could not be masked by any beautifying veils, such as the “constitutional” map of Persia. They committed the sin which is not forgiven, the sin against the law of evolution. They were weighed on the scales and found wanting. Then it was merely a question of time before the feet that were to carry them out arrived at the door.

The problem of the Boer state is partially different. It may be that they did not have much of a treasure to contribute to the higher culture, from which they had withdrawn by their “exceptions” into a remote corner of the world; but none have claimed that they lacked in civic sense or in physical and moral vital power. When violence comes to such states, then one may speak of a true tragedy. Tears are more appropriate before these graves than those of Poland and Korea, not to speak of Hanover’s.

But by such graves there is also hope, and this hope has after only five years shone over Transvaal and the Orange State in that the victor has allowed them the first degree of sovereignty (autonomy) again, in order to after two years award them full federal freedom. Herewith we touch upon the special phenomenon of *reincarnation*, whose possibilities in outer measure distinguishes the state’s undoing from that of the individual. In certain circumstances states that have gone under may be born anew to participate in a later state-system. In reality, all new births of states that have been listed

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282 It is certainly not the purpose of these remarks to absolve the executioners of Poland from guilt. As a moment in the contemporary national renaissance one may note Balzer, *Aus Problemeder Verfassungsgeschichte Polens* (“From the Problems of the Constitutional History of Poland”), Krakau, 1916: an attempted *Ehrenretterung* (“recovery of honor”) of the old Republic on its most difficult area, that of the constitution. (author) *Rzeczpospolita* is more commonly translated as *Commonwealth* rather than *Republic* in English today.



(V.2.1.) are reincarnations after centuries of interruption—Norway’s no less than Serbia’s or Bulgaria’s; only Belgium and Luxembourg are excepted. They were flourishing states in the medieval, until foreign dominions laid themselves more or less heavily over them, and only the time-turning of nationality awakened them once again to life.

Here is truly a connection that is easy to establish. We already know that nationality is a dynamic power that may rise and fall repeatedly over the course of the life of a single nation (see III.3.2., III.7.1.). Its decline denotes the downfall of the state; shall not its renewed rise properly denote the return of the state?<sup>283</sup> And is it not natural that the event itself with its consequences shall push the scales to rise again? The common sorrow and shame shall without doubt, where all vital power has not yet vanished within the nation, place the individual selfishness under a healthy pressure in favor of the national consciousness. Thus external slavery may for a nation be a baptism by suffering toward a bettering. Herein is hope for Poland too—which the World War now seems to bring to fulfillment.

### V.3.2. Physical Undermining of the Nation (Rome)

Thus everything is not yet lost so long as the nation continues to live after the state’s loss of existence. The state appears here as the more transient, the nation as the deeper nature. But there is a case where all hope for the state is out of question, and that is the *nation’s own death*. The death of nationality is a “spiritual” death with hope of resurrection; the nation’s death is corporal and permanent. For the modern state is unthinkable without its nation. If the state is lost, the nation may continue to live within its objective circumstances; but if the nation is lost, so is the state lost too, unconditionally and irreversibly. That is why the ancient culture may have seen a renaissance, but never the ancient state; from new assimilations, new nations have emerged on the peninsulas as foundations of the new states ever since the old Greeks and Romans have been lost to miscegenation, like used-up buttons of the Ibsenian button-molder’s pot (*Peer Gynt*).

We know already know the way by which they are lost: the “two-child system.” I have once described it as *national paralysis*, because it sacrifices every thought of the kin to selfish calculation. For anemia there is hope, for paralysis there is none. The individual can slaughter the nation, much like he can slaughter the nationality.

But if we now after two millennia see this disease of the people once again cast its shadow over our continent, in the clothing of an individualism which here asserts itself in the seemingly most unassailable area—that is when the great question meets us in its most serious shape. Is this the normal end for the peoples who escaped the quick death? May we not keep the faith in that death which is a dissolution into a higher life—shall the rivers dry out before they reach the sea? Shall the peoples, after a longer or a shorter venture, be forced by obscure laws upon this path of death? Are they slaves of the absolute annihilation, like us, humans, so that the pot of the button-molder awaits them all?

Herewith, we entirely seriously return to the starting point of this investigation. Neither Sardinia’s ascent into a higher lifeform nor Korea’s descent into a lower, which may be transient, place

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283 The *deductio ad absurdum*, which Jellinek thinks to find in this “jeder biologischen Analogie spottende Auferschungslehre” (“resurrection doctrine which mocks every biological analogy”), pp. 155-56, dissolves here in a natural context, and casts by this dissolution a peculiar light over this author’s declaration on pp. 153-54: “Mein Gegensatz zur organischen Lehre ist der der Erkenntniskritik zur Dogmatik” (“My opposition to the organic doctrine is that of the *Erkenntniskritik* against dogmatism”). (author)

us before the problem of the state's perishability as directly as the current population statistics of the France of the strongest development of state. It is possible, and not far-fetched, to interpret this phenomenon too as exemplary: a tragic solution to the same problem which in the case of Sardinia has a happy solution. And the interest with which we observe the effects of the World War on this point (see III.7.2.) grows into a world-historical one.

### V.3.3. Necessity of the Death

The question then stands: 2000 years ago, none of the great nations of Europe today were alive—shall any of them remain 2000 years hence? The question is to a certain degree related to that which is presented by the modern zoologists concerning the conditions of the *animal species*: has it always been natural revolutions which invoked extinctions within the paleontological world, or are the species themselves internally doomed to eventually dissolve? Another analogy is offered by the *kins* within one people, according to Fahlbeck's investigations, which show them (within a certain population group) to a high degree subject to the law of perishability.<sup>284</sup>

Beyond such speculations, we are not able to nor wish to continue further on this subject. Here, the path of science ends, and that of *faith* begins. But though we do not find here evidence for the correctness of our organic interpretation, it is of note that its opponents owe us evidence no less; for the existence of a state for a thousand years is, accounting for its long life-cycle, no evidence of its immortality.

This gazing into the unknown has, though, granted us a result, one of immeasurable significance in practical as well as theoretical considerations. *The life of the state lies ultimately in the hand of the individuals*. It is in their power to both strengthen and weaken, extend and shorten it. We do not know whether eternal life is cut out for any state or even any nation; but we see this, that it to a decisive level depends on the individuals themselves whether their state may *live longer on the surface of the Earth!*

### V.4. Necessity and Freedom within the State-Life

Looking back at this path whose end we have now reached, we shall not find any real difficulty in accepting the organic interpretation, according to which also the state is a lifeform under the influence of the great laws of life, while we on the other hand receive a clarification of the state's factual behavior which no other perspective may provide even approximately.

There is in this solution of ours to the problem of the state a great emphasis on the *necessity*, as opposed to freedom. In all areas—those of space, nationality, household, social life—we have seen great necessities emerge with the power of natural laws and place a frame around the statesman's freedom of movement. Herewith an element of reason and free will is not denied the state. We have seen glimpses thereof in all areas, where we demonstrated the state's capacity to by own ability rework their space, their national character, their economy, their social harmony. Had we chosen our point of vantage from the other direction, that is to say taken as subject the state as a cultural form, then light

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284 Fahlbeck, *Sveriges adel* ("The Nobility of Sweden"), I, 1898, "Folks och släkters undergång" ("The Decline of Peoples and Kinships"), pp. 125-139, *Political Essays*, I, 10-11. The entirety of this chapter is contained, in part literally, in the three essays of 1907-08: "The Perishability of States and Nations" ("Staters och nationers förgänglighet"), "Persia, How States Die" ("Persien, huru stater dö"), and "Bulgaria, How States Are Born" ("Bulgarien, huru stater födas"), *ibid.*, pp. 1-28. (author)

would fall even stronger upon this aspect. That has not been our task in the present investigation. That aspect has enough sharp-sighted representatives, not to speak of interested advocates. There stands the great majority. It seemed truly of necessity to complete this traditional illumination from the right with one from the left. The result lies before one in the present investigation. It was clear in itself that it would entail a different distribution of light and shadows within the problem. But it shall not be obscured that behind this illuminating effect lie new consequences for the balance between necessity and freedom: a movement in favor of the former.

Our demonstration is not the drawing of a free hand, as one may often say about the opposite side. It is from beginning to end made according to a living model. We have on all points observed the factual states' passage before collecting the observations together into the shape of a tendency or law. Therefore we do not submit to the ruling that our standpoint were to be "Dogmatism" *contra* "Erkenntniskritik" (Jellinek, see V.3.1. footnote). The difference is in another place. Where the opposite teaching has only exceptions to establish, there we have dared to turn page, assert the study, and establish the rule in the other direction. And this rule reads so, that the state is primarily a sphere of interest and power, and not a sphere of justice: a sensual-rational entity with emphasis on the sensual aspect.

#### V.4.1. International Implications

Hereof one sees once and for all the petty power of all connections between peoples. They are subject to "*rebus sic stantibus*,"<sup>285</sup> Bismarck said. International law is held in such a low regard that even in the deepest peace new treaties are concluded to confirm existing rights in the question of such an elementary thing as realm borders (the North Sea- and Baltic Treaties of 1908). So wrote a newspaper such as *The Morning Post* in October of 1908 after Austria-Hungary's action on the Balkan peninsula: "If a state sees itself in a position to break its word, there are no means of coercing it to hold faith and promises so long as the broken word does not mean such a great injustice to another power that it necessitates a war." It was a grim analysis in the middle of the flowering time-turning of pacifism and the international legal formation; but that race which has now in the World War experienced Italy's and Romania's falling away from their own allies and declaration of war against them shall not serve to disprove it.

It seems as it were not even gainful to under such circumstances cultivate the illusion of the states' high standing with respect to reason and justice. We see them to great cheers proclaim "the principles of justice and righteousness" as leading stars over the Peace Palace in the Hague; but in reality we see hardly more of this righteousness than the 7 and 70 cases!<sup>286</sup> Rather than to in vain bitterness count these relapses to sin and only condemn, we ought to finally understand the necessities under which the states make their way. Then we shall be less surprised by what happens, and may

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285 "present circumstances"

286 There were not literally 77 cases tried at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague at the time of this book's writing. Official online records contain 13 cases initiated prior to 1916. Henry F. Munro, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Aug., 1917, p. 576, refers to "the fourteen Hague cases" as of the year of publication: "five involved financial claims, two were boundary disputes, three arose out of relations which western states maintain with communities of differing civilization, two were over seizure of neutral vessels in time of war, and one—the North Atlantic fisheries case—settled a diplomatic controversy extending over a century."

perhaps also enjoy the glimpses of international justice which in spite of everything is the achievement of the times. Not as if we were ever to loosen the demand for justice; to expand this spark to a brighter flame, that is a non-negotiable task; but we are perhaps to find the path not one of judging and condemning, but of first seeking to understand and later each in his city and state seek to contribute toward an increased sense of responsibility.

When President Kruger set foot on European soil as an exile, he was welcomed by a French newspaper with the words: “*pardon pour l’Europe*—forgive us that we under the power of our circumstances could not do what we wanted and should have!” Something of that feeling is appropriate at the sight of the state’s lives in our difficult times, and not only the condemnations of ignorance or perhaps the untested virtue. To understand is occasionally to forgive.

#### **V.4.2. On Individual Duty Toward the State**

I do not hide it from myself that these viewpoints entail a deep reevaluation of conventional values, which may seem widely indispensable. And it has occasionally appeared to me as if I were uttering dangerous secrets, as I here—in close or remote connection to other modern thinkers and observers—must reduce the state from the just state of the philosophers and a rational nature to one bound by selfishness, an entity fumbling under the necessities of life, of lesser rational development than that to which an individual may elevate himself. Without doubt it seems a more ideal and therefore worthwhile interpretation to see that untainted higher nature in the state. I have myself in younger years carried twigs for that sacrificial fire. It comes from a generally widespread faith in authority, which is equally strong whether the authority is a monarchic tradition or a parliamentary majority. And should it now too be a fiction, is it not in any case useful and necessary as such? Or how else to deduce an unconditional duty of loyalty to the state, if the the citizen in development of personality does not stand lower than the state?

It is clear that we cannot leave this last question unanswered. The answer needs fundamentally not reach further than the Forth Commandment. The question, as natural as it may seem, is tainted by the rationalism of the past century, which must in the name of progress be weathered out of our state-teaching and state practices. It does not know the life itself. It believes that conditions of life are determined exclusively by abstract factors, justice, and reason. Against this standpoint we place the imperative of the Fourth Commandment: “honor thy father and thy mother!” Why? Because they are higher personalities than you, more advanced in justice and reason? No, in order that it goes well for *you*. It is a law of its own nature; the individual subordinates himself when he obeys the state, which is the (relatively) conscious and rational form of the nation whereof he is a member. Here is not a question of measuring the one’s or the other’s reason, but of necessities of life.

The problem is therefore identical to that of the private life and is illuminated thereof. Only the one who demands higher perfection of his mother in order to appropriately honor her, only he shall in our state-teaching find reason for lesser respect toward his own state. If one once again realizes that a personal relationship more easily emerges with respect to another personality, for better or worse, than an abstract, let it be just and good, then one shall in our explanation of the state find greater support for increased trust between state and citizen. The state turns itself in a different manner than the individual, but not on a lower level, because the construction of the turning is moral and not juridical.

It is up to the state to cultivate this trust as its real carrying power, so that its authority does not become a straitjacket for the citizen, but feels to him as a natural air of life; thus necessity for him becomes freedom. But it is also up to the individual to restrain himself from self-harm, as belongs to every form of existence, and therefore facilitate the stable development of state to which his own welfare is fundamentally, insolubly bound.

## Conclusion

### On the Purpose of the State

From the study of the state's relationship to the various aspects of its own nature, the investigation has finally come to the state's relationship to distinct individuals who constitute the cells of his national body.

Is their welfare then his one and true *purpose*? This study meets us in different formulations from different time-turnings: to maximize the sum of the private happiness (Bacon), to create the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of individuals (Bentham). The natural law and the historical liberalism could of course not have any other answer to this ancient question, as they derived the state from the individuals alone. The answer is also historically explainable as a negation of the absolutism's police state, that which sensed no real responsibility at all for the individuals themselves nor any boundaries for the state's power at all. Thus the French revolution thought it sufficient to assert the individual rights within a strictly fixed sphere of liberty and designate for the state the position of a guard post around this sphere. From another direction, the reaction took another form, which placed the purpose of the state in the concern for the public order as such. Locke is the former and Kant the latter teaching's flagbearer in the world of public thinking. But whether the task was sought for in either the one or the other direction, guardian of freedom or guardian of order—in either case the answer is determined in relation to the individuals alone.

This fundamentally entails that the state is made into the servant of the individual. He becomes a corporation with no other task than advancement of interests. He exists for their sake. He has no purpose in himself<sup>287</sup>. This is the standpoint of the historical liberalism against which Hans Järta among us was such a bitter opponent in his time; and one is surely not mistaken if one understands it as the popular, more or less unreflected, but hardly doubted opinion.

Our organic interpretation proves thereby its higher truthfulness, that it returns to the state a task of its own. This becomes possible only to him who in the state sees a real personhood with its own life and not a mere conglomeration of individuals, according to the law of all organic existence that the whole is something other than the sum of its parts.<sup>288</sup> To take an external and clearly visible example: Germany is not merely the sum of its member-states, but something new, strong, and great that has emerged by their organic growth into each other<sup>289</sup>; therefore its aim can neither be the member-states' comfort, but that of the greater personhood. We have found the personality of the state in the nation. The state is no longer an abstract, he is insolubly bounded to a national individual, and as such has his nation to answer for. Therefore the purpose of the state is the welfare of the nation. He is a servant, but servant of the aims of his own personality. Here we see neither any limitation to freedom, nor security, nor right. The domain of the modern state corresponds to that of the national life. Limitation remains only against the individual, on that point where the individual has his own personal aim.

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287 *själfändamål*

288 "Das Volk ist von der Summe der Volksgenossen so weit verschieden als der Baum von der Summe seiner Blätter"

("The people is as different from the sum of its members as the tree is from the sum of its leaves"), Kurt Reizler. *Die Erforderlichkeit des Unmöglichen*, 1913, p. 202. (author)

289 *sammanväxning*

This is the answer to the question of the state's purpose and necessary task. It is shown once again how the nation is an integrating part of his nature; without this connection the answer ends at generic figures of speech in which it does not sink to the level of a supporter of individualism. But between state and individual there is fundamentally no competition. They run beside one another in history, as if each carried by her great moving powers. And he does not lower himself by making nationalism as a practical-political program too—in particular where the low degree of nationality calls for this—as this has now been shown as his only way of fulfilling the tribute that he owes to his own kin within the great family of humanity.

Our great answer shows once again the state as if disconnected from the free actions of the individual, and shall therefore not be satisfactory where one (as Jellinek) sees in the state primarily conscious human reason. But we believe that behind both state and humans there are elementary creative forces to which they are deeply subject. Before this sight, states appear less as leaders of their fates and more as being led along their paths by influences whose deepest source is located beyond their own consciousness; and our present demonstration has sought to shed some light over the type these influences.

One says that this is a materialistic interpretation. We sense this risk in a world which so easily confuses the witness with the culprit. Those who truly want to judge righteously will perhaps judge differently. They know that the materialist is never able to see the true extent of materialism in the presence. Truly sharp-sighted is therefore only he who in his heart feels sorrow thereabout. For him it is perhaps ultimately possible to distinguish a *power from above* within the game of the powers from below.

But it should neither be left out of sight that our analysis directly concerns a type of state which more than ever appears to be caught up in material concerns. It is the problems of the modern state that we primarily had in sight. Much like Fustel de Coulanges half a century ago sketched out “the state of the past” and found that its nature was the culture, so have we here sought to capture the picture and the nature of the state which in reality surrounds us. And then it shall hit us that its various manifestations ultimately unite in one and the same well-known tendency. This instinct for geographical individuality, nationality, autarky, and interest grouping—are they not all together only different forms of the *return to nature*, that is to say, connection to the life of instincts which Rousseau predicated for the individual! It is in the state-life's domain of personhood a process of materialization, which harmonizes well with the spirit in a time-turning of materialism. No less does it seem to respond to international politics which appear more than ever based on ideal motives. The comparison between the crusades of the medieval against Jerusalem and the last turn of the century's great power campaign against Peking may perhaps be seen as signifiers of this general development. The state which Coulanges (possibly with some exaggeration) found absorbed in cult and worship has therefore through the romance of the medieval hardened into a type absorbed by labor and economic concerns, without time for prayer and without desire to sacrifice. Is it not a natural growth from childhood, through youth, into hard and struggling manhood?

In the middle of this time of overflowing Martha-cares, we do not lose the hope for a state which shall have the opportunity to worry about more than the *panem et circenses* of the old, bread and circus, life maintenance and entertainments for the single individuals. Nations too ultimately do not live

off bread alone and much less off entertainments. Here goes the true dividing line between materialism and idealism: in the understanding of what ought to be, not in the understanding of what is. The materialist sees for the state much like for individual no other goal than *happiness*, to get to expand into his natural inclination and sail the wind currents of instinct, with the least possible risk and concern. The idealist knows of a responsibility for the course which is also for the forward course of the ship-of-state. And where should this course be directed? "That, one must sense," answers the button-molder to Peer Gynts question of the "Lord's purpose." It is the deepest duty of the statesman to sense the purpose of his state and direct the rudder accordingly. Then he must not give into hardships, hindrances, possibly great pains which meet him along the way. For one thing is certain: only by such a journey alone does his nation attain that which for peoples as well as individuals is more significant than happiness, the only thing that fundamentally pays back the price of the life, namely the *improvement of personality* to ever greater perfection. To *perfect the qualities of the people* becomes therefore the ultimate goal of the state—then it may follow its happiness as it wills, or more precisely: then comes the true happiness of its own accord.

This may be our last word in this investigation of the state as a lifeform. We have seen the contemporary state, by compelling reasons, hardly well-developed along such a path or even very conscious of such a task. But we believe in a higher type of state, which more clearly distinguishes and more surely walks toward a rational goal.



## Appendix

# Politics As Science

(From Göteborgs Aftonblad, 22<sup>nd</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of March 1901.)

Every glance at history demonstrates how states therein advance in looser or more fixed shapes, in growth or decline, though always as a sort of unitary being. This *character of personhood* stands out particularly when we observe the “powers” within our own time, where they “sit by the council table” and speak to each other, or go into the field and fight each other, always with their own wills, own calculations, own characteristics. The understanding of the states as a sort of personhoods has also entered the public imagination, where one not only speaks of England, the United States of America, and so on as acting wills, but has occasionally gone so far as to give them private names and outer image for the caricatured fantasy (the fat “John Bull,” the tall and slim “Uncle Sam,” and so on).

All real knowledge of the states must therefore from the beginning presuppose a certain personhood within them. They constitute at every given point in time a society of individuals; and the politician directs his investigative eye at them, much like the psychologist at the private individual and the zoologist at the animal. From empirical studies of the separate individuals he seeks to find general types (forms of states) and ultimately the state’s own historically given nature and the laws according to which it arises and develops.

Experiences from the study of the private human individual, which are more available for our observation, offer themselves as valuable starting points for this study. The private individual must be understood from three points of view: the *body* or the outward structure, the *soul* or the natural characteristics, the *spirit* or that of the rational nature, principles, self-consciousness. In a fairly similar analogy, the modern state stands out as a trinity of *society*, its body, external diversity of particular and spontaneous interests and needs; *nation*, its soul, the natural inclination of the people; and *state* in the specific sense, the spirit of the people, the rational organization.

This has not always been the case. Even now, there are state-organizations which have not attained the basis of a definite folk-personality: Austria is an example thereof, and shows likewise the power of the “nationality principle” which in our time reacts against such anachronisms. It becomes therefore an important task for modern politics to demonstrate how the states have more and more matured into full and complete personhoods, with all the primary determiners of personhood, ever since the first seeds in the social formations of the natural peoples.

From this point of view, politics in its broadest sense contains the entirety of history as far as one understands history as the science of the laws of the state-life’s development. History is, fundamentally, a state science<sup>290</sup>, but after the contemporary practical differentiation, history and politics will connect approximately as geology to geography. They cannot be without one another; history cannot avoid studying the results of its developmental laws, nor can politics look past the genesis of the existing conditions. But they are separated primarily by that politics are concerned with the past only to the extent that it serves him to understand the present, while history too looks at the

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290 *statsvetenskap*

contemporary conditions only from that point of view that they serve him as means to understand the development, movement itself.

If it then is the politician's special task to seek systematic clarity in the study of his time's state-community—wherewith he has every modern scientist's duty to evaluate the object of his study *genetically*—then this task collapses into three special tasks. Under the general politics falls therefore first *ethnography*, which studies the nations, the states' natural personhoods; thereon *sociology*, which studies societies, their concrete external shapes; lastly, *state justice*<sup>291</sup>, which treats the judicial organizations, laws, and administrative systems of the different states. This division offers itself most organically, as if emerging from the state's own nature. The question is merely whether state justice as a science covers the spiritual, conscious aspect of the state-life; for now, we may assume this for the sake of simplicity.

The scientific researcher of the state-life is therefore no longer satisfied with reading laws. He exerts himself in order to get to know the different societies which to a greater or lesser degree of harmony form their respective states' exterior sides in the practical world. And he studies also the various folk-individuals<sup>292</sup> who created these state-forms on the basis these social standpoints.

One merely needs to picture something small in the work-areas of all these disciplines in order to be astonished by the embrace of the political science even after its divorce from history. A limitation lies therein, though, that the interest of the politician encompasses only those peoples who have developed themselves into true states, and only those aspects of their social lives which directly characterize the state as an individual. Ethnography allows its special researchers vast grounds for the study of peoples, sociology similar great fields for economic and other questions which are not well-known to the politician. But some popular psychology and statistics must always remain within the domain of the politician. This is necessary for the primary task of the politician: to seek knowledge of the factually present states lying at hand. With legal study alone one does not get far here; it suffices to produce real knowledge of the practically acting state no more than the study of a human's principles leads to certain knowledge of herself.

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This becomes therefore our result in the area of politics: knowledge of the various state-societies in their external and internal organization against the background of their factual forelying social structures and their individual national characters.

Is the task herewith exhausted? One has long believed that. One has therewith committed the same mistake as when one sought understanding of the human by studying the human herself alone. As a personality in action, the human is to a certain degree subject to conditions outside of herself: influences of origin, of surroundings, in one word the *circumstances*. Without the study of these too, one will get nowhere in terms of achieving truly deep knowledge. It is one of our time's deepest discoveries that *to the understanding of the object belongs the understanding of its environment*.

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291 *statsrätten*

292 *folkindividerna*—may mean peoples as individuals, or individuals of the peoples.

One knows how feared this discovery was in the art world through Taine's<sup>293</sup> method. To understand an artist, one must look at his family, his teacher, his friends, his life-circumstances of all kinds. One can go far with this method; one can ultimately discern a spiritual creature as a product of circumstances alone. But no scientific sense nowadays can escape recognizing the justified within the method in itself and see the magnitudes of *deepened knowledge* which it opens when used with understanding.

This method has in the latter years made its entrance also into the science of politics, and Friedrich Ratzel is here the reformer. That he calls his creations "*anthropogeography*" and "*political geography*" makes no difference; it is the knowledge of the state that he deepens by investigating the different *relations between the state and its "ground,"*<sup>294</sup> the country.

In its country and its territorial form, the state-individual has his once and for all given frame. Therein rests to a certain degree all of its evolutionary potential. The state cannot exceed it. The frame may be widened by "expansion," fractured through external pressure, and so on; but in every distinct moment, it constitutes the natural law of the state, which limits its free will in history.

Understanding of the states nowadays must, therefore, following Ratzel's schema, be expanded into the understanding of the relations between their borders, general morphological circumstances, position, space, and shape: in one word, their environment. One has long collected these relations in statistics as a loose appendix to the law of the state. Only now has one opened one's eyes for the deep organic connection which must make this *natural aspect of the state* one of the central chapters of the political science of the future.

All sciences in our time strive to materialize themselves, fix deeper roots in the factual reality. Politics has not gone untouched by this tendency. This shows itself for its part in a desire to clarify the roots which the human state-formation has in Mother Earth herself—next to a desire to demonstrate the states' economic basis within the societies themselves.

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We summarize first the results of our foregoing implications concerning politics as a science.

Politics seek systematic knowledge of the empirically given states, or the organized peoples. For this purpose, it sees through these folk-personalities from the same viewpoints which offer themselves for the study of the private individual: not only those of the rational principles (most closely expressed in the judicial organization, objects for the special discipline of *state justice*), but also the outer social circumstances and social needs (political statistics or *sociopolitics*), the properties of the national character and soul (popular psychology or *ethnopolitics*), that of the preceding development (parts of *history*), and of the surrounding geographical environment (*geopolitics*). Therefore, it has as closest neighbors among the sciences: *law*, which studies the nature and forms of justice; *sociology*, which studies the specific phases of the social life beyond the judicial organizations too; *ethnography*, which strives for a natural classification of the human race's different species irrespective of their state-forming work; *history*, which traces the laws for the development of the general life itself; and

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293 Hippolyte Taine, 1828-1893, French historian and art critic.

294 "mark"

*geography*, which keeps to the ground surface as such, whether human has erected cultural structures thereupon or not.

As one sees, politics has many distinguished neighbors, partially with gleaming origins; and it is entirely natural that it has had some difficulty finding an independent place where it could stand on its own legs in the circle of the others. Yes, it may have happened that one has entirely treated it as a moocher, living only on the crumbs of the surrounding sciences' rich tables. But all such difficulties and mistakes vanish immediately as soon as one looks upon the object of politics. If the state is an independent fact in the history of humanity, then so must its science be an independent discipline; and if the science is not that yet, then it shall become such. One merely needs to look at the states as empirical facts, and one shall find politics entitled to its own place in the company of the sciences just as naturally as, for example, zoology.

Another pair of perspectives follow from this manner of viewing things, which may be added to the previously suggested ones. The state as an empirical fact is not a mere judicial organization, a law, and an administrative system, not even if this organization is seen against the background of its permanent society, its nationality, and its territory. He is not finished, he is not passively standing. He does not belong to the inorganic nature. He is a *life* that moves, works, acts inwards and outwards. He works constantly to develop his organization. He exercises daily activity within the frame of this organization. He strives tirelessly to realize the evolutionary potential offered by the heritage of the people and the geographical environment and to overcome the limitations which stem from the same factors. He comes hereby into unavoidable contact with other state-entities, in trade and violence, in good and evil. He is, much like the private individual, locked in a struggle for existence which absorbs a great part of his powers and effects an unavoidable, stronger or weaker, friction against the surroundings.

The theorizing Germans (for example, Bluntschli) speak of politics in a special sense, distinct from state justice. State justice, they say, treats the state as such, tests the justifiability of the institutions and looks primarily at the law; politics treat the state in its actions, tests the purposefulness of the forms, and looks primarily at the method of governance. What we have wanted to indicate is implied by this latter definition.

Thereof follow as corollaries new areas for the work of the modern political science. We are satisfied with giving two here: the *parliamentary* (and overall domestic) *politics*, which embraces all of the actual drifts to improved organization within the states, and the *international politics*, which clarify the contemporary states' domestic relations and commonalities, and also gives the points of the hardest friction between them.

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One arrives therefore by speculation of the state's own nature to the discovery of one great area after another for an independent political science, which needs not hold either history or law or any other science by the kirtles.